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1. Chapter 1: Introduction to JCOERE Report 1   
1.1 Introduction 
Globalisation has seen the rise of the multi-national corporation. Now business can be done between 
companies separated by vast distances, crossing many jurisdictions. This is accompanied by an 
inevitable complication of modern-day business laws, particularly when these complex, interwoven 
business connections are met by financial difficulties or the insolvency of one or more of the companies 
involved. As the European Union continues to integrate further while containing different jurisdictions, 
these issues are both more complex and more demanding in a European setting. It is therefore vital that 
there is an effective and efficient means of resolving cross-border insolvencies in Europe. Similarly it 
is important to include a legal framework which aims to facilitate the restructuring of viable companies 
in order to protect the European economy.1 It is not surprising, then, that in the last two decades or so 
we have seen the emergence of considerable discussion around the methodology of co-operation and in 
turn the development of rules and guidelines aimed at facilitating the effective co-ordination of cross-
border insolvency procedures. Similarly, more recently we have seen the emergence of a pan European 
debate on corporate rescue.  The JCOERE project is concerned with cross-border co-operation between 
courts and practitioners in insolvency, with particular emphasis on rescue processes. 
While elsewhere courts devise protocols for co-operation on a case by case basis, the EU undertook to 
create a harmonised framework within which court-to-court co-operation could occur. The European 
Insolvency Regulation (Recast)2 sets out rules that streamline the management of cross-border 
insolvency law cases and contains a direct obligation for courts to co-operate with both insolvency 
practitioners and with other courts with a view to maximising the efficiency of insolvency procedures. 
In addition, there is an obligation on insolvency practitioners to co-operate with each other and with 
courts in other jurisdictions.3 The new emphasis on rescue has introduced another complex dimension 
into this already challenging context.  
Insolvency and corporate rescue (or recovery) has recently been the subject matter of focussed policy 
debate in the European Union, driven by a number of economic and related policy concerns that are 
described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Report. There are two strands to the European approach examined 
by the JCOERE Project, the first concerning the growing demand for harmonisation of various legal 
principles surrounding corporate rescue and the second placing the new rescue imperative into the 
context of cross-border co-operation in insolvency law generally. Given the range of legal areas upon 
which insolvency law touches, and differences in the underlying principles and purposes of rescue, it 
will be difficult to achieve EU wide harmonisation. As will be seen in the debates described in Chapter 
4, and in the subsequent Chapters 6-8 on substantive principles, various Member States are starting from 
very different points, both in terms of law and underlying theory. For example, some jurisdictions favour 
a more traditional creditor wealth maximisation model, whilst on the other hand, in other jurisdictions 
rescue is viewed as a valuable means of preserving jobs and protecting local communities. The new 
Preventive Restructuring Directive4 (the “PRD”) is an attempt to harmonise approaches to preventive 
restructuring frameworks in EU jurisdictions and to introduce such measures in jurisdictions that do not 
yet have them. However, as will be discussed in this Report, and in particular in Chapter 5, which 
 
1 This sentiment was echoed in a presentation during the INSOL Europe Annual Congress held in Copenhagen in September 2019 by a 
representative from the International Monetary Fund, Natalia Stetsenko, who said that Preventive Restructuring Frameworks (PRF) are needed 
for real economic growth and financial sector health. Further, the IMF recommends/prefers early/timely debt restructuring with hybrid 
mechanisms having minimum court involvement. 
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) OJ L 141/19 
(the “EIR Recast”).  
3 ibid. Articles 42-44 and 56.-57. See further infra n. 24. 
4 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the “PRD”).  
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describes the evolution of the PRD, the scope of derogation and lack of obligatory provisions are 
unlikely to achieve close harmonisation. Yet the EU must continue with attempts to provide preventive 
solutions to complex business networks throughout Europe. The continued integration of the single 
market means that there must be some harmonisation at the end stages of a business entity. 
This JCOERE Report 1 identifies substantive and procedural rules in preventive restructuring 
frameworks (either those which have already been introduced in some European jurisdictions at this 
point, or in the PRD) which may present challenges to a harmonised approach to implementation and 
consequently to cross border co-operation. The JCOERE Report 2 will continue to develop the enquiry 
regarding courts, judicial and administrative authorities, and procedural rules and consider how these 
factors may affect court-to-court co-operation generally, while also benchmarking the utilisation and 
awareness of best practice guidelines for court-to-court co-operation in preventive restructuring. As the 
research has continued, the importance of explaining some of these challenges by reference to legal 
culture has become clear. This will be addressed in our second Report. 
1.2 The Preventive Restructuring Directive (PRD): Benchmarks from other jurisdictions. 
The PRD introduces a number of concepts that are new to many Member States.5 Anecdotal evidence 
points to the influence of Chapter 116 and the UK Scheme of Arrangement7 in the drafting of the PRD, 
although neither process is mentioned in the negotiation or in any of the official documentation 
associated with the PRD. There is an additional European procedure that already closely aligns with the 
PRD, with the exception of the emphasis which we see in the PRD, on reduced court formality. The 
Irish Examinership procedure is a preventive restructuring (and insolvency) procedure that has existed 
since 1990. It was modelled on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, much like the PRD, but without 
the extensive compromises that accompanied the final version of the PRD.8 The procedure contains 
most of the features included in the PRD and adopts a robust approach to rescue. It is also included in 
Annex A of the EIR Recast so the co-operation obligations apply. 
The provisions in the PRD emulate the US Chapter 11 to some extent, but there are stark differences 
between the provisions of the PRD and the English Scheme of Arrangement, despite anecdotal evidence 
that the Scheme was an influence in the drafting process of the PRD. Notably, the Scheme does not 
provide for a cross-class cram-down.9 The Scheme also does not provide for a moratorium on 
enforcement actions. In addition, the Scheme is not considered an insolvency procedure deriving as it 
does from UK Company Law and is therefore not included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. This fact also 
raises the question as to whether other new preventive restructuring procedures will actually find their 
way into Annex A, or if they will emulate the UK approach, keeping out of Annex A and avoiding the 
restrictive Centre of Main Interest (COMI) test attached to recognition under the EIR Recast.10 If a 
procedure does not sit within Annex A, then the issue of judicial co-operation under the EIR Recast also 
becomes a moot point, following instead the rules under Brussels I or private international laws of 
recognition and enforcement.11  
 
5 A full discussion of the commentary and context of specific provisions of the PRD is contained in Chapter 4 while a detailed exposition of 
the PRD and its evolution is contained in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
6 United States Code, Chapter 11, Title 11 (the “Bankruptcy Code”). 
7 UK Companies Act 2006, part 26. Irish legislation also includes a Scheme of Arrangement process which is very similar to the UK process. 
This is included in Part 9 of the Companies Act 2014. See further I Lynch Fannon and G N Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (2nd 
edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) Chapter 14. 
8 Examinership was part of a series of measures aimed to update and modernise the entire landscape of company law in Ireland in the 1990s. 
This seems to have been part of an increasingly successful strategy to attract foreign direct investment instituted by successive Irish 
governments. Although Ireland is a committed member of the EU in terms of legal policy, particularly as regards financial and commercial 
law and practice, Ireland has always posed the question internally of itself as to whether it is closer to “Boston or Berlin” Jim Dunne, ‘Boston 
or Berlin?’ (The Irish Times Jun 23 2001) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/boston-or-berlin-1.314552> accessed 4th October 2019. 
9 While the Scheme does not provide for a statutory cross-class cram-down, a similar outcome is achieved in practice as noted by Riz Mokal 
at the INSOL Europe Annual Congress in Copenhagen in September 2019, in the Scheme of Arrangement the debtor chooses not to propose 
the inclusion of other creditors which accomplishes the same thing as a cross-class cram-down. 
10 This idea was floated during a presentation by Walter Nijnens at the Inaugural YANIL Conference at 10 Years in Copenhagen on 24th. 
September 2019, noting that in order to sit in Annex A, procedures must satisfy a number of conditions, which the PRD does not necessarily 
require of any newly introduced preventive restructuring frameworks. See further Recital 16 of the EIR Recast 848/2015. 
11 Or possibly not assisted by either legal framework in terms of enforcement. See the CJEU German Graphic case “it is conceivable that … 
there are some judgments which will not come within the scope of application” of either regime. Case C-292/09 German Graphics Graphische 
Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2010:7. See further English decisions considering the interplay between the EIR 
Recast 848/2015 and the EU Judgements Regulation Council Regulation 44/2001 Re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch) 
44 and Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch).  
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The substantive and procedural issues envisaged as possible obstacles to co-operation in cross-border 
preventive restructuring may be complex and raise issues fundamental to insolvency law including 
principles of fairness and the justifications for collective action.  However, there is already a wealth of 
case law emanating from globally significant jurisdictions such as some states in the US, the UK and 
Singapore that could help to identify solutions. In addition, in taking a critical position regarding 
preventive restructuring and the complexities inherent in such systems again, the US, and the UK are 
important jurisdictions.12 Ireland should be added as a jurisdiction which might provide assistance 
regarding this latter issue being an EU and EUROZONE jurisdiction that has been doing preventive 
restructuring with its examinership procedure for 30 years. With three decades to work out the problems, 
engage in incremental reform, and decide cases that fill in the grey areas, Ireland presents a useful case 
study for other EU Member States engaging in the drafting of their own preventive restructuring 
frameworks subsequent to the passing of the PRD. It is from this benchmark that the JCOERE project 
examines the potential for preventive restructuring frameworks to create difficulties for court-to-court 
co-operation under the EIR Recast. 
1.3 JCOERE Project Summary 
As stated, the JCOERE Project, funded by the European Commission’s DG Justice Programme (2014-
2020),13 addresses two aspects of the EU’s strategy regarding corporate rescue and market integration. 
The Commission’s strategy is described in the Recommendation setting out A New Approach to 
Business Failure.14  Subsequently, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal15 for the 
PRD describes its key policy objective as reducing the “most significant barriers to the free flow of 
capital stemming from differences in Member States' restructuring and insolvency frameworks.” 16 It 
aims to facilitate Member States putting in place key principles that underpin effective preventive 
restructuring. Further policy objectives leading to the preventive restructuring frameworks 
recommended by the Proposal were intended to:  
“help increase investment and job opportunities in the single market, reduce unnecessary 
liquidations of viable companies, avoid unnecessary job losses, prevent the build-up of non-
performing loans, facilitate cross-border restructurings, and reduce costs and increase 
opportunities for honest entrepreneurs to be given a fresh start.”17 
While the PRD has been through several iterations and compromises to arrive at the final version passed 
in June 2019,18 these policy objectives remained central to its drafting. The Commission repeated its 
explicit concern with regard to the impact on capital markets that inefficient, unharmonized 
restructuring might have, including the impact on the prevalence of non-performing loans: 
“Preventive restructuring frameworks should also prevent the build-up of non-performing loans. 
The availability of effective preventive restructuring frameworks would ensure that action is 
taken before enterprises default on their loans, thereby helping to reduce the risk of loans 
becoming non-performing in cyclical downturns and mitigating the adverse impact on the 
financial sector.”19 
Further, the Commission stated that: 
“The differences among Member States in procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt lead to uneven conditions for access to credit and to uneven recovery rates in 
the Member States. A higher degree of harmonisation in the field of restructuring, insolvency, 
discharge of debt and disqualifications is thus indispensable for a well-functioning internal 
 
12  There are a number of other significant differences between the widely used Scheme and the framework proposed in the PRD, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 7. 
13 Project No. 800807/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017. The content of this document represents the views of the authors only and is their sole 
responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 
14 Commission Recommendation C (2014) 1500 final of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency [2014] OJ 
L74/65 (the “Recommendation”). 
15 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016) 723 final of 22 November 2016 on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and 
amending Directive 2012/30/EU  [2016] 2016/0359 (COD) (the “Proposal”) including the Explanatory Memorandum.  
16 idem, Explanatory Memorandum 5-6.  
17 ibid.  
18 See further Chapters 4 and 5. 
19 PRD, extract from recital 2. 
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market in general and for a working Capital Markets Union in particular, as well as for the 
resilience of European economies, including for the preservation and creation of jobs.”20 
The interface between the co-operation obligations imposed on courts and judges in the Recast 
Regulation and the envisaged preventive restructuring procedures in the Directive highlight the 
challenges that an effective cross-border modern insolvency system will face.21 There have been 
dramatic changes over the last few decades, more so than in many other fields of law, which is 
particularly significant given the centuries during which the only focus of insolvency reform had been 
on refining liquidation mechanisms. In recent decades, insolvency law has evolved from maximising 
liquidation outcomes to developing alternative solutions of rescuing the debtor.22 Rescue frameworks 
as they have operated in Member States, such as Ireland and the UK, can, however, conflict with 
traditional insolvency law principles such as equality of treatment of creditors, transparency, and 
predictability.23  The academic debate outlined in Chapter 4 illustrates the depth of theoretical 
differences regarding restructuring which exists in the European Union. This is undoubtedly reflected 
in legal systems.  
As described in the Introductory section, the Project will produce two Reports, JCOERE 1 and JCOERE 
2. This Report is the first of these (reflecting the goals of Workpackage 2 of the Project) and will 
accordingly concentrate on the nature of substantive and procedural obstacles to co-operation24 that may 
be raised by rules applicable to complex preventive restructuring or rescue regimes as envisaged by the 
PRD. The enquiry includes an interrogation of pre-existing systems such as the Irish Examinership25 
process, the French sauvegarde, and the Spanish and Austrian reorganisation and restructuring 
procedures, as well as the approaches of other jurisdictions included in the Project Consortium, which 
include Italy and Romania. The UK is also considered as a benchmarking exercise given its popularity 
as a restructuring destination and the anecdotal evidence of its influence on the drafting of the PRD. 
Other jurisdictions were included as it became apparent that they were important, either because the 
jurisdiction quickly introduced a process in response to the discussions surrounding the PRD (for 
example the Netherlands) or at the other end of the spectrum seem reluctant to depart from traditional 
insolvency principles and approaches (for example Germany). The Project was in a position to include 
additional countries from Eastern Europe in particular Poland and from Scandinavia (Denmark). These 
are all considered in Chapters 6-8. 
Obstacles to co-operation in this context are derived from the potential effects of the envisaged approval 
processes within the PRD. These include the introduction of the ‘cram-down’ provisions described in 
the PRD, whereby creditors dissenting to a restructuring plan can be forced to comply with it have 
become a focus of dissenting views. Financing rules are also problematic26 as are approval processes 
generally. The PRD also introduces two tests of fairness; the best interests of creditors test and the 
concept of “unfair prejudice.” Again, these are a focus of debate at present. Many insolvency codes 
 
20 PRD, recital 8.  
21 Jan Adriannse, ‘The Uneasy Case for Bankruptcy Legislation and Business Rescue’ in Michael Veder and Paul Omar (eds), Teaching and 
Research in International Insolvency Law: Challenges and Opportunities (INSOL 2015); Vanessa Finch, ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law’ 
(2005) 68 MLR 713. 
22 Christoph Paulus, Stathis Potamitis, Alexandros Rokas, and Ignacio Tirado, ‘Insolvency Law as a Main Pillar of the Market Economy – A 
Critical Assessment of the Greek Insolvency Law’ (2015) 24(1) IIR 1.  
23 Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard N Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Bloomsbury 2012) Chapter 1. 
24 Relevant obligations included in Articles 42-44 and 56 and 57 of the Regulation. Note the language is mandatory. Article 42 states that the 
court “shall co-operate” … “to the extent that such co-operation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings.” It 
also details the form of co-operation: 
“For that purpose, the courts may, where appropriate, appoint an independent person or body acting on its instructions, provided that it is 
not incompatible with the rules applicable to them.  
2. In implementing the co-operation set out in paragraph 1, the courts, or any appointed person or body acting on their behalf, as 
referred to in paragraph 1, may communicate directly with, or request information or assistance directly from, each other provided 
that such communication respects the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.  
3. The co-operation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers appropriate. It may, in 
particular, concern: (a) coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any 
means considered appropriate by the court; (c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; 
(d) coordination of the conduct of hearings; (e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary.” 
Article 43 applies the same obligation to insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts “to the extent that such co-operation and 
communication are not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings and do not entail any conflict of interest”. Similarly, 
Article 56 applies the same set of obligations in a group context to insolvency practitioners and Article 57 applies a similar obligation to courts 
in a group context. 
25 Irish Companies Act 2014, part 10 “Examinerships”. 
26 Re Atlantic Magnetics Ltd [1993] 2 IR 561; Re Holidair [1994] 1 IR 416.  
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require the courts to consider principles of equality between creditors and it is difficult to see how co-
operation could continue when there are differences in cross-border creditor treatment, particularly 
when all creditors regardless of jurisdiction are included in a single proceeding under a foreign 
preventive restructuring framework. In the absence of a secondary proceeding convened to protect 
domestic interests, creditors subject to a foreign proceeding may find their rights treated less favourably 
then they might have been in a domestic proceeding. This is mitigated to some extent in some 
jurisdictions where a more robust application of the unfair prejudice test allows for the exclusion of 
creditors who are considered to be “out-of-the-money” in any event.27  
JCOERE Report II is due under Workpackage 3 of the Project. This will be more focussed on the courts, 
and judicial and administrative authorities, charged with approving and implementing restructuring 
plans. The second Report will also consider the application of best practices for co-operation cross-
border insolvency cases; judicial awareness of existing obligations and guidelines and judicial practise 
in this area. Workpackage 4 of the JCOERE Project will proactively engage with the judiciary across 
Europe through INSOL Europe as well as additional networks to raise awareness and inform experience 
of best practice in this area.  
1.4 Methodology of the JCOERE Project  
The JCOERE Project relies heavily on the comparative law method, focussing on the functional 
equivalencies between the provisions of the PRD as compared to similar provisions among the Member 
States. A detailed discussion of the methodology employed for the analysis of the project’s findings will 
be set out in Chapter 6 while a brief overview of the approach for the research associated with Report 1 
will be set out here.  
As adumbrated above, the chosen jurisdictions include Ireland (as an apparent leader in the European 
field in terms of restructuring frameworks), the UK (due to its success as a jurisdiction in relation to 
restructuring practise) as common law countries and a range of civil law jurisdictions. It is likely that 
the common law experience contrasted with the differences in civil law countries will be more 
significant as we move on to Report 2 (Workpackage 3). Denmark was added as a Scandinavian 
counterpart with the interesting characteristic of not being bound by the EIR Recast. Poland was added 
as a significant Eastern European economy (with a continued focus also on judicial practise). Finally, 
Austria was included because it has become apparent that the frequency of cross-border issues arising 
in that jurisdiction seems to be high (unsurprising perhaps given its central European location).  
In terms of practical methodology JCOERE has benefitted enormously from its inclusion of INSOL 
Europe as a member of the Consortium. INSOL Europe has provided a platform through which the 
project has collaborated with contributors and engaged with turnaround professionals, practising 
lawyers, and members of the judiciary. 
The research employs multiple methodologies common to the discipline of legal doctrine, in addition 
to the comparative law method. The discussion, comparison, and interpretation of academic and legal 
texts are the main research objects for the contextual chapters of this Report, which provide 
underpinning commentary and criticism around the topic of preventive restructuring. This approach also 
underpins the later qualitative research undertaken, which provides the material for the comparative 
analysis. The various interpretations of texts and concepts will be considered and analysed with a view 
to identifying functional equivalencies by questioning perceived similarities and differences of specific 
provisions within preventive restructuring frameworks.28  
The JCOERE project has also undertaken qualitative research for Report 1 through questionnaires 
answered by practitioners and academics specialising in insolvency and restructuring among the 11 
aforementioned different EU jurisdictions. These questionnaires investigated each of the contributing 
jurisdictions’ current preventive restructuring frameworks, practices, and underlying principles in light 
of the PRD. Due to the nature of this it was found that multiple interactions with the jurisdictional 
contributors were necessary. Both the interpretations of the questionnaire questions and different 
 
27 Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘Examinership: Approval of Schemes — Re SIAC Construction Ltd and in the Matter of the Companies (Amendment) 
Act 1990 (as Amended)’ (2015) 1 Commercial Law Practitioner; see also Irene Lynch Fannon and Thomas B Courtney (eds), Bloomsbury 
Professional’s Guide to the Companies Act 2014 (Bloomsbury 2015).  
28 Mark van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2011) 4.   
 17 
 
approaches to responding to those questions made it difficult to create a report that fully aligned the 
content of each jurisdiction so that the level of detail and depth were commensurate. In addition to 
providing their initial responses to the questionnaire, jurisdictional contributors were also asked to 
engage in a reflective comparative process. This included requests to respond to additional queries to 
add clarity or depth in light of other responses and a request to review the team’s interpretation of the 
answers when written into the Chapters of the Report. The contributors were also asked for a final 
review of content accuracy of Chapters 6-8 that pertained to the questionnaire along with any final 
queries.  
The questionnaires were divided into three parts, the analysis of which are set out in three later Chapters 
of this Report (6, 7, and 8). The first part of the questionnaire gives a general background to preventive 
restructuring in the jurisdictions. The second, and most technical part of the questionnaire, focussed on 
substantive rules, in particular those that could be perceived as controversial in some way, for example, 
those which create conflicts or undermine legal rights. Contributors were asked to explain what was 
already present in their national laws in terms of each specified provision and what, if any, changes their 
jurisdiction would need to make to comply with the PRD. These provisions are described with reference 
to the corresponding articles in the following section on the structure of the Report and the description 
of the content of Chapters 6, and 7. The third part of the questionnaire then focussed on procedural 
matters, such as the emphasis on the debtor in possession model and the relative involvement and control 
of insolvency practitioners;  the conflict between the guarantee of the protection of rights in rem under 
the EIR Recast and possible interference in preventive restructuring frameworks. These matters will be 
discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report along with the response to an additional question concerning 
thresholds of insolvency. This third part of the questionnaire also interrogated the role of judicial or 
administrative authorities; constitutional limits on judicial co-operation; examples of judicial co-
operation; and training and competency requirements, but these responses will form a part of JCOERE 
Report 2 as they deal with procedural obstacles that could interfere with court-to-court co-operation.  
The responses to the questionnaires provide the material for a comparative analysis, which will help to 
establish issues of failed or successful harmonisation under the PRD as well as identifying discrepancies 
in definition and perception of similar concepts by establishing functional equivalencies.29 The 
divergence in understanding and application among the Member States may provide a field of issues 
upon which the obligation to co-operate can be lost or impeded.   
1.5 Structure of the Report  
This first Report of the JCOERE Project examines the aforementioned substantive and procedural issues 
through a narrative that includes academic commentary to contextualise the substantive discussions. As 
described it includes a synthesis of answers to a questionnaire and an exposition of the PRD itself. This 
Report is comprised of 9 Chapters.  
This first Chapter has offered a brief introduction to the JCOERE Project highlighting the principle 
questions and concepts. The second Chapter will give a presentation of certain terms relating to 
preventive restructuring frameworks encountered by the project, which carry different meanings in 
different jurisdictions. Given the difficulty of aligning difficult concepts across cultural and language 
lines, it is hoped that this Chapter on Terminology will add to the insights generated by the Report. The 
third Chapter will then give an introduction to the European Insolvency Regulation and its Recast, 
focusing on how it will work in relation to preventive restructuring frameworks as well as introducing 
and describing the court-to-court co-operation obligations.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the development of preventive restructuring globally and will introduce key 
concepts along with criticism and commentary rooted in the robust theoretical debate surrounding them. 
The fifth Chapter then offers an exposition of the evolution of the PRD from the first attempt at EU 
legislation in this area in a Communication of 2011.  
The sixth, seventh and eighth Chapters focus on an analysis of the questionnaire responses from the 
contributor jurisdictions, focussing on the key provisions identified in the PRD and described above 
 
29 See for example Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (trans Tony Weir, 3rd edn, OUP 1998).  
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with a view to identifying true functional equivalence in the similarities and differences exposed by the 
analysis.  
Chapter 6 will discuss the responses given to part 1 of the questionnaire with an analysis of the general 
context of preventive restructuring in the contributing jurisdictions. Chapter 7 will then examine the 
responses discussing substantive preventive restructuring provisions in the context of those specified 
provisions set out in the PRD:  
• Article 6 – Stay of Individual Enforcement Actions; 
• Article 9 – Adoption of Restructuring Plans;  
• Article 10 – Confirmation of Restructuring Plans; 
• Article 11 – Cross-class Cram-down; 
• Article 13 – Workers; and 
• Article 17 – Protection of New Financing and Interim Financing. 
Chapter 8 will then examine the responses to the first half part three of the questionnaire, which deals 
with specific procedural aspects of preventive restructuring in domestic process and in the PRD. The 
topics covered here include: 
• Thresholds of insolvency; 
• The involvement of insolvency practitioners in restructurings (Article 5 – Debtor in Possession); 
and 
• Rights in rem. 
The final Chapter will reflect on the findings of the normative, doctrinal, and comparative research 
along with findings through discussions and workshops with professionals and judges at various events.  
1.6 Transition Chapter 2: Terminology 
Chapter 2 of this Report will set out commonly used terms (in English) but will also explore some of 
the discrepancies in the meaning of some terms that are used by several jurisdictions, but at times have 
slightly (or in some cases) significantly different meanings. The starting point for most of the terms in 
the next Chapter will be how they are defined in European law, mainly under the PRD and the EIR 
Recast. The purpose of this Chapter is to try to dispel some of the confusion about commonly used, but 
sometimes differently understood, insolvency, rescue, and (preventive) restructuring terms. 
 The content of this document is the sole property of the beneficiaries of the JCOERE Consortium.  
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2. Chapter 2: Preventive Restructuring Terminology 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 
This Chapter is an amalgamation of the JCOERE Team’s experience with interpreting, analysing, and 
synthesising different jurisdictions’ perception of what are quite similar concepts. The necessity of this 
Chapter became apparent when different understandings of the same or similar terms arose during the 
analysis of the contributor responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire. These differences go beyond 
simple differences of language. Often, the same term has subtle differences - and occasionally 
significant differences – in meaning across the contributing Member States, which can cause confusion 
and conflict when trying to communicate in a comparative context. Moreover, in a practical cross-
border restructuring case we would expect these problems to be exacerbated. Better understanding of 
these nuances can only help to encourage and facilitate more wide-spread understanding and co-
ordination of procedures, communication between practitioners, and increased efficiency within 
procedures. Rather than being a comprehensive legal glossary, this Chapter is designed to provide the 
reader with some context to the Report, with specific reference to preventive restructuring. 
2.2 Rescue (Corporate and Business), Rehabilitation, Reorganisation, Restructuring, and 
Preventive Restructuring 
 Corporate Rescue  
A broad understanding of corporate rescue processes includes “statutory corporate insolvency 
procedures that offer an alternative to liquidation procedures.”1 
Corporate rescue is generally understood as referring to the rescue of a corporate entity in its entirety 
although “a major intervention …[is]...necessary to avert the eventual failure of the company.”2 In all 
cases it is typical that the company retains the same corporate personality, but both the debt and equity 
structures of the company will be reorganised. Even though it is common to see some continued 
ownership of the underlying business entity, equity structures will change in many restructurings. 3    
 Business Rescue 
Business rescue refers to a situation where one or more businesses of the company or corporation (as 
a separate economic entity) is saved, often by selling it to a new corporate owner through an asset sale, 
thus changing the ownership of the business. This term is sometimes also used to refer to the rescue of 
the corporate entity, which has been known to cause confusion. This Report distinguishes between the 
rescue of the corporate entity and the rescue of the underlying business entity. 
 Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of procedures aiming to rescue the corporate 
entity or the business or businesses of that entity in order to preserve the economic benefits of an 
ongoing concern, including the preservation of employment. The concept is derived in part from a 
communitarian vision of insolvency law that places an emphasis on encouraging the survival of viable 
independent economic entities to the benefit of a variety of stakeholders.4 
 Reorganisation  
 
1 Rebecca Parry, ‘Introduction’ in Katarzyna Gromek Broc and Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from 
Selected Countries in Europe (Kluwer Law International 2004) 1-17, 2.  
2 A Belcher, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 12.  
3 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (CUP 2017) 197. 
4 idem 35-36. 
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A reorganisation is a process designed to revive a financially or economically troubled or insolvent 
firm by means of financial measures, which are often tied to operational changes at the same time. The 
CODIRE Report5 helpfully separated these measures into those aimed at dealing with assets as opposed 
to those aimed at dealing with liabilities.  
i. Operational reorganisation will often include reorganisational measures on the asset side 
of a company which can include the sale of a business. The business may then be owned 
by an entirely new set of investors. Such a transaction, while similar to liquidation, is 
undertaken to preserve value that would otherwise be lost in a liquidation.6 An asset 
focussed reorganisation may also include the sale of non-strategic assets and changes in 
the workforce. Changes in the workforce are often also referred to as an operational 
reorganisation. 
ii. A financial reorganisation tends to deal with the liabilities of a company in which financial 
terms of credit exposures might be amended to create a less onerous situation for the debtor; 
including a possible change in interest rate; postponement of debt; debt write-downs; the 
treatment of loan covenants; new contributions from shareholders or third parties; and debt-
for-equity swaps.7 The latter will naturally lead to changes in the original ownership of the 
corporate entity as indicated in 2.2.a above as the ownership of the company shares will 
change hands. 
A reorganisation will often include measures that deal with both financial and operational problems in 
a combination of the measures set out above.  
 Restructuring 
In the PRD: 
“Restructuring should enable debtors in financial difficulties to continue business, in whole or in 
part, by changing the composition, conditions or structure of their assets and their liabilities or 
any other part of their capital structure — including by sales of assets or parts of the business or, 
where so provided under national law, the business as a whole — as well as by carrying out 
operational changes.”8  
Article 2(1) states:  
“‘restructuring’ means measures aimed at restructuring the debtor's business that include 
changing the composition, conditions or structure of a debtor's assets and liabilities or any other 
part of the debtor's capital structure, such as sales of assets or parts of the business and, where so 
provided under national law, the sale of the business as a going concern, as well as any necessary 
operational changes, or a combination of those elements.” 
 Preventive Restructuring 
In the PRD:  
“Preventive restructuring frameworks should, above all, enable debtors to restructure effectively 
at an early stage and to avoid insolvency, thus limiting the unnecessary liquidation of viable 
enterprises. Those frameworks should help to prevent job losses and the loss of know-how and 
skills, and maximise the total value to creditors — in comparison to what they would receive in 
the event of the liquidation of the enterprise's assets or in the event of the next-best-alternative 
scenario in the absence of a plan — as well as to owners and the economy as a whole.”9 
2.3 Pre-insolvency 
Pre-insolvency refers to the financial circumstances of a company that are definitionally prior to a 
Member State’s threshold of insolvency, often predicated on the balance sheet or cash flow tests. The 
 
5 L Stanghellini, et al., Best Practices in European Restructuring: Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow of the Law (Wolters 
Kluwer 2018). See also <https://www.codire.eu/> 
6 idem.53-54. 
7 idem 56-59. 
8 PRD, recital 2.  
9 ibid.  
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PRD relies on a “likelihood of insolvency” but leaves the definition of this to the Member States. The 
term is not mentioned in the PRD or in the Recommendation, but is mentioned three times in the 
Proposal for a Preventive Restructuring Directive, in which it is stated that “pre-insolvency procedures 
must be available at the earliest where there is a likelihood of insolvency, …[and]…procedures must 
include all or a significant part of a debtor's creditors and must be public.” 10 In France, for example, pre-
insolvency is prior to cessation of paiements, which is the inability of a company to meet its liabilities 
with the available assets.11 The JCOERE Project adopts a technical interpretation of pre-insolvency 
processes that refers to all situations where no additional or alternative formal insolvency process has 
commenced. 
2.4 Homologation 
Homologation refers to judicial confirmation of a restructuring plan proposed in the preventive 
restructuring procedure in order to make it binding.12 From the contributor responses, this term appears 
to mean the same thing in the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Romania. It is interesting to note this 
word is not generally used in English speaking countries. 
2.5 Concordat, Composition, Arrangement, and Plan 
 Concordat  
In Romania, the preventive concordat is a contract between the debtor and particular creditors, which 
requires judicial approval. It has a similar meaning in Italy; the concordat (concordato preventivo) refers 
to a judicial composition with creditors. From research conducted on the project, it appears that the term 
“concordat” is particular to those two jurisdictions.  
 Composition 
In England and Wales: 
“A composition is an agreement in settlement of a claim which is in doubt, dispute, or difficulty 
of enforcement. It involves no transfer of assets or change of any kind in the structure of the 
company or the rights of its members inter se vis a vis creditors.” 13  
In the Netherlands, a composition is an agreement between the debtor and its creditors. It is also referred 
to as a restructuring plan. 
 Arrangement 
In Ireland, an “arrangement”, in relation to a company, includes a reorganisation of the share capital of 
the company by the consolidation of shares of different classes or by the division of shares into shares 
of different classes or by both methods. The same statutory provision describes a compromise or 
arrangement proposed between a company and its creditors (or any class of them) or its members (or 
any class of them). In Ireland, the term “Scheme of Arrangement” has also been used to refer to a 
compromise reached by an Examiner under the Examinership process.14 For this reason, the “Scheme 
of Arrangement” based in company law is sometimes referred to as a “statutory Scheme of 
Arrangement”.15 This latter arrangement is based on the same legal provisions as the English Companies 
 
10 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016) 723 final of 22 November 2016 on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and 
amending Directive 2012/30/EU [2016] 2016/0359 (COD) (the “Proposal”) including the Explanatory Memorandum, 9. 
11 What constitutes a situation of cessation de paiements is not straightforward and has been debated by courts and commentators over the 
years, in particular the accounting basis of the concept. Following the introduction of the Law of 1967, French case law was referring to the 
concept of cessation de paiements as an essentially accounting-based notion, reliant on a comparison of available assets to meet the due 
liabilities. Yet, many courts have departed from this accounting view and have interpreted elements of the concept, such as what constitutes 
an asset and a liability and whether the debt is in fact due. Solely relying on the balance sheet test would not necessarily be a true reflection of 
the reality of the business. 
12 France, Romania, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands all gave similar definitions for this term, however, the grounds for court confirmation vary 
within the jurisdictions.  
13 Mercantile Investment & General Trust Co v International Co of Mexico [1893] 1 Ch 484, 491, cited in Re Guardian Assurance Co [1917] 
1 Ch 431 per Younger J, 443, as cited in Kristin van Zweiten, Goode on Insolvency of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2018) 49.  
14 See generally, I Lynch Fannon and G Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) chapters 12 and 
13. 
15 ibid chapter 14. 
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Act of 1948, upon which the English Scheme of Arrangement was based. This is now contained in the 
Companies Act 2006. In England and Wales, an authoritative definition is as follows: “an arrangement 
is a compromise or arrangement that has been submitted to the court for approval under Pt 26 of the 
Companies Act 2006.”16 This term is used in the Scheme of Arrangement and in the Company Voluntary 
Arrangement in England and Wales.  
In Romania, an arrangement is a compromise between the debtor and one or several of its creditors, in 
order to overcome the financial difficulties, which the debtor faces. 
 Restructuring Plan 
Per the PRD, Article 8 - Content of Restructuring Plan: 
“1. Member States shall require that restructuring plans submitted for adoption in accordance with 
Article 9, or for confirmation by a judicial or administrative authority in accordance with Article 10, 
contain at least the following information:  
(a) the identity of the debtor;  
(b) the debtor's assets and liabilities at the time of submission of the restructuring plan, including 
a value for the assets, a description of the economic situation of the debtor and the position of 
workers, and a description of the causes and the extent of the difficulties of the debtor;  
(c) the affected parties, whether named individually or described by categories of debt in 
accordance with national law, as well as their claims or interests covered by the restructuring 
plan;  
(d) where applicable, the classes into which the affected parties have been grouped, for the 
purpose of adopting the restructuring plan, and the respective values of claims and interests in 
each class;  
(e) where applicable, the parties, whether named individually or described by categories of debt 
in accordance with national law, which are not affected by the restructuring plan, together with a 
description of the reasons why it is proposed not to affect them;  
(f) where applicable, the identity of the practitioner in the field of restructuring;  
(g) the terms of the restructuring plan, including, in particular: (i) any proposed restructuring 
measures as referred to in point (1) of Article 2(1);  
(ii) where applicable, the proposed duration of any proposed restructuring measures;  
(iii) the arrangements with regard to informing and consulting the employees' representatives 
in accordance with Union and national law;  
(iv) where applicable, overall consequences as regards employment such as dismissals, short-
time working arrangements or similar;  
(v) the estimated financial flows of the debtor, if provided for by national law; and  
(vi) any new financing anticipated as part of the restructuring plan, and the reasons why the 
new financing is necessary to implement that plan;  
(h) a statement of reasons which explains why the restructuring plan has a reasonable prospect of 
preventing the insolvency of the debtor and ensuring the viability of the business, including the 
necessary pre-conditions for the success of the plan. Member States may require that that 
statement of reasons be made or validated either by an external expert or by the practitioner in 
the field of restructuring if such a practitioner is appointed.” 
 
2.6 Examiner, Receiver, Trustee, and Administrator, PIFOR 
 
16 van Zweiten (n 12) 50. 
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 Examiner 
In Ireland, “an examiner means an examiner appointed under section 509” of the Irish Companies Act. 
It is essentially an insolvency practitioner appointed to “the company for the purpose of examining the 
state of the company's affairs and performing such functions in relation to the company as may be 
conferred by or under this Part.”17 The provision goes on to state that:  
“The court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that there is a reasonable 
prospect of the survival of the company and the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going 
concern.” 18  
The Irish examiner is similar to the Dutch ‘plan expert’ referred to in 2.6 f.19 
In Austria’s preventive restructuring framework, the professional responsible for the process is also 
called an examiner. The examiner must be independent from creditors and the company (including not 
being a competitor of the company).  
 Judicial Commissioner 
In Italy, the court nominates an insolvency practitioner as commissario giudiziale (which translates as 
a judicial commissioner), whose role is to inform the court of any misconduct by the debtor or any 
situation, which may impact the restructuring process negatively. The commissario giudiziale provides 
independent information to creditors to facilitate their assessment of the proposal. After court 
confirmation of the plan, the commissario giudiziale can implement it by adopting the measures that the 
debtor was supposed to (but did not) adopt under its terms.20  
 Receiver 
Under the UK Insolvency Act 1986, Receiver means:  
“(a) a receiver or manager of the whole (or substantially the whole) of a company’s property 
appointed by or on behalf of the holders of any debentures of the company secured by a charge 
which, as created, was a floating charge, or by such a charge and one or more other securities; or 
(b) a person who would be such a receiver or manager but for the appointment of some other 
person as the receiver of part of the company’s property.”21 
In Ireland a receiver includes, “a receiver and manager of the property of a company” or can be “a 
manager of the property of a company” or simply a manager of “part of the property of the company” 
or simply a receiver only of the income arising from that property.22 
 Trustee  
A Trustee is the professional responsible for debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings in Germany.  
 
17 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 509(1). 
18 ibid s 509(2) 
19 The legislative history of the Irish Examinership process is that it was originally part of a major reform Bill presented as the Companies Bill 
1987. However, with the immanent collapse of the AIBP group in late summer of 1990, the examinership legislation was extracted from the 
full Bill and passed as the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990. The remainder of the legislation was passed as the Companies Act 1990 later 
that year. All of this legislation is now consolidated in the Companies Act 2014. It would seem that it (and other parts of this legislation) were 
modelled on US codes. It is interesting to note that the term Examiner appears in the Chapter 11 process as follows:  
“Although the appointment of a case trustee is a rarity in a chapter 11 case, a party in interest or the U.S. trustee can request the appointment 
of a case trustee or examiner at any time prior to confirmation in a chapter 11 case. The court, on motion by a party in interest or the U.S. 
trustee and after notice and hearing, shall order the appointment of a case trustee for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or 
gross mismanagement, or if such an appointment is in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. 
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).”  
‘Chapter 11: Bankruptcy Basics’ (United States Courts 2019) <https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-
basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics> accessed 4th January 2020. The first Irish Examinership was a resounding success rescuing AIBP and a 
significant part of the Irish Beef Processing industry. 
20 CCI, art 44, para 1b.  
21 UK Insolvency Act 1986, s 29(2). Note following amendment in the Enterprise Act 2002, the appointment of a receiver and manager is not 
generally available under English law unless this relates to an appointment on foot of a charge over real property.  
22 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 2(9). 
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In the common law a trustee is not usually a professional position but refers to a person appointed as a 
trustee under a trust which can arise in many different contexts and is not specifically confined to 
insolvency. It is not necessary for a trustee to be qualified as such.  
However, under US Bankruptcy Law, and Chapter 11 in particular, the debtor in possession is placed 
in the position of a fiduciary but the presiding official is the US trustee.23 It is also envisaged that in 
certain cases, a case trustee can also be appointed, this is sometimes referred to as an examiner. The 
latter performs monitoring functions in the US system, which is a lesser role than that occupied by an 
Irish turnaround professional appointed as examiner.24  
 Administrator 
Under the Insolvency Act 1986 in England and Wales, an “administrator” of a company means a person 
appointed under [schedule B1] to manage the company’s affairs, business and property.25 An 
administrator is an officer of the court.26 Finally, a person may be appointed as administrator of a 
company only if he is qualified to act as an insolvency practitioner in relation to the company.27  
In Romania and Germany, the administrator is the professional responsible for the preventive concordat 
and insolvency proceeding, respectively. However, a key distinction between the English administrator 
and the administrator in Romania and Germany is that only in England and Wales does the administrator 
fully step into the shoes of the company management, taking over business decisions entirely.  
In France, an administrator (administrateur judiciaire) is tasked with supporting the company in the 
first instance but may have a more specific role, which is outlined as part of his appointment.  
 Insolvency Practitioner  
In England and Wales, insolvency practitioners must have passed the Joint Insolvency Exam Board and 
have acquired a minimum of 600 hours of insolvency experience over the previous three years, subject 
to a minimum of 150 hours per annum, of which half must be work of a type reserved to insolvency 
practitioners under the Insolvency Act 1986.28 
In Ireland, an insolvency practitioner is a liquidator or examiner regulated under s 633 of the Companies 
Act 2014. Receivers are not currently regulated under this legislation.29 
 In Romania, the Insolvency Practitioner carries out insolvency proceedings, voluntary or amicable 
liquidation procedures, as well as pre-insolvency proceedings provided by law, including financial 
supervision or special administration measures. In the Netherlands, “insolvency practitioner” is a 
generic term used for court appointed actors in insolvency proceedings.30 In Italy, insolvency 
practitioners need to be signed in a public registry held by the Ministry of Justice.31 In order to be 
eligible, it is necessary to attend regular training sessions and to be qualified as a lawyer, accountant, 
auditor or to have managed or supervised a company (in the latest case, showing adequate 
entrepreneurial abilities). 
 
23 “Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code places the debtor in possession in the position of a fiduciary, with the rights and powers of a chapter 
11 trustee, and it requires the debtor to perform of all but the investigative functions and duties of a trustee. These duties, set forth in the 
Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, include accounting for property, examining and objecting to claims, and filing 
informational reports as required by the court and the US trustee or bankruptcy administrator (discussed below), such as monthly operating 
reports. 11 USC §§ 1106, 1107; Fed R Bankr P 2015(a).” See ‘Bankruptcy Basics’ (n 18).  
24 “Although the appointment of a case trustee is a rarity in a Chapter 11 case, a party in interest or the US trustee can request the appointment 
of a case trustee or examiner at any time prior to confirmation in a Chapter 11 case. The court, on motion by a party in interest or the US 
trustee and after notice and hearing, shall order the appointment of a case trustee for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement, or if such an appointment is in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. 11 USC 
§ 1104(a).” See ‘Bankruptcy Basics’ (n 18). 
25 UK Insolvency Act 1986, schedule B1, para 1(1).  
26 idem para 5. 
27 idem para 6.  
28 ‘Making a Career as an Insolvency Practitioner’ (R3 2019) 
 <r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/professional/Making_a_Career_Brochure_V2.pdf> accessed 14 November 2019.  
29 See further proposals to regulate receivers in the ‘Company Law Review Group Annual Report 2018’ (CLRG 2019) 
 <http://www.clrg.org/CLRG/Publications/CLRG-Annual-Report-2018.pdf > accessed 12 December 2019. 
30 This includes the bewindvoerder, i.e. the joint administrator in suspension of payments proceedings and the curator i.e. liquidator in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
31 CCI, art 356. 
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 Plan Expert (The Netherlands) 
The so-called ‘herstructureringsdeskundige’ is an expert appointed by the court on the request of either 
the debtor or creditors. The plan expert prepares and offers a plan to (some of) the creditors and 
shareholders. The plan expert is required to perform his tasks effectively, impartially, and 
independently.32 
 PIFOR (Practitioner in the Field of Restructuring) 
In the PRD:  
“‘practitioner in the field of restructuring’ means any person or body appointed by a judicial or 
administrative authority to carry out, in particular, one or more of the following tasks:  
(a) assisting the debtor or the creditors in drafting or negotiating a restructuring plan;  
(b) supervising the activity of the debtor during the negotiations on a restructuring plan, and 
reporting to a judicial or administrative authority;  
(c) taking partial control over the assets or affairs of the debtor during negotiations.”33 
 The Observer (The Netherlands) 
The observer is a court appointed supervisor that can only be appointed when a plan expert has not yet 
been appointed. Its task is to supervise the realisation of the restructuring plan and, in so doing, take 
into account the interests of all creditors.34 
2.7 Pledge, Mortgage, Charge, and Floating Charge 
 Pledge 
A pledge is given as security for the fulfilment of a contract or the payment of a debt and is liable to 
forfeiture in the event of failure. In Italy, generally, the pledge is possessory but, pursuant to the recent 
Law n. 119/2016, it can also be, by derogation, non-possessory (meaning that the debtor does not lose 
the powers of management that he has over the specific asset). 
In the Netherlands, a right of pledge can be vested on transferable assets, except on registered property. 
With a pledge, the pledgee obtains security over the assets for claims until they are paid in full, meaning 
that the pledgee can sell the pledged goods if the debtor is in default. The proceeds of the sale may be 
used to repay the outstanding debt in accordance with the ranking of the pledge. 
 Charge (Fixed) 
“A fixed charge is a charge over a particular asset where the chargee controls any dealing or 
disposal of the asset by the chargor. A fixed charge ranks before a floating charge in the order of 
repayment on an insolvency.”35 
 Mortgage 
“A mortgage is a debt instrument, secured by the collateral of specified real estate property, that the 
borrower is obliged to pay back with a predetermined set of payments.”36  
In the Netherlands, a right of mortgage can be vested on transferable assets that are registered property. 
A mortgage is established by a notarial deed which will be included in the public register. The mortgagee 
obtains security over the assets for claims until they are paid in full, meaning that the mortgagee can 
sell the asset when the debtor is in default. The proceeds of the sale may be used to repay the outstanding 
debt in accordance with the ranking of the mortgage. 
 
32 WHOA, art 371(1) & (6). 
33 PRD, art 2(1)(12). 
34 WHOA, art 380(1). 
35 ‘Fixed Charge’ (Practical Law Glossary 2019) 
 <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-107-5768?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> 
accessed 14 November 2019.  
36 ‘Mortgage’ (Investopedia 2019) <investopedia.com/terms/m/mortgage.asp> accessed 14 November 2019.  
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 Floating Charge 
In England and Wales and Ireland, floating charges can be understood with reference to case law. In 
Illingsworth v Houldsworth, Lord MacNaghten stated: 
 “[a floating charge] is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and so to speak 
floating with the property which it is intended to affect until some event occurs or some act is 
done which causes it to settle and fasten on the subject of the charge within its reach and 
grasp.”37 
According to Romer LJ, if a charge had the following 3 characteristics, it would be floating: 
“(i) If it is a charge on a class of assets of a company present and future; 
(ii) If that class is one, which in the ordinary course of the business of the company, would be 
changing from time to time; and  
(iii) If you find that by the charger it is contemplated that, until some future step is taken by or 
on behalf of those interested in the charge, the company may carry on its business in the ordinary 
way so far as concerns the particular class of assets I am dealing with.”38 
In other words, a floating charge can be understood as a charge over assets owned by a company, which 
allows the charged assets to be bought and sold or otherwise dealt with, during the course of a company's 
business without reference to the chargeholder, provided that the company is not insolvent. The floating 
charge crystallises – i.e. becomes fixed - if there is a default or other equivalent event. 
Although floating charges developed out of the common law, they do also exist in some other European 
jurisdictions, for example, Denmark.  
2.8 Non-performing Loans 
“A nonperforming loan (NPL) is a sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made 
the scheduled payments for a specified period. Although the exact elements of nonperformance 
status vary, depending on the specific loan's terms, ‘no payment’ is usually defined as zero 
payments of either principal or interest.”39  
In the context of European banking law, NPLs or, rather, NPEs (exposures) are exposures which are not 
necessarily past due, as suggested in the definition, but also “unlikely to pay” (to be paid) whilst not yet 
past due.  
2.9 Interim and New Financing 
 Interim Financing 
In the PRD: 
“‘interim financing’ means any new financial assistance, provided by an existing or a new 
creditor, that includes, as a minimum, financial assistance during the stay of individual 
enforcement actions, and that is reasonable and immediately necessary for the debtor's business 
to continue operating, or to preserve or enhance the value of that business”40 
 New Financing 
In the PRD, “‘new financing’ means any new financial assistance provided by an existing or a new 
creditor in order to implement a restructuring plan and that is included in that restructuring plan.”41 
2.10 Supervising Judge, Syndic Judge, Notary  
 
37 [1904] AC 355. 
38 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association [1903] 2 Ch 284. 
39 ‘Non-Performing Loans’ (Investopedia 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonperformingloan.asp> accessed 14 November 
2019.  
40 PRD, art 2(1)(8).  
41 PRD, art 2(1)(7).  
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These terms arose from specific jurisdiction reports and are explained by the contributors of those 
jurisdictions. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive description of all administrative 
authorities involved in restructuring, but will give context for the substantive Chapters to follow. Report 
2 will provide a more complete consideration of administrative authorities.  
 Supervising Judge 
A supervising judge is the judge who has the duty to supervise debtor’s actions and to authorise its 
extraordinary actions, if still in possession, and to oversee the procedural and substantial fairness of the 
procedure. In the Netherlands a ‘rechter-commissaris’, is a judge that is tasked with supervision of the 
insolvency proceedings, such as tasks.42 In Italy, after verifying the economic feasibility and legal 
compliance of the plan, the Tribunal with jurisdiction nominates the giudice delegato. (S)he has 
supervisory powers. In France, a supervisory judge is systematically appointed during the opening order 
of safeguard proceedings. 
 Syndic Judge 
A syndic judge is a judge with specific powers in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings in Romania. 
 Notary 
In Spain, a notary is a civil servant who intervenes in certain situations to provide legal certainty. (S)he 
is the competent authority to examine the requests for extra-judicial payment compositions in relation 
to natural persons only. A mediator performs this role for extra-judicial payment compositions for 
corporate entities. In the common law, a notary has a significantly different meaning referring to a 
person who attests to the veracity of certain documents. 
2.11 Patrimonial Liability 
Patrimonial liability is a form of civil liability and is a common term in Civil Law jurisdictions; it can 
just be referred to as “liability”.  
2.12 Retention of Title 
In England and Wales and Ireland, a retention of title clause is a clause that prevents ownership of goods 
transferring to a purchaser until a seller has been paid in full. While a purchaser may possess the goods 
in question, legal title has not passed and so the goods are subject to being recovered by a seller should 
payment terms not be met. However, depending on the nature of the asset and the rights purportedly 
exercised by the seller, the retention of title clause may be deemed to be a charge and therefore void for 
want of registration as such. 
In the Netherlands, a retention of title is the right of the seller that the title to the goods sold shall remain 
with the seller and will only be passed to the buyer when the full purchasing price is paid and received 
by the seller.43 In Italy, it refers to a contractual provision, which delays the transfer of the property right 
on a certain asset up until the payment of the last instalment.  
While the definition is essentially the same across most jurisdictions, these rights may be treated 
differently in insolvency, i.e. the right to repossess is not necessarily absolute. In common law countries, 
the retention of title clause was originally viewed as a European construct which did not translate exactly 
into the common law, hence the inadvertent creation of a charge described above. 
2.13 Right in Rem 
In rem is “a Latin term meaning "against a thing." An in rem proceeding adjudicates the rights to a 
particular piece of property for every potential rights holder, even potential rights holders who are not 
named in the lawsuit. Generally, an in rem proceeding must be commenced in the jurisdiction where 
the subject property is located. The presence of the subject property in the forum state usually satisfies 
any due process concerns for binding out-of-state claimants to the court's judgment. However, notice of 
the suit still must be given to all individuals known to have interests therein.”44  This understanding 
 
42 Dutch Bankruptcy Act, art 64. 
43 Dutch Commercial Code, art 3:92. 
44 ‘In Rem’ (Practical Law Company 2019) 
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seems to be commonly accepted amongst our contributors. 
2.14 Extra-judicial Payment 
 In Spain, an extra-judicial payment is one that is obtained as a result of an out-of-court procedure. 
2.15 Unsecured, Secured, Preferential, and Subordinated Creditors 
 Secured Creditor 
A general definition of secured creditor is as follows:  
“A secured creditor is any creditor or lender associated with an investment in or issuance of a 
credit product backed by collateral. Secured creditors have a first-order claim on the pay-outs of 
a distressed credit investment. If a borrower defaults on a secured credit product the secured 
creditors have a legal right to the secured asset used as collateral which can be seized and sold to 
pay off remaining obligations.”45  
Secured creditors are those creditors with a security rights, (a right of pledge or mortgage). In France, 
secured creditors also include those “secured” by law, for example, employees or tax authorities.   
 Unsecured Creditor 
A general definition of unsecured creditor is as follows: 
“An unsecured creditor is an individual or institution that lends money without obtaining 
specified assets as collateral. This poses a higher risk to the creditor because it will have nothing 
to fall back on should the borrower default on the loan. If a borrower fails to make a payment on 
a debt that is unsecured, the creditor cannot take any of the borrower's assets without winning a 
lawsuit first.”46  
In addition to this definition which refers to loans, the term “unsecured creditors” also refers to all 
suppliers of goods, services, utilities and so on who have no collateral or contractual arrangements to 
secure payment. This can also include involuntary creditors such as tort creditors. Unsecured creditors 
– also ordinary creditors – are those creditors without a security (a right of pledge or mortgage). Again, 
this seems to be a commonly accepted understanding. 
In France, unsecured creditors are called créanciers chirographaires. They do not have a collateral on 
specific assets but rather benefit from the droit de gage general, which means that the creditors have an 
overall “right of pledge,” which guarantees payment of the claims from all of the estate of the debtor, 
rather than from specific assets. This essentially guarantees a base line right over the entire estate rather 
than over specific assets to which the debt is associated.47 
 Preferential Creditor 
Preferential creditors are generally understood as creditors with a state created priority which gives the 
creditor priority rights over other creditors.  
Preferred creditors may take many different forms or classes, each with a claim that may take precedence 
over another claimant depending on the jurisdiction. They include: 
• Employees: Workers at a bankrupt company who are owed pay for work that has been 
performed (wages) are the top preferred creditor. Preferential status can also attach to 
outstanding payments under working time legislation. 
• Tax and revenue authorities: Government authorities such as tax authorities may be paid 
before anyone else (after employees). 
• Environmental remediation: When bankrupt companies that have been found to have 
 
 <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-520-2353?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)> accessed 15 November 2019.  
45 ‘Secured Creditor’ (Investopedia 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/secured-creditor.asp> accessed 15 November 2019. 
46 ‘Unsecured Creditor’ (Investopedia 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/unsecured-creditor.asp> accessed 15 November 2019. 
47 See French Civil Code, art 2284: “Anyone who has a personal obligation is bound to fulfil his commitment on all his movable and immovable 
property, present and to come.” And art 2285: “The debtor's property constitutes the common pledge of his creditors; and the price is distributed 
among them by contribution, unless there are legitimate legal preferences between the creditors.” 
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caused environmental damage as a result of their business operations, the clean-up costs 
may receive preferential treatment by the courts in some jurisdictions. 
• Tort victims: Victims of such a civil wrong may be given preferred creditor status in some 
jurisdictions based on their status as an involuntary creditor. Since tort victims did not make 
the choice to become a creditor to a bankrupt entity, they are generally not penalized. 
Otherwise these creditors are unsecured creditors. 
The following jurisdictions are considered as examples. 
In Ireland preferential creditors are recognised in s 621 of the Companies Act 2014. Primarily these 
creditors are the State in relation to tax debts and employees in relation to outstanding payments. In the 
UK these were abolished by the Enterprise Act 2002. However, the UK government has indicated an 
intention to reinstate Crown Preference in its next budget.48 
In the Netherlands, preferential creditors hold claims, which are given a preference by law and rank 
higher than unsecured creditors. There are three types of preferential creditors: 
(i) the Dutch employee insurance agency (UWV);  
(ii) the tax authority; and  
(iii) employees with a salary claim that arose prior to the bankruptcy.  
 Subordinated Creditors (Subordinated Debt) 
In the Netherlands, subordinated creditors are creditors that have subordinated their claims to rank after 
those of ordinary (unsecured) creditors. In France, their repayment depends on the prior repayment of 
other creditors. 
In Austria, subordinated creditors are typically shareholders who granted loans to the debtor, which are 
regarded as a substitute of equity. Subordinated claims result either from the law – equity replacing 
loans of shareholders – or from an agreement and are only taken into account after full satisfaction of 
the creditors of the insolvency proceedings. Subordinated claims feature in the Austrian frameworks. 
This term is understood similarly elsewhere.  
A typical description of subordinated debt is: “Debt that is unsecured and/or ranks for interest and 
repayment after the senior debt of a company.”  
For example, subordinated debt may rank below senior debt in the following ways: 
• “Repayment of principal.  
• Interest margins.  
• Security: Senior, second lien and mezzanine debt will typically share the same security package 
(normally held by a security trustee), which means that the security granted by the borrower 
and any other obligors will be granted in favour of all the lenders under each of those 
instruments of debt. However, the intercreditor agreement between the lenders will provide that 
senior debt will be repaid first from the proceeds of any enforcement of security, followed by 
second lien debt, followed by mezzanine debt.  
• Intercreditor terms: Terms in an intercreditor agreement (or any other financing agreement) by 
which one creditor (or group of creditors) agrees to subordinate itself in any way to another 
creditor (or group of creditors) are all examples of what is termed contractual subordination.”49 
 
2.16 Self-Administration and Debtor in Possession 
 Self-Administration 
 
48 ‘Changes to Protect Tax in Insolvency Cases’ (HMRC Policy Paper 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/changes-to-
protect-tax-in-insolvency-cases> accessed 6th January 2020. 
49 This is not an exhaustive list. ‘Subordinated Debt’ (Practical Law Company 2019) 
<https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-107-7330?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> 
accessed 15 November 2019.  
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Self-administration refers to debtor-in-possession in Germany. In Austria, it refers to the debtor itself 
administering the assets involved in the insolvency proceedings (under the supervision of an insolvency 
administrator). 
 Debtor in Possession 
An insolvency or restructuring procedure in which “debtors…remain totally, or at least partially, in 
control of their assets and the day-to-day operation of their business.”50 
2.17 Court Protection, Stay, and Moratorium 
 Court Protection 
In Ireland, this is the term used to refer to a stay or moratorium. It applies to all creditor claims against 
the company and any other proceedings relating to the company can only be commenced with leave 
from the court.51 
 Stay 
Though sometimes the terms are used interchangeably, the stay and the moratorium are explained 
separately below, as the responses received from some contributors indicated that the words were 
sometimes understood differently.  
A stay generally refers to the statutory or otherwise stopping of debt enforcement claims as well as at 
times other claims against a debtor company. 
In Romania, this is the term used to refer to suspension of all forced execution procedures. In Germany, 
it refers to a stay of enforcement actions. Austria considers the stay to mean that claims of debt execution 
against the debtor by unsecured creditors are inadmissible. In the Netherlands, the stay and moratorium 
mean the same thing; a (temporary) suspension of any legal action of creditors to enforce or recover a 
claim, unless they have obtained permission. In Italy, it refers to a protective measure against creditors’ 
enforcement action, the goal of which is to preserve the going concern - in case of a restructuring 
procedure - or to ensure a liquidation of the assets in an orderly manner. In Italy, a stay does not hinder 
litigation, only enforcement and precautionary measures. In Spain, only individual enforcement actions 
against assets that are necessary for the continuation of the business are stayed, others can be if certain 
circumstances are present.52  
 Moratorium 
In Romania, this is the term used to refer to postponement of payment of public and private debts due, 
established by law for a certain time or for the period of existence of special circumstances. In Austria, 
a moratorium only applies to credit institutions in that it consists of the closure of an institution for 
payment transactions and the prohibition of accepting payments in cash or by bank transfers. 
2.18 Intra- and Cross-class Cram-Down 
 Intra-class Cram-down 
This refers to the approval of a plan by a class of creditors if a majority of creditors within that class 
votes in favour. The majority binds the minority to the plan, once confirmed by the relevant authority.  
 Cross-class Cram-down 
As defined in the PRD, a cross-class cram-down refers to a:  
“restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties in every voting class but is 
 
50 PRD, art 5(1). 
51 Irish Companies Act 2015, s 520(5).  
52 In the case of assets that are not necessary for the continuation of the business, individual actions will only be stayed when the negotiations 
that may lead to the adoption of a refinancing agreement are supported by 51 % of financial claims and creditors agreed not to enforce their 
claims during the negotiations. In the case of secured claims, foreclosure proceedings are stayed until the adoption of an extra-judicial payment 
composition, or the filing of a confirmation request for a refinancing agreement, or the end of the three months period foreseen in art 5(5) bis 
of the Spanish Insolvency Act for the adoption of a refinancing agreement or an extra-judicial payment composition. Public claims are not 
affected by the stay. 
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confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with the 
debtor's agreement and becomes binding upon dissenting voting classes.”53 
2.19 Absolute Priority 
As defined in the PRD, the absolute priority rule aims to:  
“…protect a dissenting class of affected creditors by ensuring that such dissenting class is paid in 
full if a more junior class receives any distribution or keeps any interest under the restructuring 
plan (the ‘absolute priority rule’).”54 
2.20 Relative Priority 
The following is largely accepted as being a relative priority rule under the PRD:  
“dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at least as favourably as any other class 
of the same rank and more favourably than any junior class…”55 
2.21 Unfair Prejudice 
Article 11(2) of the PRD states that in relation to confirmation of plans and the operation of a cross class 
cram down provision: 
“Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first subparagraph 
where they are necessary in order to achieve the aims of the restructuring plan and where the 
restructuring plan does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties.” 
In the Irish Examinership procedure, unfair prejudice is one of the concepts used in the test provided 
for in the legislation which guides the court in confirming a rescue.56 Section 541 of the Companies Act 
2014 provides that on presentation by the Examiner of the compromise or arrangement, the court shall 
not confirm any proposals unless “at least one class of creditors whose interests or claims would be 
impaired by implementation of the proposals has accepted the proposals” and it is satisfied that “the 
proposals are fair and equitable in relation to any class of members or creditors that has not accepted 
the proposals and whose interests or claims would be impaired by implementation” and the proposals 
are not “unfairly prejudicial” to the interests of any interested party...”57 
Under the UK Insolvency Act 1986, “any creditor who was entitled to vote at the creditors’ meeting 
may apply to court to challenge the CVA on grounds of unfair prejudice or material irregularity.”58 
“Where…a group of creditors’ uses its votes to deprive a creditor or group of their rights against third 
parties, while preserving its own rights, the courts are likely to find that unfair prejudice was suffered.”59 
Similarly, the court will assess a Scheme of Arrangement and will approve only if it is “satisfied that 
the scheme does not operate unfairly between groups and will ask whether an intelligent and honest 
member of the class could reasonably have approved the proposal.”60  
Under the WHOA, unfair prejudice means judicial review of a restructuring plan where the court will 
assess if the restructuring plan provides unfair preferential treatment of one or more creditors or 
shareholders over other creditors or shareholders. 
2.22 Best Interest of Creditors 
Under the PRD, “satisfying the ‘best-interest-of-creditors’ test should be considered to mean that no 
dissenting creditor is worse off under a restructuring plan than it would be either in the case of 
liquidation, whether piecemeal liquidation or sale of the business as a going concern, or in the event of 
the next-best-alternative scenario if the restructuring plan were not to be confirmed.”61  This test has also 
 
53 PRD, art 11(1).  
54 PRD, recital 55.  
55 PRD, art 11(1)(c). 
56 Companies Act 2014, s 541(4)(b)(ii). 
57 See generally John O’Donnell and Jack Nicholas, Examinerships (Roundhall 2016) and Lynch Fannon & Murphy (n 13) chapters 12 and 
13. 
58 Finch & Milman (n 3) 436-437. 
59 Re a Debtor (No 101 of 1999) [2001] BCLC 54 and Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Ltd [2007] BCC 500. 
60 Finch & Milman (n 3) 411; Re Linton Park Plc [2008] BVV 17 and RAC Motoring Services Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 307.  
61 PRD, recital 52.  
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been developed in Irish law.62 
2.23 Conclusion and Transition 
This Chapter has introduced some commonly used terms as well as jurisdictional specific terms in order 
to dispel some of the confusion associated with them. The next Chapter will explore the way in which 
cross-border insolvencies are regulated within the EU. This will include some background on the 
development of the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) through a series of failed treaties and 
conventions beginning in the 1970s. The key features and function of the EIR Recast will also be 
described as well as the influence it has had on choice of forum in the European Union. This leads on 
to issues of substantive harmonisation in the EU. The PRD aims to address harmonisation of 
restructuring measures. A consideration of the interface between the EIR Recast and the PRD leads on 
to the prospect that some preventive restructuring frameworks may effectively avoid inclusion in Annex 
A of the EIR Recast.  This could potentially lead to the development of procedures that will compete 
across jurisdictions due to the ability to choose a forum without reference to the EIR Recast. Chapter 
three provides background commentary on the regulation of cross-border insolvency generally, while 
highlighting some of the issues that could arise depending upon the characteristics of the preventive 
restructuring frameworks that are eventually implemented. 
 
62 Lynch Fannon & Murphy (n 13) (Page No?) and Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘Examinership: Approval of Schemes — Re SIAC Construction Ltd 
and in the Matter of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 (as Amended)’ (2015) 1 Commercial Law Practitioner; Re SIAC Construction 
Limited [2014] IESC 25, [2014] ILRM 357 
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3. Chapter 3: The Regulation of Cross-Border Insolvency and 
Restructuring in the EU 
3.1 Introduction: Cross-Border Insolvency in the EU 
Insolvency law has a millennia old history, with some regimes tracing the roots of rules regulating the 
relationship between debtors and creditors as far back as the Hammurabi dynasty in Babylon in around 
2250 B.C.1 As commerce has developed over the centuries, so have the laws regulating the relationship 
between debtors and creditors.2 The institutions of insolvency are said to have been transmitted to 
modern European commerce by bankers in Lombardy, Italy. The term ‘bankruptcy’ is said to be derived 
from banca rotta, a Latin phrase from ancient Rome that refers to the breaking of an insolvent trader’s 
bench to prevent him from continuing his business.3 The needs of modern commerce – long-distance 
travel to and from the foires of the Champagne region of France; long-term credit terms; and the physical 
difficulty of transporting literally hard currency - led to the rules of the lex mercatoria in the Middle 
Ages. This provided certainty for commercial transactions and became the foundation for Western 
commercial law and, by extension, cross-border insolvency rules.4 Over the centuries, insolvency has 
evolved from a purely punitive process to a process whereby unlucky entrepreneurs (and individuals) 
could achieve a second chance at their business models. However, the stigma of bankruptcy and 
insolvency has faded to different degrees among the Member States of the European Union, leading to 
a fair variety of approaches in insolvency frameworks. The multiplicity of approaches and the increased 
prevalence of cross-border insolvency cases led to actions in the EU aimed at both coordinating and 
harmonising insolvency and restructuring law. The latter of these aims has thus far been the most 
difficult to achieve owing to the jurisdiction specific characteristics of the underlying aims and 
approaches to resolving business distress among the Member States.  
3.2 History and Development of European Insolvency Coordination 
A number of conventions on cross-border insolvency were agreed among a selection of jurisdictions 
before the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) as it is now known.5 The development of the 
European Community in 1957 set the groundwork for simplifying the formalities governing reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, which came into force in the Brussels Convention of 1968.6 
The first European Preliminary Draft Insolvency Convention7 came out of a working group in the 1970s 
and was aimed at establishing a single jurisdiction to deal with insolvency matters. This was a common 
theoretical idea (which had engendered considerable debate) among American insolvency academics, 
in addition to one or two academics at this side of the Atlantic8. It included conflicts of law rules that 
 
1 L Levinthal, ‘The Early History of Bankruptcy Law’ [1918] U Pa L Rev 223, 230.  
2 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 7. 
3 Paul Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004) 3.  
4 Jennifer L L Gant, Balancing the Protection of Business and Employment in Insolvency: An Anglo-French Perspective (Eleven International 
Publishing 2017) 84.  
5 Paul J Omar, ‘Genesis of the European Initiative in Insolvency Law’ (2003) 12(3) IIR 147, 147.  
6 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 25 September 1968 [1972] OJ L 299/ 32, 
replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters [2000] OJ L12/1. 
7 Draft Convention E Comm Doc 3.327/1/XIV/70-F on bankruptcy, winding-up, arrangements, compositions and similar proceedings [1976] 
(Preliminary Draft Insolvency Convention). 
8 See for example Lynn M LoPucki, ‘Co-operation in International Bankruptcy: A Post Universalist Approach’ (1999) (84)3 Cornell L Rev 
696; ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2216; ‘Universalism Unravels’ (2005) 
79 Am Bankr L J 143; Andrew T Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2178; Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276; ‘Universalism and Choice of Law’ (2005) 23 Penn St 
Int’l L Rev 625; ‘Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm’ (2006-2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 1019; ‘A Comment on Universal Proceduralism’ 
(2010) 48 Colum J Transnat’l L 503; Edward J Janger, ‘Universal Proceduralism’ (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 819; ‘Virtual Territoriality’ (2010) 
48 Colum J Transnat’l L 401; ‘Reciprocal Comity’ (2011) 46 Tex Int’l L J 441; Robert K Rasmussen, ‘Where are all the Transnational 
Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for Universalism’ (2007) 32(3) Brook J Int’l L 983; Edward S Adams and Jason K Fincke, ‘Coordinating 
Cross-border Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism’ (2008) 15 Colum J Eur L 43; Alexander M Kipnis, ‘Beyond UNCITRAL: 
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were intended to deal with the assertion of jurisdiction by more than one court.9 The insolvency 
convention went back to the drawing board several times for a number of reasons, including the 
accession of new Member States to the EU. 10  Despite over a decade of work on the insolvency 
convention, it was abandoned in 1985 after the failure to agree on a second draft.11 
In 1984, the Council of Europe tried its hand at introducing an insolvency convention. In their draft, the 
principle of universality espoused by the convention drafted in the 70s, was mitigated by introducing 
more territorial concepts. This would allow for domestic law to trump the law of the leading insolvency 
jurisdiction, in some cases. It introduced a variety of territorial rights, such as the ability of the liquidator 
to exercise rights abroad, the rights of creditors to lodge claims abroad, and by suggesting prescriptions 
about the possibility of opening a secondary insolvency proceeding.12 The Convention on Certain 
International Aspects of Bankruptcy (the Istanbul Convention) 13 was introduced in 1995, but it failed 
for lack of universal adoption and ratification.14 
An ad hoc working party was convened in the European Community by the Community Ministers of 
Justice in the early 1990s under the chairmanship of Manfred Balz. In 1995, a new ‘Convention on 
insolvency proceedings was introduced,’ which contained the possibility of opening secondary 
proceedings,15 adopting the deviation from universality first introduced by the Istanbul Convention. It 
was in this draft convention that the modern version of the European Insolvency Regulation16 emerged. 
This was accompanied by the Virgos Schmit Report,17 which explained the strategy behind the 
convention and the historical reasons for it. This Convention was more complete than the Istanbul 
Convention, but it did not obtain the signature of all Member States – the United Kingdom was the only 
dissentient.18 
At the turn of the millennium, the European Parliament recognised that the time was likely ripe for 
another attempt at coordinating insolvency, so it instructed the Commission to convert the Insolvency 
Convention into a regulation and to use the Virgos Schmit Report as the basis for an explanatory 
memorandum.19 Given the decades of work in trying to come up with a European method of dealing 
with cross-border insolvencies, the passing of the EIR was not a shock. The initiative aimed to improve 
and speed up cross-border insolvency proceedings as well as improve the functioning of the internal 
market. Among the many elements of the Regulation the idea of cross border judicial co-operation was 
included. The Regulation was accepted by all Member States, including the UK, and was adopted on 
29th May 2000, and published on 30th June 2000. It was largely similar to the original proposals and 
came into effect on 31st May 2002.20  
In 2012 the time came to review the EIR,21 a task undertaken by a group of scholars from the University 
of Heidelberg and the University of Vienna.22 The rapporteurs agreed that shortcomings of the EIR 
concerned its scope, jurisdiction, secondary proceedings, the publicity of secondary proceedings, and 
the lack of rules relating to groups of companies.23 The recast of the EIR was therefore conceived with 
the intention of further embracing the rescue culture; dealing with groups of companies; and considering 
IT facilities. Among the options presented, it was decided to modernise the existing regulation while 
 
Alternatives to Universality in Transnational Insolvency’ (2008) 36(2) Denv J Int’l L & Pol’y 155; Gerard McCormack, ‘Universalism in 
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9 Omar (n 5) 149. 
10 Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (OUP 2016) 14.  
11 See the E Comm Doc III/D/72/80 (Draft Convention); Paul J Omar, ‘Genesis of the European Initiative in Insolvency Law’ 12(3) IIR 147, 
154-155. 
12 Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (OUP 2016) 14. 
13 European Convention ETS No 136 on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy [1990] (Istanbul Convention).  
14 Omar (n 3)155-157.  
15 Bork & Mangano (n 10) 14-15. 
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1 (hereafter referred to as the “EIR”).  
17 Miguel Virgos and Etienne Schmit, ‘Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (Council of the European Union 1996).  
18 Bork & Mangano (n 10) 15; Omar (n 3) 161. 
19 Bork & Mangano (n 10) 15. 
20 Omar (n 3) 162-163; Bork & Mangano (n 10) 15.  
21 Required by EIR Art 46, which states that “no later than 1 June 2012 and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the application of this Regulation. The report shall be 
accompanied if need be by a proposal for adaptation of this Regulation.” 
22 Burkhard Hess, Paul Oberhammer, and Thomas Pfeiffer, et al, ‘External Evaluation of Regulation No. 1346/2000/EC on Insolvency 
Proceedings’ (JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4, University of Heidelberg and University of Vienna 2012) (Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna-
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23 Bork & Mangano (n 10) 16-17. 
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preserving the balance between creditors and between the competing principles of universality and 
territoriality.24 The EIR Recast was passed on 20th May 2015.25 
3.3 The Key Features of the EIR Recast 
The EIR contains rules that provide procedural uniformity for European cases in the area of insolvency 
law (relating to both corporate and personal insolvency) and related procedures. It sets out the 
parameters for establishing Member State jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments.26 (The JCOERE project relates to corporate entities only).  
The EIR applies to companies whose Centre of Main Interests (COMI) is in a Member State of the 
European Union. It is designed to provide uniform rules regarding choice of jurisdiction (forum) and 
choice of law. Generally, the country possessed of the COMI has exclusive jurisdiction to open main 
insolvency proceedings and these must be given immediate, full, and unqualified recognition in every 
other affected Member State. As to choice of law, the general principle (although there are important 
exceptions) is that the law of the Member State within which main proceedings are opened will govern 
the conduct and effect of the insolvency proceedings.27  By providing full and unqualified recognition, 
the EIR applies the concept of limited universality, meaning that the proceeding is universal and 
produces enforceable effects throughout the EU, including over the authority of the insolvency 
professional and over all creditors of the entity in the whole of the EU. The limited aspect of the EIR is 
associated with the provisions in the EIR which recognise the ability of parties to open a secondary 
proceeding in another Member State.28 Primarily, secondary proceedings are intended to protect local 
creditors whose claims might be treated differently in the primary proceedings due to differences in 
legal frameworks.29 To support this aim, the Regulation also provides for choice of law provisions in 
relation to certain specific issues. 
The effectiveness of the EIR in curbing forum shopping between EU jurisdictions also depends to some 
extent on the harmonisation of substantive rules. Where there are significant differences in legal 
frameworks and no “gatekeeping” devices present to prevent it, debtors and their practitioner advisors 
are likely to select a jurisdiction that most benefits their particular situation and outcome goals.30 There 
are debates surrounding the concept of choice of forum. It could be said that the flexibility of an effective 
procedure in one jurisdiction will benefit the EU economy overall, as well as those professionals of a 
jurisdiction who run such procedures.31 On the other hand, there is a view that choice of forum is driven 
by the search for particularly favourable legal frameworks. In academic debates, choice of forum is 
sometimes associated with claims that it engenders a ‘race to the bottom’ but not all commentators agree 
that this is a noticeable effect. The purpose of the EIR is to prevent abusive forum shopping, where an 
entity has no real connection to a particular jurisdiction. The COMI test determines the selection of a 
jurisdiction by the debtor.  It must be borne in mind that the requirement to apply the COMI test and 
establish jurisdiction only applies to procedures listed in Annex A of the EIR and this is repeated in the 
EIR Recast. 
Prior to the passing of the Recast EIR, a number of Member States had also developed supplementary 
legislation or rules that required national courts to cooperate with foreign insolvency courts where main 
proceedings had been opened.32 Codes and best practice guidelines were also developed in the time 
between the passing of the original EIR and its Recast.33 The EIR Recast refers to these guidelines in 
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Recital 20.34 It was however determined that the Recast regulation should also contain a prescription of 
an extended obligation for courts to cooperate and communicate.35 As such it introduced Articles 41-44 
and Articles 56 and 57 into the Recast EIR. These are based on Art 4 of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) and the principles of sincere co-operation and mutual trust, which in turn aim to establish 
an area of freedom, security, and justice, and on the provision concerning judicial co-operation in civil 
matters.36 
Regardless of whether a procedure is included in Annex A of the EIR Recast, continued differences in 
insolvency and restructuring frameworks will continue to provide a broader menu of choices to cross-
border enterprises in the EU.  Entities will continue to either shift COMI within the rules of the EIR 
Recast, or to utilise frameworks that are not included within the Regulation if they provide an easier 
means of access along with better potential outcomes. We would view this as particularly true of rescue 
frameworks. These continued differences stem from the difficulty mentioned at the beginning of this 
Chapter that the EU has had in its harmonisation attempts regarding insolvency law frameworks. 
3.4 The Harmonisation Debate over European Insolvency and Restructuring  
Harmonisation has been a topic of debate in the EU since the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957. It is a process in which diverse elements, in this case the laws of Member States, 
are combined or adapted to each other to form a coherent whole, while also retaining their individuality.37 
Uniform and harmonised laws help to avoid conflicts of law situations, so harmonisation efforts tend to 
be practical in nature.38 However, unification and harmonisation can only be achieved if approved by 
the EU Member States.39. 
In our context, harmonisation of insolvency law in the EU has continued to be a topic of discussion. In 
2010, INSOL Europe prepared a report discussing the need and feasibility of harmonisation of 
insolvency law.40 This report was presented to the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and 
advocated substantive harmonisation in several areas of insolvency law, including thresholds, filing, 
verification, rescue plans, ranking and priority, among many others. Beyond supporting improvements 
in procedure connected with the EIR Recast, the INSOL report also appeared to support real 
harmonisation of insolvency law across the EU.41 The INSOL report argued a familiar point, that the 
differences in insolvency frameworks between the Member States are an incentive for firms to forum 
shop in order to use the most convenient and financially beneficial insolvency framework and venue, 
regardless of the location of their assets or activities.42 The INSOL report also contended that forum 
shopping jeopardises transparency and legal predictability while decreasing the chances of restructuring 
insolvent firms.43 What followed, however, was primarily the reform of cross-border insolvency 
procedural rules in the EIR Recast, rather than introducing any harmonised substantive rules. The PRD 
is an example of a more ambitious harmonisation project:  
“The differences among Member States in procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt lead to uneven conditions for access to credit and to uneven recovery rates in 
the Member States. A higher degree of harmonisation in the field of restructuring, insolvency, 
discharge of debt and disqualifications is thus indispensable for a well-functioning internal 
market in general and for a working Capital Markets Union in particular, as well as for the 
resilience of European economies, including the preservation and creation of jobs.”44 
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39 idem 286. 
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By pursuing a harmonisation strategy, the Commission is acting in line with its prior policies.45 
Harmonisation is also a “remedy against negative externalities produced by domestic legislations of 
Member States.”46 If insolvency laws were harmonised in the EU, regulatory arbitrage and forum 
shopping at the expense of creditors and other stakeholders would be reduced. In addition, all creditors 
would know in advance with certainty which rules would apply in the case of their debtor’s default.47 A 
drive towards wholesale harmonisation may, however, effectively ignore the jurisdiction specific 
characteristics of individual Member States, including local interests and needs.48 Therefore, sometimes 
for good reason, harmonisation of insolvency has been considered impractical and unfeasible. However, 
in order to introduce an effective EU wide restructuring regime aimed at rescuing distressed businesses, 
some level of harmonisation is needed to discourage forum shopping and reduce the knock-on effects 
that this has on creditors and other stakeholders.49 
On the other hand, one could take the view that it has long been recognised that harmonisation of 
traditional insolvency proceedings is not politically feasible.50 The Commission’s aim of harmonising 
restructuring processes seems to be driven mainly by the goal of creating equal refinancing conditions 
for all businesses in Europe under financial distress.51 While the Commission’s initial Proposal for a 
Preventive Restructuring Directive52 created a set of minimum principles, upon which a preventive 
restructuring framework could be built among the Member States it became clear, however, through the 
draft iterations of the PRD, that significant political resistance was met, which is reflected in the 
compromised version that was eventually passed. 53 
The overall result of the implementation of the PRD is likely to be quite far from a fully harmonised 
position, with the consequence that debtors may continue to suffer from an uneven playing field when 
it comes to the prospect of achieving a value-preserving restructuring when facing financial distress.54 
The options provided for in the PRD means that there will be divergences in design choices among the 
Member States.55 This will likely result in a raft of new preventive restructuring frameworks56 that meet 
the PRD’s minimum standards but remain quite different given the scope afforded to implementation. 
Criticisms of the PRD are reflected in the following statement:  
“At the end of the day, it appears that the drafters of the Directive sought to address pressures and 
objectives which are too divergent to be coherent. The preventive proceedings, as initially 
envisaged, were largely inspired by the second-generation Chapter 11 restructurings, but also by 
the British Schemes of Arrangement, while keeping in tune with the lessons derived from the law 
and economics movement.”57  
As a result, where possible, debtors may choose to shop for the most convenient and beneficial forum 
for their restructuring services.  
3.5 Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Restructuring Cases: Forum Shopping. 
Nevertheless, one of the key aims of the EIR Recast is to reduce abusive forum shopping:  
“It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid incentives for parties to 
transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a 
 
45 Horst Eidenmuller and Kristin van Zweiten idem 651. 
46 Mucciarelli (n 42) 197. 
47 ibid. 
48 Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, ‘On the Number and Size of Nations’ (1997) 112 Quarterly J Econ 1030. 
49 Gert-Jan Boon, ‘Harmonising European Insolvency Law: The Emerging Role of Stakeholders’ (2018) 27 IIR 150, 165. 
50 Vasile Rotaru, ‘The Restructuring Directive: a Functional Law and Economics Analysis from a French Law Perspective’ (2019) Working 
Paper published by Droit et Croissance.  
51 Horst Eidenmuller, ‘Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime’ (2017) 18 Eur Bus Org L Rev 273, 275. 
52 Proposal for a directive COM(2016) 723 final of 22 November 2016 on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures 
to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU [2016] 2016/0359 (COD). 
53 Jennifer Payne, ‘Restructuring Reform in Europe: the European Commission’s draft Directive’ (2017) March JIBFL 149, 149-150; Horst 
Eidenmuller, ‘Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime’ (2017) 18 Eur Bus Org L Rev 273, 286.  
54 Eidenmuller & van Zweiten (n 45) 652. 
55 idem 651. 
56 Reinhard Bork, ‘Preventive Restructuring Frameworks: A “Comedy of Errors” or “All’s Well that Ends Well?” (2017) 14(6) ICR 417, 425.. 
57 Rotaru (n 50) 20. 
 38 
 
more favourable legal position to the detriment of the general body of creditors (forum 
shopping).”58 
The EIR Recast, however, has been unable to definitively preclude forum shopping given the often-
liberal interpretation of COMI by some national courts. This can happen in circumstances when forum 
shopping is perceived as a means to increase the chances of a successful and efficient restructuring, 
which is in the interests of all creditors.59  
In other systems such as the US, choice of forum can be key for the debtor to maximise returns to 
creditors and shareholders, as well as to avoid costs associated with considerable court oversight. Other 
elements such as the control by the debtor and the balance of favour between creditors (mainly the 
secured creditors) and debtors are factors in forum choice.60  The choice of a forum is governed by 
jurisdictional rules that dictate the level of association that a debtor must have with a jurisdiction in 
order to use its insolvency procedures. Where such rules are lax, it is more likely that debtors will try to 
utilise the most favourable jurisdiction for the resolution of their financial difficulties.61 However, 
gatekeeping rules are only effective if they cover the procedures that attempt to circumvent them:  
“…those who want a special legal regime governing loss distribution when a firm fails or closes 
at the same time it defaults to creditors must expect to see in bankruptcy many cases that do not 
belong there, and many cases outside bankruptcy that belong in bankruptcy.”62 
Applying this analysis to the European context, even though the aim of the EIR Recast is to avoid this 
kind of forum shopping, if it is possible to create a flexible rescue procedure that meets all of the criteria 
of the PRD while keeping the procedure outside of the remit of the EIR Recast, a jurisdiction may well 
choose to do so. This decision would be in order to compete with jurisdictions such as the UK, which 
continues to benefit from global restructurings utilising the Scheme of Arrangement. In relation to the 
UK prior to Brexit the Scheme of Arrangement was not covered by the EIR Recast and this is therefore 
a perfect example of the problem raised in this section.  
Recital 13 of the PRD refers to the EIR Recast by claiming that the PRD should be “fully compatible 
and complementary to that Regulation by requiring Member States to put in place preventive 
restructuring procedures which comply with certain minimum principles of effectiveness.”63 This 
Recital also recognises that in order to achieve compatibility with the EIR Recast, the procedures created 
in implementation of the PRD provisions may also be included in Annex A of the EIR Recast, and 
therefore subject to the test of COMI. However, Annex A has several specific parameters to be satisfied 
for the inclusion of procedures in it, such as the requirement that proceedings be public and collective. 
This means that all or a significant proportion of creditors should be included as long as the proceedings 
do not affect the claims of creditors who are not involved.64 Further, procedures in Annex A should also 
be those in which assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court.65 The 
provisions of the PRD do not necessarily include these same parameters, which gives jurisdictions 
implementing the PRD the ability to create procedures that do not satisfy the Annex A criteria and 
therefore fall outside of it.  
It has been shown that the non-inclusion in Annex A of a procedure may lead to greater use of an 
effective and efficient procedure throughout the EU and globally as the COMI test does not have to be 
met. The UK Scheme of Arrangement is a prime example of a procedure that has benefited from 
extensive use by many different jurisdictions. This is partly due to the fact that it is effective and fast, 
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but also widely accessible because it does not require COMI, only a “sufficient connection” to the UK 
to establish jurisdiction. While the absence of the Scheme from Annex A means that they will not have 
EU wide recognition, it also means that UK courts have “a wider jurisdictional base in that they may 
sanction schemes where the relevant foreign company has a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK even 
though its COMI may not be in the UK.”66 Sufficient connections have been found in circumstances that 
appear to be tenuous, such as relying on the extension of credit facilities containing English choice of 
law and jurisdiction clauses.67 Thus, there are clear benefits to not fitting within the EIR Recast. Where 
the EIR Recast does not apply, there are other legal methods of recognising and enforcing decisions on 
insolvency cases in European, private international, and domestic law.  
3.6 Recognition and Enforcement: Including Restructuring Frameworks in Annex A 
There are two main schemes of recognition and enforcement for civil and commercial proceedings 
available to companies in the EU, which are mutually exclusive when it comes to insolvency 
proceedings. The Brussels 1 Regulation applies to civil and commercial proceedings while specifically 
excluding insolvency and analogous proceedings from its remit.68 Instead, these insolvency proceedings 
are governed  by the EIR.69 However, the term “analogous proceedings” is not that helpful as the EIR 
does not expressly define what could be proceedings related to or analogous to insolvency.70 This 
uncertainty has not been fully resolved by case law. 71 
The UK has managed to utilise the Brussels 1 Regulation to increase the effectiveness of Schemes of 
Arrangement. However, there are gaps72 between these two Regulations, and the Scheme of 
Arrangement does not appear to fit neatly under either. No one is being sued in a Scheme, so it is difficult 
to fit it within Brussels I, as it is technically a procedure of UK company law, governed by Part 26 of 
the Companies Act 2006. Because it is not an insolvency procedure but a procedure based in company 
law, it is specifically excluded under Recital 16 which states that the EIR Recast will not cover 
“proceedings that are based on general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations” 
as these “should not be considered to be based on laws relating to insolvency.” In contrast, the EIR 
Recast clearly states that:- 
“This Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, 
which are based on laws relating to insolvency and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment 
of debt, reorganisation or liquidation: a debtor is totally or partially divested of its assets and an 
insolvency practitioner appointed.”73 
It will also apply where the assets of a debtor are subject to court control or supervision;74 if a temporary 
stay is granted to enable negotiations.75 It adds a further line that potentially brings procedures enacted 
subsequent to the PRD within the EIR Recast:  
“Where the proceedings referred to in this paragraph may be commenced in situations where 
there is only a likelihood of insolvency, their purpose shall be to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or 
the cessation of the debtor’s business activities.”76 
The non-inclusion of a procedure in Annex A77 will explicitly limit the application of the EIR Recast. If 
a restructuring process is not in Annex A, the Regulation will not apply.78 Despite its non-inclusion in 
the EIR, the global use of the English Scheme has proved advantageous to the UK, allowing it to become 
a global hub for insolvency and restructuring. There is nothing in the PRD that requires that the new 
procedures are entered into Annex A. For example, if the new restructuring procedure is derived from 
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a nation’s company law framework, as opposed to its insolvency framework,79 the framework will not 
be covered by the EIR Recast.  
If the aim of the Commission was to ensure that the EIR Recast and the PRD dovetail perfectly, the 
discussion in the previous paragraphs, and the example of the UK Scheme of Arrangement, raises 
questions over this policy goal. In contrast, however, the Irish Examinership, and the French Sauvegarde 
are covered by Annex A and the EIR Recast. This issue has been considered by some commentators,80 
but will be discussed further in JCOERE Project Report 2.  
That said, there are many benefits to being included under the EIR Recast that go beyond simply 
competing in the global restructuring market, as it provides certainty and foreseeability of outcomes, 
which as aforementioned, provides a positive environment for effective co-operation and 
communication in cross-border restructuring cases.  
While the PRD is unlikely to lead to the complete harmonisation of preventive restructuring 
frameworks, allowing for the flexibility that it does, means Member States will be able to adapt their 
restructuring frameworks to the real conditions of their markets. As noted by Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard: 
“…the economic efficiency of insolvency law depends on the economic conditions and 
characteristics of the financial markets of each country, as well as the sophistication of the 
institutions and actors involved in the restructuring of a viable business.”81 
Accordingly, the argument could be made that too much harmonisation in this area could have a 
counterproductive effect on Member State economies, as it would not be possible to fully adapt the 
frameworks to domestic economic conditions. Regardless, there is likely to be some harmonisation 
around a common core of the PRD,82 and the introduction in general of more effective and efficient 
restructuring frameworks will be good for the economy of the EU. 
3.7 Conclusion  
Chapter 3 has explored the history and background of cross-border insolvency and the developments in 
coordination of cross-border insolvency cases over time. In the EU, this culminated in the introduction 
most recently of the EIR Recast, which aims to coordinate cross-border cases procedurally without 
introducing any aspects of substantive harmonisation of insolvency law. The PRD, however, is the first 
attempt of the EU to introduce harmonisation in what is essentially insolvency-like procedures aimed 
at preventing formal insolvency. Chapters 6,7, and 8 address potential divergences in the Member 
States. 
3.8 Chapter 4: Context of Preventive Restructuring in the EU 
Chapter 4 will explore the evolution of preventive restructuring in the EU, as it has emerged out of 
normal insolvency frameworks. This will include an analysis of the underlying insolvency law theories. 
As the idea of a collective procedure occurring prior to insolvency is fundamentally contrary to 
traditional insolvency law principles, there are many debates and controversies among academics. These 
will be discussed in detail. The more controversial provisions include the stay or moratorium, aspects 
of majority decision-making, and cross-class cram-down. Apart from the obvious impairment of 
creditors rights and whether that is indeed fair, the justification of compelling dissenting classes of 
creditors (cram-down) has created a tremendous amount of controversy. This may also cause significant 
differences in the frameworks implementing the PRD which must be introduced by the end of 2021. 
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4. Chapter 4: Context of Preventive Restructuring in the EU 
4.1 The Evolution of Corporate Rescue and the European Rescue Culture 
The modern concept of corporate rescue has existed in some Member States for many decades, since 
the 1960s in some places. This development is associated with a realisation that, in terms of resolving 
corporate financial distress, what actually mattered for the benefit of national economies was the 
continued existence of a viable company or its business and the associated benefits to individuals and 
communities.1 Today, corporate rescue is associated with the rehabilitation of companies that are on the 
brink of collapse in order to salvage individual undertakings, restore production capacity, preserve 
employment, and ensure the continuation of investment and capital rewards.2 The idea of corporate 
rescue has, however, been met with controversy and debate as to what the ultimate benefit of rescuing 
a company might be. Issues include whether rescue ‘works’ in the long term, the extent to which the 
rights of pre-existing creditors’ are abridged, and the anticompetitive effects of rescue.3 Nonetheless, 
rescue is now accepted in many jurisdictions and has been identified as a specific policy goal in the 
European Union, reflected in the PRD.4  
This Chapter will explore the conceptual development of preventive restructuring and pre-insolvency 
procedures; it will examine the arguments supporting these ideals, and their conceptual problems. The 
views presented hereunder are not necessarily the opinions of the JCOERE Project Team, unless 
otherwise stated, rather the chapter represents the attempt of the project to canvas academic opinions. 
The Chapter will continue by exploring the evolution of preventive restructuring in the European Union, 
which will connect with the content of Chapter 5. The provisions that may present obstacles to judicial 
co-operation, either because of their implementation or because of conflict with underlying legal 
principles in individual Member States, will be explored, providing a clear link to Chapters 6-8. More 
specifically, the academic commentary surrounding the stay; majority rule in voting; and the concept of 
the cross-class cram-down, including absolute and relative priority, will be considered. The theoretical 
issues surrounding the priority for interim or rescue financing during a restructuring plan will also be 
explored. In addition, this Chapter will consider the typical tests that form part of the confirmation 
process under the PRD, namely the ‘best interests of creditors’ and the ‘unfair prejudice’ standards. 
Finally, this Chapter concludes with a transition into Chapter 5, which discusses the evolution of the 
PRD since the 2014 Recommendation on a New Approach to Business and Insolvency.5  
4.2 Preventive Restructuring: Principles and Context 
 
 Insolvency Theory 
The objective of traditional insolvency law which relies on collective processes is based on the idea that 
all (unsecured) creditors are treated proportionately, and a collective execution is directed against all of 
the property of the debtor for the common benefit, while at the common expense of all creditors.6 If all 
creditors acted in a purely self-interested manner, rushing to satisfy their claims before others, the result 
would be the destruction of collective value. 7  In the context of rescue this can lead to the destrunction 
 
1 Paul Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate 2004) 11. 
2 idem 13. 
3 I Lynch Fannon and GNM Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Bloomsbury Professional 2012) chapters 12 – 14. 
4 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the “PRD”). 
5 Commission Recommendation C(2014) 1500 final of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency OJ L 74/65. 
6 Louis Edward Levinthal, ‘The Early History of Insolvency Law’ (1918) 66(3) U Penn L Rev 223, 225.  
7 Rolef J de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Tow Common Problems: Common Pool and 
Anticommons’ (2012) 21(2) IIR 67, 69; This has the hallmarks of a common pool problem as in insolvency, a debtor’s assets are a part of a 
common pool of assets which, without certain controls over creditors who lay claim to them, would be dissipated: Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
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of a potentially viable business.8 In the absence of co-ordination and information, the best option for a 
rational creditor would be to exercise its individual enforcement rights as soon as possible.9 A collective 
system, which controls the assets of a debtor as part of a common pool for the benefit of all stakeholders 
is required.10 This collective system addresses the “failure of collective autonomy” afflicting a company 
in financial crisis and supplies the “reflective capacity” that the company would otherwise lack. It also 
aims to limit the ability of individuals to enforce their legal rights against the debtor and the exertion of 
“authority and practical leverage.”11 As noted by Jay Westbrook:  
“Only a single system operating under a single set of overall rules can achieve…unified results. 
A single system cannot be legally effective unless it controls assets and binds stakeholders 
throughout the market.”12 
Therefore, the insolvency mechanism limits the ability of creditors to reach assets in specific situations 
to the benefit of the collective of creditors, providing a mechanism whereby creditors can act in concert.13 
However, this limitation must be balanced with the need to ensure credit markets are not undermined, 
which requires that there is a reliable mechanism of execution in the event that a debtor fails to meet its 
obligations.14 There are a number of theories which have attempted to explain and justify the use of 
collective procedures to determine or resolve a company’s financial distress.  
The classic theory that has underpinned the development of insolvency law frameworks and the measure 
of fairness in the apportionment of distributions is the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. This theory takes the 
view that the objective of insolvency law is to provide a collective debt mechanism for the creditors of 
an insolvent entity and therefore, the legitimacy of an insolvency procedure depends on its ability to 
maximise the value of the debtor’s estate for distributions.15 The creditor’s bargain also claims that pre-
insolvency entitlements should be impaired in insolvency, only when necessary to maximise the net 
asset distribution to the collective of creditors, but not to accomplish strictly distributional goals.16 
Insolvency laws based on the creditors’ bargain tend to be hostile toward the redistribution of wealth 
post-insolvency.17 It could be argued, therefore, that there is inherent tension between the creditors’ 
bargain and modern regulations on corporate rescue and restructuring.18 As a result, a number of other 
theories have been developed over the past four decades.  
Jackson recognised that insolvency rules often require the sharing of assets with other creditors, in some 
cases with shareholders, and other third parties, justified often on the basis of equity, wealth 
redistribution, or appeals to communitarian values. This led him to introduce a richer version of the 
creditors’ bargain, in which all participants share the risks of business failure attributable to certain 
‘common disasters.’ The theory is nuanced by the presumption that these common disasters and the 
redistributional influence that they have had on the development of insolvency rules would be explicitly 
included in the hypothetical ex ante bargain, as long as the costs of implementing these redistributional 
rules would not outweigh the benefits to creditor wealth maximisation.19 Where the simple creditors’ 
bargain was premised on the idea that redistribution of wealth in insolvency is inconsistent with 
maximising the objectives of the collective by strictly adhering to pre-insolvency entitlements, the 
enhanced theory accepts rules that provide for redistribution to shape the insolvency process. 
Distributional objectives are entirely congruent with the goal of maximising the welfare of the group.20 
This is, however, still limited to a few specific types of creditors and continues to ignore the more 
 
‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2285; T H Jackson, ‘Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An 
Analysis of Insolvency Policy and Non-Insolvency Rules’ (1986) 60 ABLJ 399, 402. 
8 Donald R Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Insolvency’ (1991) 91(4) Columbia L Rev 717, 718.  
9 Nicolaes Tollenaar, Pre-Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative Foundation and Framework (OUP 2019) 12. 
10 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2289; see also Thomas Jackson, The 
Logic and Limits of Insolvency (HUP 1986) 11. 
11 Donald R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Insolvency Law’ (1993) 71 Tex L Rev 541, 549. 
12 Westbrook (n 10) 2285. 
13 Douglas G Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’ (1986) 15(1) J Legal Studies 127, 133. 
14 Douglas G Baird, ‘A World without Insolvency’ (1987) 50(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 173, 176. 
15 Jackson (n 10) 2-3. 
16 Robert E Scott, ‘Through Insolvency with the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic’ (1986) 53 U Chi L Rev 690, 692. 
17 Carlson (n 16) 457. 
18 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Insolvency System (Yale University Press 1999) 138. See also Scott (n 17) 691. 
19 Thomas H Jackson & Robert E Scott, ‘On the Nature of Insolvency: an Essay of Insolvency Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain’ (1989) 
75(2) Virginia L Rev 155, 157.  
20 idem 202. 
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idiosyncratic insolvency stakeholders.21 Insolvency is a messy business and involves far more 
stakeholders than those contractually connected to the business in difficulty. As Carlson notes: 
“The debtor is not the only exile from the bargaining table. Non-creditors who experience 
disutility are also not permitted into the bargain. For example, employees at will who lose their 
jobs have no status in the bargain. Neither do shopkeepers and restaurateurs who served these 
fired employees. Families and friends have no status. And public outrage over the spectacle is 
worth nothing.22 
The universe of those with legally cognizable claims in no way conforms with the universe of 
those who are harmed by an insolvency. In wealth maximisation, all preferences backed by wealth 
are honoured, whether or not those preferences are reflected in a cause of action recognised by 
state law.”23 
Elizabeth Warren recognised that the distributional issues arising in insolvency have an inherent give-
and-take character; for example, when a secured creditor enforces against an insolvent estate, this often 
defeats, at least partially, the collective rights of unsecured creditors who will not get their full 
contractual due.24 Warren’s “traditionalist” approach considers issues of fairness in the treatment of 
creditors and whether a creditors’ bargain style of approach is really the right approach to the policies 
informing insolvency law. She challenges the creditors’ bargain, redefining it as an argument about 
economic rationality, in which the aim of the policies underpinning insolvency law are to make sure 
assets are dealt with to achieve the highest value in their use.25 Warren argues that the central job of 
insolvency law should be to apportion the losses of the debtor’s default, and that “a variety of factors 
impinge on the difficult policy decision of where to let those losses fall.”26 Warren also claims that 
neither the simple nor enhanced creditors’ bargain could justify or account for corporate rehabilitation, 
restructuring, and rescue.  
 Shifting from Liquidation to Rehabilitation, Restructuring, and Rescue 
Given the focus on corporate rescue over the last several decades, there are now clearly two separate 
goals when one considers resolving financial distress: to rescue the economic entity, or to ensure an 
equitable distribution of the company’s assets upon liquidation. The former relies on the ability to 
‘rehabilitate’ a company, which implies a reorganisation rather than a liquidation; the success of the 
procedure is defined in terms of particular economic outcomes, with the economic entity surviving as a 
going concern or continuing long enough to maximise dividends to creditors.27 In contrast the criteria 
against which the success of a process such as liquidation is measured are more stratightforward and 
ascertainable. 
It could certainly be argued that, given the many competing interests in a restructuring procedure, a 
more nuanced and thoughtful approach is more appropriate than a straightforward and, ultimately, 
economic framework. The traditional approach described by Warren allows for the consideration of 
‘non normal’ stakeholders such as workers, which Baird agrees are not always protected adequately, 
though he considers that their protection is something that should sit outside of an insolvency 
framework.28  
Warren suggests that an insolvency law should also be designed to keep viable businesses from closing 
even though certain stakeholders with legitimate legal interests may want it to close.29 In other words, 
an insolvency framework should also provide for rescue, rehabilitation, and restructuring where 
relevant, to protect the greater interests of the company and its stakeholders. Further, the rules that 
 
21 idem 204. 
22 Carlson (n 16) 475. “Employment at will” refers to the employment relationship in the United States in which the employer and employee 
are entitled to walk away at any time. European and UK employment relationships are regulated, requiring in most cases a written set of 
employment terms at the least as well as certain requirements for giving notice and notice periods. That said, employees will still not find 
themselves at the bargaining table in many European jurisdictions so will still fall into the category of “non-creditors who experience disutility” 
in the insolvency of a company.  
23 Carlson (n 16) 476. 
24 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Insolvency Policy’ (1987) 54(3) U Chi L Rev 755, 789-790. 
25 idem 802. 
26 idem 810. 
27 Korobkin (n 8) 772-773. 
28 Douglas G Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Insolvency: A Reply to Warren’ (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 815, 815.  
29 idem, 828. 
 44 
 
govern a failing business should also be crafted such that the process of saving the business has a limited 
effect on the value of that business.30 In other words, insolvency and rescue rules should not be overly 
onerous or costly.31 Maximising value for the collective also means reducing strategic behaviour 
associated with individual creditors and debtors pressing whatever advantage they may have in the 
process, creating “prisoners’ dilemmas” by the exploitation of superior information or greater 
bargaining power.32 While these characteristics are undoubtedly key to an efficient system that retains 
value in the debtor for maintaining itself as a going concern or at least maximising distributions in a 
liquidation, the policies underpinning these characteristics do not fully explain how to achieve the aims 
in practice.  
 Communitarianism in Insolvency and Restructuring 
Donald Korobkin offers a competing normative explanation of insolvency law that is a value-based 
account.33 In his view, this is necessary because the creditors’ bargain model is “limited by the economic 
account’s vision of insolvency law as a mechanism for achieving superior economic returns,”34 which 
limits choices to economic outcomes only.35 Insolvency law has, however, emerged as a system with 
varied contours and dimensions that satisfy interests that go well beyond simple wealth maximisation.36 
Further, a purely economic account does not explain the provision for reorganisation that is present in 
most insolvency systems. Rather, the economic account he argues “…demonstrates only that its own 
economic model is incapable of recognising noneconomic values essential to a vindicating explanation 
of corporate reorganisation.”37 
Korobkin begins by altering how one should view the estate of an insolvent entity to include 
rehabilitative opportunities. Rather than viewing it solely as an economic object, he maintains that the 
view should also include the dynamic character of the estate. Essentially, the insolvent estate is the 
potential of the corporation as it exists.  It provides the framework within which the future of the 
corporation can be debated, shaped and determined.38 Rather than viewing the enterprise solely as a 
profit-making entity, Korobkin takes into account its individual character reflected in the choices of 
decision-makers. “Through these decisions, the enterprise is realised as a moral, political, social, and 
economic agent.”39 If one considers the enterprise in these terms, it becomes difficult to then justify a 
pure creditor wealth maximisation aim for corporate insolvency.  
Korobkin offers an alternative to the economic account in his value-based account, which also includes 
noneconomic outcomes. Where the economic account views insolvency law as a response to an 
economic problem of debt collection, the value-based account is founded on the concern to which 
insolvency law is actually addressed: “[i]nsolvency law is a response to the problem of financial distress 
– not only as an economic, but as a moral, political, personal, and social problem that affects its 
participants.”40 This alternative view easily encompasses reorganisation and restructuring, and by 
extension, preventive restructuring. It recognises that the outcomes of financial distress, such as a 
foreclosure by a secured creditor, has more than just an economic impact on the company involving 
also moral, political, personal and social issues. These conflicts tend to be intractable as they involve 
the competition of “diverse human values that are fundamentally incommensurable.”41 These human 
values cannot be reduced to purely economic terms and are thereby at odds with basic assumptions of 
economic theory, upon which the economic account of insolvency is based.42 Given the higher level of 
 
30 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Insolvency Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich L Rev 336, 344. 
31 idem 346. 
32 A prisoner’s dilemma is a theory that says that rationally acting individuals will not act in a manner that is in their collective interest if they 
are not able to communicate with each other and co-ordinate their actions. See A Rapoport and AM Chammah, Prisoner’s Dilemma (University 
of Michigan Press 1965).  
33 Korobkin (n 8) 721.  
34 idem 737. 
35 idem 738.  
36 idem 739. 
37 idem 740. 
38 idem 770. 
39 ibid. 
40 idem 762. 
41 idem 765. 
42 ibid; see generally, Jeffrey L Harrison, ‘Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics’ (1985) 33 UCLA L 
Rev 1309, 1329-1330: “Conventional Economic theory assumes that needs or wants are reducible. Essentially there is some common 
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complexity that reorganisation and restructuring present procedurally, a purely economic account does 
not explain fully or justify the use of such procedures. Reorganisations and restructurings aim to 
rehabilitate a company, rather than to liquidate it, with the success of such a procedure predicated on 
the corporation surviving as a going concern or at least existing long enough to maximise distributions 
to creditors.43 Financial distress forces participants to make difficult choices between values that cannot 
be fully reduced to pure economic terms and corporate rehabilitation (reorganisations or restructurings) 
attempts to correct financial distress and resolve those choices.44  
Korobkin’s “insolvency choice” theory is a similar communitarian approach to the creditors’ bargain 
model based on a hypothetical situation in which the principles of an insolvency system are selected by 
participants. The participants in the insolvency choice model are not limited to creditors, but include all 
persons in a society impacted by an insolvency.45 The aim is to define a “procedure of choice that 
satisfies basic notions of fairness” while ensuring that these principles do not “offend our most strongly 
considered judgments about how society ought to respond to the problem of financial distress.”46 All of 
the parties to the agreement stand equally with each person holding only a potential interest in the 
principles by which society responds to enterprises in financial distress.47 This approach argues that 
insolvency should respond to more than the exclusive problem of collecting debt48 and consider 
problems associated by other parties affected by financial distress. For example, creditor wealth 
maximisation would often lead to the sale of the business to distribute proceeds to creditors. This 
outcome would not necessarily satisfy the needs of employees or their dependents.49  
Korobkin adopts a principle of rational planning, which aims to maximally satisfy the parties’ aims by 
applying rational guidelines to regulate the aims of those represented in the bargain when an enterprise 
is in financial distress.50 When it becomes impossible to satisfy one stakeholder without frustrating 
another, the principle of rational planning benefits the parties in a worse off position (more vulnerable) 
over those who are in more advantageous positions.51 To a certain extent, Korobkin’s approach better 
explains the current insolvency and restructuring frameworks in most modern legal systems. The 
preferential treatment of some parties in both insolvency frameworks and social policy regulation is a 
clear departure from normal priorities, but meets a social need to protect more vulnerable parties.52 While 
this concept does not fit neatly within the definition or collective principles of insolvency law, it does 
allow such a framework to satisfy a broader set of needs than strict adherence to contractual entitlements 
and priorities and embraces rehabilitation.  
4.3 Rehabilitation of Companies in Financial Distress 
This section discusses the many competing viewpoints within the European insolvency academy on the 
purpose and value of rehabilitation and restructuring as well as their underlying theoretical principles. 
These discussions should lend context to some of the conflicting viewpoints amongst different Member 
States on the more controversial provisions of the PRD.  
Some European commentators are overly resistant to corporate rescue. These commentators present the 
following argument: The rehabilitation of a company aims to reduce the economic effect of a financial 
disaster.53 A fundamental justification for reorganisations and restructuring is that an entity is usually 
worth more if kept intact than if sold piecemeal. One of the common justifications for restructuring over 
liquidation is the achievement of a going concern sale. It has been argued, however, that the same 
 
denominator – utility – that can be used to compare all wants or needs. If all wants and needs are reduced to a single component, on can easily 
assume infinite interchangeability”. 
43 Michael J Roe, ‘Insolvency and Debt: A New Approach to Corporate Reorganisation’ (1983) Colum L Rev 527, 534-536. 
44 Korobkin (n 8) 773. 
45 Korobkin (n 11) 554.  
46 idem 553-553.  
47 idem 554.  
48 idem 556.  
49 idem 579. 
50 idem 582. 
51 idem 584.  
52 For other theories of corporate insolvency that have not been discussed in this report, see for example: Barry E Adler, ‘A Theory of Corporate 
Insolvency’ (1997) 72 New York University L Rev 343 and ‘The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited’ (2018) 166 Uni Pennsylvania L Rev 1853; 
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outcome can be achieved in liquidation, as the businesses of an entity are often sold on as going concerns 
as a part of the liquidation process. The argument continues that the only difference between this and a 
reorganisation is that a liquidation involves an actual sale of the assets to a third-party buyer, while a 
reorganisation only involves a hypothetical sale.54 Therefore it is argued that sale as a going concern is 
not necessarily a valid justification for opting for a restructuring over liquidation.55 But equally it is our 
view that this is not an argument against restructuring.  
The proposition that a going concern sale can be achieved as easily through liquidation ignores a few 
possibilities. The first is the forced sale aspect of liquidation; a restructuring has the advantage of 
avoiding a discount in value that would be inherent in a forced sale.  A liquidation process aimed at 
converting assets into cash within a fixed timeframe will often generate less than what one would expect 
for the same assets at market value. As Tollenaar observes, prices during a liquidation are reduced due 
to compressed timelines, inadequate information, and negative publicity.56 He goes on to state, therefore, 
that the added value of a restructuring is not a going concern surplus, rather it is the difference between 
the value that creditors attribute to the enterprise and the price that a third party is actually prepared to 
pay for it as a going concern. Essentially, supporting liquidation over restructuring relies on a hypothesis 
that the assets are worth more to the claimant creditors than they would be to third parties.57 Again, this 
is not an argument against restructuring. Furthermore, it ignores a second and important possibility that 
restructuring will allow for additional value to be extracted from the assets or business through new 
investment and new management. 
Rehabilitation, reorganisation, and restructuring may all have the benefit of protecting jobs and job 
security. While workers may be repaid as a priority in a liquidation, they may also be out of a job. 
“Those who have nothing to sell but their labour remain in the weakest possible bargaining position.”58 
A significant benefit of maintaining a company as a going concern is the protection of workers and 
maintenance of job security. Tollenaar, however, maintains that neither the rescue of a business nor the 
preservation of jobs should be the objective of a restructuring plan, which in some views is simply 
considered an alternative instrument aimed at debt enforcement.59 The continuation of the business is 
rather a consequence of a restructuring plan allowing the creditors to preserve and realise the value of 
the business as a going concern when that leads to the best recovery outcome.60 While there are 
arguments on both sides of this complex and lively debate, the EU has definitively endorsed rescue and 
has developed a preventive restructuring framework that aims to protect jobs, preserve viable 
businesses, encourage harmonisation, and protect the common capital markets.  
As outlined in Chapter 1 of this Report, the EU policy objectives included the goals of preventing 
unnecessary liquidations, avoiding unnecessary job losses and a number of capital related objectives 
such as preventing the build-up of non-performing loans. It is this latter interface with capital markets 
that is re-iterated by Commission spokespeople – “reducing the risk of loans becoming non-performing 
in cyclical downturns and mitigating adverse impacts on the financial sector.”61 
4.4 Defining Preventive Restructuring 
Restructuring and insolvency (liquidation) proceedings address different problems. Insolvency law 
responds to the insufficiency of the debtor’s assets by providing a collective debt enforcement 
mechanism in the interests of all creditors aimed at preventing disorganised dissipation of assets by 
creditors acting in their own self-interest. A pre-insolvency restructuring procedure deals with a 
situation in which assets may be, but are not necessarily, sufficient to satisfy all creditor debt. Academic 
debate seems to differ in the understanding of what is entailed in a pre-insolvency restructuring with 
some assuming there is a sufficiency of assets in all cases. This leads to a theoretical proposition that 
states that a collective procedure that impairs creditors’ rights in a restructuring is unjustified. In 
Germany where a restructuring plan can occur within a formal insolvency procedure, this has led to a 
 
54 Baird (n 13) 139. 
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57 Jackson (n 10) 214. 
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60 Tollenaar (n 9) 70. 
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distinction being made between restructuring post (formal) insolvency and restructuring pre-insolvency; 
62 the former is where all creditors have already been locked into a collective proceeding and are unable 
to exercise individual enforcement rights against the collective assets of the debtor and in the latter, it 
is assumed (perhaps wrongly by those making this distinction) that the debtor is solvent.63 This leads to 
an overemphasis on a not very controversial rule, namely a majority rule principle, which ensures that 
assets can be used efficiently without the need for unanimous agreement, as unanimity would give each 
party a veto right to a restructuring plan and potentially leading to assets being left unused.64 For effective 
restructuring to occur, jurisdictions will include at least a majority rule criteria in order to overcome 
hold-out creditors. 
The assumption that restructuring involves a non-insolvent situation contrasts with the position in other 
jurisdictions; for example, in France, Ireland, and the UK, restructuring is available where the company 
is insolvent (but not in liquidation) or tending towards insolvency. Therefore, the EU reframed the EIR 
to ensure that rescue and restructuring frameworks can also be subject to the procedural rules of the EIR 
Recast. (This is already the case with some restructuring processes including the French sauvegarde 
procedure and the Irish Examinership, amongst others). This aligns with the developments of the rescue 
culture over the last decade or so. The EIR Recast specifically includes: 
“…public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, which are based on laws relating 
to insolvency and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, reorganisation, or 
liquidation… 
Where the proceedings referred to in this paragraph may be commenced in situations where there 
is only a likelihood of insolvency, their purpose shall be to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the 
cessation of the debtor’s business activities.”65 
By including restructuring procedures as a part of insolvency law, the EIR Recast, can stretch to include 
the new restructuring tools that will be developed subsequent to implementation of the PRD.66 By 
including tools that can be used outside of formal insolvency, the legislator appears to be accepting that 
the definition of insolvency now extends beyond what has been traditionally accepted as insolvency. It 
has been argued that this approach defines insolvency proceedings instead as “not the material 
insolvency of the debtor, but rather whether the proceedings attempts to solve a common pool problem 
of the creditors.”67 An alternative approach which resonates with the view of the CJEU is that rescue 
and restructuring proceedings can operate in a situation where the company is technically but not 
formally insolvent – i.e. in an insolvency process – or is likely to be insolvent. The nature of a particular 
proceeding was at issue in a relevant CJEU case that actually revolved around the application of Article 
5(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive,68 which exempts liquidation proceedings from the automatic 
transfer of employment contracts upon the transfer of a business. The decision clearly differentiates 
between insolvency proceedings that result in the liquidation of the business and those insolvency 
related proceedings that allow the business to continue operating while undergoing reorganisation or 
restructuring.69 The key difference is that the business continues in the latter circumstances.70 Thus, there 
appears to be a different understanding among the legislature and the courts, as well as among academic 
and professional commentators, of the meaning of insolvency, how broadly it should be defined and 
whether it should include restructuring, particularly if that is taking place in a pre-insolvency situation. 
Nevertheless, the PRD has provided for an inclusive framework which envisages a range of 
restructuring tools.  
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As previously articulated, reorganisations and restructurings aim to rehabilitate a company, with success 
of such a procedure predicated on the corporation surviving as a going concern.71 Arguably, this does 
not consider the distinct possibility that the interested parties might be better off as a group if the firm’s 
assets were put to a different use.72 Douglas Baird, has questioned whether the complicated nature of 
restructuring and the risks for under-compensation and strategic game-playing by the parties are worth 
the benefits.73 Financial distress forces participants to make difficult choices between values that cannot 
be fully reduced to pure economic terms and corporate rehabilitation … attempts to correct financial 
distress and resolve those choices.74 As Madaus observes, modern restructuring frameworks offer more 
than traditional liquidation procedures; they offer planned solutions in which debtors may, for example, 
offer payments from future income or shares to creditors in exchange for debt.75 He goes on to state that, 
while giving access to creditors based on their unpaid claim is not unjustified or difficult to construct, 
the practise does deviate from liquidation priorities. It abandons the restrictions on the current collective 
assets; the mechanism at play is not dependent on insufficient available assets, if payments are 
predicated on future available income.76 While perhaps startling to some commentators, this reality is 
generally the purpose of restructuring pre-insolvency.  
A debtor-centric view of corporate reorganisation is that corporate reorganisation procedures should 
provide a “breathing space” for entities in financial difficulties by preventing creditors serving their 
individual interests by destroying a firm by selling it off piecemeal resulting in job and asset 
dissipation.77 This has been viewed as giving a debtor certain substantive rights in insolvency that they 
did not have outside of the procedure, i.e. to delay repaying its creditors.78 The PRD defines restructuring 
as:- 
“measures aimed at restructuring the debtor's business that include changing the composition, 
conditions or structure of a debtor's assets and liabilities or any other part of the debtor's capital 
structure, such as sales of assets or parts of the business and, where so provided under national 
law, the sale of the business as a going concern, as well as any necessary operational changes, or 
a combination of those elements;”79 
In addition to financial restructuring of a corporate entity that retains its full integrity, the wording of 
the PRD appears to include a process that aims to adjust the business (going concern) of a corporate 
entity through either financial restructuring or reorganisational activities, which includes the sale of 
assets or parts of businesses with the objective of enabling the enterprise to continue.80 Another crucial 
technique in a financial restructuring is a debt for equity swap, which reduces a distressed firm’s fixed 
liabilities while strengthening its equity base.81 
The PRD also offers some guidance on what it means by the term, “preventive”:  
“Preventive restructuring frameworks should, above all, enable debtors to restructure effectively 
at an early stage and to avoid insolvency, thus limiting the unnecessary liquidation of viable 
enterprises. Those frameworks should help to prevent job losses and the loss of know-how and 
skills, and maximise the total value to creditors — in comparison to what they would receive in 
the event of the liquidation of the enterprise's assets or in the event of the next-best-alternative 
scenario in the absence of a plan — as well as to owners and the economy as a whole.”82 
Thomas Jackson notes that preventive restructurings are in no way different than restructurings that 
occur during an insolvency procedure, as they have to meet the same objectives and deal with the same 
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problems.83 If insolvency proceedings are characterised by the co-ordination of the collective of 
creditors, rather than the actual insolvency of the debtor, then preventive restructuring frameworks will 
clearly satisfy the same goal.84 
“Regardless of their form, public or confidential, with or without the debtor’s dispossession, 
concerning all or only some of the creditors, if the contemplated proceedings provide an answer 
to the problem of co-ordination, then preventive proceedings are but a variation on the same 
theme. It follows that they are justified only with respect to the same objectives, that is, 
maximising the value of the company’s assets in the interest of all stakeholders and promoting 
the efficient distribution of resources in the economy”85 
The EU has, through the PRD, introduced a restructuring framework that should be available during 
(what has been often described as) “pre-insolvency”, as it refers to a “likelihood of insolvency”: 
“This Directive lays down rules on: preventive restructuring frameworks available for debtors in 
financial difficulties where there is a likelihood of insolvency, with a view to preventing the 
insolvency and ensuring the viability of the debtor.”86 
The PRD leaves “likelihood of insolvency” and “insolvency” to be defined by reference to the national 
law of the Member States.87 The PRD aims to catch firms at a stage that precedes formal insolvency, but 
it is not entirely clear how far in advance restructuring procedures should be made available. The PRD 
stipulates that a restructuring framework should be available:  
“…when it appears likely that their insolvency can be prevented, and the viability of the business 
can be ensured. A restructuring framework should be available before a debtor becomes insolvent 
under national law, namely before the debtor fulfils the conditions under national law for entering 
collective insolvency proceedings, which normally entail a total divestment of the debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidator.” (emphasis added) 
The further “upstream” that procedures are accessible, however, the greater the possibility that 
restructuring frameworks could be misused. The PRD attempts to resolve this matter in Recital 24: 
“In order to avoid restructuring frameworks being misused, the financial difficulties of the debtor 
should indicate a likelihood of insolvency and the restructuring plan should be capable of 
preventing the insolvency of the debtor and ensuring the viability of the business.” 
This does not, however, inform debtors how the likelihood of insolvency is to be determined, only that 
it should be circumstances in which the debtor is still outside of functional insolvency. European 
commentators have made much of these issues and have argued that pre-insolvency and preventive 
restructuring may, in reality, just refer to what are functionally insolvency proceedings as the 
circumstances are broadly the same, requiring the facilitation of collective enforcement. Further, it is 
argued that these proceedings should perhaps be available at a time when the insolvency of a debtor is 
so predictable that any other alternative is pointless. It may be reasonable to suggest that the time to 
initiate a restructuring procedure is when the debtor’s management is constrained by the company’s 
indebtedness to such a degree that they begin to favour short term over long term solutions, with 
detrimental effects on the long-term sustainability of the company.88 In reality, however, preventive 
restructuring can be used in less constrained circumstances.89 
The term “pre-insolvency” could therefore be a misnomer, as such proceedings are not usually used 
unless a company is already in financial difficulties. Accordingly, a pre-insolvency proceeding may still 
be regarded as an insolvency proceeding. The term is often used simply to refer to proceedings taking 
place outside of what would be considered traditional and formal insolvency procedures, essentially 
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identifying it as different in a procedural sense. 90 This is distinct from a situation where the debtor is not 
in financial difficulty to the extent that it could amount to insolvency in the near future.91  
4.5 Preventive Restructuring in Europe 
As will be described in detail in Chapter 5 of this report the PRD had a long and arduous journey through 
EU institutions and experts’ groups to becoming a Directive. The Commission began with a 
Recommendation92 in 2014 on A New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency which was made 
following a range of consultative documents including a report from INSOL Europe on the desirability 
and practicability of harmonising national insolvency laws in Europe.93 This Report surveyed seven 
Member States – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, but interestingly not 
Ireland which had a fully developed restructuring process along the lines of what became the PRD – to 
identify the differences in current restructuring procedures. These included when formal reorganisation 
procedures could be initiated and how reorganisations or restructurings were proposed, voted on, and 
sanctioned. The differences between Member States created an uneven playing field, in which some 
debtors had better prospects of restructuring than others, thereby incentivising forum shopping. Further, 
it was reported that the differences in frameworks also acted as a barrier to the adoption of restructuring 
plans in cross-border cases.94 The INSOL Europe report went on to recommend a number of areas to 
harmonise. A parliamentary Resolution reflecting many of the INSOL Europe Report’s 
recommendations was passed on 15th November 2011.95 Insolvency law harmonisation then found its 
way into the Commission’s second Communication on the Single Market Act, identifying it as a priority 
action for “the strengthening of the internal market”.96 This was quickly followed by the Commission’s 
first substantive response in the Communication on “A New European Response to Business Failure 
and Insolvency”, which is explored in detail in Chapter 5.97 Post-2014, a Commission funded project 
based at the University of Leeds surveyed Member States’ legislative frameworks providing information 
to the Commission on the existence of national restructuring frameworks.98  
It should be noted that the Commission’s activity in this area came against the backdrop of the financial 
and sovereign debt crises of the late-2000s.99 This is evident from the wording in the introduction to the 
Communication of 2012, in which it called for a “European response to create an efficient system to 
restore and reorganise a business so that they can survive the financial crisis…”100 This placed the 
emphasis more on recovery and rescue, than on liquidation and dissolution. 
While a number of Member States have introduced preventive restructuring procedures over the last 
few decades, few of them were introduced as a result of the 2014 Recommendation. Ireland had already 
been using its Examinership procedures since the 1990s and France had been formulating preventive 
restructuring frameworks at a rate of two or three reforms or new procedures per year.101 The aim of the 
2014 Recommendation was to encourage Member States to put in place frameworks to efficiently 
restructure viable enterprises to promote entrepreneurship, investment, and employment, while reducing 
obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market.102 Despite this, the response of Member States 
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was both inconsistent and incomplete; when evaluated by the Commission,103 it concluded that the 
Recommendation had not succeeded in “facilitating the rescue of businesses in financial difficulty”.104 
As a result, negotiations began on the development of a harmonising directive that would introduce a 
preventive restructuring framework to all of the EU Member States. 
Following the Commission’s evaluation of the Member States’ response to the call for legislative action 
on the back of the 2014 Recommendation,105 a new Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union 
was passed, which set out the legislative intention to pass a Directive that would deal with early 
restructuring, stating that “the initiative will seek to address the most important barriers to the free flow 
of capital, building on national regimes that work as well.”106 A year later the Proposal for a Directive107 
was published and began its journey through the EU institutions.  
The Proposal aimed to: 
“Remove obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, such as the free movement of capital 
and freedom of establishment, which result from differences between national laws and 
procedures on preventive restructuring, insolvency and second chance. This Directive aims at 
removing such obstacles by ensuring that viable enterprises in financial difficulties have access 
to effective national preventive restructuring frameworks which enable them to continue 
operating.”108 
Although the Recital 1 was revised during the negotiations period, it encompasses the same themes, 
making an important statement about the problems associated with differences in national laws and the 
related effect on the proper functioning of the internal market. In addition, preventive restructuring 
frameworks were intended to “prevent the build-up of non-performing loans”,109 an aim that was 
maintained in the final Directive.  
The PRD was influenced by 422 different inputs from a range of sources.110 In 2015, a group of 22 
experts was convened to assist the Commission in drafting the provisions and with coordinating the 
different inputs received.111 There were also meetings with more than 250 representatives of national 
governments and Parliaments, workers unions, consumers’ organisations, and other interested economic 
actors.112 Given the high level of involvement from a broad range of stakeholders and experts, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the result was what some regard as “a highly complex text”.113 For example, 
commercial and central banks tend to be in favour of harmonising insolvency proceedings and reducing 
the length of statutory moratoria, while workers’ unions and the representatives from SME organisations 
favoured harmonisation aimed at enhancing business rescue and diminishing the fixed costs of 
proceedings.114 European institutions also adopted different positions during the negotiations; the 
Commission aimed at a high degree of harmonisation of restructuring frameworks based on Chapter 11 
and the English Scheme of Arrangement.115 The European Parliament took a more cautious approach 
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with a view to preserving the interests of the affected workers, while the European Council tried to 
retain the greatest possible flexibility for national legislators.116  
4.6 Specific Restructuring Provisions as Potential Causes of Conflict in Co-Operation 
The PRD offers a restructuring framework with a range of options for the Member States among several 
obligatory provisions. Fundamentally, the PRD gives the debtor the right to propose a plan when there 
is a likelihood of insolvency, while protecting the debtor from creditors by staying enforcement actions. 
The PRD does not specify precisely what a restructuring plan can contain but it does give a general list 
of information that should be included.117 The restructuring plan can bind all creditors or be limited to 
affected creditors, leaving the rest unaffected by the plan.118 Voting takes place in classes that must be 
formed in accordance with a sufficient commonality of interest. A plan can then be adopted if the 
requisite voting majority is reached.119 The PRD also provides for a cross-class cram-down, which 
essentially means that a dissenting classes can be bound by the plan if certain criteria are present.120 
While the PRD aims to reduce court and practitioner involvement, it requires this involvement in certain 
specified circumstances, providing a minimum level of protection against the moral hazard associated 
with a complex restructuring plan that is overseen only by the debtor and forced upon dissenting 
creditors.121  
Many of these preventive restructuring provisions have controversial aspects relating to their effect on 
creditors’ rights and may present points of contention and obstacles to co-operation where differences 
can be allowed to persist between Member States. Academic commentary emanating from the 
Netherlands, Germany and other Member States underlines this potential for a difference and 
dissonance. Among the more controversial provisions that will be discussed in the sections that follow 
are the stay of enforcement actions;122 the ability to bind dissenting creditors and classes of creditors;123 
how to ensure dissenting classes are treated fairly (what rule to apply);124 and the protection and priority 
afforded to interim or new rescue financing.125 These concepts have garnered a great deal of academic 
debate and created significant controversy among the Member States, creating a wealth of literature 
presenting conflicting and contrasting view points on the benefits, disadvantages, and fairness 
justifications for the application of such provisions in a preventive restructuring situation. While the 
JCOERE Project has explored other provisions of the PRD with its contributors, they do not carry the 
same controversy than do those discussed below. The following subsections will examine each of these 
concepts in turn and the scholarly debate that surrounds them.  
 The Stay of Individual Enforcement Actions 
A stay or moratorium refers to the halting of individual enforcement actions, as well as other claims in 
some cases. The full provision of the moratorium is set out under Article 6 of the PRD and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 of this Report. The PRD Recitals set out the concept underlying 
the provision:  
“A debtor should be able to benefit from a temporary stay of individual enforcement actions, 
whether granted by a judicial or administrative authority or by operation of law, with the aim of 
supporting the negotiations on a restructuring plan, in order to be able to continue operating or at 
least to preserve the value of its estate during the negotiations.”126 
The stay is at the core of the ability to supplant individual creditors’ contractual remedies with a 
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collective system of distribution.127 It is viewed as the “archetypal vehicle of rational planning” and as 
playing an “essential role in framing insolvency discourse.”128 When creditors enforce their rights 
unilaterally against the debtor’s property, their actions may prevent the possible realisation of other aims 
that could be far more important than the satisfaction of the best interest of an individual creditor. While 
the better aims may be unknown at the outset, the stay allows those aims to be realised and articulated 
without risking the value of the business in the process. It could be uncertain in the beginning whether 
the corporation has a realistic prospect of survival and if it does, what the “relative importance is of the 
aims that may be frustrated by its demise.” An automatic stay prevents creditors from determining the 
final content of a restructuring plan before all of the relevant facts have emerged.129 
A stay also prevents the un-co-ordinated rush to grab assets through non-insolvency remedies. Without 
a stay, it would be impossible to co-ordinate between stakeholders if their separately rational actions 
resulted in an outcome that is suboptimal for the stakeholders as a whole.130 The stay therefore allows 
for a collective approach to be taken.131 A co-ordinated action could then hypothetically maximise the 
value of the debtor’s assets to the benefit of the collective as a whole and ensure an efficient distribution 
of the value should liquidation be the end result.132  
There are also those who recognise some potential for abuse within the stay. For example, a stay may 
not incentivise the use of a procedure in a case where a restructuring would not be value-maximising. 
Managers of a non-viable business may seek to use a procedure with a stay for some strategic purpose, 
or there may be an incentive for a viable debtor to use a procedure if it wishes to “shake-off” liabilities 
that it is currently capable of servicing.133 Such abuse can be mitigated, however, by the ability for 
creditors to apply to lift the stay in certain circumstances, as well as the option for Member States to 
provide that authorities can refuse to grant the stay. Generally, though, the stay is considered a key 
provision that allows for the successful completion of preventive restructuring plans. Were it possible 
to continue actions during the negotiation of a plan, they could imperil the success of a restructuring by 
impairing the value of assets available.134 
 The “Intra-Class” Cram-Down (or Majority Rule) 
The application of a majority rule within individual classes of creditors can allow for the maximisation 
of the debtor’s assets in the interest of all creditors, which helps to justify interference with contractual 
rights for dissenting creditors. Creditors are viewed by some as being best placed to identify their best 
interests, therefore, applying a majority rule is a reasonable approach because it shows that creditors 
have been adequately protected in a way that is commonly accepted in democratic society. While not 
all creditors have the same interests, by placing them in classes where interests are aligned, the 
possibility of unfairly expropriating a group of creditors with a different set of interests is removed.  
If unanimity is required to approve a plan, any individual voting creditor essentially has a veto right that 
can prevent a plan from coming into effect. If one or more creditors fail to consent in a situation of 
unanimity, then there will be a “hold-out” position, in which a creditor can try to leverage a higher 
proportionate share in exchange for their consent to the plan.135 As such a share is obtained at the expense 
of consenting creditors, every creditor has an incentive to withhold their consent to avoid the reduction 
of their proportionate share in favour of a hold-out creditor, preventing the plan from coming into 
effect.136 Thus the application of majority rules in the confirmation of an insolvency plan helps to prevent 
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“individualistic behaviour from harming the interests of the group.” 137 In common insolvency law 
parlance, this majority rule is often called a cram-down or intra-class cram-down.  
A key criterion that justifies a democratic approach to plan approval is that no party should be worse 
off under the plan than without it.138 Further:  
“Plan approval should be based on clear criteria aimed at achieving fairness among similar 
creditors, recognition of relative priorities, and majority acceptance, while offering opposing 
creditors or classes a dividend equal to or greater than what they would likely receive in a 
liquidation proceeding.”139 
The PRD provides that if a creditor challenges a plan, it can be confirmed only if it meets the “best 
interests of creditors” test. This states that no dissenting creditor can be worse off under the plan than 
they would be in a liquidation or in the next best alternative, should a plan not be confirmed.140 While 
concern is expressed that this fairness criterion is insufficient, the  PRD mitigates this danger by 
requiring that voting rights and class formation can be examined by a judicial or administrative 
authority, if a request for confirmation is submitted.141 In addition, Member States are required to have 
judicial or administrative confirmation of plans if they affect the interests of dissenting parties, 
embedding formal oversight in the process that can mitigate any potential unfairness.142 
 The Cross-class Cram-down 
Arguably, the presence of the cross-class cram-down in article 11 of the PRD is a tremendous advance 
in European restructuring law as it potentially facilitates value- and employment-preserving 
restructuring of distressed but viable enterprises that might otherwise go into liquidation.143 From an 
economic perspective, once the plan being imposed on dissenting classes ensures the maximisation of 
value of the debtors’ assets and provided no creditors’ interests are unjustifiably sacrificed, it is 
reasonable to accept its confirmation.144 In the absence of a cross-class cram-down mechanism, classes 
of creditors would effectively be able to leverage to limit their losses to the detriment of other classes 
of creditors, for which the adoption of a plan may be more important, such as classes with a lower 
tolerance for losses. “It follows that the rejection of the plan by a class of creditors must not preclude 
its adoption as long as other safeguards against the unfair treatment of recalcitrant creditors…offers 
sufficient protection.”145  
There are also some significant conceptual issues with priority rules that aim to assess fairness within a 
cross-class cram-down. While the term “absolute priority” seems to have an accepted definition derived 
from American restructuring law, in practice this is viewed only as a starting point, which can be 
diverted from if the outcome would be better for the collective of creditors.146  
The Commission’s approach to the cross-class cram-down initially followed Chapter 11, requiring that 
the plan be approved by at least an “in-the-money” class other than the shareholders, where the value 
breaks between a going concern sale and a liquidation. This test aligns the interests of all stakeholders 
as they benefit from all gains and suffer all losses connected to the decision that is at stake, although 
such a test also encourages a war on valuation.147 The final PRD addressed some of the criticism from 
the Member States, leading to a cross-class cram-down based on the German model, which gave the 
provision some predictability.148 This model does not preclude a majority rule over dissenting classes, 
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140 PRD, art 10(2)(d) – “best interests of creditors” is defined in PRD, art 2(1)(4) as “a test that is satisfied if no dissenting creditor would be 
worse off under a restructuring plan than such a creditor would be if the normal ranking of liquidation priorities under national law were 
applied, either in the event of liquidation, whether piecemeal or by sale as a going concern, or in the event of the next-best-alternative scenario 
if the restructuring plan were not confirmed.” See also Eidenmuller (n 81) 282. 
141 PRD, art 9(5). 
142 PRD, art 10(1)(a). 
143 Ignacio Tirado and Riz Mokal, ‘Has Newton had his Day? Relativity and Realism in European Restructuring’ (2019) Winter Eurofenix 20, 
21. 
144 Rotaru (n 86) 36. 
145 ibid. 
146 Ignacio Tirado, Keynote Address “Relative vs Absolute Priority”, INSOL Europe Academic Forum, 26 th September 2019, Copenhagen 
Denmark. 
147 Rotaru (n 86) 38. 
148 PRD, art 11(1)(b). 
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which requires the provision of sufficient protection of creditors by reference to rules of fair treatment 
and respect for the order of priorities.149 The derogations from Article 11 and its terms then allow for the 
application of the overriding test of unfair prejudice.150 
The absolute priority rule “provides that in a reorganisation, senior owners are paid in full before junior 
owners are paid anything.” This rule is common in all or most insolvency systems. Much has been made 
of the fact that this is a default position in the US Insolvency code, however, while absolute priority 
remains a fixed principle that forms the foundation of the American restructuring procedure, departures 
from this rule are commonplace in practice.151 The procedure allows parties to negotiate a settlement that 
tolerates a deviation from the default position. As a result, the rule of absolute priority only comes into 
play when it is protecting a class that dissents from a plan.152 This approach is also reflected in the Irish 
Examinership process.153  
There are also economic efficiency rationales for respecting priority rules. All stakeholders have an 
interest in a company as they all participate in its financing in some fashion, whether directly or 
indirectly through labour. The order of priority ascribed to these interests defines the cost for the debtor 
of each layer of financing. Respecting priorities also avoids encouraging some stakeholders to engage 
in strategic activities to create conditions that favour themselves to the detriment of other stakeholders. 
It also increases the predictability of the treatment of all creditors with the concomitant impact of 
reducing the costs of financing. Finally, it ensures that the distribution in some way measure up to pre-
insolvency entitlements by indicating default entitlements, but without impeding a negotiation for 
redistribution, if needed, to secure a plan to rescue a viable business.154 The respect of priorities reflects 
the concept of the “absolute priority rule.”155 
There are also economic justifications for deviations from absolute priority. For example, if junior 
investors run the business and have private information and expertise, often described as firm-specific 
human capital, then a portion of the value of the business may be inextricably linked to their 
participation. This is particularly the case for small businesses. Allowing junior investors to participate 
in the distributions from reorganisation, even if they are technically out-of-the-money, appears to be a 
price that senior investors in the United States are willing to pay in order to ensure their co-operation.156  
This is not usually the case for the reorganisations of larger companies, however, in which equity holders 
do not have similar expertise or value to the company and are often wiped out. At times, junior investors 
can exercise enough power to reach a deal with senior investors in order to avoid unnecessary dissipation 
of value that can be caused by the delays in negotiation. It was noted by Baird that “a world in which 
absolute priority is not respected is one in which entrepreneurs have less access to capital.” 157 This is 
clearly a criticism in the ability of parties to negotiate too far away from pre-contractual entitlements 
during a reorganisation, if it is not absolutely necessary to preserve value in the company.158  
Arguably, the academic debate regarding the retention of the absolute priority rule does not reflect the 
issues in practise. The PRD, in its description of the approval process and the provision of the cross-
class cram-down in article 11, addresses both legal frameworks and practise in existence in Member 
States. It also reflects the concerns expressed in this regard by commentators and experts.  
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The European relative priority rule is seen as a means of facilitating restructuring negotiations, while 
the absolute priority rule is seen by some as being too rigid and counterproductive by giving certain 
classes of creditors a “harmful lever of extortion”.159 There are four further problems with the APR 
suggested by Mokal and Tirado. First, the APR subjects approval to a requirement that may be 
completely unrealistic; the debtor’s estate may lack sufficient value to pay dissenting creditors fully, 
making the cram-down impossible and causing the plan to fail. Secondly, it incentivises dissent on the 
basis of a possible “free-ride”; members of a class may sufficient support elsewhere, thereby having an 
incentive to vote against the plan in the hopes of receiving full payment. Third, the aforementioned 
incentive to hold-out risks backfiring as creditors in multiple classes may have similar incentives to 
hold-out, potentially leading to rejection of the plan. Finally, it makes it difficult to give any value to 
equity holders, which is viewed as problematic for small and medium sized companies160 as noted 
above.161 
Unsurprisingly, the APR while operating as a starting point from which negotiations and bargaining 
begins, it does not feature as an absolute rule in any restructuring framework that operates as a genuine 
corporate rescue device.162 
As noted by the CODIRE Project Team: 
“The relative priority rule is a preferred alternative to the ‘absolute priority rule’ familiar in US 
restructuring practice. The absolute priority rule makes it a precondition for confirmation of a 
plan rejected by one or more classes of affected stakeholders that members of each dissenting 
class would receive the full face-value of their claims before the members of a lower class receive, 
or retain, anything. This approach is defective. It incentivises dissent from the plan so long as the 
dissentients expect the plan to receive sufficient support from claimants in other classes. Such 
dissentients would expect to free-ride on others’ sacrifice by being paid in full while those others 
accepted a haircut. This makes confirmation of the plan less likely, however, since each class 
might in this way have some such incentive to dissent.” 163 
The European concept of the RPR reflects pre-existing practise in some Member States.  As with the 
US Chapter 11, the starting point is an absolute priority rule pre-existing the relevant domestic 
processes. Negotiating the rescue plan and reaching agreement is done with full recognition and 
management of pre-insolvency entitlements. These domestic processes tend to include formal approval 
of the plan, before becoming effective. This stage is similarly envisaged in the PRD. It has been claimed, 
however, that there is a moral hazard in allowing for divergence from absolute priority, derived in part 
from allowing shareholders to retain shares while writing down creditors, upending priority rules. This 
is viewed as unfair; it should be noted, however, that in practice shareholders rarely benefit. 164 For these 
commentators, the question may be how to balance this moral hazard with the benefit to the economy 
of rescues of viable businesses and all of the associated benefits. 165 
The introduction of the European version of RPR has caused considerable consternation in some 
quarters, claiming that it will lead to arbitrary results and value destroying uncertainty.166 These 
criticisms have been roundly rebuffed by the highly respected authors of two reports.167 On the one hand, 
if the aim is to better safeguard the interests of all stakeholders negotiating a plan in an optimal setting 
for such negotiation, then an RPR in the way it is drafted in the PRD seems understandable. On the 
other hand, it has been viewed as blurring the initial bargaining positions of creditors. The argument 
continues that the existence of an RPR approach broadens the scope of agreements beyond what can 
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reasonably be discussed under time pressures, as each creditor has an incentive to try and win a bit more 
from the agreement as the priority rules become negotiable. 
Furthermore, the wording of the APR in the PRD has been viewed as providing enough flexibility to 
ensure the effective agreement of restructuring plans. There is leeway for national legislators to assess 
the meaning of “full satisfaction” and “equivalent means” according to Recital 55:  
“Member States should have discretion in implementing the concept of ‘payment in full’ 
including in relation to the timing of the payment, as long as the principal of the claim and, in 
the case of secured creditors, the value of the collateral are protected.”  
This should make it possible to pay junior creditors as soon as senior creditors have been given sufficient 
additional security or payment in kind that equates to what they are owed, in other words, not necessarily 
in cash.168 In addition, the PRD allows for exceptions to the APR if they are equitable, which is reflected 
in recital 56:  
“Member States should be able to derogate from the absolute priority rule, for example where 
…essential suppliers covered by the provision on the stay of individual enforcement actions are 
paid before more senior classes of creditors.” 
If the aim of the PRD is to create proceedings that save companies, however, then a relative priority 
rule may be helpful, as it can allow a plan to be confirmed even when some creditors do not believe in 
the existence of the restructuring value and oppose the proposed plan. An application of the RPR as 
drafted in the PRD may help restructuring practitioners to reach an agreement that seems reasonable, 
while saving the debtors’ company in spite of  the opposition of creditors.169 Fundamentally, this seems 
to be a remnant of the debtor or creditor focussed debate within corporate rescue.  
The absolute vs relative priority argument presents a challenge for comparative law because it raises 
fairly serious reactions among academics in certain jurisdictions, which makes finding a compromise 
difficult.170 Some of this is due to legal culture, which ascribes moral hazard to flexible debtor in 
possession restructuring procedures. This argument is associated with the debate described above 
between insolvency and pre-insolvency.171 For example, some of the contributors to the JCOERE 
Questionnaire took a strict interpretation, discussing only pre-insolvency restructuring even if they had 
a basic restructuring procedure that essentially fulfilled the same purpose. This issue goes beyond the 
challenges of comparative law, to the challenge of debating new and largely untested concepts within 
the civil law systems of most of the EU. These concepts are often discussed at cross-purposes with 
common law jurisdictions, such as Ireland and the UK, which have judicially developed standards for 
assessing fairness to dissenting creditors. It would seem, therefore, that the requirement in article 11 for 
approval of a plan by a judicial or administrative authority approval where the plan has not been 
accepted by every class anticipates difficulties and reflects practise. However, again we find in debates 
that scepticism regarding the judicial function emerges in this latter context. These issues, which we 
believe are reflective of legal culture will be considered in detail in the JCOERE Report 2. 
 Protection and Priority of Rescue Financing 
The PRD presents a number of justifications for the protection and prioritisation of rescue financing. 
The PRD recognises that the success of a restructuring plan often depends on financial assistance: first, 
to support the operation of the business during the negotiations. Second, financial assistance supports 
the implementation of the restructuring plan following its confirmation. For this reason, the PRD aims 
to protect interim and new financing by making it exempt from avoidance actions in a subsequent 
insolvency proceeding.172 In so providing, the PRD recognises that the availability of necessary 
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financing could be jeopardised if national insolvency laws allow such financing to be subject to 
avoidance actions, or to civil, administrative, or criminal sanctions.173 
Interim financing occurs prior to a restructuring plan being confirmed, therefore limitations should not 
be applied so as to encourage a fully successful restructuring process. It is defined explicitly as: 
“any new financial assistance, provided by an existing or a new creditor, that includes, as a 
minimum, financial assistance during the stay of individual enforcement actions, and that is 
reasonable and immediately necessary for the debtor's business to continue operating, or to 
preserve or enhance the value of that business.”174  
New financing is defined as “any new financial assistance provided by an existing or a new creditor in 
order to implement a restructuring plan and that is included in that restructuring plan.”175 
According to the PRD, both interim and new financing should be protected from avoidance actions and 
personal liability at a minimum. In order to encourage new lenders to take the enhanced risk of investing 
in a viable debtor in temporary financial distress may require other incentives, such as giving priority 
to financing over unsecured claims in subsequent insolvency procedures, at the least.176 To reduce 
potential for abuse, the financing should at least be limited to that which is immediately necessary for 
the continued operation or survival of the enterprise, or to preserve or enhance value pending 
confirmation of a plan.  
The availability of such financing can be justified by the fact that debtors in financial distress will find 
it difficult to acquire new financing if they cannot offer reliable security, thus offering priority or 
protection may incentivise rescue lending. It is unlikely that lending institutions will be prepared to lend 
new money if there is a risk of not getting that money back, should the restructuring plan fail. “Security 
can be provided by rights in rem but if the debtor has no assets in which it can offer a priority right, 
subsequent insolvency proceedings would suffice.”177 The concept of a super-priority for rescue 
financing raises certain complex questions, however, particularly if financing is coming from an existing 
creditor, which may benefit from an improved priority position in a pre-existing claim as part of the 
restructuring plan. 178 
Priority rights place some creditors in a better position than those already owed debts by the company. 
As the pari passu is a key tenet of insolvency law, deviance from this norm must be justified. This has 
been done by reference to the argument that restructuring efforts are worthy of being supported through 
fresh money and that there is an economic necessity to protect new financing.179 The Directive resolved 
this in a number of ways, for example some protections are provided by requiring court or administrative 
approval for plans that include priority for new or interim financing.180 While giving priority to new 
financing clearly interferes with standard priorities in insolvency and treats new financiers more 
favourably than other creditors, the rescue of viable businesses and the associated benefits, is seen as an 
overarching justification.  
4.7 Summary and Conclusion: Implementation and Conflicts 
This Chapter explored the theoretical underpinnings of insolvency law as it has evolved to accommodate 
aims going beyond simple liquidation. Beginning with the creditors’ bargain theory and progressing 
through alternatives, such as traditionalism and communitarianism, which more closely reflect the 
evolution of insolvency and corporate rescue, rehabilitation, and now preventive restructuring. The 
conceptual evolution of preventive restructuring within the EU was then discussed in terms of 
contrasting academic and scholarly commentary on the subject. A brief discussion of the evolution of 
the PRD was then presented, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Finally, the 
more controversial provisions, namely the moratorium, majority rule, cross-class cram-down, and 
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priority of rescue financing, were introduced and discussed in terms of their worth, fairness to creditors 
and cost or benefit to rescue generally.  
 
4.8 Chapter 5: Exposition of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 
The next chapter will give a full exposition of the PRD, beginning with the 2011 report presented to the 
Commission by the Committee on Legal Affairs and continuing with the 2014 Recommendation on a 
New Approach to Business and Insolvency.181 It considers the journey from these early communications 
to the PRD, as it is now. The next chapter will examine the various inter-institutional discussions and 
the Proposal’s progress through the EU, focusing on the provisions, which resulted in the greatest 
compromises in the final text. These provisions will primarily include the stay, the cram-down and 
cross-class cram-down, and the protection of new financing. The work in Chapter 5 satisfies a key task 
of Workpackage 2 of the JCOERE project.
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5. Chapter 5: Exposition of the Preventive Restructuring Directive  
5.1 Introduction  
 Context of Exposition within the JCOERE Project 
Chapter 5 of this Report provides a detailed exposition of the evolution of the Preventive Restructuring 
Directive,1 which at the commencement of the JCOERE Project was still only a Proposal for a Directive 
on Preventive Restructuring.2 As the PRD came into effect on 20th June 2019 and has now entered the 
implementation period, which is due to end on 17th July 2021,3 this task became more challenging. 
However, this challenge allowed the JCOERE Project team the opportunity to fully assess the 
institutional changes that occurred prior to the finalised PRD with a clear picture of the compromise 
eventually achieved. This legislative process adumbrated the difficulties that there may be in the 
harmonisation of implementation of the PRD across the Member States, given the competing values 
apparent in the final drafting. This Chapter will describe the progress of the Directive through various 
EU Institutions and will highlight the significant changes that have occurred along the way, providing 
a background against which the contributor responses to the JCOERE Questionnaires can be discussed 
in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.  
 Presentation of the Chapter 
The journey of the PRD began in 2011 going through many levels of EU negotiations until finding its 
current state as a Directive. The JCOERE Project has identified a collection of the provisions in the 
PRD that may present obstacles to judicial co-operation. These rules are also the subject matter of the 
JCOERE Questionnaire Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU Directive, the 
responses to which will be discussed and analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this Report. The articles of 
the PRD, upon which the JCOERE Project focuses are articles 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 17.  
For the purpose of this Chapter, the conceptual foundations of these articles will be discussed as they 
developed over time and through various institutional changes into their final form.4 These concepts 
include the stay of individual enforcement actions; the protection of new finance; decreased court 
formality; and the cross-class cram-down. The stay and the protection of new financing are clearly now 
enshrined in articles 6 and 17 respectively. The cross-class cram-down and its connected rules regarding 
the adoption and confirmation of restructuring plans are set out in articles 9-11, while article 11 contains 
the mechanics of the provision as well as some of its most controversial characteristics. Articles 9 and 
10 will be discussed only insofar as they relate to article 11 in this Chapter. Finally, court involvement, 
whether this amounts to decreased court formality or otherwise depending on jurisdiction, is considered 
under article 4, but really is present as a concept in all of the aforementioned articles. This will be 
discussed insofar as it has developed within the various provisions. The conclusion of this Chapter will 
then offer a brief synopsis of how the articles under scrutiny have changed from the Proposal to the 
PRD. 
Section 5.2 begins with the report presented by the Committee on Legal Affairs – a committee of the 
European Parliament – to the European Commission in 2011, continues with the Communication from 
the Commission to the Parliament in 2012 and concludes with the Recommendation and accompanying 
 
1 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the “PRD”). 
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2016) 723 final of 22 November 2016 on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and 
amending Directive 2012/30/EU [2016] 2016/0359 (COD) (the “Proposal”). 
3 PRD, art 34.  
44 There was little discussion of art 13 on Workers during these interinstitutional negotiations as this appeared at a very late stage in the drafting, 
so will not form a focus of this Chapter.  
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Impact Assessment put forward by the Commission in 2014. By detailing this 3-year process, the 
intention is to give a clear overview of the steps preceding the Commission Proposal in 2016. 
Accordingly, this Chapter is split into three distinct parts: 
(i) Section 5.2 – the historical context of the Directive (pre-Proposal); 
(ii) Section 5.3 – the Commission Proposal (2016); and 
(iii) Sections 5.4 & 5.5 – the negotiation process for the final Directive (post-Proposal).   
 
5.2 Historical Context 
 Committee on Legal Affairs Report (2011)5 
In 2011, the Committee on Legal Affairs issued a series of recommendations on insolvency proceedings 
in the EU to the Commission and with that report, began a journey towards the final Directive and 
indeed towards elements of the Recast Insolvency Regulation of 2015.6 Amongst the other reasons for 
the proposed changes contained within the 33 recitals, the Committee noted that:7 
(i) the (then) variances between national insolvency frameworks could lead to “forum 
shopping” by businesses and as such, there was a need to prevent abuse in order to benefit 
the internal market;8  
(ii) whilst full harmonisation was not possible, there some areas of insolvency law where 
harmonisation would be worthwhile and achievable;9  
(iii) there was significant difficulty in insolvency proceedings where the process involved a 
group of companies. At that time, the commencement of multiple separate insolvency 
proceedings in different jurisdictions was likely, as opposed to a co-ordinated approach, 
which led to more monetary losses for the parties involved and greater impediments to 
recovery;10 
(iv) the interlinking of national insolvency registers would allow relevant parties and courts to 
determine whether insolvency proceedings have been opened in another Member State; 
and11 
(v) the (then) lack of harmonisation with regard to the ranking of creditors was problematic 
and that a higher priority for employees' claims was necessary.12 
The report went on to suggest that the European Parliament advocated harmonisation in the following 
five areas: 
- certain aspects of the opening of insolvency proceedings;  
- certain aspects of the filing of claims;  
- aspects of avoidance actions;  
- general aspects of the requirements for the qualification; and  
- work of liquidators and aspects of restructuring plans.  
The Parliament considered that the conditions under which insolvency proceedings could be opened 
should be harmonised via directive. The report supported harmonisation of, amongst other areas, the 
 
5 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Report with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the 
context of EU company law’ (2011) A7-0355/2011 (“Legal Affairs Report”).  
6 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) OJ L 141/19 
(the “EIR Recast”). 
7 Much of the content of the recitals focused on employees and employment law, which are not considered to be particularly relevant to the 
conversation at hand, except for (v), which pertains to employees as a class or creditors.  
8 Legal Affairs Report, recitals A & B. 
9 Legal Affairs Report, recital C. Later in the Legal Affairs Report, it became apparent that the areas were certain aspects of the opening of 
insolvency proceedings and the filing of claims, aspects of avoidance actions and restructuring plans and the qualifications and role of 
liquidators.  
10 Legal Affairs Report, recitals P & Q. 
11 idem recital R. 
12 idem recital AB. 
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ability of companies themselves to initiate insolvency proceedings, the timely initiation of proceedings 
in order to allow for rescue, and the ability of the debtor to open proceedings if they are insolvent or 
likely to be.13 Part 1.5 of the report proposed harmonisation of aspects of restructuring plans, including 
that debtors and liquidators may present a restructuring plan as an alternative to complying with 
statutory rules, that such plans must contain all relevant information enabling creditors to make a 
decision and that the plan must be approved (or rejected) by the relevant court.14 Also noteworthy is 
part 2.4., where the European Parliament considers that article 32 of the Insolvency Regulation15 should 
provide for an unequivocal duty of communication and co-operation, not only between liquidators, but 
also between courts. 
 Commission Communication ‘A New Approach to Business Failure’ (2012)16 
Following on from this report, the Commission responded to the Parliament in the form of a 
Communication, dated 12 December 2012. In this document, “A new European approach to business 
failure and insolvency”, the Commission identified six key areas where national differences could create 
“legal uncertainty and an ‘unfriendly’ business environment”. They cited second chance for honest 
entrepreneurs; discharge periods that discourage a second chance; different rules on opening 
proceedings leading to varying chances for restructuring; unfulfilled expectations of creditors for 
different categories of debtors; uncertainty regarding procedures to file and verify claims for creditors; 
and the promotion of restructuring plans. Of key importance to the Commission as evidenced by the 
section dedicated to it was the situation faced by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The report 
noted the importance of giving businesses in that sector a second chance and suggested four key ways 
in which SMEs could be supported: prevention (of bankruptcy due to high cost of restructuring), second 
chance, out-of-court settlements, and in-court procedures.  
The report concluded with the ‘steps to be taken,’ namely: 
(i) Modernisation of the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings; 
(ii) Adoption of the European Entrepreneurship Action Plan; 
(iii) Country-specific recommendations inviting Member States to update their insolvency laws; 
(iv) Impact assessment of the differences in national insolvency laws; and 
(v) Public consultation on the issues identified in the document. 
 Commission Recommendation and Impact Assessment (2014)17 
Subsequent to the Communication to the Parliament, the Commission drafted a Recommendation dated 
3rd March 2014 and entitled ‘A new approach to business failure’ and an accompanying Impact 
Assessment. It was the view of the Commission at that time that the EU was still facing the single largest 
economic crisis in its history and that consequently, improving the efficiency of insolvency laws was 
critical to supporting economic recovery, given the record numbers of bankruptcies across Member 
States.18 The objective of the Commission, according to the Recommendation, was to “ensure that viable 
enterprises in financial difficulties…have access to national insolvency frameworks, which enable them 
to restructure at an early stage with a view to preventing their insolvency…”19 It was argued that 
preventing insolvency would maximise the value to the economy as a whole, benefit those connected 
with businesses at risk of insolvency, such as creditors, employees and owners, and contribute to saving 
jobs.20 The Commission also sought to give honest bankrupt entrepreneurs a “second chance”, which it 
viewed as potentially increasing self-employment rates in Member States, amongst other benefits.21 
 
13 idem part 1.1.  
14 idem part 1.5. 
15 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1 (the “EIR”). 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee 
COM(2012) 742 final of 12 December 2012 on a new European approach to business failure and insolvency [2012] OJ C 271/ 55. 
17 Commission Recommendation C(2014) 1500 final of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency [2014] OJ L 
74/65 (the “Recommendation”). 
18 Commission, ‘Impact Assesment Accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and 
Insolvency’ [2014] (Staff Working Document) SWD (2014) 61 final 1 (“Impact Assessment of Recommendation”). 
19 Recommendation, recital 1.  
20 Recommendation, recital 1 & 12. 
21 ibid. 
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Variances in both how Member States treated restructuring and the national rules on a second chance 
for honest entrepreneurs led to a reluctance on the part of businesses to expand across the European 
Union, either by virtue of the increased costs or uncertainty as to their level of exposure in other Member 
States, and very different recovery rates for creditors.22 As such, the Commission believed that:  
“the creation of a level playing field in these areas would lead to greater confidence in the systems 
of other Member States for companies, entrepreneurs and private individuals, and improve access 
to credit and encourage investment.”23  
The Recommendation noted that SMEs, in particular, would benefit from the Recommendation as 
paying high restructuring costs was not feasible for such companies, something which reflected the 
position taken by the Commission in 2012 in its Communication to the Parliament.24  
Key to the Recommendation of the Commission were the following points: 
- Flexibility of procedures, namely limiting the need for court formalities to where they are 
necessary and proportionate;25 
- Provision for a stay of individual enforcement actions;26 
- Protection of the interests of dissenting creditors, namely that the court should reject any 
restructuring plan which would likely reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below what they 
could reasonably expect to receive, were the debtor’s business not restructured;27 and 
- Provision for “second chance”, namely that provisions should be made for a full discharge of 
debt after a specified period of time.28 
Part I of the Recommendation lays out its objectives, namely to encourage Member States to establish 
efficient restructuring frameworks, which it was submitted would, in turn, promote entrepreneurship, 
investment and employment and reduce “obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market.”29 
The aims of the Recommendation are also contained in Part I and are to lower the costs of assessing 
risks of investing in other Member States; to increase recovery rates for creditors; and to remove 
difficulties in restructuring cross-border groups of companies, respectively.30  
Part III of the Recommendation set out the Commission’s position on preventative restructuring 
frameworks, which covered a number of areas. Section 6 lists common principles or elements which 
should be part of all national insolvency frameworks, namely: 
(i) the availability of early restructuring for debtors likely to become insolvent;  
(ii) the debtor retaining control over the day-to-day business operations; 
(iii) the availability of a stay of individual enforcement action; 
(iv) cram-down; and  
(v) protection for new financing.31  
Sections 7 through 9 reflect the intention laid out in recital 17, namely that Member States should adopt 
a less rigid approach to insolvency proceedings by confining the involvement of national courts to where 
such involvement is necessary and proportionate; by ensuring that debtors need not formally open court 
proceedings in order to begin the process of restructuring their business; and by ensuring that the 
 
22 idem recital 4. 
23 idem recital 8. 
24 idem recital 13. 
25 idem recital 17. 
26 idem recital 18; the recommendation was that the stay should be available for a period of no more than four months initially, in order to 
balance the rights of creditors. 
27 Recommendation, recital 19. 
28 idem, recital 20; it was felt that this particular aim would help to combat the “social stigma” and legal consequences of an on-going inability 
to pay off debts. Part IV of the Recommendation concerns “second chance” provisions; the Commission recommended that entrepreneurs 
should be fully discharged of their debts within three years from either the date on which implementation of a payment plan began or the date 
on which the court approved the opening of bankruptcy proceedings (section 30). Per s 32, however, Member States are entitled to introduce 
more stringent provisions in certain circumstances, for example to discourage entrepreneurs who have acted in bad faith or failed to adhere to 
a repayment plan, or to safeguard the livelihood of the entrepreneur by allowing him / her to keep certain assets. 
29 Recommendation, s 1. 
30 ibid. 
31 idem s 6. 
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appointment of a mediator or supervisor be done on a case by case basis, as opposed to being 
mandatory.32  
The importance placed by the Commission on the stay of individual enforcement actions is highlighted 
in sections 10 through 14. It is recommended that debtors should have the right to request a stay where 
individual actions may hamper the restructuring process.33 A stay should be granted in all circumstances 
where there is widespread, though not necessarily universal, support amongst creditors for the process 
and the plan has both a reasonable prospect of being implemented and of preventing the insolvency of 
the debtor.34 The Commission also seeks to strike a balance between the rights of debtors and creditors 
by limiting the duration of the initial stay to 4 months and the total duration (with extensions) to 12 
months.  
Section 18 of the Recommendation provides for the introduction (or retention) of provisions which 
empower courts to confirm restructuring plans that are supported by the majority of classes of creditors, 
once due regard is given to the claims of the respective classes of creditors, i.e. cross-class cram-down. 
Sections 21 through 23 set out the approach that Member States should adopt in relation to court 
confirmation of restructuring plans, with section 22 stating that the law on court confirmations should 
be clear. It sets minimum requirements, including that the restructuring plan does not reduce the rights 
of dissenting creditors below what they would reasonably be expected to receive in the absence of 
restructuring and that any new financing is both necessary and does not unfairly prejudice the interest 
of dissenting creditors.35 Section 26 recommends that court approved restructuring plans should be 
binding upon every affected creditor, in other words “cram-down”.  
Finally, sections 27 through 29 deal with protection for new financing during the restructuring process; 
the Commission recommends that new financing, contained in the agreed restructuring plans and 
approved by a court, should not be declared void as an act detrimental to the general body of creditors 
and that in the absence of any justified exception to the rules protecting new finance, providers of new 
financing should be exempt from civil and criminal liability relating to the restructuring process.36  
The Impact Assessment accompanying the Recommendation37 identified three general policy objectives 
of the Recommendation, namely to contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market by 
enabling restructuring of viable businesses (and liquidation of unviable ones); to enhance the survival 
prospects of firms in difficulty; and to minimise investment decisions being made on foot of national 
insolvency laws.38  The Impact Assessment also identified a number of specific objectives, including to 
reduce the cost of restructuring in Member States with inefficient rescue processes and reduce the cost 
to creditors resulting from the relocation of debtors.39 The Impact Assessment also identified two viable 
policy options for the Recommendation: a Commission recommendation to Member States or a 
Directive. Both would aim to deal with introducing minimum standards for preventative restructuring 
frameworks and second chance.40 
The Commission considered the first policy option of maintaining the status quo and the fourth of a 
fully harmonised procedure to be unsuitable, as they would, respectively, fail to achieve the objectives 
set out by the Commission and would be a disproportionate response to the issues identified. Within 
sub-options 2 and 3, the Impact Assessment identified a number of sub-options.41 For the purposes of 
this Report, the sub-options under the stay or moratorium, protection of new financing, plan approval 
by a majority of creditors (cram-down), and less court formality within preventative restructuring will 
be analysed.  
a) The Stay  
The sub-options laid out under the moratorium were that:  
 
32 idem ss 7-9. 
33 idem s 10. 
34 idem s 11; this section applies to Member States which impose certain conditions on the granting of a stay. 
35 Recommendation, s 22 (c)(d). 
36 idem ss 27-29. 
37 Impact Assessment of Recommendation. 
38 idem 26. 
39 idem – see table of specific objectives. 
40 idem 27. 
41 idem see table of sub-options for Options 2 and 3, 27-28. 
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1. a stay would be granted automatically against all creditors; 
2. a stay would be granted at the request of the debtor;  
3. a stay of short, limited duration would be granted at the request of the debtor.  
In the analysis of the impacts of the policy options for the stay, sub-option (3) was considered to be the 
most appealing as it was felt that it struck the best balance between the interests of all parties involved. 
A stay of limited duration was viewed to reduce the length of the restructuring procedure, thereby 
limiting the detriment caused to creditors, but also providing for the possibility of extension in certain 
circumstances. 42 What is interesting to note about sub-options (2) and (3) is that both referred to a stay 
at the request of the debtor and under sub-option (2) it was noted that countries such as Ireland, which 
has an “automatic stay in place”, would need to provide for a stay on request.43 In contrast, the PRD, 
which will be discussed in more detail later in this Report, only provides for the existence of a stay for 
the benefit of debtors. It does not specify that the stay must be at the request of the debtor, thereby 
seeming to contradict the link between the sub-option and the benefit to the effectiveness of the 
procedure identified by the Impact Assessment.44 
b) Protection of New Financing 
Two sub-options were provided under the heading of new financing,45 namely: 
1. Super-priority status for new financiers; 
2. Exempting approved new financing from avoidance actions except in the case of fraud. 
Member States may also grant super-priority status.  
Sub-option (2) was considered to be the preferable option as it was contended that it provided “the 
necessary incentives and support for restructuring plans to be successful, without unduly affecting the 
rights of existing creditors.”46 It was felt that where the rights of creditors were impacted, these were 
proportionate if the alternative was to be the liquidation of the debtor.47  
c) Cram-Down 
Three sub-options were identified under the heading ‘Plan approval by a majority of creditors’:48 
1. A majority of creditors could be bound by a majority in the same class, but Member States 
may exclude secured creditors from majority voting; 
2. A minority of creditors in any class could be bound by a majority of creditors in the same 
class, with decisions made by formal voting; 
3. A minority of creditors in any class could be bound by a majority of creditors in the same 
class without the need for a formal voting process, provided the debtor can prove the 
majority support.  
Sub-option (3) was considered preferable, as it was opined that it would ensure that secured creditors 
could also be bound by the plan, thereby promoting greater likelihood that a restructuring process would 
succeed, as secured creditors are critical to the restructuring process.49 Furthermore, it was the position 
of the Impact Assessment that such a policy would increase efficiency by reducing the time and cost 
with organising formal voting but not at the expense of proper oversight. As is evident, the option did 
not outline a mechanism for cross-class cram-down; instead, it merely gave scope for Member States to 
make provisions for cram-down (majority rule within classes) in the concluding paragraph. Interestingly 
 
42 idem 30-32. 
43 ibid; Arguably, to state that Ireland has an “automatic stay in place” was somewhat misleading, rather the Irish legal position is that a 
company receives court protection for a limited duration on foot of the presentation of a petition for the appointment of an examiner by the 
relevant court. As a petitioner the debtor can initiate the process applying for the appointment of an examiner and hence the commencement 
of the stay. Other potential petitioners include creditors, employees or contributories. In all cases the stay will be imposed pending the hearing 
but will be lifted in the petition to grant an examiner is not granted or is subsequently denied following a full hearing. 
44 See Impact Assessment of Recommendation 30: “The stay should be on request by the debtor, so that debtors who are able to continue to 
pay their debts as they fall due and do not need a stay can negotiate in confidentiality with those creditors which they need to involve.”  
45 Impact Assessment of Recommendation 30.  
46 idem 37; It should be noted that as part of its analysis, the Commission commented on the impact that granting super-priority to new finance 
would have on the property rights of some creditors. The Impact Assessment noted that the granting of super-priority to new finance may lead 
to a limitation in the exercise of the right to property of dissenting creditors. 
47 Impact Assessment of Recommendation 37. 
48 idem 28. 
49 idem 35. 
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as was noted earlier, section 18 of the Recommendation does provide for cross-class cram-down, which 
it could be argued results in some inconsistency between the two related documents. Article 11 of the 
Directive also includes a provision for cross-class cram-down, thus it is seemingly more in line with the 
Recommendation.  
d) Decreased Formality 
Two sub-options were provided under the heading ‘Reducing the formalities relating to court 
proceedings’: 50 
1. A flexible framework, providing for more limited court involvement save in certain 
circumstances (e.g. it is necessary to prevent abuse); 
2. A flexible framework, providing for more limited court involvement save in certain 
circumstances, but which requires courts to rule in principle in written procedure. 
The position of the Impact Assessment was that sub-option (2) was the most suitable as it balanced the 
need to reduce costs of restructuring with protecting the procedural right of parties. It is interesting to 
note the view in the Impact Assessment that Member States, such as Ireland and the Netherlands, would 
need to “make possible that courts are not seised when negotiations start, but at a later stage when the 
prospects of a restructuring plan are also more tangible.”51 
 Conclusion 
The response of the Member States to the Recommendation and accompanying Impact Assessment was 
lacklustre. An evaluation of the Recommendation was carried out by the Directorate-General Justice & 
Consumers of the European Commission in 2015,52 with 24 countries from 28 taking part. There are two 
points worth making in relation to this Evaluation; the first relates to the language utilised and the second 
relates to the findings.  
First, the language employed in the Evaluation is quite vague; in Part 1, it was noted that “a few Member 
States [had] undertaken reforms which, in some cases, resulted in legislation implementing the 
Commission's Recommendation”.53 Although examples of such Member States were provided in Part 1, 
it was noted that “in most cases” the legislation only partially implemented the Recommendation.54 One 
could contend that language such as “a few”, “in some cases” and “in most cases” lacks the specificity 
and analytical quality that one would expect from an evaluation, particularly one where the goal was to 
assess the impact of a Commission Recommendation. Instead, it is submitted that the Evaluation tends 
more towards being a discussion of the position of the respondents on some aspects of insolvency law.  
The Evaluation does give some insight into the ways in which Member States were partially compliant 
with the Recommendation, somewhat mitigating against the vagueness in Part 1. With that said, 
however, the analysis of the legal position in the Member States only served to highlight their lack of 
engagement. Consider the stay, for example, as was highlighted earlier the Recommendation advocated 
for the availability of a stay of short, limited duration at the request of the debtor. Yet at the time of the 
Evaluation, there was no possibility of a stay in Austria and a number of countries, including Romania 
and Belgium, provided for a stay of indefinite length.55 On the matter of protection for new financing, 
the Recommendation advocated for approved new financing being exempt from avoidance actions 
except in the case of fraud and for the option for Member States to grant super-priority status. At the 
time of the Evaluation, a number of Member States including Luxembourg and Sweden offered no 
special protection to new financiers in subsequent insolvency proceedings.56 Furthermore, in both 
examples, some of the responding Member States were absent from analysis. 
 
50 idem 28. 
51 idem 38. As will be evident upon discussing the final wording of the PRD, Ireland and other Member States with similar provisions are 
unlikely to have to make changes to national law.  
52 Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission, ‘Evaluation of the implementation of the Commission 
Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on A New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency’ (2015.  
53 idem 1.  
54 ibid.  
55 idem 3. 
56 idem 4. 
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Following on from the lack of legislative activity among the Member States following its 
Recommendation, the Commission established the Expert Group on Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
which met a number of times throughout 2016. It was comprised of over 20 leading academics and 
practitioners from 12 EU countries and its function was to discuss various aspects of insolvency law 
and more specifically, to focus on how the Commission Recommendation could be amended, thereby 
making it more effective across the EU and leading to more legal certainty.57 A full discussion of the 
meetings of the Expert Group is contained in Annex 1 of this Report. However, one aspect of discussion 
around the stay was particularly relevant for the purposes of this Report. Some of the experts had “strong 
concerns” that the stay would be open to abuse and they referred to the “moral hazard problem” on more 
than one occasion.58 There was clear divergence between the experts as to whether the stay should be 
automatic and general. Those experts who expressed concern regarding abuse stated that the stay should 
be neither automatic nor general, whereas other members were of the view that the stay should be 
automatic at first, otherwise it would be “cumbersome for a court to determine if there are reasonable 
prospects of success of the restructuring”.59 The reference to the moral hazard problem is interesting, as 
it highlights, once again, how differing traditions and cultures lead to very different opinions on how 
the law should function. 
5.3 The Commission Proposal 
In November 2016 the Commission issued its Proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU. One of the main justifications given by the 
Commission for proposed directive was similar to the justification given for the Recommendation circa 
four years previously. Uncertainty regarding local insolvency rules and/or the risk of a complex and 
costly restructuring as a result of national systems were the primary reason for the reluctance of investors 
to expand outside their own country.60 It was the view of the Commission that:  
“[a] higher degree of harmonisation in insolvency law is thus essential for a well-functioning 
single market and for a true Capital Markets Union” as “increased convergence of insolvency and 
restructuring procedures would facilitate greater legal certainty for cross-border investors and 
encourage the timely restructuring of viable companies in financial distress”.61  
 The Stay  
Article 6 and 7 of the Commission Proposal pertained to the stay, with the latter detailing the 
consequences of a stay of individual enforcement and the former giving the mechanics of the provision. 
Article 6(1) stated: 
“Member States shall ensure that debtors who are negotiating a restructuring plan with their 
creditors may benefit from a stay of individual enforcement actions if and to the extent that such 
a stay is necessary to support the negotiations of a restructuring plan.” 
Article 6(2) provided for the stay to extend to all types of creditors and to be general in nature or limited 
to particular creditors.62 Articles 6(4)-6(7) pertain to the duration of the stay; article 6(4) placed a 
maximum time limit of four months on the (initial) stay and 6(5) granted Member States the ability to 
provide for extensions, or the granting of a new stay, if the negotiations were progressing and the 
extension was not unfairly prejudicial.63 6(7) placed a time limit of 12 months on the total duration of 
the stay, including extensions and renewals. Articles 6(8) and 6(9), respectively, outlined the conditions 
for the lifting of the stay by a judicial or administrative authority and mandated Member States to 
 
57 Minutes Expert Group Meeting – 14 January 2016 3: “[t]he view shared by the majority of the experts is to focus on how the Insolvency 
Recommendation may be improved as to provide more legal certainty and more binding force in Member States.” 
58 Broadly speaking, moral hazard occurs when a party takes increased risks because they are aware that another party will bears the cost of 
those risks. See Minutes Expert Group Meeting 14 June 2016, 3 and Minutes Expert Group Meeting 11 July 2016, 3. 
59 Minutes Expert Group Meeting 14 June 2016, 3-4. 
60 Proposal, 2. 
61 Proposal, 2. 
62 Proposal, art 6(3) excluded workers’ claims from the scope of s 6(2) except where Member States ensure that the claims are protected to the 
same extent as they would be under the national interpretation of Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [2008] OJ L 283/36. 
63 Proposal, art 6(6) adds an additional condition to the granting of an extension, namely the “strong likelihood” that the plan will be adopted. 
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provide for the judicial or administrative authority refusing or lifting the stay at the request of creditors 
unfairly prejudiced by the stay. 
Article 7(1) and 7(2) apply to insolvency proceedings with the former stating that any obligation to file 
for insolvency under national law is suspended for the duration of the stay and the latter dictating that a 
general stay prevents the opening of insolvency procedures at the creditors’ request.64 Article 7(4) 
specified that Member States should prevent affected creditors from withholding performance or 
terminating or modifying executory contracts to the detriment of the debtor for debts occurring prior to 
the stay.65 Article 7(5) specified that Member States should prevent creditors from withholding 
performance or terminating or modifying executory contracts solely by reason of the debtor's entry into 
restructuring negotiations, a request for a stay, the ordering of the stay, or any similar event connected 
to the stay.66 Article 7(6) dictated that Member States must ensure that debtors are not precluded from 
paying certain claims, namely those of creditors unaffected by the stay and those that arise after the stay 
is granted and reoccur throughout the stay. Lastly, article 7(7) stated that Member States should ensure 
that debtors are not required to file for insolvency procedures if the conditions laid down by national 
law are met, not solely because the stay period has expired without a plan agreed. 
 Protection for New Finance 
Article 16 pertained to the protection of new finance. Article 16(1) stipulated that new and interim 
finance should be “adequately encouraged” and specifically, that it should not be declared void or 
unenforceable in subsequent insolvency proceedings, unless other criteria were met.67 Article 16(2) 
mandated that new or interim financiers should be ranked senior to unsecured creditors. Furthermore, it 
stated that Member States may decide to grant priority status to new and interim finance in subsequent 
insolvency proceedings. Finally, article 16(3) absolved new and interim financiers from criminal and 
civil liability in subsequent insolvency proceedings unless the transactions were fraudulent or carried 
out in bad faith.  
 Cross-Class Cram-Down 
Article 11 of the Commission Proposal related to cross-class cram-down, with article 11(1) providing 
for a restructuring plan to be binding on dissenting creditors once it was approved by a judicial or 
administrative authority and complied with three criteria: 
a) Compliance with article 10(2);68 
b) Approval of at least one class of affected creditors69 and any other class, which would not 
receive any payment if liquidation occurred; and 
c) Compliance with the absolute priority rule. 
Article 11(2) gave Member States latitude to decide the number of affected classes which would be 
required to approve the restructuring plan in order to cram-down on dissenting creditors.  
 Decreased Court Formality 
Article 4(3) applied to decreased formality within restructuring processes. It stated: 
 
64 Proposal, art 7(3) provides an exception to art 7(1) as follows: “[w]here the debtor becomes illiquid and therefore unable to pay his debts as 
they fall due during the stay period … Member States shall ensure that restructuring procedures are not automatically terminated and that, 
upon examining the prospects for achieving an agreement on a successful restructuring plan within the period of the stay, a judicial or 
administrative authority may decide to defer the opening of insolvency procedure and keep in place the benefit of the stay of individual 
enforcement actions.” 
65 Proposal, art 7(4) went on to state; “Member States may limit the application of this provision to essential contracts which are necessary for 
the continuation of the day-to-day operation of the business.” 
66 There is currently a variety of approaches among Member States in relation to these so-called ipso facto clauses. See Jason Chuah and 
Eugenio Vaccari (eds), Executory Contracts in Insolvency Law (Elgar 2019) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
67 Fraudulent transactions or those carried out in bad faith. 
68 Proposal, art 10(2) stated; Member States shall ensure that the conditions under which a restructuring plan can be confirmed by a judicial or 
administrative authority are clearly specified and include at least the following: (a) the restructuring plan has been adopted in accordance with 
art 9 and has been notified to all known creditors likely to be affected by it; (b) the restructuring plan complies with the best interest of creditors 
test; (c) any new financing is necessary to implement the restructuring plan and does not unfairly prejudice the interests of creditors. 
69 Aside from equity-holders. 
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“Member States shall put in place provisions limiting the involvement of a judicial or 
administrative authority to where it is necessary and proportionate so that rights of any affected 
parties are safeguarded.” 
5.4 The Consultation Process 
Throughout 2017 and 2018, various bodies expressed opinions and, in some cases, suggested specific 
amendments to the proposal. Broadly speaking, these submissions are considered chronologically, 
however, some bodies, such as the Council via the Justice and Home Affairs Council, held a number of 
debates throughout the aforementioned time period.70 As will become evident, the Council had the 
greatest impact on the content of the final Directive and as such, its amendments are discussed in 
considerably more detail than the amendments proposed by other various committees, such as the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs. It would seem that much of the impact of amendments from these committees 
seemed to be increasing the degree to which workers were referenced in the final text. One key aspect 
to take away from the consultation process was the considerable weakening of the provision mandating 
the decrease in court formality, something which was supported by a number of parties to the 
consultation process. 
 European Economic and Social Committee71 
In early 2017, mandatory consultation with the European Economic and Social Committee (henceforth 
“the EESC”) took place. In general, the Committee expressed support for the proposal, in particular, 
noting its preference that the EU not be afraid to move towards the maximum possible harmonisation. 
The Committee did, however, seem to have concerns regarding the degree to which the proposal 
protected the rights of workers. As such, most of its recommendations pertained to worker protection. 
However, there are some points to note in relation to decreased court formality and the stay, which are 
outlined below.72  
The Committee strongly supported the “marginal role granted to the courts” at point 1.10 of the EESC 
Opinion and supported limiting the role of the courts to “intervene only in cases of necessity” in the 
insolvency process. At point 1.7 the Committee contended that members of the judiciary should have 
“appropriate common training and extensive experience” which would enable them to work in this 
area.73 This is reflective of the concerns of members of the judiciary that have been expressed in 
 
70 In the interest of expediency, a number of bodies / committees which commented on and/or proposed amendments to the Commission 
Proposal have been removed from the main body of the Chapter. A fuller discussion of those submissions is available in Annex 1 of this 
Report. These submissions are: the opinions of the national parliaments (Annex 1, para 10.6.2) and the opinion from the Committee of the 
Regions (Annex 1, para 10.6.5). 
71 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive 
restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and 
amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (Business Insolvency) INT/810 (“EESC Opinion”). 
72 For example, at point 1.5 of the EESC Opinion, the Committee recommended that workers attain the status of priority creditors in all Member 
States and that employees and unions must be involved throughout the process including having the ability to make alternate proposals and 
refer an expert (point 4.2.4). At point 1.3 of the EESC Opinion, the EESC insisted that the final text;  
provide for mandatory consultation by company management with employees prior to and during the negotiation process,  
give greater importance to workers’ interests early in the restructuring process, and  
make specific reference to Article 5(2) of Directive 2001/23 to protect the rights of workers.  
It is worth noting that there is an error in the Committee opinion, as point 1.3 actually advocates for reference to be made to “Article 5(2) of 
Directive 2011/23” The correct Directive is Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses OJ L 82/16, art 5(2) of which reads: 
“Where Articles 3 and 4 apply to a transfer during insolvency proceedings which have been opened in relation to a transferor (whether or 
not those proceedings have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor) and provided that such proceedings 
are under the supervision of a competent public authority (which may be an insolvency practitioner determined by national law) a Member 
State may provide that: 
(a) notwithstanding art 3(1), the transferor's debts arising from any contracts of employment or employment relationships and payable 
before the transfer or before the opening of the insolvency proceedings shall not be transferred to the transferee, provided that such 
proceedings give rise, under the law of that Member State, to protection at least equivalent to that provided for in situations covered 
by Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection 
of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer(7), and, or alternatively, that, 
(b) the transferee, transferor or person or persons exercising the transferor's functions, on the one hand, and the representatives of the 
employees on the other hand may agree alterations, in so far as current law or practice permits, to the employees' terms and conditions 
of employment designed to safeguard employment opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business.”  
73 At 4.5.1 of the EESC Opinion, the Committee stated that it would be helpful if the aforementioned training was “organised directly be the 
Commission (including through agencies)”. 
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JCOERE several meetings. Furthermore at point 4.2.8 of the EESC Opinion, it was noted that the 
objective was “to reduce action taken by judicial / administrative authorities” which, in the view of the 
EESC, were too frequently called upon prematurely “to solve insolvency issues using drastic 
measures.”74 Regarding the stay, the Committee advocated for abuse of the insolvency process (the 
“tactical use of insolvency procedures to avoid legal liability and deny workers their rights”) to be an 
illegal practice, which critically, they argued, should render a stay unattainable.75 
 The European Central Bank76 
In mid-2017, the European Central Bank issued its opinion on the proposal; while the ECB broadly 
welcomed the proposed directive, it did express reservations in relation to certain aspects. In stark 
contrast to the Member States, the ECB lamented the lack of harmonisation in what it considered to be 
key areas of insolvency law such as a definition of insolvency, the conditions for opening insolvency 
proceedings, the ranking of insolvency claims and avoidance actions and cited the need for “more 
ambitious action” to be taken.77 In relation to the stay, in particular, the ECB expressed concern about 
the unintended consequences of the directive.78 At para 1.7 it was noted that: 
“…the consequences and scope of the stay, such as whether the stay of individual enforcement 
actions also applies to assets of the debtor pledged as collateral for claims of the creditor, need 
to be carefully assessed also from the perspective of its possible impact on regulatory capital 
requirements, and in particular from the perspective of risk mitigation techniques under 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.”79 
No attempt was made to further harmonise the aforementioned areas in light of the opinion of the ECB. 
As such, one could opine that perhaps the “considerable legal and practical challenges” associated with 
further harmonisation, as identified by the ECB in its Opinion, were considered too great by the 
Parliament and Council. 
 European Parliament Committees: Committee on Legal Affairs80 
The Committee on Legal Affairs issued an extensive report on the Commission proposal in September 
2017. The Committee suggested a significant number of amendments to the proposal, 85 in total and 
demonstrated a tendency towards more conservativism in its approach to issues such as the stay and 
decreased court formality.81  
a) The Stay 
Amendments 39 to 51 applied to articles 6 and 7. At Amendment 39, the Committee proposed attaching 
the conditions that the “obligation of the debtor to file for insolvency under national law” had not yet 
arisen and that there was a likelihood of being able to save the company from insolvency to the 
availability of the stay under article 6(1).82 At Amendment 40, the Committee attempted to limit the 
stay to only those creditors that were “participating in the negotiation of a restructuring plan”83 
 
74 The JCOERE 2 Report will return to this issue, along with the role of the judiciary/ administrative authority envisaged in art 11 of the 
Directive regarding confirmation of plans which include cross-class cram-down. 
75 EESC Opinion points 4.2.3 & 1.9. 
76 European Central Bank ‘Opinion on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending 
Directive 2012/30/EU’ (Communication) CON/2017/22 OJ C 236/02 (“ECB Opinion”). 
77 ECB Opinion para 1.2. 
78 Essentially, the ECB was concerned that financial institutions may suffer unintended consequences as a result of the impact that the stay 
may have on financial contracts with commercial entities.  
79 ECB Opinion para 3. 
80 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report of 22 September 2017 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU COM(2016)0723 – C8-0475/2016 – 2016/0359(COD) (“Report by Committee 
on Legal Affairs”). 
81 The Committee on Legal Affairs proposed no amendments to the protection of new financing. The amendments proposed to cross-class 
cram-down were not included in the final draft. The Committee advocated for the amendment of article 11(1)(b) to require that the restructuring 
plan be approved by “the majority of classes of affected creditors,” as distinct from “at least one class of affected creditors” contained in the 
proposal. The Committee proposed amending article 11(2) as follows: “Member States may vary the minimum number of affected classes 
required to approve the plan laid down in point (b) of paragraph (1) to the extent that that minimum number covers still the majority of classes.” 
82 Report by Committee on Legal Affairs 29. The Committee also sought to amend art 6(5) – conditions for granting an extension to the stay 
– to include the same condition, namely that the obligation of the debtor to file for insolvency under national law had not yet arisen. 
83 Report by Committee on Legal Affairs 29. 
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Arguably, however, creditors who are not participating in the negotiation process could be the most 
likely creditors to initiate proceedings against the debtor, if it appears as though they may be 
disadvantaged by the process. Interestingly, the Committee also attempted to reduce the maximum 
duration of the stay from four months to two and the total duration of the stay including extensions from 
twelve months to six via Amendments 41 and 46.84 Furthermore, the Committee also attempted to insert 
the following after article 6(7): 
“The total duration shall be limited to two months if the registered office of the company has been 
transferred to another Member State within a three-month period prior to the filing of a request 
for the opening of restructuring proceeding.” 
It appears that none of the amendments that the Committee put forward in relation to article 6, were 
adopted. The Committee also proposed a number of changes to article 785 but it appears, however, that 
none of these were integrated into the final draft either.86 
b) Decreased Court Formality 
The Committee sought to weaken to position of the Commission on decreased court formality by 
replacing the word “shall” with “may” in article 4(3);87 as such, the requirement for Member States to 
put provisions in place to limit formality to where it was necessary and proportionate was no longer 
present. This is one area where the position of the Committee was reflected in the final text of the PRD, 
as the word “may” remained in article 4(6).88  
 European Parliament Committees: Employment and Social Affairs (“EMPL”)89 
In December 2017, the European Parliament Committees on Employment and Social Affairs and on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs issued opinions on the Proposal. The EMPL opinion mirrored much of 
the concern expressed by the EESC earlier in the same year, namely that workers had not been 
adequately considered in the proposed directive. As such, the Committee went on to suggest a number 
of changes to the proposed text. Amendments 1 – 24 proposed by the EMPL Committee, were to the 
recitals of the Proposal, suggesting either the insertion of a new recital or the amendment of an existing 
one. Amendments 25 – 64 applied to articles of the Proposal, all with a view to strengthening the 
position of workers.90  
Although many of the EMPL Committee proposals were not specifically adopted by the Parliament, the 
revised article 8(1)(g) includes a specific reference to the arrangements for informing and consulting 
the employees’ representatives and the overall consequences for employees e.g. dismissals, changes to 
working arrangements. Arguably, this indicates that the canvassing for greater protection of employees 
carried out by various parties did have some impact on the final wording of the PRD.  
In the following section, this Report will consider the amendments proposed by the EMPL Committee 
to the key areas relevant to this report, namely the stay and protection of new finance. The proposed 
 
84 Report by Committee on Legal Affairs 30 & 32. 
85 Amendments 47 – 51 applied to art 7 of the Proposal and again, one could argue that that there was evidence of a tendency towards 
conservatism. The Committee on Legal Affairs advised amending art 7(1) to provide that the stay not apply in situations where the debtor was 
obliged to file for insolvency under national law and proposed deleting art 7(2), which limited the right of creditors’ to open insolvency 
proceedings during the stay, See the Report by Committee of Legal Affairs 32. The Committee also proposed deleting art 7(3): 
“Member States may derogate from paragraph 1 where the debtor becomes … unable to pay his debts as they fall due during the stay 
period. In that case, Member States shall ensure that restructuring procedures are not automatically terminated and that, upon examining 
the prospects for achieving an agreement on a successful restructuring plan within the period of the stay, a judicial or administrative 
authority may decide to … keep in place the benefit of the stay...”. 
The Committee also proposed deleting art 7(6): “Member States shall ensure that nothing prevents the debtor from paying in the ordinary 
course of business claims of or owed to unaffected creditors and the claims of affected creditors that arise after the stay is granted and which 
continue to arise throughout the period of the stay.” 
86 Article 7(6) was removed, but the wording features in recital 39 of the PRD instead. Article 7(4) was reworded once more before the final 
text, so neither the Committee recommendations nor the original proposal text remained. The other amendments, 47-49, were not accepted.  
87 Committee on Legal Affairs Opinion p. 26. 
88 Article 4(6); “Member States may put in place provisions limiting the involvement of a judicial or administrative authority in a preventive 
restructuring framework to where it is necessary and proportionate while ensuring that rights of any affected parties and relevant stakeholders 
are safeguarded.” 
89 European Parliament Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Opinion of 5 December 2017 on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU COM(2016)0723 – C8-0475/2016 – 
2016/0359(COD) (“Opinion of EMPL Committee”). 
90 See Annex 1 for a more thorough discussion of the amendments relating to workers’ rights.  
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amendments pertaining to decreasing court involvement in insolvency matters were quite minor and 
there were no amendments proposed to cross-class cram-down.91  
a) The Stay 
Few amendments proposed by EMPL applied to the stay of individual enforcement.92 The Committee 
did, however, propose one interesting amendment in that it advocated for employees to be specifically 
excluded from the types of creditors who could be affected by a stay of individual enforcement: 
“Member States shall ensure that a stay of individual enforcement actions may be ordered in 
respect of all types of creditors, including secured and preferential creditors but excluding 
workers.” 
In justifying this change, the Committee acknowledged the protection for workers contained in article 
6.3; however, it was their view that workers needed to be expressly excluded.93  
b) Protection of New Financing 
The Committee sought to reduce the protection afforded to new finance by removing article 16(2) from 
the proposed directive. The justification the Committee offered was their belief that it constituted “a 
super-privilege for actors providing new and interim financing”, which it was argued could result in 
“downgrading of other creditors including workers”, thereby reducing the “remaining substance of the 
concerned enterprise, thereby further endangering workers”. Despite the concerns expressed by the 
Committee, article 17(4) of the Directive gives Member States the ability to treat the providers of new 
or interim financing with priority in the context of subsequent insolvency procedures.  
 European Parliament Committees: Economic and Monetary Affairs (“ECON”)94 
Broadly speaking, the changes proposed by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs focused 
on strengthening the position of smaller entrepreneurs, vulnerable creditors and workers and 
occasionally on providing for more assurances that restructuring processes would be successful.95 The 
ECON Committee Opinion embodied an attempt towards balancing competing interests with successful 
restructuring, particularly in the areas of focus of this report. The bulk of the relevant amendments 
applied to the stay; as such, it and decreased court formality are discussed below.96 
a) Stay 
Amendments 51 – 56 pertained to article 6 of the proposal. The Committee wished to amend article 6(1) 
to mandate Member States to specify “[p]articular conditions … in order to ensure that such a stay is 
necessary” and advocated for mandating Member States to require that debtors benefiting from a stay 
 
91 The is worth noting that the EMPL Committee proposed amendments to cram-down, as opposed to cross-class cram-down in Amendments 
45 through to 48. Generally speaking, the proposed amendments were to provide for further protection of workers; for example, the amendment 
of art 9(4) added “the workers class” after the reference to “each and every class”, a proposal that was not adopted by the Parliament. It was 
also suggested that art 9(1) be amended to specifically include workers in the creditors that should have the right to vote on the adoption of a 
restructuring plan and including the caveat that parties must be “duly informed about the procedure and its potential consequences for the 
company”. The original art 9(1) read: “Member States shall ensure that any affected creditors have a right to vote on the adoption of a 
restructuring plan.” The amendment read: “Member States shall ensure that the procedures provided for in national law allow creditors, 
including workers affected by a waiver plan, to have a right to vote on the adoption of the restructuring plan, after having been duly informed 
about the procedure and its potential consequences for the company.” The Committee also proposed amending art 9(2) to state, in much 
stronger terms, that workers should have a privileged position by replacing “Member States may also provide that workers are treated in a 
separate class of their own” with “Taking into account that workers are a class of preferential creditors, except in duly justified circumstances, 
Member States shall also ensure that outstanding wage claims for active workers and pension claims for retired workers are treated in a separate 
preferential class of their own, and shall guarantee the priority of such claims” The original wording of the article, now art 9(4), was retained, 
however. 
92 The EMPL Committee did propose removing the phrase “in principle” from recital 34, thereby changing it to “Given the need to ensure an 
appropriate level of protection of workers, Member States should exempt workers' outstanding claims …from any stay of enforcement 
irrespective of the question whether these claims arise before or after the stay is granted.” 
93 The proposed art 6(3) stated: “Paragraph 2 shall not apply to workers' outstanding claims except if and to the extent that Member States 
ensure by other means that the payment of such claims is guaranteed at a level of protection at least equivalent to that provided for under the 
relevant national law transposing Directive 2008/94/EC.” 
94 European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Opinion of 7 December 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU COM(2016)0723 – C8-0475/2016 – 
2016/0359(COD) (“ECON Committee Opinion”). 
95 See, as discussed later, the inclusion of a requirement that Member States require that debtors benefiting from a stay are “viable”. 
96 For the sake of efficiency, the minor amendment to art 17 (protection of new finance) and the amendments to cram-down are discussed in 
Annex 1.  
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were “viable”.97 The proposed amendment to article 6(2) attempted to make it a condition of limited 
stays rather than general and to ensure that they do not “endanger the efficiency and success of the 
restructuring plan”.98 The focus of the Committee on balancing the rights of affected parties with 
ensuring that the success of the restructuring process was evident in amendments such as this. In 
Amendment 53, the Committee attempted to exclude the claims of “micro and small enterprises” in 
addition to workers’ claims from being covered by the stay.99 In Amendments 54 and 55, the ECON 
Committee attempted to reduce the duration of the initial stay to between 3 and 6 months and the 
maximum duration, including extensions, to 9 months.100 It is curious that the Committee would, on the 
one hand, seek to increase the maximum duration of the (initial) stay while, on the other hand, 
attempting to decrease the maximum duration, including extensions. In any event, neither of the 
proposed changes to the duration of the stay, or indeed the other changes proposed by the ECON 
Committee, were accepted for the final text. The final amendment sought by the ECON Committee to 
article 6 was the specific inclusion in article 6(9) of the suffering of financial difficulties by a “vulnerable 
creditor” as a justification for the stay being lifted or refused by the judicial or administrative authority 
and the statement that “[a]n unfair prejudice shall be deemed to exist at least where a creditor or class 
of creditors is facing considerable economic difficulties.”101 As was the case with the other amendments 
to article 6, they were not incorporated.102  
b) Decreased Court Formality 
The ECON Committee Opinion suggested amending article 4(3) to replace “shall” with “may”, thereby 
making it optional for Member States to limit judicial involvement. As was noted earlier, the final 
wording of article 4 reflected this position.103 In addition, as noted earlier, this issue, together with the 
requirements regarding the involvement of a judicial/ administrative authority for approval of a plan 
which includes cross-class cram-down under article 11 (mentioned at 5.6 below) will be returned to in 
the second JCOERE Report. 
5.5 Council of the European Union 
Throughout 2017 and 2018, the Council considered the proposed directive. In a note from the Presidency 
to Coreper and the Council in May 2017, it was stated that the objectives of the proposal had received 
broad support from ministers at an informal meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council.104 In the 
same note however, the President of the Council emphasized the need for flexibility in the 
implementation of the provisions within individual Member States. The Working Group tasked with 
reviewing the Proposal highlighted two areas which required greater scrutiny: the role of the national 
courts in insolvency matters and debtor in possession.105  
Regarding the role of the courts, the Council was quick to point out that judicial or administrative 
authority involvement did not always equate to a less efficient procedure; instead it was the position of 
many delegations that the role of the judiciary in such matters was to act as an impartial safeguard.106 
As a result, the Council suggested that the proposal should be written in such a way as to allow Member 
States that desired decreased formality to do so, without making decreased formality a requirement for 
all Member States. At this point, it now appeared that committees within the Parliament – Legal Affairs 
 
97 ECON Committee Opinion 32. 
98 Originally, art 6(2) read; Member States shall ensure that a stay … may be ordered in respect of all types of creditors, including secured and 
preferential creditors. The stay may be general … or limited, covering one or more individual creditors, in accordance with national law”. 
99 ECON Committee Opinion 33:  
“Paragraph 2 shall not apply to micro and small enterprise claims and workers' outstanding claims except if and to the extent that Member 
States ensure by other means that the payment of such claims is guaranteed at a level of protection at least equivalent to that provided for 
under the relevant national law transposing Directive 2008/94/EC.” 
100 ECON Committee Opinion 33-34. 
101 Resultingly, the amended art 6(9) would have read:  
“Member States shall ensure that, where an individual creditor or a single class of creditors is or would be unfairly prejudiced by a stay 
… or a vulnerable creditor would encounter financial difficulties, the judicial or administrative authority may decide not [to] grant … or 
may lift a stay already granted in respect of that creditor or class of creditors, at the request of the creditors concerned. An unfair prejudice 
shall be deemed to exist at least where a creditor or class of creditors is facing considerable economic difficulties.” 
102 As none of the amendments proposed to art 7 were accepted in the final draft, they have been discussed in Annex 1.  
103 See discussion on the Report by the Committee of Legal Affairs. 
104 Council of the European Union, Policy Debate of 19 May 2017 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU File 2016/0359 (COD) 2 (“Policy Debate 19 May 2017”). 
105 idem 2-5; It is worth noting that the Working Group had only considered arts 1 – 9 at this point in time.  
106 idem 3. 
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and ECON – and the Council were opposed to mandatory decreased court formality. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the final wording reflected this position. Arguably, however, if Member States wished 
to decrease court involvement in insolvency matters, they could do so without the need for 
“encouragement” from a directive. As such, it is questionable whether the overall goals of the Proposal 
have now been nullified. It is interesting to note that the discussion around court involvement was not 
set in the broader context of the obligations to co-operate included in the EIR Recast.  
In the period between May and November 2017, the Working Group identified three more areas in need 
of further consideration by Council, namely viability of the debtor, cross-class cram-down and second 
chance for honest entrepreneurs.107 In relation to cross-class cram-down, it was noted that a majority of 
Member States considered there to be a need for provisions which allow the confirmation of a 
restructuring plan by a judicial or administrative authority in the event of the plan not being supported 
by a majority in one or more classes of creditors. With that said however, there were Member States 
which were hesitant to create such provisions; as such, further discussion on the area was considered 
beneficial.  
In May 2018, the Council adopted a partial position (general approach)108 on the proposed directive, 
however the position only pertained to Titles III, IV and V, thereby excluding the stay, cross-class cram-
down, protection of new financing and decreased court formality. 109 The major development in the 
consultation process took place in October 2018, when the Council reached a full general approach on 
the proposed directive. The President, in an 87-page letter to the Council and Permanent Representatives 
Committee, highlighted a number of specific elements of compromise, including the stay and cross-
class cram-down.110 It was noted, however that there were still Member States in disagreement with the 
proffered compromises though a majority had accepted them.111  
 The Stay 
There was considerable difference of opinion within Member States regarding the stay, some having a 
preference for short stays in the interest of creditors and others favouring a longer or indefinite stay in 
order to maximise the possibility of a successful restructure.112 Even with the agreement on the stay, 
however, there was a clear, and in many cases, successful attempt by the Council to inject more latitude 
for the individual approaches of Member States into the PRD. Article 6(1) was amended to include an 
express provision allowing Member States the option to legislate for the refusal of a stay by a judicial 
or administrative authority in certain circumstances.113 It could be argued, however, that this provision 
merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the wording of the first paragraph.114 The Council 
also inserted 2b – now article 4 – into the Directive, which reads: 
“Member States may exclude certain claims or categories of claims from the scope of the stay of 
individual enforcement actions, in well-defined circumstances, where such an exclusion is duly 
justified and where: 
(a) where enforcement is not likely to jeopardise the restructuring of the business; or  
(b) where the stay would create unfair prejudice to the creditors of those claims.” 
The Council also proposed amending the conditions under which the stay can be lifted – now article 
6(9) – to include where one or more creditors or classes of creditors would be unfairly prejudiced by 
 
107 Council of the European Union, Policy Debate of 30 November 2017 on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU File 2016/0359 (COD) (“Policy Debate 30 November 2017”).  
108 Council of the European Union, Partial General Approach of 16 May 2018 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU File 2016/0359 (COD).  
109 Neither the partial general approach not the general approach really addressed employee interests / employees as a class of creditors. 
110 Council of the European Union, General Approach of 24 September 2018 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU File 2016/0359 (COD) 3-6. 
111 idem 6. 
112 idem 4. 
113 “Member States may provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse to grant a stay of individual enforcement actions where 
such a stay is not necessary or where it would not fulfil the objective set out in the first subparagraph.” 
114 The first paragraph of art 6(1) specifically refers to “a stay of individual enforcement actions to support the negotiations of a restructuring 
plan“[emphasis added] It would seem implicit therefore, that were the stay not to achieve this aim, that it could be rejected.  
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the stay, where provided for by national law. The Council inserted another paragraph into article 6(9), 
which read: 
“Member States may limit the power, under the first subparagraph, to lift the stay of individual 
enforcement actions to situations where creditors had not had the opportunity to be heard before 
the stay came into force or before an extension of the period was granted by a judicial or 
administrative authority.”115 
Finally, as there are circumstances where national law requires a debtor to submit the restructuring plan 
to a judicial or administrative authority within 8 months, the Council attempted to insert article 6(7a) 
into the final text of the directive, however the Parliament declined to do so: 
“By way of derogation from paragraph 7, where, according to national law, the restructuring plan 
is to be submitted within eight months from the start of the initial stay … to a judicial or 
administrative authority for confirmation, Member States may provide that that stay is extended 
until the plan is confirmed.”  
Although there were changes made by the Council to most of the subsections of article 7, these were 
largely of a minor nature. The substantial change made by the Council to article 7 was the insertion of 
article 6(6): 
“Member States may provide that a stay of individual enforcement actions does not apply to 
netting arrangements, including close-out netting arrangements, on financial markets, energy 
markets and commodity markets, even in circumstances where Article 31(1) does not apply, if 
such arrangements are enforceable under national insolvency law. The stay shall, however, 
apply to the enforcement by a creditor of a claim against a debtor arising as a result of the 
operation of a netting arrangement.  
The first subparagraph shall not apply to contracts for the supply of goods, services or energy 
necessary for the operation of the debtor’s business, unless such contracts take the form of a 
position traded on an exchange or other market, such that it can be substituted at any time at 
current market value.” 
 Protection of New Finance 
With respect to the protection of new finance, the Council proposed some changes to (the then) article 
16.116 It sought to give individual Member States more control through the newly created article 17(2) 
and (3), which state respectively: 
“Member States may provide that paragraph 1 shall only apply to new financing if the 
restructuring plan has been confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority, and to interim 
financing which has been subject to ex ante control.  
Member States may exclude from the application of paragraph 1 interim financing which is 
granted after the debtor has become unable to pay its debts as they fall due.” 
It also rewrote the article 16(2)117 which arguably has the effect of increasing the protection for new 
financiers:  
“Member States may afford grantors of new or interim financing the right to receive payment 
with priority in the context of subsequent liquidation procedures in relation to other creditors that 
would otherwise have superior or equal claims to money or assets. In such cases, Member States 
shall rank new financing and interim financing at least senior to the claims of ordinary unsecured 
creditors.” 
This was rewritten as follows: 
 
115 The Council also attempted to grant Member States the ability to provide for a minimum period during which the stay could not be lifted, 
however this was not included in the final text.  
116 This was art 16 in the Commission draft and in the submission from the Council, however, the compromise text was renumbered as 17. 
117 Now art 17(4). 
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“Member States may provide that grantors of new or interim financing are entitled to receive 
payment with priority in the context of subsequent insolvency procedures in relation to other 
creditors that would otherwise have superior or equal claims” 
Arguably, the removal of the obligation on Member States ranking new financiers as “at least senior” 
to ordinary unsecured creditors leaves it at the protection of the new finance at discretion of the Member 
State, as the only obligation is that new financing and interim financing “are adequately protected”. As 
noted above, article 17(4) merely states that Member States may provide that new financiers have 
priority in subsequent insolvency proceedings, not that they must. As such, it will be interesting to see 
if certain Member States only implement the basic requirement, for example, that generally, new 
financing cannot be declared void or unenforceable and that new financiers be exempt from liability but 
then make no changes to the priority of claims coming from new financiers in subsequent insolvency 
proceedings. 
 Cross-Class Cram-Down 
The Council sought extensive changes to article 11. Some of these could be described as linguistic 
changes such as amending article 11(1)(a) to replace “fulfils the conditions in article 10(2)” with 
“complies with article 10(2)” and replacing the word “vary” with “increase” in article 11(2). However, 
the majority of changes were quite significant and offer considerable leeway to member states, in 
particular for those member states such as Ireland, which had operated a robust cross-class cram-down 
provision in the past. 118 To article 11(1) alone, the Council proposed nine different changes, one of 
which was outlined above. For clarity, the entirety of the Council’s amended article 11(1) is below to 
enable proper comparison with the final text:119 
(1) Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by all voting 
classes of affected parties as provided for in Article 9(4), may be confirmed by a judicial 
or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or (…) with the debtor's 
agreement, and become binding upon (…) dissenting voting classes where the restructuring 
plan fulfils at least the following conditions: 
(a) it complies with Article 10(2); 
(b) it has been approved by the required voting classes of affected parties in accordance 
with paragraph 2; 
(c) it complies with the fairness test in accordance with paragraph 2a; 
(d) no class of affected parties can, under the restructuring plan, receive or keep more 
than the full amount of its claims or interests; 
By derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may limit the requirement for 
the debtor's agreement to cases where debtors are SMEs.” 
The final wording of the first paragraph is not exactly what the Council proposed, but it is more similar 
to its amendment than the original proposal; instead of “approved by all voting classes of affected parties 
as provided for in Article 9(4)…” it reads “approved by affected parties, as provided for in Article 9(6), 
in every voting class”. The insertion of the word “voting” in relation to “dissenting voting classes” and 
the insertion of “fulfils at least the following conditions” remain in the final text.120 
 
118 General Approach; Note from the Presidency to Permanent Representatives Committee and the Council dated 24/09/2018 File 2016/0359 
(COD) p.65-6. 
119 The wording of the Commission proposal was as follows; “Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by 
each and every class of affected parties may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or of a creditor 
with the debtor's agreement and become binding upon one or more dissenting classes where the restructuring plan: (a) fulfils the conditions in 
art 10(2); (b) has been approved by at least one class of affected creditors other than an equity-holder class and any other class which, upon a 
valuation of the enterprise, would not receive any payment or other consideration if the normal ranking of liquidation priorities were applied; 
(c) complies with the absolute priority rule.” 
120 Paragraph 1 of the final text reads; “Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties, as 
provided for in art 9(6), in every voting class, may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with 
the debtor's agreement, and become binding upon dissenting voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils at least the following 
conditions…”. 
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The wording of article 11(1)(b) provides for a declining set of requirements providing that a plan can 
be confirmed by a court where the plan: 
“has been approved by:  
a. a majority of the voting classes of affected parties, provided that at least one of 
those classes is a secured creditors class or is senior to the ordinary unsecured 
creditors class; or, failing that,  
b. at least one of the voting classes of affected parties or where so provided under 
national law, impaired parties, other than an equity-holders class or any other class 
which, upon a valuation of the debtor as a going-concern, would not receive any 
payment or keep any interest, or, where so provided under national law, which 
could be reasonably presumed not to receive any payment or keep any interest, if 
the normal ranking of liquidation priorities were applied under national law;”121 
This final text is almost identical to the amendments proposed by the Council if one reads article 
11(1)(b) in conjunction with paragraph 2, as the Council instructed in its amendment. The only 
substantial difference is that in the final text, the order of the two conditions is reversed and the words 
“failing that” have been inserted after the first condition, thereby giving it priority that it did not have 
in the Council amendment.  
The final wording of article 11(1)(c) adopted some but not all of the amendment proposed by the Council 
in that it provides for ensuring “that dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at least as 
favourably as any other class of the same rank and more favourably than any junior class”.122 The 
remainder of the amendment to 11(1)(c) via the newly inserted 11(2a), specifically that Member States 
require “a dissenting voting class of affected creditors is satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means 
if a more junior class is to receive any payment or keep any interest under the restructuring plan” was 
reformulated as a derogation instead (article 11(2)).123 The scheme proposed by the Council therefore 
allows Member States to allow for the confirmation of plans where very little by way of consent has 
been secured. There is in fact a cascading set of requirements, allowing Member States to proceed to a 
robust restructuring framework, but also allowing for a more conservative approach for some member 
states. The view of the JCOERE Project Team is that this may amount to a failure of the policy goals of 
harmonisation and minimising the opportunities for forum shopping. The final wording of article 
11(1)(d) and the derogation for SMEs in the PRD is the same as the amendments proposed by the 
Council.  
The final paragraph of amendment 11(2a), namely that Member States may derogate from the earlier 
paragraph where it is necessary to achieve the aims of the restructuring plan as long as it is not unfairly 
prejudicial to affected parties, is now the second paragraph of article 11(2) in the Directive. The Council 
also tried to insert article 11(2b) which stated that “Article 10(3) shall apply mutatis mutandis”, however 
this amendment was not included in the final text.  
As has been demonstrated, the Council proposed quite considerable changes to the Commission text. In 
September 2018, the relevant bodies (the Parliament, the Council and the Commission) agreed to enter 
into interinstitutional negotiations, more commonly referred to as “a trilogue”. The purpose of a trilogue 
is “to reach a provisional agreement on a text acceptable to both the Council and the Parliament”;124 as 
such, members of the three bodies took part in the negotiation. In March 2019, the Parliament voted to 
approve the compromise wording of the PRD. In a short debate, which took place the day before the 
vote, MEP Cofferati lamented the missed opportunity to ensure that the most vulnerable were properly 
protected, namely workers.125 In his view, it would have been appropriate to extend the rights of workers 
to approve or reject restructuring plans concerning the organisational aspects of the company, such as 
plans involving layoffs and changes to working conditions. He also stated that employees should be 
 
121 PRD, art 11(1)(b). 
122 PRD, art 11(1)(c). The Council amendment in its General Approach (n 110) mandated reading art 11(1)(c) in conjunction with art 11(2a). 
123 PRD, art 11(2): “By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 1, Member States may provide that the claims of affected creditors in a 
dissenting voting class are satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means where a more junior class is to receive any payment or keep any 
interest under the restructuring plan.” 
124 ‘Interinstitutional Negotiations for the Adoption of EU Legislation’ (European Parliament Ordinary Legislative Procedure 2019) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ordinary-legislative-procedure/en/interinstitutional-negotiations.html> accessed 9th January 2020. 
125 Translated from European Parliament Debates 27 March 2019. 
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treated preferentially compared to all other classes and opined that it should be mandatory for Member 
States to provide for a separate class for creditors. The Rapporteur responded that she was satisfied that 
the right approach was for employees to have the same protection as any other creditor. Strictly 
speaking, it is not correct to state that employees have the same protection as any other creditor, given 
that new financiers may receive preferential treatment. With that said, it may be a consequence of 
translating the response from German to English that this distinction was lost. 
5.6 Conclusion 
As of 20th June 2019, the final draft of the Directive was signed and was published in the Official Journal 
on 26th June with the implementation deadline set for 17th July 2021.126 As has been demonstrated 
throughout this Chapter, many aspects of the Directive have seen substantial changes between its 
inception and its signing in 2019. Article 4(6) has transformed from being a clear requirement on 
Member States to decrease court formality to being a suggestion.127 The primary amendment to article 
6(1) was the inclusion of the second paragraph giving Member States the option to provide for judicial 
or administrative authorities refusal of a stay where it was viewed to be unnecessary where it would not 
support the negotiation of a restructuring plan.128 Arguably, however, the insertion of this paragraph is 
of limited value; it is implied in the first paragraph of article 6(1) that the purpose of the stay is that it 
supports the negotiations of the restructuring plan, therefore is should only be granted in circumstances 
where it supports the negotiation process. Article 6(9)(a) was reformulated to make explicit that the stay 
can be lifted where it no longer fulfils the objective of supporting the negotiations on the restructuring 
plan and gave the original (a) as an example of such a case.129 Article 6(9)(d), which states that if the 
stay gives rise to the insolvency of a creditor, it can be lifted where this is provided for under national 
law, was added. Again, the strength of this amendment is questionable; if it only applies in Member 
States where it is already a legal provision, then arguably, nothing is changing. Furthermore, it is 
possible that such provisions do more harm than good to the overall goal of harmonisation, It neither 
requires Member States who have these provisions to remove them, nor Member States who do not have 
them to introduce them.  
The redrafting of article 11 is particularly significant regarding debates which had raged concerning the 
issue of priorities. The derogations provided allow for a broad range of practices and solutions to emerge 
once implementation has occurred. 
As discussed previously, the primary changes to article 17 came from the Council, namely the insertion 
articles 17(2) and (3) and the rewriting of article 17(4); however, the wording of these articles means 
that their implementation can be classed as optional, rather than mandatory. Accordingly, one must once 
again question the degree to which the PRD achieves the central aim of harmonisation of the law across 
Member States if the protection for new finance may be significantly stronger in some jurisdictions than 
others.  
5.7 Transition Chapter 6: Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU 
Directive: Part 1 – Introduction and Methodology 
Chapter 6 will introduce the core research aspects of the JCOERE Project: The JCOERE Questionnaire. 
Split into 3 parts, Chapter 6 will focus on the first part, which discusses the current preventive 
restructuring frameworks in each of the contributing Member States. The Chapter begins by providing 
a benchmark to an already well-used and robust preventive restructuring procedure that has existed in 
Ireland since 1990. Chapter 6 will then provide a more detailed discussion of the research methodology 
employed in the JCOERE Project, as well as illuminating some of the challenges encountered by the 
team. It will also provide some general context for preventive restructuring as a background to the 
discussion of the responses from the first part of the questionnaire. Finally, the first part of the 
 
126 PRD, art 34.  
127 Article 4(6) states that Member States “may” put in place provisions limiting the involvement of a judicial or administrative authority in a 
preventive restructuring framework to where it is necessary and proportionate while ensuring that rights of any affected parties and relevant 
stakeholders are safeguarded.” 
128 Article 6(1); “Member States may provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse to grant a stay of individual enforcement 
actions where such a stay is not necessary or where it would not achieve the objective set out in the first subparagraph.” 
129 “[I]f it becomes apparent that a proportion of creditors which, under national law, could prevent the adoption of the restructuring plan do 
not support the continuation of the negotiations”. 
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questionnaire responses will be described, essentially setting out what each contributing jurisdiction 
currently has in terms of preventive restructuring frameworks. 
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6. Chapter 6: Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the 
EU Directive: Part 1 – Introduction and Methodology 
6.1 Introduction: the JCOERE Context  
The previous Chapter discussed the introduction of the Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency (the 
“PRD”)1 through the various EU institutions. As described in Chapter 1 the PRD has been said to have 
been influenced by the perceived success of the US Chapter 11 procedure.2 Another widely held 
perception is that the PRD aims to help Member States to emulate what already exists in the United 
Kingdom in the Scheme of Arrangement (“SoA”),3 but the PRD provisions differ in fairly significant 
ways from the Scheme. What appears to be less well-known is that the Irish Examinership4 procedure 
functions in a way that is far closer in function to the intention and provisions of the PRD, with some 
exceptions. The idea underpinning the JCOERE Project was inspired in part by the fact that the Irish 
Examinership process has been doing much of what the PRD intends since it was introduced in 1990 
and it has been well-used by companies of many types and sizes over the last thirty years. The Irish 
Examinership and the UK SoA are both well-developed preventive restructuring procedures, the latter 
being used often by non-UK companies in order to take advantage of its flexibility and efficiency.5 It is 
curious that similar attention has not been paid to the Irish Examinership procedure, given its similar, 
and in some cases, more progressive attributes, such as the availability of a cross-class cram-down. 
The purpose of the JCOERE questionnaire6 is to explore substantive and procedural rules arising in the 
context of preventive restructuring, which may be considered obstacles to cooperation between the 
courts of the Member States.7 The questionnaire has focused on specific substantive rules arising in a 
typical restructuring process, which may be problematic to cooperation. This Report will focus on the 
substantive provisions of preventive restructuring in the contributing jurisdictions and how they measure 
up to the new PRD. Report 2 will then look at these and other matters in the specific context of court-
to-court cooperation. Contributors to this part of the Report include those partnered on the JCOERE 
Project: Ireland (University College Cork), Italy (Università degli Studi di Firenze), and Romania 
(Universitatea Titu Maiorescu). Contributors from several other Member States have also taken part: 
Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, France, Austria, Poland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (for 
comparative purposes).  
The responses to the questionnaire have helped to determine what preventive restructuring frameworks 
are already present in the contributing jurisdictions and how they relate to the terms of the PRD. These 
questions were contained in part I of the questionnaire. Secondly, the responses have helped to 
determine existing rules in Member States, in addition to those in the Directive, which pertain to the 
stay/moratorium; cram-down provisions; workers; and the protection of rescue financing. Finally, part 
 
1 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the “PRD”). 
2 Title 11, United States Code, which is referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 deals with reorganisation. See < 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/USCODE> accessed 29 October 2019. 
3 UK Companies Act 2006, part 26. 
4 Irish Companies Act 2014, part 10. See generally for a discussion of the Irish Examinership process Lynch, Marshall and O’Ferrall: Corporate 
Insolvency and Rescue (Butterworths, 1996) and Lynch Fannon and Murphy: Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Bloomsbury Professional, 
2012). See also O’Donnell and Nicholas: Examinership (Londsdale Law Publishing, 2016).  
5 It should be noted, however, that the UK Scheme of Arrangement is not covered under the EIR Recast as it is technically a company law 
procedure arising as it does out of the Companies Act 2006, Part 26. In addition, Irish company law contains a similar scheme of arrangement 
provisions, see Irish Companies Act 2014, ss 449-455. Irish legislation also includes a Scheme of Arrangement process which is very similar 
to the UK process. This is included in Part 9 of the Companies Act 2014. See further I Lynch Fannon and G N Murphy, Corporate Insolvency 
and Rescue (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) Chapter 14. 
6 “Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU Directive for the JCOERE Project: Jurisdiction Questionnaire” available in 
Annex 2 of this Report and available online from < https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/jcoere-jurisdiction-research-questionnaire/>. 
7 European Commission DG Justice Grant Agreement 800807 – JCOERE – JUST-AG-2017/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017, Annex 1 Part B 
Workpackage 2 – Methodology. 
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III of the questionnaire revealed a number of emerging procedural issues that may also present obstacles 
to co-operation; these will be considered in Chapter 8 of this Report. Only the first half of Part III of the 
questionnaire will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this Report; the second half of Part III refers to the role 
of judicial and administrative authorities, which is more relevant to Report 2. The purpose of this 
Chapter 6 is to explore the responses to Part I of the JCOERE questionnaire. 
6.2 Introducing the Irish Examinership Procedure 
The Irish Examinership process is a classic and modern example of a rescue process with all of the key 
operative provisions provided in the PRD.8 Accordingly, it provides the JCOERE Project with an ideal 
benchmark. The early cases often referred to three significant features of the legislation; the first has 
been characterised in judicial pronouncements as providing ‘breathing space’ for failing companies to 
find new investment and to agree a compromise with their creditors. While the PRD does not use this 
exact terminology, it was referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum preceding the Proposal and the 
Impact Assessment published on 22nd November 2016, and in the General Approach published by the 
Council of the European Union on 24th September 2018. In Ireland, this is a description of the stay or 
moratorium whereby the court orders the appointment of an examiner to the company and the company 
is put under the protection of the court for a period of time.9 A second purpose that seemed to motivate 
the courts in appointing an examiner to attempt rescue and supporting the operation of the legislation 
was the preservation of jobs. This is also a clear focus in the PRD as all iterations, including the proposal, 
the ancillary, explanatory, and assessing documents mention job preservation as a key factor in 
promoting the introduction of restructuring frameworks throughout the EU.  
Third, the perception also expressed at the time of the introduction of the Examinership procedure that 
the aggressive securitisation practises of banks were precipitating business failure. Examinership was 
presented as an alternative to the drastic solution of appointing a receiver and manager and a subsequent 
liquidation. A fairly recent iteration of these goals is found in Re Traffic Group Ltd,10 in which Clarke 
J described that purpose in the following terms: 
“It is clear that the principle focus of the legislation is to enable, in an appropriate case, an 
enterprise to continue in existence for the benefit of the economy as a whole and, of equal, or 
indeed greater, importance to enable as many as possible of the jobs which may be at stake in 
such enterprise to be maintained for the benefit of the community in which the relevant 
employment is located. It is important both for the court and, indeed, for examiners, to keep in 
mind that such is the focus of the legislation. It is not designed to help shareholders whose 
investment has proved to be unsuccessful. It is to seek to save the enterprise and jobs.” 
This quote closely resembles the purposes of the PRD. Furthermore, 30 years’ worth of case law in 
Ireland could be instructive for jurisdictions implementing their own frameworks for preventive 
restructuring subsequent to the PRD, although there are also systemic and institutional characteristics 
that underpin the success of the Irish Examinership procedure that should be considered. These 
characteristics are revealed when in-depth comparisons are drawn between systems and the specific 
provisions of the PRD. 
6.3 Methodology 
The research method for this project was described in some detail in Chapter 1. The analysis in Chapters 
6, 7, and 8 uses the comparative legal methodology to draw relevant functional comparisons between 
Member States’ restructuring frameworks and their underlying insolvency law systems. Comparative 
law has a number of purposes. It can increase knowledge and understanding, which in turn can act as 
an aid to the domestic legislator in pursuit of legal reform. At an international, or supranational level 
such as the institutions of the EU, knowledge of  comparative law can help to find solutions to questions 
of how to unify and harmonise laws.11 Comparative law provides a “richer range of model solutions” 
by examining the solutions to similar legal problems devised in a number of legal systems.12 The PRD 
 
8 Irene Lynch Fannon, Jane Marshall, and Rory O’Ferrall, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Butterworths 1996); Irene Lynch Fannon and 
Gerard Nicholas Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Bloomsbury 2012); John O’Donnell, Examinerships (Londsdale 2016). 
9 Companies Act 2014, s 520. 
10 [2008] 3 IR 253 [260]. 
11 Matthias Siems, Comparative Law (CUP 2014) 2-4.  
12 Konrad Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 15. 
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has done this to some extent by adopting and adapting successful pre-existing provisions from different 
legal systems. By identifying fundamental differences, it is possible to forecast conflicts that could arise 
in court cooperation due to the differences in legal systems. 
6.4 JCOERE Approach to Comparative Legal Analysis 
The JCOERE Project utilises a comparative law methodology to determine what preventive 
restructuring (or restructuring) procedures currently exist in the contributor Member States and the 
proposals being considered in light of the PRD. The comparative law methodology provides a paradigm, 
through which international exchanges can be facilitated by the “gradual approximation of viewpoints, 
the abandonment of deadly complacency, and the relaxation of fixed dogma.”13  
Comparative methodology is often said to begin with a principle of functionality. Every legal system 
tends to face the same problems, but while their resolution can be quite different, the results may often 
be quite similar. Therefore, it is important not to look at a foreign law by reference to concepts contained 
in one’s own familiar legal system; rather, it is important to find a neutral means of describing the 
problem that relies solely on the function of the law in question. Comparative law must, therefore, focus 
on a concrete legal problem and its resolution. 14 Even where legal solutions do not appear to exist in a 
foreign system, it is important to think around the problem and look at other areas of a legal system for 
existing solutions that may have been incorporated in an entirely different way.15  In relation to the EU, 
seeking for functional equivalences makes it possible to compare common law and civil law systems, 
despite the fundamental differences in legal origin and culture.16 
There are some limits to functionalism depending on the systems being compared. If legal systems are 
too different, drawing effective comparisons may be impossible if they are actually incomparable.17 
Fortunately, for EU Member States, there is a common enough history with all legal systems based on 
reasonably familiar legal families (common law, French and German civil law, and Roman Law) that 
the systems can be effectively compared.18 The different approaches to similar problems can also be 
explained by the path dependent nature of legal development. There are differences in the social and 
economic histories of individual jurisdictions, which influence the direction taken to resolve similar 
legal problems. In recognising these fundamental differences in culture, as a part of the comparative 
law paradigm, it becomes easier to explain why those differences persist and, perhaps, find a unifying 
solution.19 In fact, any harmonising Directive is based on the premise that such a solution is possible. 
The JCOERE methodology has examined the functional equivalences of specific substantive provisions 
common to preventive restructuring procedures: the stay of enforcement actions; adoption and 
confirmation rules relating to restructuring plans; intra- and cross-class cram-downs; the treatment of 
workers; and the protection of new and interim financing. By looking for functional equivalences, 
assumptions based on terminology can be avoided as the key determinants are conceptual rather than 
linguistic. Contributors were asked to explain their own systems and provisions within this paradigm. 
This revealed a number of differences in terminology, definition and perception, which sometimes made 
drawing clear comparisons challenging.  
6.5 General Context of Preventive Restructuring: Questionnaire Part I 
This Report began with a brief introduction to the project aims and context, followed by a discussion of 
academic commentary pertaining to preventive restructuring, as the context for the exploration of the 
challenges of judicial cooperation. The second chapter presented a discussion of challenging 
terminology, in other words, the same or similar terms, which carry different meanings across the EU. 
This chapter evolved out of the team’s experience of comparative qualitative research.  The third chapter 
briefly introduced the EIR Recast and the enhanced obligation to co-operate and the fourth chapter 
explored academic debate around the concept of preventive restructuring and its associated substantive 
 
13 idem 3.  
14 idem 34-35. 
15 idem 15. 
16 Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(OUP  2006) 339-382, 356-357. 
17 Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, ‘Critical Evaluation in Comparative Law’ (1974) 5 Adel L rev 343, 345. 
18 Siems (n 11) 27. 
19 See John Bell, ‘Path Dependence and Legal Development’ (2013) 87 Tul L Rev 787 and Oona A Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the Law: 
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2000) 86 Iowa L Rev 601. 
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provisions. The fifth chapter set out the evolution of the PRD and its underpinning aims and purposes. 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this Report will present a synthesis of the responses to the questionnaires20 that 
were completed by contributors from 10 different jurisdictions throughout the EU. This will be 
presented as a thematic analysis.  
 Functions and Aims of Preventive Restructuring   
Preventive restructuring is a concept largely derived from the focus on corporate and business rescue in 
insolvency law frameworks, thus many of the underpinning values and intentions apply. As noted in 
Chapter 4, there are a number of common principles that underpin the insolvency regimes of Europe. 21  
While Member States place different values on these underlying principles, they tend to be common 
throughout the EU. The flexibility in the Directive is likely to allow the Member States to maintain their 
fundamental positions on this continuum, which along with conflicts with underlying principles, 
procedural differences, and court discretion, may cause obstacles to cooperation where creditors are 
treated less favourably in a jurisdiction to which a court is being asked to defer. 
 Legislative Frameworks of the Contributing Jurisdictions in Context 
JCOERE Questionnaire Questions 1 and 2:  
1. Please specify existing legislative frameworks (if any) in your jurisdiction that provide for 
the preventive restructuring of companies, specifying the relevant legislation, legislative 
provisions, and/or rules that regulate the framework along with the date of implementation.  
2. What are the stated functions and aims of your jurisdictions’ preventive restructuring 
frameworks? Please refer to legislative policy documents or from your jurisdiction where 
relevant, statements in the legislation or statements by courts in applying the legislation (e.g. 
the Cork Report in the UK). 
Generally, recognition of insolvency or insolvency related procedures is viewed by courts as obligatory 
and automatic if a procedure sits within Annex A of the EIR Recast. As noted in Chapter 3 of this 
Report,22 while the PRD envisions that all restructuring frameworks will be included in Annex A, this 
can only be done if they satisfy its inclusion criteria. If the frameworks eventually developed are not 
included in Annex A, then they will not be subject to the EIR Recast and its enhanced obligation to 
cooperate, which the JCOERE Project is interrogating. Unless otherwise noted, all of the procedures 
mentioned in the following Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are also included in Annex A of the EIR Recast, thus 
will be subject to the enhanced obligation to cooperate.23 This section of Chapter 6 will give a brief 
introduction to the preventive restructuring frameworks in the contributing jurisdictions, along with 
their context and any planned changes. Where plans include consideration of the inclusion in Annex A, 
these plans will also be discussed. 
a) Ireland24 
As noted in section 6.1.1 above, the principles underpinning the main Irish preventive restructuring 
proceeding, Examinership, closely align to those underpinning the PRD. In addition, Irish law contains 
provisions that are broadly similar to the English company law Scheme of Arrangement, originally 
provided in the Companies Act 1963 as amended by the Companies Act 2014.25 While a few cases arose 
 
20 See Annex 2 of this Report for the questionnaire distributed to the contributors.  
21 Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 22. 
22 See Chapter 3 of this Report, section 3.6.  
23 Included in Annex A of the EIR Recast are France’s Sauvegarde, Sauvegarde accélérée, and Sauvegarde financière accéléré; Germany’s 
Insolvenzverfahren; Italy’s Concordato preventive and Accordi di ristrutturazione; The Netherlands surséance van betaling; Romania’s 
Concordatul preventive and its ad hoc mandate; Spain’s Procedimiento de homologación de acuerdos de refinanciación, and Procedimiento 
de acuerdos extrajudiciales de pago; Poland’s PostČpowanie naprawcze, Upadłość obejmująca likwidacjČ, and Upadłość z możliwością 
zawarcia układu; Austria’s the UK’s Company Voluntary Arrangement and Administration procedures (Schemes are not in Annex A); the 
Irish Examinership Procedure (equally Schemes are not in Annex A). Interstingly, the Austrian Unternehmensreorganistionsgesetz (URG) is 
not present in Annex A and as Denmark is not a party to the EIR, their insolvency and rescue procedures would not be included.  
24 The Irish Country Report was provided by Professor Irene Lynch Fannon and Aoife Finnerty (Research Assistant on the JCOERE Project 
Team) of University College Cork, Ireland and is available to view on the JCOERE website.  
25 Irish Companies Act 2014, ss 449-455.  
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in relation to the constitution of classes for the purposes of approving a scheme between 1963-1990,26 
… the Examinership procedure has been much more significant as a preventive restructuring process.27 
It should be noted that the Irish Scheme, like the English Scheme, is not included in Annex A of the 
EIR Recast. … Examinership, by contrast, is. 
The Irish Examinership procedure was introduced in 1990 under the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990 
and subsequently amended in 1999 following a report of the Company Law Review Group, which 
criticised some of its most radical aspects. This legislation has now been consolidated in Part 10 of the 
Companies Act 2014. Since its introduction in 1990, the examinership process has been considered in 
numerous cases decided by the Irish High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court and has been the 
subject of extensive academic commentary.28  
In light of the similarities between examinership and the PRD, the responses to the questionnaire 
primarily focus on examinership procedures; however, where relevant aspects of the scheme of 
arrangement will also be noted. 
b) Italy29 
The Italian legal framework on preventive restructuring has recently undergone an extensive reform.  
The “Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza” (hereinafter the “CCI”) is due to come into force 
on August 14th, 2020. This new framework has three main objectives; first, it aims to increase recovery 
in pre-insolvency procedures in the interests of creditors.30 Second, it aims to enable healthy firms in 
financial difficulty to restructure at an early stage, to avoid insolvency, and to continue their activities.31 
Finally, the Italian framework aims to reduce the duration and costs of the procedures.32 To achieve 
these objectives, the Italian legislature has enacted the Delegated Law No. 155/2017, providing 
guidelines for the CCI.  
Italy has established a “modular” approach to pre-insolvency and insolvency procedures, creating a 
basic, single procedure, which will vary in its approach and outcome depending on the specific case 
under examination.33 Referring legislation has focused on a number of specific issues including:  
i. the efficiency of the proceeding and the empowerment of institutional bodies with supervisory 
and control powers to take the initiative;34  
ii. prioritizing those proposals that allow the business to recover from the crisis as a going concern 
(not necessarily with the same entrepreneur) and that are able to ensure that the best interest of 
the creditors are protected;35  
 
26 These are described Lynch-Fannon & Gerard N Murphy (n 8) chapter 14. See for example Re Pye (Ireland) Ltd (No 1) (12 November 1984), 
HC, Costello J and (ex tempore, 22 November 1984) SC, (1963–1993) ICLR 320 (HC), (1984) Irish Times, 23 November (SC); and Re John 
Power & Sons Ltd [1934] IR 412. More recent Irish cases on UK style Schemes of Arrangement include Re Millstream Recycling Ltd [2009] 
IEHC 571 and Re: Ballantyne RE Plc & Companies Act 2014 [2019] IEHC 407. 
27 In 2014 there were 18 reported and completed examinerships, 19 in 2015, and 15 in 2016. When considering the viability of a rescue process 
generally, the comparative figures for liquidations are 68, 50 and 32 to the 3rd Quarter of 2016 and 299, 251 and 346 receiverships. See the 
2017 statistics here <http://www.insolvencyjournal.ie/stats> accessed 12 December 2019. In this period there was one completed scheme of 
arrangement in Re Millstream Recycling Ltd [2009] IEHC 571. It should be noted that during the recession the rescue of companies became 
even more important. The Irish Times notes that ‘Of the 420 companies that had an examiner appointed between 2007 and 2016, some 56 per 
cent of them are now back on their feet.’ Peter Hamilton, ‘Majority of Companies Entering Examinership since Crash Survived’ (Irish Times 
3 July 2017). 
28 Lynch Fannon, Marshall, &  O’Ferrall (n 8); Lynch Fannon and Murphy (n 8). Thomas B Courtney, et al (eds), Bloomsbury Professional’s 
Guide to the Companies Act 2014 (Bloomsbury 2015). O’Donnell (n 8). For an early discussion of this legislation see Irene Lynch Fannon, 
‘Goodman International and the 1990 Companies (Amendment) Act.’ (1991) (Spring) DLI 2. See also Irene Lynch Fannon, ‘Saving Jobs at 
What Cost? Consideration of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990’ (1994) Irish Law Times 208 and ‘Reform in Haste: Repent at Leisure. 
A Consideration of the Company Law Reform Group, 1993’ (1994) Irish Law Times 189. 
29 The Italian Country Report was provided by the Universita degli Studi di Firenze and Dr Iacopo Donati (Post-Doctoral Researcher) and 
Niccolo Usai (Junior Researcher), with input from Professors Lorenzo Stanghellini and Andrea Zorzi and is available on the JCOERE website. 
30 See the Explanatory Report of the Delegated Law n. 155/2017 and the Italian Supreme Court’s decision, section I, 07 April 2017, n. 9061. 
31 See the Explanatory Report of the Delegated Law n. 155/2017 and the Italian Supreme Court’s decision, section I, 13 June 2016, n. 12119. 
32 See the Explanatory Report of the Delegated Law n. 155/2017. 
33 CCI, art 40. 
34 CCI, art 377 and following. 
35 CCI, art 86. 
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iii. attributing defined responsibilities to insolvency practitioners and advisors and weakening the 
statutory priorities that such professionals used to enjoy in relation to their fees accrued in the 
context of or in connection to the restructuring;36  
iv. ensuring that judges will be properly specialized in the field of insolvency;37 and  
v. providing for the creation of a public register containing a list of professionals, who could also 
be organized as associations or companies, having the requirements to act as court-appointed 
insolvency practitioners in the context of pre-insolvency and insolvency procedures.38 
There are three procedures in the new Italian framework that satisfy the definition of preventive 
restructuring: the concordato preventivo (preventive concordat),39 the accord di ristrutturazione dei 
debiti (debt restructuring agreement),40 and the accordi di ristrutturazione ad efficacia estesa (debt 
restructuring agreement binding on dissenting creditors).41 
The concordato preventivo (judicial composition with creditors) allows a distressed company to avoid 
opening an insolvency liquidation proceeding by means of an agreement with a majority of its creditors. 
The plan is proposed by the debtor, and in some cases by the creditors if they represent at least 10% of 
the indebtedness, which is known as a competing plan.42 A competing plan can only be submitted in 
response to a procedure initiated by the debtor. Competing plans are not admissible if an independent 
expert certifies that the debtor’s proposal ensures the payment of at least 30% of the unsecured claims.43 
Upon request by the debtor at court filing, the judicial composition features an automatic stay on 
enforcement actions; priority for new financing (priority cannot, however, trump secured creditors); 
termination of executory contracts; intra- and cross-class cram-down; and a stay on recapitalisation 
obligations. After the approval of the plan by the required majority of creditors, it becomes binding only 
after judicial confirmation, which will rely on an expert’s report certifying that (1) the financial and 
economic data used in the plan are truthful as to the current situation, and reliable as to the prospects, 
and (2) that the plan is feasible, and, if implemented, suitable to overcome the crisis. 
The accordo di restrutturazione dei debiti (debt restructuring agreement) allows for the confirmation of 
an out-of-court agreement reached by the debtor with at least 60% by value of a company’s creditors, 
supported by an expert’s report confirming that the agreement can ensure the full payment of non-
consisting creditors. The key features of this debt restructuring agreement are a temporary stay on 
enforcement actions, which is automatically granted by the court upon request by the debtor; priority 
for new financing (not including secured creditors); and a stay on recapitalisation obligations.  
Finally, the accordo di ristrutturazione ad efficacia estesa (debt restructuring agreement binding on 
dissenting creditors) also allows for the confirmation of an out-of-court agreement. The differentiating 
feature is that it is also binding on dissenting creditors. The debtor may form one or more classes of 
creditors on the basis of commonality of interest and an equivalent ranking. All creditors included in a 
class are bound by effects of the agreement if at least 75% of the total amount of creditors of the relevant 
class have consented; this results in the remaining 25% of non-consenting creditors being bound. There 
is no cross-class cram-down provision, meaning that if the 75% threshold is not reached in a certain 
class, the creditors remain unaffected by the agreement. The key features of this alternative debt 
restructuring agreement are the temporary stay on enforcement actions at the request of the debtor; an 
intra-class cram-down; priority for new financing (not over secured creditors, as in the concordato 
preventivo); and a stay on recapitalisation obligations.44 
 
36 CCI, art 6. 
37 CCI, art 27. In this respect the CCI implemented only partially the principles of the Enabling Law 155/2017. 
38 CCI, art 356. 
39 CCI, art 84-120. 
40 CCI, art 57-64. 
41 CCI, art 61. 
42 The 10% threshold can also be reached by buying credits after the proceeding is opened. 
43 CCI, art 90.  
44 The obligation to recapitalise refers to a rule that is triggered if a company’s net asset falls below zero. In order to protect creditors, the 
recapitalization of the company is a condition to continue trading and the violation of such duty exposes the directors of the company to actions 
by creditors and the relevant stakeholders (this concept recalls, with differences, the wrongful trading doctrine, which the Directive makes 
reference to). During the preventive restructuring procedure, the business may be continued without directors being liable to the company and 
its stakeholders. 
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c) Romania45 
Like many Member States, Romania was influenced by the economic crisis of 2009, which in turn 
influenced the modern development of insolvency, corporate rescue and restructuring procedures. The 
Preventive Concordat and the Ad-hoc Mandate Law no. 381/2009 had the aim of providing a buffer 
against the wave of insolvencies, which were not necessarily justified by a real cessation of payments. 
These early reforms, however, were not as effective as hoped. After the Preventive Concordat and the 
Ad-hoc Mandate Law no. 381/2009 came into force, it was foreseeable that the insolvency claims would 
be drastically reduced for a period of at least 6 months afterward. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of 
the concordat was minimal. The debtors preferred to file for insolvency and financial institutions were 
resistant to the procedure, resulting in a slow take-up of the concordat. Against this background, 
Romania introduced revised versions of the ad-hoc mandate and preventive concordat procedures in 
2014, which seems to have improved the position of the concordat. While this law was intended to 
protect the interest of both debtors and creditors, the Law No 85/2014 is more creditor friendly. 
The law contains concrete pre-insolvency instruments aimed at obtaining the amicable negotiation of 
claims through the ad hoc mandate and the conclusion of a preventive concordat. Reforms may include 
continuing the flow of interest for secured creditors; simplifying the approval of the arrangement; and 
introducing the private creditor test, which also allows public creditors to vote on a concordat project.46 
The shorter duration of pre-insolvency proceedings and their greater flexibility should encourage the 
parties to use pre-insolvency procedures when the business has a temporary and repairable shortfall in 
liquidity.47 Pre-insolvency procedures aim to restructure the company through a conventional 
restructuring of debts subject to negotiations with creditors. Unfortunately, the debtor’s protection 
against potential enforcement procedures from the non-adherent creditors is less effective. For this 
reason, most debtors prefer to open insolvency proceedings and propose a reorganisation plan to fully 
benefit from the protection against enforcement.  
The ad-hoc mandate48 is a confidential procedure initiated at the request of the debtor in financial 
difficulty. An ad-hoc agent is then designated by the court and negotiates with creditors to reach an 
agreement between (one or more of) them and the debtor with the aim of overcoming the debtor’s 
financial difficulties.  
The preventive concordat49 is a contract between the debtor and creditors that hold at least 75% of 
accepted and undisputed value of claims, which is homologated by the syndic judge. The debtor 
proposes a workout and recovery plan with the aim of covering the creditors’ claims and the creditors, 
in turn, support debtor’s efforts to overcome the financial distress. The concordat procedure is opened 
only at the request of the debtor. The most important effect of its approval is that an insolvency 
procedure against the debtor cannot be opened during the concordat period. 
d) France50 
Three main preventive restructuring procedures are currently used in France. The three main procedures 
that satisfy the definition of preventive restructuring in France are the (1) mandate ad hoc,51 (2) 
conciliation,52 and (3) procédure de sauvegarde.53  The latter is included in Annex A of the EIR Recast. 
 
45 The Romanian Country Report was provided by Judge Nicoleta Mirela Nastasie and Dr Cristian Draghaci of University Titu Maiorescu, 
available on the JCOERE website. 
46 “Public creditor” is a term used to define a budgetary creditor. Usually budgetary claims are significant, as typically value and budgetary 
creditors vote against any kind of pre-insolvency arrangement, restructuring plan or reorganization insolvency plan. 
47 ‘Codul Insolventei Adnotat’, The World Bank Group and Romanian Ministry of Justice, in the Program “Întărirea mecanismului insolvenței 
în România” financed by BIRD 2011-2016,  9 <www.just.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Cod-adnotat-FINAL.docx> accessed 18 November 
2019. 
48 Law no 85/2014 on preventing insolvency and insolvency proceedings (The Insolvency Code), arts 10-15. 
49 Law on pre-insolvency and insolvency proceedings no 85/2014, art 5(17). 
50 The French Country Report was provided by Dr Emilie Ghio of Birmingham City University with the assistance of Dr Paul Omar, technical 
research coordinator of INSOL Europe is available on the JCOERE website. 
51 Regulated by Articles L611-1 to L611-16 of the Commercial Code. 
52 ibid. 
53 Regulated by Articles L620-1 to L628-10 of the Commercial Code. See the debate as to whether the safeguard procedure should come within 
the scope of the Directive. For authors saying it will not be encompassed by the Directive, see R Dammann and M Boché-Robinet, 
‘Transposition du projet de directive sur l’harmonisation des procédures de restructuration préventive en Europe. Une chance à saisir pour la 
France’ (2017) 22 Recueil Dalloz < http://www.dirigerentempsdecrise.com/assets/fichiers/RECUEIL22-
05_CHRONIQUE_Mise%20en%20page%201.pdf> accessed 16 August 2019.  
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There are an additional two procedures that are subsets of the sauvegarde and available only as a 
conversion of the conciliation procedure.54 
Arguably, the French model is one of the most advanced preventive restructuring models in the 
European Union, although it has continually reformed its legislative frameworks, sometimes without 
enough time to fully test the procedures in practice. Relative to many other jurisdictions, France has 
given an early priority to business recue, unless the business is in such a dire situation that liquidation 
could be the only foreseeable outcome. The French model of insolvency and preventive restructuring 
has, since the recession of the 1980s, tended to favour the rescue of businesses in order to preserve 
employment, at times to the detriment of creditors and saving functionally non-viable businesses. Three 
new insolvency laws were passed during the 1980s, one of which introduced a pre-insolvency process 
for the first time.55 These laws placed the focus on reorganisation, rather than liquidation with the aim 
of protecting employment. The focus on employment preservation has changed over the last couple of 
decades, however, the importance of job preservation is still a clear aim of the French rescue culture. 
In 2005, French insolvency law was reformed once again.56 The major change brought about by the 
Law of 2005 was the introduction of a new procedure called safeguard (procédure de sauvegarde), 
designed as a hybrid of the American Chapter 11 model and pre-existing French judicial rescue 
procedure. It was conceived as a preventive restructuring mechanism designed to encourage upstream 
rescue, since companies could avail of it before they were officially insolvent (en cessation de 
paiements). The safeguard was amended by the Ordinance of 2008,57 which addressed its main flaws 
and amended again in the immediate wake of the financial crisis in 2010, to introduce a variant of 
sauvegarde called sauvegarde financière accélérée (SFA).58 The SFA drew on the practice of pre-pack 
administrations in the UK.  The Ordinance of 2014 extensively reformed French insolvency law with a 
view to: (i) favouring preventive measures; (ii) strengthening the efficiency of pre-insolvency 
proceedings; and (iii) increasing the rights of creditors in insolvency proceedings. Another variant on 
the sauvegarde procedure was also introduced, the sauvegarde financière (SA).59  
The most recent round of amendments occurred in 2016; a law on the Modernisation of 21st Century 
Justice focused on the promotion of the rescue culture, the enhancement of confidentiality during 
proceedings, the ring-fencing of new monies during restructuring, and the improvement of transparency 
and impartiality.60 Some of the amendments included the removal of the need for notification of the 
employees’ council or representatives during the opening of mandat ad hoc or conciliation; the 
exclusion of a judge in a prior mandat ad hoc or conciliation from acting in any subsequent sauvegarde 
of the same debtor; and the facilitation of the extension of the observation period in a sauvegarde by a 
further six months on application. 
1. Mandat ad hoc 
The mandat ad hoc is flexible and not subject to overly heavy regulation. As it is preventive in nature, 
it is a condition that the company cannot be in a cessation de paiements at the time of proposed entry.  
In the mandat ad hoc a court can appoint an ad hoc representative at the request of a debtor, which can 
also suggest the name of a particular representative. The Commercial Court defines the extent and scope 
of the mandataire’s responsibilities. The ad hoc representative plays a similar role to a conciliator in a 
conciliation procedure, albeit he is not bound by the same procedural rules that apply to the conciliation 
procedure. 
 
54 The two procedures that are subsets of the sauvegarde are the accelerated financial safeguard (sauvegarde financière accélérée) (SFA) and 
the accelerated safeguard (sauvegarde accélérée)). Unless otherwise specified, any reference to sauvegarde will be to the main procedure. If 
referring to one of the subset procedures, this will be clearly stated.  
55 Law No 84-148 of 1 March 1984; Law No 85-98 of 25 January 1985 focused on insolvency law and Law No 85-99 of 25 January 1985 
regulated office-holders. 
56 Law No 2005-845 of 26 July 2005. See P Omar, ‘The Progress of Reforms to Insolvency Law and Practice in France’ in K Gromek Broc 
and R Parry (eds.), Corporate Rescue in Europe: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries in Europe (Kluwer 2004) 51-
78. 
57 Ordinance No 2008-1345 of 18 December 2008. 
58 Law No 2010-1249 of 22 October 2010. See also P Omar, ‘Preservation and Pre-Packs à la Française: The Evolution of French Insolvency 
Law after 2005 (2011) 22(8) ICCLR 258.  
59 Ordinance No 2014-326 of 12 March 2014. For an in-depth account of the sauvegarde accélérée, see S Danjon ‘La procédure de sauvegarde 
accélérée’ (Master Thesis, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne 2016) <https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-01317161/document> 
accessed 9 January 2020. 
60 Law No 2016-1547 of 18 November 2016.  
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2. Conciliation 
A conciliation procedure is conducted under the supervision of a conciliateur, appointed by the court at 
the request of the debtor. The objective is the negotiation of an agreement between the debtor and its 
main creditors, which is then sanctioned by the court (constatation or homologation). Once reached, the 
agreement has the force of a normal contract but the step of sanctioning by the court through 
homologation makes the agreement public and all creditors are informed. 
3. Sauvegarde 
The sauvegarde can be opened at the request of a debtor, provided it is not in cessation de paiements.61 
The objective is to obtain a moratorium on claims during the observation period (période 
d’observation). The judgment opening safeguard proceedings appoints (i) an insolvency judge (juge 
commissaire) who oversees the whole procedure;62 (ii) an administrator (administreur) who supervises 
and/or assists the management in the preparation of a safeguard plan (plan de sauvegarde); (iii) a 
creditors’ representative (mandataires judiciaires) who represents the creditors’ interests and assesses 
the proofs of claims. They are designated by the insolvency judge who can be assisted by supervising 
creditors (créanciers contrôleurs) whom the insolvency judge appoints.63 
In terms of current and future developments in France, the “Loi Pacte”64 introduced in May 2019 allows 
the French Government to legislate by means of an Ordinance in order to transpose the Directive. 
e) The Netherlands65 
In 2012, the Minister of Security and Justice presented a legislative agenda for reform of the Dutch 
Bankruptcy Act, including a legislative proposal for what is called the Wet homologatie onderhands 
akkoord (Act on confirmation of extrajudicial restructuring plans, hereafter “the WHOA”). On July 5th 
2019, the Dutch Minister for Legal Protection presented this Bill, which is likely to be adopted by the 
Parliament in 2020 and enter into force in 2020/2021.66 The WHOA provides for a proceeding inspired 
by the US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code (Restructuring Proceeding) and the UK Scheme of 
Arrangement. While the WHOA is drafted in line with the PRD, a separate legislative proposal will be 
prepared to implement the Directive with respect to a preventive restructuring proceeding. It appears 
from the Minister’s announcement that this will be achieved by amending the Dutch surseance van 
betaling (suspension of payment proceeding).67  
Until the WHOA comes into force, the only preventive restructuring procedure currently available in 
the Netherlands is the suspension of payment.68 The suspension of payment is available to corporate 
debtors and aims to facilitate the continuation of imminently insolvent, but viable, companies. It is 
available at the request of the debtor and provides for a moratorium, which is confined to non-secured 
creditors. The aim is to provide the debtor with the time needed to reorganise the business, thereby 
allowing it to regain its viability. Suspension of payment can be requested when the debtor expects (or 
foresees) an inability to continue paying debts.69 Upon receipt of the request, the suspension of payment 
is automatically granted for a provisional period provided certain formal requirements are met.70 
 
61 Commercial Code, art L620-2. 
62 Article L621-9 of the Commercial Code.  
63 Commercial Code, art L621-10 and L621-11.  
64 Law no 2019-486 of 22 May 2019.  
65 The Dutch Country Report was provided by Gert-Jan Boon, legal researcher and lecturer at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands and 
is available on the JCOERE website. 
66 In 2014 a first draft bill was presented, the Wet Continuïteit Ondernemingen II (Business Continuation Act II). The public consultation led 
to ample response and led to a revised draft bill – the WHOA – that was made available for a public consultation. The WHOA and an 
explanatory memorandum is available here: <https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/wethomologatie>. An unofficial translation of the WHOA has 
been prepared by several law firms, see for instance: <https://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/20180108-WHOA-unofficial-
translation.pdf>. In July 2019 the Minister for Legal Protection presented a revised text of the WHOA to Parliament. This text is available 
here: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/07/08/tk-nader-rapport-wet-homologatie-onderhands-akkoord>; with 
an unofficial translation available here: <https://www.debrauw.com/cerp/>. The translated articles of the WHOA in this report have been taken 
from this translation. 
67 Explanatory note to the WHOA (2019) 4; Kamerstukken II 2018/19, 33 695, nr 18, 3. 
68 Dutch BA, art 214. 
69 Article 214(1) Dutch BA states that (provisional) suspension of payment can be granted of payment to the debtor who expects (foresees) 
that he will be unable to continue the payment of his debts. 
70 The Dutch BA gives no specified time for this provisional suspension of payment. Court procedural rules state that within two to four months 
after granting the provisional suspension of payment,a hearing will be held regarding granting the final suspension of payment. See Dutch BA, 
art 215(2) and 2.3.1 Procesreglement verzoekschriftprocedures insolventiezaken rechtbanken (2019) 
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Following this provisional period, the court will decide if granting a final suspension of payment 
is warranted in the circumstances.71 
In practice, this proceeding is perceived as a forerunner for requesting the opening of bankruptcy 
proceedings.72 Besides the suspension of payment, there are no specific formal or pre-insolvency 
restructuring proceedings available. With that said, it is worth noting that, in practice, the Dutch 
bankruptcy proceeding is often used to facilitate the restructuring of insolvent debtors. 
f) Spain73 
The purpose of preventive restructuring in Spain is twofold: first, to reach an agreement between the 
debtor and its creditors that will allow for the restructuring of debts. The second aim is to save the 
company, enabling it to continue its economic activity, and preserve jobs. There are two preventive 
restructuring procedures in the Spanish framework that try to meet these purposes.74 First, Spain 
provides for refinancing agreements that may be proposed to financial creditors before the 
commencement of insolvency procedures, which may be approved by a judge and kept confidential if 
the agreement meets certain requirements.75 Spain also provides for extra-judicial payment 
compositions, which may be offered to creditors of both legal and natural persons prior to the initiation 
of insolvency proceedings.76 Both of these procedures are the result of more recent reforms; the 2013 
reform introducing the regulation of extra-judicial payment compositions,77 the 2014 reform on the 
refinancing and restructuring of corporate debts,78 and the 2015 reform on urgent measures in insolvency 
proceedings.79 Both refinancing agreements and extrajudicial payment compositions must be approved 
by a judge. 
g) Austria80 
The function and aims of the Austrian preventive restructuring framework is to reorganise enterprises 
in financial trouble before they become insolvent. It is presumed that reorganisation is necessary when 
the equity ratio is less than 8% and the fictitious debt amortization period is more than 15 years. 
Currently, the Austrian preventive restructuring framework is provided in the Act on Reorganisation of 
Enterprises (Unternehmensreorganistionsgesetz (“URG”)).81 The URG has not been popular, however, 
having had only 3 or 4 cases since it was introduced. Its underutilisation has been attributed to the lack 
of stay of enforcement actions; its high costs; and the fact that most enterprises do not qualify for 
preventive restructuring as they are already insolvent.  
h) Poland82 
The purpose of restructuring in Poland is to avoid bankruptcy (insolvent liquidation) by enabling the 
debtor to successfully restructure through an arrangement with creditors. With respect to remedial 
proceedings, there is a further purpose, namely to safeguard the legitimate interests of creditors while 
restructuring the debtor.83 Each restructuring procedure – there are currently four types - of a collective 
type is centred around the adoption of an arrangement plan that must be voted upon by the debtor’s 
creditors and approved by a competent court. The current legislative framework in Poland is set in the 
 
<https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Procesreglement-verzoekschriftprocedures-insolventiezaken-rechtbanken-2019.pdf> 
accessed 27 October 2019. 
71 The final suspension of payment will be granted for a maximum of 1.5 years (Dutch BA, art 223(1)). 
72 See for instance Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 24 036, nr 238, 1. 
73 The Spanish Country Report was completed by Dr Antonio Sotillo Marti of the Departamento de Derecho mercantil “Manuel Broseta Pont” 
of Universitat de Valencia, Spain and is available on the JCOERE website. Thanks also to Nuria Bermejo, Senior Researcher in Derecho 
Privado, Social y Económico of the Faculty of Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and Professor Francisco Garcimartin, Chair Professor 
of Private International Law at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, for their review and last-minute contributions to the Spanish parts of this 
Report.  
74 Contained in the Ley 22/2003, de 9 de julio, Concursal, “BOE” núm 164, de 10/07/2003. 
75 Ley 22/2003, art 5 bis, 71 bis, and additional provision 4. 
76 Ley 22/2003, art 231-242 bis. 
77 La Ley 14/2013 de 27 de septiembre que introdujo la regulación del acuerdo extrajudicial de pagos. 
78 La Ley 17/2014 de 30 de septiembre de refinanciación y reestructuración de deudas empresariales. 
79 La Ley 9/2015 de 25 de mayo de medidas urgentes en material concursal. 
80 The Austrian Country Report was completed by Dr Susanne Fruhstorfer, partner at Taylor Wessing and is available on the JCOERE website. 
81 Bundesgesetzblatt (“BGBI”) 1997/114. 
82 The initial Polish Country Report was completed by Sylwester Zydowicz, Partner at Taylor Wessing and is available on the JCOERE 
website. Thanks also to Michał Barłowski of Wardynski & Partners, Warsaw Poland for significant additional input at short notice. 
83 RL, art 3. 
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Restructuring Law Act of 15 May 201584 (“RL”). Any company that is at risk of insolvency85 or is 
already insolvent86 can commence restructuring by way of a court application, with the exception 
of  arrangement approval proceedings, where a court accepts the previously created plan by way 
of a private process.87 In the three other restructuring proceedings, a court will appoint a supervisor after 
commencing the procedure. The debtor will continue to manage the business (debtor in possession) with 
oversight from the supervisor, with the exception of remedial proceedings where, by default, the court 
will appoint an administrator to take over management of the debtor’s business. There are four types of 
restructuring proceedings covered by the RL: (i) arrangement approval proceedings; (ii) accelerated 
arrangement proceedings; (iii) arrangement proceedings; and (iv) remedial proceedings. The first two 
proceedings can also be conducted in limited form where a (partial) arrangement can cover some 
creditors, which are key/have a fundamental influence on the debtor’s business. This leaves other 
creditors unaffected.  
Irrespective of the above, restructuring of a debtor’s business viewed from a commercial perspective 
can also take place during bankruptcy (liquidation insolvency) as covered by the Bankruptcy Law88 
”BL” through a prepared liquidation procedure (pre-packaged sale of business as a going concern 
or of its organised part or substantial assets). In such a case the sale is executed by a receiver on terms 
previously approved by a court after debtor bankruptcy proceedings have been opened. In general, after 
the opening of restructuring proceedings (this does not apply to arrangement approval proceedings) the 
debtor can no longer pay the receivable claims covered by an arrangement. Therefore, in some, but it 
would seem not all, restructuring proceedings, enforcement or security proceedings are stayed. Once an 
arrangement is adopted by the creditors and approved by the court, it needs to be implemented; this 
process is overseen by a court nominated a supervisor.  
If a debtor is insolvent, each of its executive directors is required to file for a declaration of bankruptcy; 
failure to do so may result in personal liability. This is not the case in any of the restructuring 
proceedings. If concurrent motions are filed, in other words, one for the opening of bankruptcy 
proceedings and one for restructuring proceedings, a court will give priority to opening restructuring 
proceedings. 
While it is commonly accepted that a revised Bankruptcy law and the entry into force of the 
Restructuring law in 2016 had a positive effect on the market and that many businesses used the new 
procedures to avoid bankruptcy declaration, it is clear after three years that certain changes are 
necessitated. This may well be done together with enactment of the PRD. Pre-pack procedures under 
the Bankruptcy law have already been amended,89 and will enter into force on 24 March 2020, whereby 
the aim of reform is to promote this method of restructuring under rules of the Bankruptcy law. 
The original aims and goals of the Restructuring law of 2016 may be found in the justification 
of the draft act.90 Statistics show that not all of its aims were met in practice.91 
i) Germany92 
Germany does not currently provide any type of preventive restructuring along the lines of what the 
Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency envisages. However, from 1927 to 1999 there was a 
preventive restructuring framework available (the “Vergleichsordnung”), which provided a collective 
procedure aimed at a debt restructuring agreement that could be confirmed based on a majority vote of 
 
84 Consolidated text, Journal of Laws of 2019, item 243, with subsequent amendments.  
85 RL, art 11. 
86 RL, art 6. 
87 RL, art 223: 
 “1. The court shall issue a decision on approval of an arrangement within two weeks from the date of filing an application for arrangement 
approval. 
2. A decision on arrangement approval shall indicate the basis for the jurisdiction of Polish courts. If Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on bankruptcy proceedings applies (OJ L 141 of 5 June 2015, page 19), the 
decision shall also specify whether the proceedings are main or secondary proceedings.” 
88 Act of 28 February 2003 of Bankruptcy law (Consolidated text, Journal of Laws of 2019, item 498, with subsequent amendments). 
89 Act of 30 August 2019 amending the Act - Bankruptcy Law and some other acts (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1802), published on 
23 September 2019. 
90 See website: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=2824 – document word “2824-uzas.docx”. 
91 See website: http://acuria.eu. 
92 The German Country Report was provided by Professor Dr Stephan Madaus of Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg and is available 
on the JCOERE website. 
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unsecured creditors and a statutory minimum payoff to creditors. Since 1999, however, the German 
insolvency framework has featured a unitary procedure (the “Insolvenzverfahren”) that includes a 
restructuring plan option inspired by US Chapter 11 for both insolvent debtors and debtors nearing 
insolvency. A major reform in 2012 created a so-called umbrella (interim) proceeding option (the 
“Schutzschirmverfahren”) as a privileged path guaranteeing that the debtor will remain in possession 
while negotiating a plan. In both 1999 and 2012, the legislator deliberately decided against providing 
any separate preventive framework. Thus, all that is left is a preventive process for financial institutions 
(following the financial crisis) and a bond restructuring option, if provided for in the terms of the bond. 
The PRD will require the German legislator to design new procedural options and a legislative proposal 
is expected in the first half of 2020.  
While Germany does not yet provide a truly preventive proceeding, their insolvency law does provide 
for the possibility of proposing a restructuring plan. The Insolvenzordnung of 1999 (the “InsO”) 
provides a unified insolvency procedure with three paths, one of which is an insolvency plan93 through 
which there is a possibility to agree a plan with creditors. This can preserve the company as a legal 
entity by waiving certain residual claims owed to debtors of the company through the plan. The plan 
also aims for higher and quicker repayments to debtors than would otherwise be available in a 
liquidation.94 
It should be noted that in Germany, filing for insolvency is mandatory for the managing directors of 
corporations within three weeks of the occurrence of the circumstances of insolvency. It is in these 
circumstances that an insolvency plan can be initiated. Such circumstances include the inability of the 
debtor to meet most of its payment obligations as they become due.95 This illiquidity is presumed if the 
firm has ceased making debt repayments entirely. The procedure is also available if there is an 
impending illiquidity, which applies if the debtor has voluntarily filed for insolvency proceedings; it 
assumes that if the debtor has filed, it will not be able to make its repayment obligations.96 It is also 
available if the debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets (the ‘balance sheet test’). While it is the case that the 
plan is only available if a firm meets the criteria for insolvency, German law also allows the parties to 
stipulate separate agreements in accordance with their respective needs, allowing private party 
autonomy to agree to restructuring plans. That said, there is no procedure available prior to definitional 
insolvency in Germany.  
The sale of assets comprising the viable part of a business of an insolvent debtor is the dominant aim in 
any business insolvency in Germany that features a going concern business. Insolvency law is geared 
towards keeping businesses alive until their viability is tested by the administrator and creditors in the 
first general meeting of creditors. If an investor is identified and a purchase negotiated, the contract 
requires the confirmation of a creditor body, either the creditor committee or – in small cases – their 
general meeting. The assets are transferred under the contract while any liability stays with the debtor. 
Some contracts are, however, transferred as well, in particular lease and labour contracts. 
In practice, plan proceedings are rare; statistically, they were present in less than 2 per cent of all 
insolvency proceedings. They are a little more relevant, however, in cases where large companies are 
concerned where a plan is often at least considered as a relevant solution. Overall, however, viable 
businesses are most commonly saved by a transfer of viable assets by the administrator in a sale of 
assets rather the under a plan. 
The principal content of a plan is not restricted by law. It may contain a restructuring of the balance 
sheet, a transfer of assets or simply propose a solution to some issues in dispute in a regular insolvency 
liquidation. The latter has become more frequent recently, leading to plans that do not prevent a 
liquidation but instead streamline the process. 
 
93 InsO, s 217. 
94 Georg Streit & Fabian Burk, ‘Restructuring and Insolvency in Germany: Overview’ (2018) Practical Law Company available from 
<https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-501-6976?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true> accessed 16 
September 2019. 
95 InsO, s 17 – defined as lacking more than 10% of the funding needed during the coming 21 days to meet its obligations, and it is not 
foreseeable that the financial gap will be less than 10% in the short term.  
96 InsO, s 18.  
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j) Denmark97 
Denmark does not currently provide any type of truly preventive restructuring procedures along the 
lines of what the PRD envisages. Its current insolvency framework provides for a restructuring 
proceeding that aims to overcome insolvency by negotiating a plan, which consists of either a 
compulsory composition or for the debtor’s assets to be sold as a going concern. Functional insolvency 
is, however, required to utilise this procedure.  
k) England and Wales98 
The UK’s modern insolvency law regime was designed in response to the Cork Committee’s Report.99 
The committee was convened as a response to deficiencies identified in the UK’s insolvency law 
framework, as well as in response to pressure from the UK’s accession to the ECC, which required that 
the UK be able to negotiate with other Member States on a draft EEC Insolvency Convention.100 It is 
within the Cork Report that the UK’s first foray into corporate rescue, as opposed to focussing on 
efficient corporate liquidation, was introduced. The broad philosophy of Cork represented a movement 
toward stricter control of directors, but also in favour of an increasing emphasis on rehabilitation of a 
company in distress.101 The underpinning justification for an emphasis on rehabilitation was given as 
“business is a national asset and, that being so, all insolvency schemes must be aimed at saving 
businesses.”102 Further, Cork recognised that saving businesses could mean reducing unemployment as 
the previous focus on liquidation was the “kiss of death for [the company] and the creator of 
unemployment.”103 Cork’s broad policy approach was aimed at rehabilitation, but the resulting 
Insolvency Act of 1986 did not go as far as he perceived was necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of 
economically viable companies.104 This was despite the stated aims and principles being endorsed in a 
subsequent Government White Paper in 1984.105 
The Enterprise Act 2002 effected some highly significant changes that brought the UK insolvency 
framework closer in line with Cork’s vision; it reduced some formalities, took some power away from 
the secured creditor (abolishing receiverships), and repealed the Crown preference. The Enterprise Act 
opened the way for the development of the Pre-Pack by making it possible for out-of-court administrator 
appointments. This in turn opened the way for more the development of more effective preventive 
frameworks.  One key aspect of UK insolvency law is that it generally still adheres to the principle of 
creditor wealth maximisation, with some departures. 106 
There are two procedures available in the UK that can be used before a debtor enters into a state of 
insolvency. The Scheme of Arrangement in the Companies Act 2006, Part 26 and the Company 
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), which is contained in the Insolvency Act 1986, Part 1 and Schedule 
A1. The Scheme of Arrangement has been on the Company Law books in the UK since the Victorian 
age and the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1870. It does not appear in Annex A of the EIR Recast as it 
is of Company Law rather than Insolvency Law origin. The CVA was part of a raft of reforms to the 
Insolvency Act 1986 that were implemented via the Enterprise Act 2002 and does form a part of Annexe 
A. 
The Scheme of Arrangement specifically aims to coordinate an arrangement with the company’s 
creditors, which includes a reorganisation of the company's share capital by the consolidation of shares 
of different classes or by the division of shares into shares of different classes, or by both of those 
 
97 The Danish Country Report was provided by Line Langkjaer, Assistant Professor at Aarhaus University in Denmark and is available on the 
JCOERE website. 
98 The English and Welsh Country Report was provided by Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant, post-doctoral researcher on the JCOERE Project at 
University College Cork, Ireland with the assistance of Dr Paul Omar, technical research coordinator of INSOL Europe and is available on the 
JCOERE website. 
99 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558 (the “Cork Report”). 
100 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 12. 
101 idem 14. 
102 Cork Report (n 99) 202-203. 
103 idem 202-203. 
104 Jennifer L. L. Gant, Balancing the Protection of Business and Employment in Insolvency: An Anglo-French Perspective (Eleven 
International Publishing 2017) 115; Finch & Milman (n 100) 15.  
105 A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (Cmnd 9175, 1984). 
106 See for example T H Jackson, Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy (Harvard University Press 1986); and D G Baird and T H Jackson, ‘Corporate 
Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interest: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 U Chi L Rev 97. 
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methods.107 The CVA is a composition between the company and its creditors in satisfaction of the 
company’s debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs. A CVA typically involves either a sale of 
assets and a distribution of the proceeds to creditors, or a continuance of trading under which the 
company makes periodic payments from its trading income to the supervisor of the CVA for distribution 
in accordance with its terms.108 It is used mainly as a vehicle for trading and though it rarely succeeds 
in saving the business of the company, it is still available to a debtor company outside of a state of 
insolvency, so should qualify as preventive in nature if used in such circumstances. The Scheme of 
Arrangement is specifically excluded from the EIR Recast as being a process based in company law.109 
This would equally apply to the Irish statutory scheme of arrangement which is also excluded from 
Annex A of the Regulation. 
Both of these procedures are often used in the context of a pre-pack administration in order to take 
advantage of the associated additional benefits,110 such efficiency, secrecy, and control with the ability 
to appoint an administrator out-of-court, delaying the required formalities till the last minute. The pre-
pack is a procedure within which a number of things can happen, such as the restructuring of the 
company, the rescheduling of debt, and the selling of businesses of the company.111 While 
fundamentally the pre-pack is still an insolvency procedure, it has grown in popularity and in parallel 
with a focus on pre-insolvency or “up-stream” procedures. It now serves an important role in recovery 
and contingency planning,112 thus qualifies in some degree as a preventive restructuring procedure, 
although the overarching administration procedure does have an insolvency requirement, so it is not 
strictly pre-insolvency. That said, it does often operate to prevent corporate failure.  
It should be noted that a recent government consultation on insolvency law reform in the UK has 
presented a recommendation for a new restructuring plan that pretty closely aligns with the Directive, 
but it is probably not necessarily because of the Directive, apart from the UK recognising a need to 
continue being competitive in terms of restructuring in Europe given its departure from the EU.113  
6.6 Conclusion 
The forgoing chapter introduced the JCOERE Questionnaires, their purpose and function, as well as the 
approach taken to gathering the information from the contributing jurisdictions: Ireland, Italy, Romania, 
France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Poland, Spain, and England and Wales. This 
Chapter also expanded on the comparative law methodology adopted in the analysis of the questionnaire 
responses, as well as certain challenges encountered in the synthesis of this part of the project. The 
questionnaires themselves were divided into three sections and Chapter 6 has dealt with the initial 
interrogation of existing preventive restructuring frameworks in the contributing member states, as well 
as the aims and functions of insolvency and restructuring in the jurisdictions. This has in some cases 
included a brief history where relevant.  
6.7 Chapter 7: Mapping of Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU Directive Part 
II – Substantive Aspects of Preventive Restructuring in Domestic Processes and in the 
Directive 
Chapter 7 will deal with Part II of the questionnaire, which concerned substantive aspects of preventive 
restructuring, while Chapter 8 will deal with the first part of Part III, which looked at procedural matters. 
 
107 England and Wales Companies Act 2006, s 895(2). 
108 Kristin Van Zwieten, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 588-589. 
109 See Recital 16 of the EIR Recast:  
“This Regulation should apply to proceedings which are based on laws relating to insolvency. However, proceedings that are based on 
general company law not designed exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on laws relating to 
insolvency. Similarly, the purpose of adjustment of debt should not include specific proceedings in which debts of a natural person of very 
low income and very low asset value are written off, provided that this type of proceedings never makes provision for payment to 
creditors.” 
110 Administration is a procedure provided for in the English and Welsh Insolvency Act 1986, schedule B1. The pre-pack is a practitioner 
devised process, but it is governed by guidelines set out by R3, the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16).  
111 David Christoph Ehmke, Jennifer L. L. Gant, Gert-Jan Boon, Line Langkjaer, Emilie Ghio, ‘Restructuring Europe – The EU Preventive 
Restructuring Framework: a Hole in One? A Comparative Study on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the INSOL Europe Younger 
Academics Network of Insolvency Law’ (2019) 28(2) IIR 184.  
112 Finch & Milman (n 100) 373-374.  
113 Insolvency Service (BEIS), A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (May 2016) and Summary of Responses: A Review of the 
Corporate Insolvency Framework (September 2016); and Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response (August 2018). 
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The second part of Part III of the questionnaire deals with the role of judicial and administrative 
authorities, which will be discussed in Report 2 of the JCOERE Project. The next chapter will discuss 
more specific aspects of the existing preventive restructuring and restructuring procedures set out above, 
with a specific focus on whether they contain any of the common modern elements of preventive 
restructuring, such as those included in the US Chapter 11, the Irish Examinership, and the PRD. The 
next chapter will focus on six specific substantive areas: the stay or moratorium (Article 6); adoption of 
restructuring plans (Article 9); confirmation of restructuring plans, including the exercise of majority 
rule within classes (Article 10); the cross-class cram-down and the relevant fairness tests for assessing 
the impact on dissenting creditors (Article 11); workers (Article 13); and the protection of interim and 
new financing along with the potential for priority in repayment (Article 17). The next chapter will 
examine what provisions, if any, the contributing jurisdictions have that align with these provisions and 
any plans for the introduction of such provisions or for amendments to their current systems.
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7. Chapter 7: Mapping of Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the 
EU Directive: Part II – Substantive Aspects of Preventive Restructuring 
in Domestic Processes and in the Directive 
7.1 Introduction to Part II of the Questionnaire Mapping Preventive Restructuring 
Frameworks 
Part II of the JCOERE Questionnaire,1 Specific Substantive Aspects of Preventive Restructuring in 
Domestic Processes and in the Directive, asks the contributors to examine their preventive restructuring 
frameworks in relation to specific provisions that are contained in the Preventive Restructuring 
Directive,2 describe them and identify what changes, if any, will be needed to bring their legal provisions 
into line with the Directive. Some Member States do not have any preventive restructuring frameworks. 
Accordingly, when that was the case, it was requested that the contributors respond with reference to 
comparable frameworks, such as restructuring procedures within insolvency.3 The following sections 
will take a thematic approach to analysing the responses from the various contributors in relation to the 
specified provisions.4   
7.2 The Stay of Individual Enforcement Actions (PRD Article 6) 5 
As noted in Chapter 5 of this Report, the stay of enforcement actions has been a focus of the Commission 
since the Recommendation of 2014 in an effort to improve restructuring and insolvency law.6 This focus 
has followed through into the various iterations of the Directive and is enshrined in article 6 of the PRD. 
Agreeing to the nature of the stay in the new Directive was challenging, however, due to the significant 
differences in views of the Member States on the appropriate balance between benefits to the debtor to 
disadvantages to the creditors, which is apparent mainly in the debate surrounding the duration of the 
stay that would be provided by the Directive. The longer a stay is in place, the more money creditors 
will lose in terms of opportunity costs, such as the interest they could gain by investing it differently or 
the value of using that money sooner to support a supplier’s ongoing business. If a creditor is ‘out-of-
the-money’, there is no loss to them, hence an adverse impact that is balanced against ‘in-the-money’ 
creditors.7  
 The Purpose of Article 6 in the PRD (Question 3) 
The purpose of Question 3 was to establish the different ways in which the jurisdictions approached the 
stay prior to the PRD and to ascertain what changes would be required to implement it. Variances in the 
duration of the stay across jurisdictions can be problematic in a cross-border insolvency; the result can 
be the favouring of lower ranking creditors, which no longer have an economic interest, over in-the-
 
1 See Annex 2 of this Report for the full JCOERE Questionnaire Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU Directive for 
the JCOERE Project.  
2 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 20 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the “PRD”). 
3 It should be noted that the content of this Chapter relies on the responses of the contributors from the jurisdictions that the JCOERE Team 
has investigated at the time that the JCOERE Questionnaires were fully answered in November 2019. Therefore, the views expressed in this 
chapter a based on the information provided to the JCOERE Team. 
4 By extension and in relation to the overall JCOERE hypothesis, the scope available for implementation, the controversial nature of the 
substantive provisions, and the challenges to implementation may also indicate some difficulties that courts may encounter in efforts to 
cooperate in cases of cross-border restructuring. This will be the focus of JCOERE Report 2. 
5 PRD, art 6(1):  
“Member States shall ensure that debtors may benefit from a stay of individual enforcement to support the negotiations of a restructuring 
plan in a preventive restructuring framework.” 
“Member States may provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse to grant a stay of individual enforcement actions where 
such a stay is not necessary or where it would not achieve the objective set out in the first subparagraph.” 
6 See Chapter 5 of this Report section 5.2.4.  
7 Nicolaes Tollenaar, Pre-Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative Foundation and Framework (Oxford University Press 2019) 147. 
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money creditors, which are essentially prevented from exercising their enforcement rights.8 This is 
unlikely to be problematic following implementation in light of the maximum durations specified in 
articles 6(6) and 6(8); however, it is a good example of the way in which creditors in cross-border 
insolvency matters can be treated differently where there is a failure to closely harmonise the relevant 
provisions. 
Question 3 has two parts; first, it focuses on whether the jurisdiction has a stay in preventive 
restructuring proceedings (article 6(1)) and if so, the relevant legislative provisions. Secondly, it focuses 
on article 6(9), i.e. whether the jurisdiction provides for the removal of the stay by a judicial or 
administrative authority and the conditions relevant to the removal. Article 6(1) of the PRD obliges 
Member States to provide for a stay of individual enforcement actions, however, the second paragraph 
gives Member States the option to provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse a stay if 
it is unnecessary or would not support the negotiation of a restructuring plan.9 The second paragraph 
has the potential to create some inequality across Member States; it may lead to situations where a 
debtor can avail of a stay in one Member State, where the stay is automatic for example, but not in 
another, where the stay can be refused by a judicial or administrative authority. This could influence the 
choice of forum as far as that choice is available under the provisions of the EIR Recast.      
Article 6(2)10 provides that the stay shall cover all types of claims; it may cover all creditors or be limited 
to only certain creditors.11 As was noted in Chapter 5, the Council added article 6(4)12 which permits 
Member States, where justifiable, to exclude certain claims in “well-defined circumstances”.13 Article 
6(5)14 specifically excludes the claims of workers, unless by derogation workers claims are stayed, but 
provides that in this case payments to workers must be guaranteed in the relevant preventive 
restructuring framework to a similar level of protection which they otherwise enjoy. The stay is set at 
an initial duration of four months and article 6(6)15 is extendable up to 12 months only in well-defined 
circumstances.16 Where the procedure does not fulfil notification requirements under  Annexe A of the 
 
8 idem 147-151.  
9 The second paragraph of the PRD, art 6(1) reads; “Member States may provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse to grant 
a stay of individual enforcement actions where such a stay is not necessary or where it would not achieve the objective set out in the first 
subparagraph.” This paragraph was added by the Council during the negotiation phase.  
10 PRD, art 6(2):  
“Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5, Member States shall ensure that a stay of individual enforcement actions can cover all types of 
claims, including secured claims and preferential claims.” 
11  PRD, art 6(3): 
“Member States may provide that a stay of individual enforcement actions can be general, covering all creditors, or can be limited, covering 
one or more individual creditors or categories of creditors.  
Where a stay is limited, the stay shall only apply to creditors that have been informed, in accordance with national law, of negotiations as 
referred to in paragraph 1 on the restructuring plan or of the stay.”   
Article 6(5) specifically excludes the claims of workers, unless by derogation workers claims are stayed, but that payments to workers are 
otherwise guaranteed in the relevant preventive restructuring framework to a similar level of protection. 
12 PRD, art 6(4):  
“Member States may exclude certain claims or categories of claims from the scope of the stay of individual enforcement actions, in well-
defined circumstances, where such an exclusion is duly justified and where:  
(a) enforcement is not likely to jeopardise the restructuring of the business; or  
(b) the stay would unfairly prejudice the creditors of those claims.” 
13 This must be where (a) enforcement is not likely to jeopardise the restructuring of the business; or (b) the stay would unfairly prejudice the 
creditors of those claims. 
14 PRD, art 6(5):  
“Paragraph 2 shall not apply to workers' claims.  
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may apply paragraph 2 to workers' claims if, and to the extent that, 
Member States ensure that the payment of such claims is guaranteed in preventive restructuring frameworks at a similar level of 
protection.” 
15 PRD, art 6(6): “The initial duration of a stay of individual enforcement actions shall be limited to a maximum period of no more than four 
months.” 
16 PRD, art 6(7):  
“Notwithstanding paragraph 6, Member States may enable judicial or administrative authorities to extend the duration of a stay of 
individual enforcement actions or to grant a new stay of individual enforcement actions, at the request of the debtor, a creditor or, where 
applicable, a practitioner in the field of restructuring. Such extension or new stay of individual enforcement actions shall be granted only 
if well-defined circumstances show that such extension or new stay is duly justified, such as:  
(a) relevant progress has been made in the negotiations on the restructuring plan;  
(b) the continuation of the stay of individual enforcement actions does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties; 
or  
(c) insolvency proceedings which could end in the liquidation of the debtor under national law have not yet been opened in respect of the 
debtor.” 
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EIR Recast and the debtor has moved its COMI within three months after filing for preventive 
restructuring, the four-month  maximum duration period applies.17  
Article 6(9) provides for the option of giving judicial or administrative authorities the power to lift a 
stay if it no longer supports the negotiation of a restructuring plan, or at the request of a debtor or 
relevant professional. Following the inter-institutional negotiations, two additional subsections were 
added, thereby allowing for current variances amongst Member States to remain; the subsections allow 
for the stay to be lifted where creditors are unfairly prejudiced by the stay or if the stay would result in 
a creditor’s insolvency 
If procedures with a stay are set within Annex A of the EIR Recast, then the stay granted would be a 
robust pan-EU stay. If new procedures are not set within Annex A, then the stay can only be 4 months 
under article 6(8). Already we can see the potential for forum shopping depending on whether member 
states choose to keep their procedures outside of Annex A or place the procedures within Annex A.  
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Existence of the Stay (Article 6(1-8) 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 3.1:  
Article 6 of the Directive states that:  
“Member States shall ensure that debtors may benefit from a stay of individual enforcement to support 
the negotiations of a restructuring plan in a preventive restructuring framework.”  
a) Does your jurisdiction provide for a stay of individual enforcement actions in existing 
preventive restructuring proceedings? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or rules 
and describe the terms of your jurisdiction’s stay or moratorium and how it compares with 
the terms of Article 6(1-8) of the Directive. 
b) Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 6 of the Directive? If so, 
please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the 
enactment of Article 6(1-8) of the Directive. 
Of the respondent jurisdictions,18 two, namely Austria19 and the UK20 do not provide for a stay of 
enforcement actions in their preventive restructuring procedures. The UK provides alternative 
mechanisms, which are only available through an administration procedure, which is not a pre-
insolvency procedure.21 The remaining jurisdictions approach the stay in a variety of ways.22   
In Ireland,23 the stay, described as “court protection”, commences upon receipt of the petition for 
examinership by the relevant court and applies to all creditor claims against the company and any other 
proceedings relating to the company which can only be commenced with leave of the court.24 It lasts for 
up to 70 days, with the possibility of an extension of up to 30 days for the examiner to complete his / 
her report.25 Under s. 534(4) the court may extend the stay, if the report has been submitted but the court 
has not yet adjudicated on it, however, no maximum duration is specified in the legislation for this 
extension.  In contrast to the Scheme of Arrangement in England and Wales, the parallel Irish legislation 
 
17 PRD, art 6(8):  
“The total duration of the stay of individual enforcement actions, including extensions and renewals, shall not exceed 12 months.  
Where Member States choose to implement this Directive by means of one or more procedures or measures which do not fulfil the 
conditions for notification under Annex A to Regulation (EU) 2015/848, the total duration of the stay under such procedures shall be 
limited to no more than four months if the centre of main interests of the debtor has been transferred from another Member State within a 
three-month period prior to the filing of a request for the opening of preventive restructuring proceedings.”  
18 See Chapter 6 of this Report section 6.1.  
19 Austrian Country Report, page 1. 
20 England and Wales Country Report, page 3. 
21 England and Wales do not have a stay associated with either the CVA or the Scheme of Arrangement, however, these procedures are often 
conceived of through a pre-pack or administration procedure, so that they can derive benefit from the moratorium available under 
Administration.  The CVA does, upon request, provide a stay for small and medium sized companies.  It has also been common practise for 
courts to approve injunctions against enforcement actions during Schemes of Arrangements, amounting to what is functionally a stay.  
22 Note that where preventive restructuring procedures are not available, a jurisdiction’s insolvent restructuring or plan proceedings will be 
discussed as an example.  
23 Irish Country Report, page 2. 
24 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 520(5).  
25 See Irish Companies Act 2014, s 520 & 543(3-4). Court protection will cease earlier than 70 days should the petition be withdrawn or refused 
by the court (s 520(2)). 
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does provide for a stay on request of relevant parties.26 There is no maximum time limit associated with 
the stay within the Scheme of Arrangement.27 
Spain28 provides for an automatic stay in relation to negotiations relating to refinancing and out of court 
payment agreements.29 According to article 5(5) of the Spanish Insolvency Act, the debtor has three 
months to reach an agreement with his creditors. If no agreement is reached after three months, during 
the fourth month the debtor must file for bankruptcy if he is insolvent. During this time, actions are also 
stayed.30 Thus, actions can be stayed up to 4 months. 
In Italy31 the stay of enforcement actions takes several different forms; in the concordato preventivo32 
and the accordo di ristrutturazione dei debiti33 a debtor is entitled to request a stay, which is 
automatically granted by the court until a hearing takes place within 30 days (or within 45 days by 
extension of the court). At the hearing, the stay may be confirmed by the court and its duration is 
extended until the court confirms or rejects the plan. A type of stay applies to judicial liens on real estate 
in that they are unenforceable against the debtor, if registered within 90 days prior to the date when the 
same debtor has filed for concordato preventivo. Technically speaking it is not a stay – but rather a case 
of automatic unenforceability – however, it serves a similar purpose to the stay, since the registration of 
judicial liens is possible only in the context of a foreclosure.34 The stay in an Italian concordato 
preventivo extends to all creditors, employees included, however, the Italian social security entity 
(INPS) provides for a fund that covers workers’ claim. A stay can also be requested under the 
procedimento di composizione assistita della crisi35 for a period of 90 days, extendable to 180.  
The Dutch suspension of payment36 is a stay that is granted upon application to the court under that 
procedure, which is effective against unsecured creditors only. It endures as long as the suspension is in 
effect, which is up to 1.5 years maximum with an initial provisional period of 2 plus 2 months, although 
the final suspension can be extended indefinitely.37 These provisions allow for a stay outside of the 
terms of the PRD. The Dutch BA also excludes certain classes of creditors, namely secured and 
preferential, appearing to conflict with article 6(2), unless an article 6(4) justification can be made.38 
The Dutch stay does not stay pending proceedings or prevent the commencement of new proceedings, 
but this appears to be in line with Art 6(1) of the Directive, which refers only to a stay in relation to 
individual enforcement procedures. If the proceedings referred to in the Dutch BA are not enforcement 
proceedings, this is not in conflict.  
A moratorium is available in one form or another in all five of the preventive restructuring procedures 
in France.39 For conciliation and the ad hoc mandate, a debtor can apply to the court for a moratorium 
of up to two years if creditors attempt to enforce their rights while proceedings are pending.40 Where 
conciliation is converted into a sauvegarde accélérée or sauvegarde financière accélérée, a general stay 
arises, which can endure for up to 3 months for the former and 1 month for the latter. For the standard 
sauvegarde, a stay arises automatically for up to 18 months during the observation period and any 
renewals.41  
In Romania,42 a moratorium does not arise automatically under the ad-hoc mandate, but in practice 
creditors are expected to accept a moratorium along with the mandate proposals. A debtor may request 
 
26 Irish Companies Act 2014 s 451(2)(3); the parties which can request a stay are laid out in s.451(3), namely, the company, its directors, any 
creditor or member of the company and the liquidator, if the company is in liquidation. 
27 Irish Companies Act 2014 s 451(2); “the court may, on the application of any of the following persons ...stay all proceedings or restrain 
further proceedings against the company for such period as the court sees fit.”  
28 Spanish Country Report, page 2. 
29 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 5a and 235. 
30 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 5(4)(e). 
31 Italian Country Report, page 2.  
32 Decree No 14 of 12th January 2019 – Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenze (CCI), art 54 para 2.  
33 CCI, art 54, para 3. 
34 This is confined to judicial liens, leaving unaffected all other forms of securities registered within the same timeframe prior to the concordato 
proposal. 
35 CCI, art 20. 
36 Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet) 1896 (Dutch BA), art 214. 
37 Dutch BA, art 230(1). 
38 Dutch BA, art 232. It is questionable if these exclusions could be justified under art 6(4)(a-b). 
39 French Country Report, page 2. 
40 Code Civil, art 1343-5. 
41 Code Commercial, arts L621-3, L622-7 and L622-28.  
42 Romanian Country Report, page 2.  
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a provisional stay against forced execution under the preventive concordat.43 Once the preventive 
concordat has been approved, a stay of individual enforcement actions arises automatically with a 
duration of no more than eighteen months.44 Where a provisional stay is already in place, it is practice 
not to apply the additional stay under art 29 para 1.  
In Poland,45 in three out of four restructuring procedures: accelerated arrangement proceedings, 
arrangement proceedings and remedial proceedings, the enforcement of pre-opening claims is stayed 
with the opening of restructuring proceedings. This does not apply ex lege to creditor claims not 
participating in an arrangement. 46 The most notable exception from the stay, apart from claims 
stemming from employment contracts, are claims secured by rights in rem during accelerated 
arrangement proceedings and arrangement proceedings to the extent that such claim can be satisfied 
from the collateral. Such creditors can enforce their claims from the object constituting collateral47. This 
rule does not apply to remedial proceedings where all claims are stayed.48 The above principles do not 
comply with article 6(2) of the Directive, and this is in relation to three out of four restructuring 
proceedings covered by the RL.49  
While Denmark50 does not provide a preventive restructuring procedure that satisfies the definition of 
the Directive, it does have a stay mechanism in its insolvency and restructuring procedures. It is possible 
that the stay in the Danish insolvency procedures will be transferred into the framework that Denmark 
will create to implement the Directive, however, it is not certain at this point. In restructuring 
proceedings,51 a stay arises automatically and covers all claims and lasts for as long as the procedure 
continues (up to 11 months).52 This may conflict with article 6(5) unless Denmark avails of the 
derogation, as it includes workers’ claims. Floating charge holders can seek execution in the debtor’s 
invoices, i.e. claims of the debtors as against third parties, but the debtor cannot sell or make use of 
assets belonging to the floating charge holder. Denmark permits secured creditors to request regular 
payments while the stay is in place, possible contraventions of article 6(2).53 
Similarly, while Germany does not currently have a preventive restructuring procedure, the InsO 
insolvency plan does provide for a statutory moratorium upon the decision to commence proceedings 
and this cannot be lifted until the procedure is complete.54 In interim proceedings, the court can decide 
whether to issue a stay up to the commencement of proceedings, but can later revoke this decision if 
necessary, though this rarely happens. 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements for Article 6(1) 
The responses to the questionnaire as to what the implementation requirements to align with the PRD 
may be, in addition to commentary from other sources, has led to the following conclusions. Italy 
appears to be generally compliant with the PRD, including article 6(5). and although Dutch law is not 
currently in line, the Dutch legislator has already begun the process of introducing the desired reform.55 
The WHOA will likely be compliant with the provisions on the stay, including its non-applicability to 
 
43 Law 85/2014, art 25 para 1. 
44 Law 85/2014, art 29-30. 
45 Polish Country Report, page 2. Additional thanks should be extended to Michał Barłowski of Wardynski & Partners, Warsaw Poland for 
significant additional input at short notice. 
46 RL, art 151. 
47 RL, art 260(1) & 279. 
48 RL, art 312. 
49 Unless, as is the case with the Dutch exemptions, it can be justified under art 6(4)(a-b). 
50 Danish Country Report, page 1. 
51 The Danish Bankruptcy Act, Consolidated Act No 11 of 6 January 2014, as amended by Act No 84 of 28 January 2014, Act No 737 of 25 
June 2014, Act No 573 of 4 May 2015, Act No 550 of 30 May 2017, Act No 1555 of 19 December 2017 and Act No 58 of 30 January 2018 
(Danish BA), s 17.  
52 Danish BA, s 12(c). 
53 Danish BA, s 12(c)(5). As is the case with the Netherlands and Poland, this will either need to be amended or justified under art 6(4)(a-b).  
54 Thomas Hoffman and Isabel Giancristofano, ‘Germany: Corporate Recovery and Insolvency 2019’ (ICLG.com 2019) available from 
<https://iclg.com/practice-areas/corporate-recovery-and-insolvency-laws-and-regulations/germany> first accessed 16/09/2019. The InsO 
provides for the possibility of agreeing an insolvency plan that can perform a similar function to a preventive restructuring plan, namely the 
preservation of the company as a legal entity by using similar mechanisms, such as the sale of the debtor’s business, an operational restructuring 
based on an insolvency plan in which the debtor’s business is continued, and financial restructurings. Georg Streit and Fabian Burk, 
‘Restructuring and Insolvency in Germany: Overview’ (Practical Law Company 2018) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-501-
6976?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true> accessed 16 September  2019.  
55 Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord (Act on the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans) (WHOA). 
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employees in line with article 6(5).56 It appears that the remaining Member States may require 
amendments ranging from minor to significant in order to implement the PRD, the majority of which 
seem to relate to the duration of the stay. The introduction of a maximum duration, including extensions 
of 12 months, will likely be required in Poland, Romania and France. Currently, the stay in an Irish 
examinership extends to all creditors, which will include employees. Thus, Ireland may need to either 
amend the provisions of the stay to exclude workers or utilise the derogation from the second paragraph 
of article 6(5) in order to comply with the PRD.57 Also the stay in an Italian concordato preventivo 
extends to all creditors, employees included. In this regard, the Italian social security entity (INPS) 
provides for a fund that covers workers’ claim. For this reason, Italy may not need to amend its 
legislation pursuant to article 6(5).  Romania may need to ensure that the exceptions provided for either 
comply with article 6(2) or article 6(4), as will Poland. Assuming Denmark implements a preventive 
restructuring framework similar to its existing insolvency proceedings, it may reconsider the exemption 
relating to fixed charge holders and the provision for regular payment of secured creditors.58 Germany 
may choose to emulate some of its existing stay provisions from the InsO insolvency plan procedure in 
its preventive restructuring framework, but at the time of writing this Report, the intended direction of 
the changes is not clear. It appears that Austria will need to introduce a stay as part of its preventive 
restructuring process, which it could potentially map from its insolvency procedures.59 Spain will 
possibly need to provide for judicial extension of the stay. Finally, it is envisioned that the UK will 
introduce a new moratorium in the next set of insolvency reforms.60 This will likely be modelled on the 
moratorium available under Administration,61 however, to align with the PRD, its duration will likely 
have to be limited in line with articles 6(6) and 6(8).62  
 
 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Removal of Stay by Authority (Article 6(9)63 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 3.2:  
Article 6(9) sets out a mandatory provision allowing for the removal of the stay by a judicial or 
administrative authority under certain conditions. 
 
56 WHOA, art 369(4) & 376. 
57 The derogation in the second paragraph of art 6(5) allows the extension of the stay to employee claims as long as those claims are guaranteed 
by the Employers’ Insolvency Fund which protects the entitlement claims of employees affected by both the Scheme of Arrangement and 
Examinership procedures, as well as other insolvency procedures affecting employee claims. The claims guaranteed will have to amount to a 
similar level of protection as a stay not applying to workers’ claims at all, per art 6(5), if Ireland is to make use of this derogation. 
58 The likelihood, according to the rapporteur, is that the exemption relating to regular payments will need to be modified or left out of a new 
framework as the depletion in assets could interfere with the running of the business, in conflict with art 6(4)(a). In addition, the lack of 
exemption would not unfairly prejudice the secured creditor (art 6(4)(b)) as it could rely on art 6(9) in the alternative. 
59 In Austrian insolvency proceedings, all enforcement actions are stayed for a period of six months and until the beneficiary applies to 
recommence their claim, with the exception of enforcement actions for secured creditors, except if the discharge of a claim by a secured 
creditor could endanger the continuation of the business of the debtor. Enforcement proceedings can only be continued after the elapse of the 
six-month period and on application of the beneficiary.  
60 See the recent consultation and the government’s response; Insolvency Service (BEIS), A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework 
(May 2016) (“Consultation”); Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (September 2016) (“Consultation 
Response”); and Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response (August 2018) (“Government Response”). 
61 English and Welsh Insolvency Act 1986, sch B1. 
62 Naturally, this will only be obligatory should the UK remain in the EU; with that said, it may be advisable to align closely to the PRD in 
order to present a competitive insolvency marketplace. 
63 PRD, art 6(9):  
“Member States shall ensure that judicial or administrative authorities can lift a stay of individual enforcement actions in the following 
cases:  
(a) the stay no longer fulfils the objective of supporting the negotiations on the restructuring plan, for example if it becomes apparent that 
a proportion of creditors which, under national law, could prevent the adoption of the restructuring plan do not support the continuation 
of the negotiations; 
(b) at the request of the debtor or the practitioner in the field of restructuring;  
(c) where so provided for in national law, if one or more creditors or one or more classes of creditors are, or would be, unfairly prejudiced 
by a stay of individual enforcement actions; or  
(d) where so provided for in national law, if the stay gives rise to the insolvency of a creditor.  
Member States may limit the power, under the first subparagraph, to lift the stay of individual enforcement actions to situations where 
creditors had not had the opportunity to be heard before the stay came into force or before an extension of the period was granted by a 
judicial or administrative authority.  
Member States may provide for a minimum period, which does not exceed the period referred to in paragraph 6, during which a stay of 
individual enforcement actions cannot be lifted.” 
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a. If your jurisdiction provides for a stay, does it also provide for its removal by judicial or 
administrative authorities and under what conditions are authorities empowered to remove 
it?  
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 6(9) and if so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 6(9).  
While Irish examinership law broadly reflects article 6 of the Directive, the ability to refuse a stay is 
connected to a challenge to the petition itself, rather than to the stay, which is procedurally different 
than the wording of the article. Examinership does provide that a court has the option to wind up the 
company or make any order it sees fit, which would logically extend to removing a stay if deemed 
necessary.64 There is also a provision allowing for a debtor to withdraw the petition - thereby ending the 
stay - which could be said to comply with 6(9)(b). The effect of the stay under the examinership 
procedures has largely been the same as the intended effect of article 6(9) in the PRD, though the 
removal of the stay is possible by the refusal or ending of the overall procedure.65 The legislation 
pertaining to the Scheme does not specify the means by which the stay can be lifted by the court, or if 
it can be.66  
In Italy, the incoming legislation provides for the right of the debtor, insolvency practitioner, or creditors 
to require the court to lift the stay in the event of fraudulent conduct or when the restructuring plan is 
unlikely to be successful, the latter complying with 6(9)(a).67 The legislation goes a bit further than the 
Directive by also extending the ability to request the lifting of the stay to creditors. 
The stay in Romania is connected to the preventive restructuring procedure and will endure as long as 
the preventive concordat continues. There are options for discontinuing the concordat (and the stay) if 
the debtor has severely breached its obligations or where creditors file a petition to end the procedure. 
Severe breaches include favouring creditors with unfair prejudice, concealing assets and making 
payments which put the ongoing business at risk.68 The stay and the procedure are connected and the 
conditions for termination are fairly similar to those set out in article 6(9)(b); they may also satisfy 
article 6(9)(a), as the creditors can also file for termination, which would be likely in a situation where 
the plan is likely to fail.  
In France, a stay granted for conciliation can be lifted by the relevant court if the provisions of the 
conciliation are not implemented by the parties.69 There is, however, nothing currently in the French 
legislation that allows for the lifting of a stay by a judicial or administrative authority in relation to the 
sauvegarde procedure.  
In Spain, the stay can be lifted if it is shown that the assets are not necessary for continuing the business 
activities.70 
In Poland, the general rule is that a stay lasts for the duration of restructuring proceedings, specifically 
until a court order accepting an arrangement becomes final. This is when stayed enforcement 
proceedings are discontinued ex lege.71 Since in the accelerated arrangement proceeding 
and  arrangement proceeding automatic stay does not cover the right to enforce claims from collateral 
by a secured creditor, the judge commissioner supervising restructuring proceedings may, upon 
application of the debtor or court supervisor, release objects or rights constituting collateral from 
enforcement, but only if the debtor requires a secured asset for business.72 The total length of such 
 
64 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 535; there are no specific conditions attached to this similar to those listed in Art 6(9)(a-b). 
65 Irish law does not have specific provisions for the court to lift a stay where creditors would be unfairly prejudiced or where the stay would 
give rise to the insolvency of a creditor, but these arts are optional. With that said, s 520(5) does allow for the commencement of proceedings 
by leave of the court, which could also amount to a lifting of the stay in relation to specific creditors / claims.  
66 It could be argued that the wording of s 451(2) - “on such terms as seem just” and “for such period as the court sees fit” - suggests that the 
court is empowered to lift the stay. Essentially, were the court no longer of the view that the stay was just, then it would be unlikely that the 
court would see fit for it to continue.  
67 CCI, art 55 paras 3-4. 
68 Law no 85/2014, art 35. 
69 Commercial Code, art L611-10-3. 
70 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 5(4) bis. 
71 RL, art 170. 
72 See, for example RL art 260(2). 
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release from enforcement cannot exceed three months. The RL regulates situations where restructuring 
proceedings may be discontinued before creditors vote on an arrangement (for example, if continuation 
of proceedings is detrimental to creditors or it is clear from the case that an arrangement will not be 
executed or, in the case of arrangement and remedial proceedings, the court discontinues proceedings 
if the debtor fails to cover post opening debt or costs of proceedings73). However, there are no provisions 
per se that directly relate to the lifting of a stay and reflect all of situations covered by article 6(9) of the 
Directive. 
In the Dutch provisional suspension of payment, creditors can apply to set the suspension of payments 
aside (within 8 days of the judgment), but only based on the ground that the court lacked international 
jurisdiction based on the EIR Recast.74 Dissenting creditors in the final suspension of payment can 
appeal the relevant judgment, again within 8 days. Otherwise, the moratorium ends when the suspension 
is withdrawn at the recommendation of the supervisory judge, at the request of the insolvency 
practitioner, at the creditors’ request or by the court ex officio.75 The latter of these options presents a 
number of conditions subsequent to which the court can exercise its power to end the moratorium, 
including bad faith, prejudicing creditors or that maintaining the suspension is no longer desirable, 
which broadly align with the conditions set out in article 6(9)(a-b). The requirement not to prejudice 
creditors also aligns with article 6(9)(c), but there is no explicit provision for lifting a stay if it will lead 
to a creditors’ insolvency, though this may also be covered in the other conditions set out in the Dutch 
BA.  
  Summary of Implementation Requirements (Article 6(9)) 
The responses to the questionnaire on the requirements arising for jurisdictions by virtue of the PRD 
have led to a number of tentative conclusions. The pending legislation in Italy and the WHOA in 
Netherlands appear to align with article 6(9), thus no other amendments should be needed.76 The Irish 
examinership procedure appears to be broadly in line, however, it may be wise for the Irish legislature 
to make it explicit that the debtor or insolvency practitioner can request that the stay be lifted, even 
though the effect of the current legislation is very similar. Romania may need to create the ability for 
the court to lift the stay without simultaneously terminating the procedure and, potentially, also legislate 
for the conditions under which the stay should be lifted. France will likely either need to introduce new 
procedures or amend a current one, in order to provide for the court to lift the stay. Arguably, this is 
also the case in Denmark, Germany and Poland, which appear to lack provisions for the court to lift a 
stay. In Spain, the stay can be lifted if the assets are no longer needed to continue the business activities. 
Accordingly, these Member States may well need to consider this at the implementation stage. In 
Austria, although there is no stay in the restructuring procedure, its stay in insolvency does provide for 
the court of execution to exercise its discretion in relation to granting extensions to the stay.77 Finally, 
the 2018 UK government response to the Insolvency Service’s Insolvency and Corporate Governance 
Consultation provides a recommendation that creditors should be able to object  in court to a stay and 
to apply to have it lifted;78 if this comes to fruition, it will be broadly in line with article 6(9), but further 
amendments will likely be necessary to include conditions outlined in 6(9)(a-b). 
7.3 The Adoption of Restructuring Plans (Article 9) 
Article 9 pertains to the adoption of restructuring plans and regulates the classification of creditors and 
the voting rights enjoyed by creditors during the negotiation of a restructuring plan. The rules 
surrounding the classification of creditors and the related voting rights form a fundamental part of the 
cross-class cram-down set out later in the PRD, arguably one of its more controversial features.  
 The Purpose of Article 9 in the PRD (Question 4) 
 
73 See details in RL arts 324-333. 
74 Dutch BA, art 215a(1) 
75 Dutch BA, art 242(1). 
76 WHOA, art 376(10) seems to focus primarily on the ground stated in art 6(9)(a) of the PRD. It appears to provide for the lifting of the stay 
by the district court. 
77 Austrian Insolvency Code, s 11(3). 
78 Government Response para 5.40. 
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Article 9(1)79 provides for the adoption of restructuring plans and the full article sets out conditions 
under which such plans should be adopted. Article 9(2)80 provides for the right of creditors to vote on 
the adoption of restructuring plans; it provides that only “affected parties” have the right to vote and 
mandates the exclusion of unaffected parties from voting.81 Article 9 contains a provision on the 
classification of creditors for voting purposes - article 9(4)82 - which requires creditors to be grouped in 
“separate classes which reflect sufficient commonality of interest based on verifiable criteria”. At a 
minimum, the Member State must have secured and unsecured creditors. These voting rights and 
creditor classifications are subject to judicial or administrative body approval.83 Interestingly, article 
9(4) also provides for specific protection to be conferred on “vulnerable creditors”, such as small 
suppliers. Perhaps this reflects the importance of SMEs to the economy of the EU, something which 
was discussed in Chapter 5. An intra-class cram-down, in other words, a majority system of voting, is 
provided for in article 9(6); the PRD has permitted jurisdictions to retain or introduce their desired 
voting majority for a restructuring plan to be carried by vote, provided that the majority required does 
not exceed 75%.84 Finally, and for the sake of completeness, article 9(7),85 allows for the replacement 
of a formal vote by an agreement with the requisite majority should Member States so desire.   
There are four parts to Question 4. Question 4.1 focuses on whether the participating jurisdictions 
provide voting right to affected parties and if so, the similarity between these provisions and the PRD. 
Question 4.2 relates to the classification of creditors, paying specific attention to whether domestic 
legislation divides creditors into separate classes and if so, what classes are recognised by each 
jurisdiction. Question 4.3 pertains to judicial or administrative authority oversight of the process; it 
considers the extent to which the relevant judicial or administrative authority in each jurisdiction is 
involved in the examination and confirmation of voting rights and classes. Finally, Question 4.4 focuses 
on intra-class cram-down, in other words, the majority required in each jurisdiction for creditor approval 
of a restructuring plan with a view to comparing with the terms of the PRD.  
There is scope for unequal treatment of creditors depending on the jurisdiction; varying majorities 
required for intra-class cram-down are permitted, with some jurisdictions requiring a simple majority 
and others requiring 75%. The same creditor may be classified differently in different jurisdictions, as 
some may simply have 2 classes - secured and unsecured - and others may sub-divide this further.  
 
 
79 PRD, art 9(1):  
“Member States shall ensure that, irrespective of who applies for a preventive restructuring procedure in accordance with Art 4, debtors 
have the right to submit restructuring plans for adoption by the affected parties.  
Member States may also provide that creditors and practitioners in the field of restructuring have the right to submit restructuring plans 
and provide for conditions under which they may do so.” 
80 PRD, art 9(2): “Member States shall ensure that affected parties have a right to vote on the adoption of a restructuring plan. Parties that are 
not affected by a restructuring plan shall not have voting rights in the adoption of that plan.” 
81 PRD, art 9(3):  
“Notwithstanding paragraph 2, Member States may exclude from the right to vote the following:  
(a) equity holders;  
(b) creditors whose claims rank below the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors in the normal ranking of liquidation priorities; or  
(c) any related party of the debtor or the debtor's business, with a conflict of interest under national law.” 
82 PRD, art 9(4):  
“Member States shall ensure that affected parties are treated in separate classes which reflect sufficient commonality of interest based on 
verifiable criteria, in accordance with national law. As a minimum, creditors of secured and unsecured claims shall be treated in separate 
classes for the purposes of adopting a restructuring plan.  
Member States may also provide that workers' claims are treated in a separate class of their own.  
Member States may provide that debtors that are SMEs can opt not to treat affected parties in separate classes.  
Member States shall put in place appropriate measures to ensure that class formation is done with a particular view to protecting vulnerable 
creditors such as small suppliers.” 
83 PRD, art 9(5): 
“Voting rights and the formation of classes shall be examined by a judicial or administrative authority when a request for confirmation of 
the restructuring plan is submitted.  
Member States may require a judicial or administrative authority to examine and confirm the voting rights and formation of classes at an 
earlier stage than that referred to in the first subparagraph.” 
84 PRD, art 9(6): 
“A restructuring plan shall be adopted by affected parties, provided that a majority in the amount of their claims or interests is obtained in 
each class. Member States may, in addition, require that a majority in the number of affected parties is obtained in each class.  
Member States shall lay down the majorities required for the adoption of a restructuring plan. Those majorities shall not be higher than 
75 % of the amount of claims or interests in each class or, where applicable, of the number of affected parties in each class.” 
85 PRD, art 9(7): “Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 to 6, Member States may provide that a formal vote on the adoption of a restructuring plan 
can be replaced by an agreement with the requisite majority.” 
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 Jurisdictional Contributions: Voting Rights and Exclusions (Article 9(1)) 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 4.1: 
Article 9(2) requires that Member States to “ensure that affected parties have a right to vote on the 
adoption of a restructuring plan”, allowing for certain exclusions from this rule in 9(3).  
a. Does your jurisdiction provide voting rights to affected parties of a restructuring plan and 
what, if any, exclusions are permitted? Please specify and describe the relevant legislative 
provisions or rules and how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(2-3) and if so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 9(2-3).   
In Ireland, the examiner is obliged to have the agreement of at least one class of impaired creditors prior 
to court confirmation of a restructuring proposal.86 This agreement is expressed via formal vote.87  The 
legislation creates no express exclusions, although it is possible that parties may be excluded from 
voting where they are not considered to be creditors.88 As such, Irish law appears to comply with article 
9(2) of the Directive.89 Section 540(1) specifically refers to “members or creditors summoned” to 
consider the proposals; when read in conjunction with s.541(4) – proposal must be approved by at least 
1 class of creditors impaired by the proposal. Creditors which are unimpaired will still vote on the plan 
but the significant threshold for progress to the approval stage is that a class of impaired creditors 
consents.  Furthermore, only those impaired by the restructuring plan have a right to be heard at the 
court hearing to confirm the proposal according to s.543(1).90 Similar to the framework in England & 
Wales, creditors are also afforded voting rights in the Irish Scheme of Arrangement.91  
Italian law provides for voting rights for all creditors affected by the plan in the accordi di 
ristrutturazione ad efficacia estesa.92 Voting rights are afforded to all unsecured creditors in the 
concordato preventivo.93 Article 109 CCI excludes four types of creditors from voting on the plan; 
secured creditors that will be satisfied in full and paid immediately under the terms of the 
confirmed concordato, related parties of the debtor,94 creditors that purchased their claims within the 
year preceding the commencement of the procedure and any creditor with a conflict of interest.95 
Interestingly, the plan may postpone full reimbursement of secured creditors for a period not longer than 
2 years from the date confirmation of the composition (Art. 86 CCI). When the debtor utilises this 
option, secured creditors are entitled to vote on the plan, although the plan provides for full 
reimbursement of their claim, only for the difference between principal plus interest and the present 
value of the proposed stream of payments under the plan (thus, not for the entire face value of their 
claims).96 As a result, it is unclear if the law complies with the Directive; although not expressly 
provided, the Directive seems to base its provisions on the implicit assumption that each affected 
creditor is entitled to cast its vote for the full value of its claims.  
Romanian law also provides for affected parties to have the right to vote on a restructuring plan. Specific 
parties are excluded from voting, namely creditors which, directly or indirectly, control, are controlled 
 
86 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(4). A creditor's claim against a company is impaired if the creditor receives less in payment of the claim 
than the full amount due in respect of the claim at the date of presentation of the petition for the appointment of the examiner (s 539(5)). 
87 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 540 pertains to creditor and member consideration of the proposal and provides that “[p]roposals shall be 
deemed to have been accepted by a meeting ... a class of creditors when a majority in number representing a majority in value of the claims 
represented at that meeting have voted… in favour”.  
88 For example, in Re SIAC Construction Limited [2014] IESC 25, [2014] ILRM 357 a particular creditor, the Polish Roads Authority, was 
excluded by the examiner on the basis that outstanding litigation generated uncertainty regarding whether the party was in fact a creditor. The 
court nevertheless agreed to hear submissions from the party 
89 Per the Irish Companies Act 2014, s 540 of the Irish Companies Act 2014, affected parties have a right to vote on the examiner’s proposal. 
90 Other individuals may be permitted to make submissions, but their right to be heard is not guaranteed.   
91 Irish Companies Act 2014 s 450-453. 
92 CCI, art 61. 
93 CCI, art 109. It should be noted that under Italian law, equity holders are excluded from voting. 
94 This includes any creditors that belongs to the same group of companies as the debtor  
95 Secured creditors will have the opportunity to wave their privilege, entirely or in part, just for the purposes of that procedure, in order to be 
able to cast their vote for the part of their claims that became unsecured.   
96 Their vote is accounted just for the difference between principal plus interest and the present value of the proposed stream of payments under 
the plan, not for the entire face value of their claim. 
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or are under joint control with the debtor and the restructuring plan offers them more than what they 
would receive in case of bankruptcy. The debtor provides the list of creditors for the preventive 
concordat; accordingly, the debtor has flexibility in identifying which creditors will be involved. 
In France, affected parties are afforded the right to vote in the sauvegarde procedure.97 Creditors 
unaffected by the restructuring plan or those who benefit from a fiducie agreement (bénéficiaires d’une 
fiducie) cannot vote on the adoption of the plan.98 Social and tax authorities cannot vote, as they cannot 
be members of a class. They are, however, invited to negotiate on the plan and can grant a debt 
cancellation or rescheduling. In conciliation, there is no formal voting per se, however, before the court 
can sanction an agreement via homologation, it must hear from the relevant parties to the agreement.99 
Strictly speaking, in Spanish refinancing agreements creditors have no voting rights, but the right to 
subscribe to the agreement.100 Claims of especially related persons within the meaning of article 93(2) 
of the Spanish Insolvency Act (e.g., shareholders of the debtor, other companies of the group, etc.), will 
not be taken into consideration for the formation of the majorities. However, these creditors will be 
affected by the agreement. Since refinancing agreements only affect financial claims, non-financial 
creditors, that is, workers, commercial and public creditors, do not take part in the adoption of these 
agreements. Nevertheless, workers and commercial creditors can voluntarily adhere to them, but their 
claims will not be taken into consideration for the formation of the abovementioned majorities 
(Additional Provision 4th (1) of the Spanish Insolvency Act). In the case of extra-judicial payment 
compositions, in principle, only unsecured creditors have voting rights, since they are affected by the 
plan. Secured claims will only be affected by the plan when they voluntarily decide to vote for it (articles 
238 and 238 bis of the Spanish Insolvency Act). 
As discussed previously, Denmark does not have a preventive restructuring framework within the 
meaning of the PRD. With that said, its restructuring framework in insolvency has many of the key 
features of preventive restructuring frameworks in other jurisdictions and, indeed, the PRD.101 As such, 
the relationship between the system in Denmark and article 9 will be discussed on the assumption that 
Denmark will map its current insolvency framework to preventive restructuring. Danish law affords 
affected parties – creditors, which will not be paid be in full or at all - the ability to vote on a restructuring 
plan.102 Secured creditors are excluded from voting except for the amount of their claim that is 
unsecured.103  Related parties are also excluded from voting on the restructuring plan.104 Creditors with 
contested claims may be considered ineligible to vote by the Bankruptcy Court if the contested claim is 
decisive for the adoption of the plan.105 If the plan consists of a compulsory composition, all creditors 
whose claims are written down are considered affected; this is limited, however, as a compulsory 
composition cannot include secured or preferential creditors.106  
Polish law as a rule grants the right to creditors affected by restructuring proceedings to vote on an 
arrangement plan107 (employment-related receivables and secured creditor receivables - to the extent 
that such receivables cannot be satisfied from collateral - will participate in an arrangement only if   a 
creditor explicitly agrees to do so). Separate regulations apply to proceedings where a partial 
arrangement plan is to be adopted if a secured creditor can be bound to participate in an arrangement, 
irrespective of its decision).108In practice, the voting right is related to creditors whose claims have been 
entered in an approved table of claims or to creditors present at an assembly of creditors with proof of 
those claims who can also be admitted to vote at the meeting. Creditors who are close relatives, equity 
 
97 Bondholders are to be consulted in one general meeting of all bondholders in relation to all bonds; they vote in a general meeting on the plan 
that has already been adopted by the relevant creditors’ committees. 
98 Commercial Code, arts L626-30-2 & L626-32, respectively.  
99 The relevant parties include the conciliator, some representatives of the company, the debtor and creditors 
100 Ley 22/003 of ninth July on Insolvency, additional provision 4(1). 
101 In some instances, the only difference between Danish restructuring and preventive restructuring in other jurisdictions is the end purpose; 
the purpose of the Danish framework is to enable the debtor to exit insolvency, whereas preventive restructuring is to enable the debtor to 
avoid becoming insolvent in the first place. As such, in order to access restructuring in Denmark, the debtor must be insolvent, making it 
different to the PRD.  
102 Danish BA, ss 13 d (1) & 120 (1). 
103 Danish BA, s 120(2). 
104 Danish BA, s 13 d (3). 
105 Danish BA, s 13 d (2). 
106 Danish BA, s 13 d (4) and section 10 a (2). A ccompulsory composition (tvangsakkord) is a legally regulated restructuring procedure, in 
which the amount that the debtor has to pay to the creditors is reduced. 
107 RL, art to be read in conjunction with art 150. 
108 RL, arts 180 - 188. 
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holders (when meeting certain qualifications) and creditors holding claims acquired by way of transfer 
and/or endorsement after the opening of restructuring proceedings are excluded from voting.109 
Not covered are therefore provisions of non-compulsory article 9(3)(b) of the Directive. At this point it 
is yet unclear what legislative changes will be proposed to amend the RL and the BL to render them 
compliant with the Directive. 
In the Netherlands, a vote is required by all affected parties for an out-of-court composition.110 Where 
there is a suspension of payment – which excludes secured and preferential creditors – the restructuring 
plan will be voted on by affected creditors.111 When a claim is disputed and consequently the right of 
the creditor to vote, the court will adjudicate on the validity of claim.112  
Austrian law empowers creditors to vote in a restructuring plan in the course of insolvency proceedings, 
but not in the course of a preventive restructuring proceeding (URG). Similar to Italy and Denmark, 
secured creditors do not have voting rights except if the hold a partially secured claim, in which case 
their vote relates solely to the unsecured part. 
Similarly, Germany provides voting rights for impaired creditors and shareholders in its insolvency 
restructuring plan proceedings (InsO). 
In England and Wales, both the Scheme of Arrangement and the CVA provide voting rights to approve 
the relevant plan.113 There are no exclusions specified in the legislation.  However, in practise the 
English courts have approved plans where ’out of the money’ creditors have not been included in a class 
of creditors. 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements 
A combination of the responses received by the JCOERE project and other commentary has led to the 
following provisional conclusions regarding the changes necessitated by the PRD: It is likely that 
countries such as Austria will have to make substantial changes to their legislation in order to comply 
with article 9. As discerned from the responses to the questionnaire, Austria does not provide voting 
rights for creditors in preventative restructuring; however, it is likely that Austria will opt to require the 
maximum limit majority of 75% in number and value of the claims as the basis for consent to pre-
insolvency restructuring plans. Germany may also choose to borrow from its InsO insolvency plan 
provisions to provide voting rights in a new preventive restructuring framework aligning with the PRD.  
As the Dutch ‘suspension of payment’ can be interpreted to afford voting rights to all creditors - not just 
those affected by the proposed restructuring plan – the WHOA contains the necessary changes.114 Italy 
France, Romania, Poland, Denmark and Ireland seem to have no need to amend their legislation.115 
Poland may decide to clarify exactly which creditors are excluded from voting in line with the PRD. It 
is likely that the UK will align any new framework with provisions of the Scheme in terms of voting,116 
which will be compliant with the PRD.  
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Class Formation (Article 9(4)) 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 4.2:  
Article 9(4) requires that Member States treat affected parties in separate classes, “which reflect 
sufficient commonality of interest based on verifiable criteria, in accordance with national law.” 
a. Does your jurisdiction provide for the separation into classes of those parties affected by a 
restructuring plan?  
b. What classes does your jurisdiction recognise?  
 
109 RL, arts 107, 116, & 109. 
110 An out-of-court composition requires full support of the creditors, save in limited circumstances, which are discussed in paragraph 7.3.8. 
111 Dutch BA, arts 232 & 252. 
112 Dutch BA, art 267. 
113  English and Welsh Companies Act 2006, s 899(1); and Insolvency Act 1986, s 4(1) & 4(1A).  
114 Voting creditors and shareholders are defined as those whose rights are amended as a result of the restructuring plan. 
115 As articulated above, Denmark is included assuming it extends its current restructuring process to preventive restructuring. Refer to the note 
regarding the insolvency and restructuring framework in Denmark in section 7.3.2 of this Chapter.  
116 Government Response (n 60) para 5.135. 
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Please specify and describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they compare with 
the terms of the Directive. 
c. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(4) and if so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 9(4).   
In Ireland, s.536(f) of the Companies Act 2014 states that the examiner’s report must contain a “list of 
the creditors of the company…the nature and value of any security held…and the priority accorded...to 
any such creditor”. In line with the usual rules of ranking for liquidation, creditors can be divided into 
preferential, secured and unsecured creditors. They may be further subdivided into categories at the 
discretion of the examiner. There is a clear distinction between super-preferential, preferential, secured 
and unsecured claims. The common law rules on class formation, which exist in Ireland and England 
and Wales in the context of Schemes of Arrangement, also apply to examinership and add an additional 
layer to class formation.117  
In the Italian concordato, the debtor can form different classes based on the legal position of the creditor 
- senior and junior - and their commonality of interest.118 The creation of separate classes for secured 
and unsecured creditors is not mandated; secured creditors will be unaffected by the plan because they 
are paid in full, therefore they will not be entitled to vote and there is no need to include them in a 
“class”. Instead, Italian law mandates the formation of the following classes: 
(i) tax and social security claims that are not going to be paid in full;  
(ii) creditors whose claim is assisted by guarantees provided by third parties; 
(iii) creditors that are not going to be paid entirely in cash under the plan; and 
(iv) in case of a competing plan, the proposing creditors and their related parties. 
All unsecured creditors - including secured creditors for the unsecured part of their claim – may be 
included in one single voting class. It is important to note, however, that secured and priority creditors, 
although not forming a voting class for the part unaffected by the plan, are always treated separately 
from one another.  
In the accordo di restrutturazione dei debiti, there is no class formation and the plan is binding only on 
consenting creditors. In the accordo di restrutturazione dei debiti ad efficacia estesa, there is class 
formation in order to bind minority creditors by the agreement reached by the majority of creditors in 
the same class. 
Romanian law does not provide for the separation of creditors into classes in the preventative 
restructuring process but does have classes for insolvency proceedings. The classes are secured 
(receivables with preference rights), salary claims, budget receivables, indispensable claims 
(receivables belonging to essential suppliers) and other unsecured claims.  
Interestingly, during the sauvegarde procedure in France, class formation is done on the nature of the 
business of the creditor, as opposed to the type of the claim. Three classes of creditors exist - financial 
institutions, major trade creditors and bondholders - into which creditors are organised based on their 
relationship with the company, as opposed to the type of debt.119 The Loi Pacte, however, authorises 
the introduction, via an Ordinance, of “true” classes of creditors, which it is envisioned with bring 
France in line with the PRD.120  
Similarly, Denmark does not specifically separate creditors into classes for the purpose of voting, but 
the restructuring plan cannot entail a compulsory composition of secured creditor claims that are higher 
ranked than ordinary unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceeding. So a compulsory composition will 
 
117 See Re Pye (Ireland) [1985] IEHC 62 and Re Millstream Recycling [2010] IEHC 538. See also Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard Murphy 
Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 2012) 548 & 627-632. 
118 For example, creditors benefitting from a third-party personal guarantee are not in the same position as those not having such guarantee, 
although they have the same ranking vis-a-vis the debtor. 
119 According to the French Commercial Code, art L626-30 the classes of creditors are (i) financial institutions, (ii) major trade creditors and 
(iii) bondholders. This applies to companies of a certain size i.e. companies with more than 150 employees or an annual turnover of over €20 
million per art L626-9, making reference to art 162 of Decree n°2005-1677 of 28 December 2005. 
120 Loi Pacte, art 196(1).  
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only affect the ordinary unsecured creditors that then vote in one pool. Since the voting does not take 
place in classes there is no need to separate them.  
While the Netherlands does not have separation of creditors for the purpose of voting, it does recognise 
different types of creditors for the purpose of ranking. The WHOA, however, will address this issue, 
once passed. 
The German insolvency procedure provides for the division of creditors into classes on the basis of 
economic interests and the creditors’ status in law. Classes include shareholders if they are impaired.   
Austria differentiates between secured, unsecured creditors and subordinated creditors in both 
insolvency and restructuring procedures.121  
Spain distinguishes financial creditors which are all creditors that are not public creditors, workers or 
commercial creditors (suppliers), and non-financial creditors and in some cases uses different 
procedures for different types of creditors. Banks and credit institutions are an example of financial 
creditors; however, shareholders having lent money to the company will also be considered financial 
creditors. In extra-judicial payment compositions, Spanish law has unsecured and secured creditor 
classes, although, in principle, secured claims are not affected by extra-judicial payment compositions. 
However, these creditors can voluntarily decide to take part on these agreements, voting in favour of 
them. The effects will be extended to other secured creditors when the requisite majorities of creditors 
vote in favour. In the case of refinancing agreements, secured creditors holding financial liabilities can 
be affected by the plan and, therefore, are entitled to subscribe to it. The effects can be extended to 
dissenting or non-voting creditors with the requisite majorities. Strictly speaking, in both frameworks, 
creditors do not vote in classes. However, majorities for secured claims are calculated taking into 
account the total value of secured liabilities.  
In Poland, the organisation of creditors into classes is optional in that legislation provides for a right, 
but no obligation, to form classes. The formation of classes may be based on the following criteria (non–
exclusive list):122  
(i) among creditors entitled to claims under employment and who have agreed to be covered 
by an arrangement; 
(ii) farmers entitled to claims under contracts for delivery of products from their own farm; 
(iii) creditors whose claims are secured by a debtor’s property with mortgage, pledge, registered 
pledge, tax lien and/or maritime mortgage, as well as by the transfer to the creditor of 
ownership of an asset, claim and/or another right, and who have agreed to be covered by 
the arrangement; 
(iv) creditors who are partners and/or shareholders of a debtor that is a capital company, with 
shares and/or stock of the company ensuring at least 5% of votes at the shareholders’ 
meeting or the general meeting of shareholders, even if they are entitled to claims specified 
in subsections 1-3. 
In addition, more favourable debt restructuring proposals can be addressed to such creditors who have 
granted new financing post-opening of restructuring proceedings that is required for executing an 
arrangement.  
To make the RL compliant with article 9(4) of the Directive, an amendment to the RL would need 
to make the division of creditors into classes mandatory. In case of partial arrangements, it seems that 
amendment of the RL would need to primarily provide for the formation of classes explicitly. Under the 
current RL it is unclear whether this right - even on a non-compulsory basis - can be derived from 
existing RL provisions. 
In England and Wales, the “essential requirement” of class formation for the Scheme of Arrangement 
is that classes are comprised of “only of those persons whose rights … are sufficiently similar to enable 
 
121 Markus Fellner, ‘Restructuring and Insolvency: Austria’ (Thompson Reuters 2011) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-385-
2603?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> accessed 26 October 2019.  
122 RL, art 161. 
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them to properly consult and identify their true interests together.”123 Thus, where creditors have 
different interests, separate classes should be convened and where they have similar interests, 
they should be grouped together. In the CVA, specific classes are not identified in the same way. Rather, 
a composition will be approved if a majority of at least three quarters in value of the creditors voting is 
achieved.  
 Summary of Implementation Requirements  
From the responses to the JCOERE questionnaire and discussions in various other fora, the following 
has been deduced in relation to the potential changes necessitated by the introduction of the PRD. There 
may be widespread scope across Member States for the introduction of specific provisions to protect or 
strengthen the position of vulnerable creditors in line with article 9(4).124 Aside from that, it can be 
suggested that Ireland will have no changes to make. The WHOA should result in the Netherlands being 
compliant with the Directive, as article 374 regulates creditor class composition in a way that aligns 
with the PRD.125 The UK proposal for a restructuring plan suggests applying an approach similar to the 
current Scheme of Arrangement framework, which is widely considered to be fit for purpose and in 
terms of voting rights, compliant mostly as it is.126 More extensive changes may be needed in the 
remaining Member States. As with the previous question, Germany and Austria will likely need to 
extend their similar provisions within insolvency to a preventative restructuring framework or devise a 
new framework entirely. In addition, Austria currently intends to create a new class of “worthy 
creditors” that will include groups such as small suppliers. Spain should perhaps consider the lack of 
clarity in how classes of creditors are established in order to align with the terms of the PRD. It appears 
that Denmark will have to provide for voting to take place in classes in its new preventive restructuring 
framework, as Poland will likely have to make this an obligation in its existing framework.127 The 
classification of creditors and voting rights based on these classes may form areas of scrutiny for 
Romania. Similarly, France may need to amend how it classifies creditors; as extracted from the 
response to the questionnaire, however, the Loi Pacte.128 Although Italian law does not expressly 
provide for separation of secured and unsecured creditors, this result is substantially achieved in 
practice, except for a very limited number of cases. In reality, whenever a plan provides for class 
formation, the applicable criteria under the Italian law, namely commonality of interests and 
homogenous legal position of creditors placed in each class, ensure that secured and unsecured creditors 
are put in different classes. A possible conflict with the PRD  may only arise when the law permits the 
submission of a plan without forming classes, since in such cases  the above criteria do not apply and, 
as a result, secured creditors are treated and may vote on the plan for their possible deficiency claim 
(i.e., the part of the claim that exceeds the value of the collateral and, thus, it treated as unsecured) at 
the same terms as unsecured creditors. The same may occur when secured creditors are entitled to vote 
due to the rescheduling of their claims pursuant to Art. 86 CCI (see above). 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Examination of Voting Rights and Class Formation by 
Authority (Article 9(5) 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 4.3:  
Article 9(5) allows for judicial or administrative examination of voting rights and the creation of 
classes when a request for confirmation of a plan is submitted and, further, allows Member States to 
“require a judicial or administrative authority to examine and confirm the voting rights and formation 
of classes at an earlier stage…” 
 
123 Primacom Holding GmbH & Anor v A Group of the Senior Lenders & Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch) para 44. 
124 “Member States shall put in place appropriate measures to ensure that class formation is done with a particular view to protecting vulnerable 
creditors such as small suppliers.” 
125 WHOA, art 374:  
“Creditors and shareholders are allocated in different classes if the rights they would have in the event of liquidation of the debtor's assets 
in bankruptcy or the rights they are offered on the basis of the restructuring plan are so different that there is no comparable position. In 
any event, creditors or shareholders who, in accordance with Title 10 of Book 3 of the Civil Code, another law, or a set of rules or 
agreement based thereon rank differently in relation to the recovery of the debtor's assets, are allocated in different classes.” (unofficial 
translation) 
126 Government Response (n 60) 70 
127 As discussed previously, Polish law currently has classes, but they are optional. 
128 Loi Pacte, art 196(1).  
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a. Does your jurisdiction provide for the examination, confirmation, approval or otherwise of 
the voting rights and separation into classes of affected parties for the purpose of approving 
a restructuring plan? Please specify and describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules 
and how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(5) and if so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 9(5).   
Irish law mandates that the Examiner's report, which is subject to court approval, must contain inter alia 
the proposals placed before creditor meetings, the outcome of each vote and the list of the company’s 
creditors including their priority (separation into classes).129 Therefore, while there is not a separate 
approval of the voting procedure and classification of creditors, the confirmation of the report 
encompasses their approval, presumably complying with article 9(5). In applying Irish case law, 
MacCann and Courtney state that the court will only confirm a scheme if it is satisfied that the classes 
were properly constituted, amongst other criteria.130 An individual creditor can object to court 
confirmation of the Examiner’s proposal under s.543(1)(a) - material irregularity at the meeting - which 
could encompass the failure of the Examiner to correctly classify that creditor.131 Outside the 
Examinership procedure the Irish Scheme is broadly similar to the framework in England & Wales, in 
that there is no provision which specifically mandates the examination of voting rights and class 
formation, but there is court sanction of the compromise.132 However, Irish law has been amended to 
eliminate the need for the first court hearing approving the holding of meetings which is still required 
under s 896 of the Companies Act (UK) 2006.133 
In the Italian concordato preventive, the law requires an examination of the formation of classes at an 
earlier stage than confirmation, per article 9(5) of the PRD. The court verifies the criteria used to form 
the relevant classes before starting the voting process and subsequently re-evaluates such criteria in the 
confirmation hearing. Article 48 CCI, which regulates court confirmation of the concordato 
plan approved by creditors, allows the judge to verify the correctness of the procedure, including the 
formation of classes. Article 61 CCI provides a control on the formation of classes when the court is 
asked to confirm the agreement thereby allowing for the extension of its effects to the dissenting 
minority (accordo di ristrutturazione ad efficacia estesa).134 These provisions reflect, with no 
significant difference, the provision contained in the current Italian insolvency law.135  
Romanian law provides for mandatory judicial examination of the voting process for approval of the 
concordat, which is submitted by the administrator after its approval by the creditors.136 The judge 
homologates the preventive concordat and issues a resolution in the council’s chamber, after summoning 
and hearing the concordat administrator.  
The French sauvegarde system is a little more complex; strictly speaking, there is no examination, 
confirmation or approval of the classification of affected parties for the purpose of approving a 
restructuring plan in sauvegarde proceedings. With that said, voting rights can be amended, which 
presupposes an examination. Decisions made by the administrator regarding the value of votes can be 
referred to the court for adjudication, should a dispute arise.137 Once the plan has been adopted, the court 
 
129 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 536. Classification of creditors is the responsibility of the Examiner. 
130 Lyndon MacCann and Thomas Courtney, The Companies Acts 1963 – 2006 (Bloomsbury 2008) 396 in relation to Re Colonia Insurance 
(Ireland) Ltd. [2005] 1 IR 497 and Re John Power and Sons Ltd [1934] 412.  
131 See John O’Donnell and Jack Nicholas, Examinerships (2nd edn, Lonsdale 2016) 136: they argue that such an error or misclassification 
would have to be determinative i.e. the proposal would not have been accepted by the particular class of creditors, had the particular creditor(s) 
been correctly classified. The other grounds for objection are laid out in s 543(1)(b)-(d). 
132 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 453(2)(c). 
133 s 896(1) provides that ”The court may, on an application under this section, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the 
members of the company or class of members (as the case may be), to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.” 
134 CCI, art 47 & 85. Pertains to the accordi di ristrutturazione ad efficacia estesa 
135 CCI, arts 182-bis & 182-septies. 
136 Law no. 85/2014, art 28 (1).  
137 Commercial Code, art L626-30-2 para: Creditors may have contracts with the debtor which contain clauses regulating how their vote on 
the plan will be exercised. Creditors who benefit from a guarantee or a subordination agreement must notify the administrator. The 
administrator will take into account the benefits accruing to the creditor when deciding on the value of the vote and will notify the creditor 
before the meeting takes place. For bondholders, the same voting rules apply as the ones for the creditors’ committees, however, the value of 
their vote is determined without reference to the value of any accessory security given by the debtor by which they may benefit. 
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will ensure that the interests of all creditors are sufficiently protected.138 It is interesting to note that 
there is some discord in France relating to the 2014 reforms, which afforded the administrator the power 
to calculate creditors’ rights in light of subordination agreements. It has been argued that there is a lack 
of objective criteria attached to this power.139  
Austria has provisions for the examination of voting rights, but the legislation does not currently require 
a formal class formation, relying instead on the natural division of secured, unsecured, and subordinated, 
although as noted above there is an intention to create a new class of “worthy creditors” in upcoming 
reforms. While it does not specifically have a mechanism for “class formation”, the system of 
differentiating classes of creditors is functionally equivalent. Creditors with disputed or conditional 
claims are allowed to vote initially and if the result varies based on those votes, then the insolvency 
judge conducts a preliminary examination and hearing of the parties (article 93 of the Insolvency Code) 
and adjudicates the matter. 
Germany has the relevant structures for a restructuring plan approval, but only in insolvency, not 
preventative restructuring. Within the insolvency plan procedure there is a requirement that courts verify 
the fairness of class formation and voting. 
Denmark has provisions relating to the confirmation / examination of voting rights within insolvency; 
the Danish Bankruptcy Court examines and confirms the creditors which are eligible to vote, a decision 
which is not subject to appeal. 
In the Netherlands, the debtor and creditors will verify the claim themselves in an out-of-court 
composition. Where there is a dispute, they refer the matter to dispute resolution, either in or out of 
court. When the suspension of payment has been granted, the creditor must submit his claim to the 
insolvency practitioner for verification.140 Where the insolvency practitioner disputes the claim, the 
creditor will be consulted for more information in the first instance; for claims which remain disputed, 
the court or supervisory judge will decide.141 In general, the admission of claims for the purpose of 
voting is not performed by a judicial or an administrative authority per article 9(5) of the Directive. 
Polish Restructuring law provides for a simplified process – in relation to bankruptcy (liquidation 
insolvency) proceedings under the BL – of examining creditors who have the right to participate 
in proceedings and thereby exercise voting rights during an assembly of creditors. Different rules apply 
depending on the type of restructuring proceedings: 
(i) in arrangement and remedial proceedings, a voting right results from the inclusion of claims 
in a table of claims. The parties may object to entry of claims in the table to the judge-
commissioner;142 
(ii) in accelerated arrangement and arrangement approval proceedings, every claim reported to 
the debtor prior to the opening of restructuring proceedings accrues voting rights if; 
(a) this claim was confirmed by the debtor; or  
(b) the judge-commissioner admits a claim, which is when the claim is subject to a 
condition precedent or is disputed by the debtor, but its existence is probable143 (i.e. 
there are grounds to believe that a claim exists and is justified). 
If the assembly of creditors accepts an arrangement, a hearing takes place to confirm an arrangement 
plan. Prior to the hearing, written reservations can be submitted to the court,144 which will be resolved 
during a hearing. 
If an arrangement plan is in breach of the law or is considered to be grossly unfair to those creditors 
who have voted against it and have made reservations, the court may refuse its approval. Indirectly, this 
 
138 Commercial Code, art L626-31. “Adopted” means the plan has been adopted by each of the creditors’ committees and where applicable, 
by the general meeting of bondholders (and shareholders’ meeting in case of a debt-to-equity swap). 
139 A Droege Gagnier and A Dorst, ‘France: quo vadis? France is Keen to Reform its Security and Insolvency Law’ (2018) 12 Insolvency and 
Restructuring International 24, 25. 
140 Dutch BA, art 257(1). 
141 Dutch BA, arts 258, 259 & 267. 
142 RL, art 91.  
143 RL, art 107(3). 
144 RL, art 164. 
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acts as a verification of the classification of creditors in an arrangement.145 It is therefore unclear whether 
an amendment of the RL will be required. If so, this will be to make it explicit that a court has an 
obligation to analyze creditor voting rights and formation into classes as provided by article 9(5) of the 
Directive. 
Extra-judicial payment compositions in Spain are verified by a mediator (in the case of business) or by 
a notary (in the case of consumers). These professionals are responsible for verifying the fairness of the 
procedure and that the requisite majorities have been met in order to confirm an agreement.146 
Refinancing agreements are confirmed (homologated) by the court,147 thus it is the judge’s duty to verify 
the fairness of these agreements.148 
In England and Wales, it is the applicant’s responsibility to ensure that classes are constituted properly 
for the purposes of approving a Scheme, however, the court will give due consideration to the 
identification of classes.149 The Scheme has three stages. First, there is an application for an order that 
meeting should be summoned at which time it is decided as to whether further meetings should be 
summoned. Secondly, scheme proposals are presented to a meeting, are voted upon, and if approved by 
the requisite majority in number and value of 75%, the Scheme proceeds to the third and final stage. 
During the final stage, the court’s sanction must be obtained.150 During this third stage, the court is 
concerned: 
“(1) to ensure that the meeting or meetings have been summoned and held in accordance with its 
previous order, (2) to ensure that the proposals have been approved by the requisite majority of 
those present at the meeting or meetings and (3) to ensure that the views and interests of those 
who have not approved the proposals at the meeting or meetings (either because they were not 
present, or, being present, did not vote in favour of the proposals) receive impartial 
consideration.”151 
It is at this third stage that a court will consider issues of fairness, including that the views and interests 
of affected creditors who may not have voted in favour of the scheme.152 During the first stage, the court 
will also look at whether the creditors as a whole have interests that are aligned closely enough to be 
considered together or whether they are so dissimilar as to render it impossible for them to consult 
together on the aspects of the plan.153 Following Re Hawk Insurance, the court will not take a mechanical 
approach to determining the composition of a class, but will instead look at the scheme’s impact on the 
substantive rights of different creditors.154 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements 
The responses to the JCOERE questionnaire and contributor views on what will be required to 
implement the PRD have led to a number of tentative conclusions. Ireland, Denmark, Romania155 and 
Italy will likely require no changes in light of article 9(5) of the Directive. France may implement the 
required changes via the The Loi Pacte, the amendment to which was discussed in the previous section. 
Consideration may need to be given to the legislation in Austria and the requirements on the examination 
and confirmation / approval of class formation and voting rights in the PRD. Poland may wish to amend 
its legislation in order to provide for the confirmation of class formation at an earlier stage. The WHOA 
will likely ensure that the Netherlands is compliant with the PRD as it seems to provide for ex officio 
examination of class formation by a relevant authority. A request that the court adjudicates on the class 
formation and voting rights prior to voting on the plan can be made by the debtor or the expert.156 In 
 
145 RL, art 165(2). 
146 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 238. 
147 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 238. 
148 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, additional disposition 4 part 6.  
149 Practice Statement (Companies: Scheme of Arrangement) [2002] 1 WLR 1345 as cited in Kristin Van Zwieten, Goode on Principles of 
Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 581. 
150 Re BTR Plc [2000] 1 BCLC 740, 742 and Re My Travel Group Plc [2005] 2 BCLC 123, para 8. 
151 Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2002] BCC 300, 511 (b-g).  
152 idem para 12 as cited in van Zweiten (n 149) 577. 
153 van Zweiten (n 149) 581. 
154 RE Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2002] BCC 300 and Re UDL Holdings Ltd [2002] 1 HKC 172. 
155 Refer to the note regarding the framework in Denmark in section 7.3.2 of this Chapter. 
156 WHOA, art 378(1), which provides for the option that the debtor or the plan expert requests the court to assess the validity, for instance, of 
the class formation and voting rights.  
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addition, it appears that creditors and shareholders may dispute their class or voting rights with the 
debtor, or in court.157 England and Wales already provide court heavy approval process in its Scheme 
of Arrangement, which is likely to be adopted in similar fashion should the Government Response yield 
restructuring reform introducing a plan procedure, although the court heavy procedure is contrary to the 
spirit of the PRD. 
 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Intra-Class Cram-Down (Majority Voting) (Article 
9(6&7)158 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 4.4:  
Article 9(6) includes a compulsory intra-class cram-down element:  
“A restructuring plan shall be adopted by affected parties, provided that a majority in the amount of 
their claims or interests is obtained in each class. Member States may, in addition, require that a 
majority in the number of affected parties is obtained in each class.” 
The optional provisions are that member states may provide that a majority in number in each class 
must also agree. In addition, the majority can be set down by member states but cannot be higher 
than 75%. Article 9(7) provides that formal votes can be replaced by an agreement with the requisite 
majority. 
a. Does your jurisdiction have intra class cram down provisions in existing preventive 
restructuring proceedings? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or rules and 
describe the terms of these provisions and how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9 of the Directive? If so, 
please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the 
enactment of the Article 9(4). 
Ireland has provisions which provide for the vote to be carried by a majority within each class; s.540(4) 
provides that “[p]roposals shall be deemed to have been accepted by a meeting of …a class of creditors 
when a majority in number representing a majority in value of the claims represented at that meeting 
have voted… in favour”. As such, Ireland utilises a system of simple majority i.e. in excess of 50%. 
Irish legislation does not have a system of replacing formal voting with a less formal, expression of 
majority agreement. The proposal in the Scheme of Arrangement becomes binding on a class of 
creditors once a special majority is reached, in other words, 75% by value.159 
In Italy, the plan in a judicial composition with creditors is approved if the majority by value of creditors 
entitled to vote have approved the plan.160 If a single creditor holds a majority of the value of all the 
claims entitled to vote,161 then there must also be approval by a majority of the number of creditors in 
the class.162 In addition to that requirement, in case of class formation, the approval of the plan requires 
that the majority of the number of classes have approved the plan (a class is deemed to have approved 
the plan when the majority by value of the creditors included therein have voted favourably). With 
 
157 WHOA, arts 383(9) (with debtor), 383(8) & 384(2)(c) (in court) respectively. 
158 PRD, art 9(6):  
“A restructuring plan shall be adopted by affected parties, provided that a majority in the amount of their claims or interests is obtained in 
each class. Member States may, in addition, require that a majority in the number of affected parties is obtained in each class.  
Member States shall lay down the majorities required for the adoption of a restructuring plan. Those majorities shall not be higher than 
75 % of the amount of claims or interests in each class or, where applicable, of the number of affected parties in each class.” 
159 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 453(2)(a). The 75% majority refers to a “number representing at least 75 per cent in value of the creditors or 
class of creditors ... present and voting either in person or by proxy at the scheme meeting”. (Irish Companies Act 2014, s 449(1)) 
160 CCI, art 109 para 1. 
161 This requirement also applies in case a restructuring plan does not envisage the formation of classes. 
162 The PRD mandates that the majority required by a Member State shall not be higher than 75%. There could be situations where, based on 
the specific circumstances of the case, the majority required by Italian law is higher than 75% by amount e.g. when a creditor has a claim of 
60% by amount, and there are two other creditors each having a claim of 20% by amount, under the Italian rules the class may be deemed to 
have approved only if a majority representing 80% by amount is reached. 
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respect to restructuring agreements, binding dissenting creditors within a class, the class is deemed to 
have approved the plan if 75% by value of creditors have approved it.163  
In Romania, preventive restructuring plans (preventive concordat) can be adopted and confirmed by 
creditors’ votes representing at least 75% of the value of the accepted and uncontested claims, reflecting 
the maximum threshold set out in the PRD. 
In France, there is no need for a cram-down mechanism in the conciliation or ad hoc mandate 
proceedings, as they are voluntary in nature; in other words, they are negotiations with particular 
creditors, which are willing participants in the process. In the sauvegarde proceedings - for the purpose 
of the plan becoming binding on all members of a particular class once it is confirmed by the court – 
the plan must be approved by a majority of two-thirds of the number of claims.164 
In the Austrian voluntary reorganisations and self-administered reorganisation (debtor in possession), a 
reorganisation plan requires a majority of unsecured creditors holding more than 50% of the aggregate 
claims of those unsecured creditors present at the hearing.165   
Within Germany’s insolvency procedure, a simple majority within individual classes by value and 
number will succeed in the individual class approving a plan.  
Danish insolvency law – for the purpose of the plan becoming binding on all affected creditors once it 
is confirmed by the court – has a system of majority rule in that it mandates that a restructuring plan is 
adopted if the majority does not oppose it.166 It is worth bearing in mind that Danish law does not 
mandate voting in classes, therefore the "cram-down" is not intra-class, so to speak. Voting is formal 
and confirmation is always needed.167  
Similarly, in Poland, an arrangement is adopted by the assembly of creditors if there is a majority 
of voting creditors who hold a total of at least two-thirds of the sum of claims owed to voting creditors. 
If voting on an arrangement takes place in classes of creditors, an arrangement shall be adopted if 
in each group the majority of voting creditors in such group is in its favour, with a total of at least two-
thirds of the sum of claims owed to voting creditors from that group. This is not so, however, during 
arrangement approval proceedings where an arrangement shall be accepted if the majority of creditors 
entitled to vote on an arrangement having a total of at least two-thirds of the sum of claims that give the 
right to vote on an arrangement are in its favour. Furthermore, if the vote takes place in classes of 
creditors, it shall be adopted, if, in each group, the majority of creditors entitled to vote on an 
arrangement from this group have a total of at least two-thirds of the sum of claims vested in creditors 
from that group eligible to vote on an arrangement. There are provisions regulating a cross-class cram 
down mechanism,168 which state that an arrangement will be adopted by an assembly of creditors despite 
failure to obtain the required majority in some groups of creditors.  This is if creditors with a total of 
two-thirds of the sum of claims vested with creditors entitled to vote on an arrangement have voted 
for the arrangement, and when creditors from the group or groups that have been against 
the arrangement are satisfied on the basis of an arrangement to a degree not less favourable than in the 
case of bankruptcy proceedings (liquidation insolvency). Even if the concept of a cross-class cram down 
is recognised by the RL, a view prevails that the RL will need to be amended to comply with article 9 
of the Directive, in particular, due to the wording of its section 4 that sets minimum requirements related 
with the enactment. 
As discussed previously, currently there is no separation of classes in the Netherlands for voting, 
however dissenting creditors in the suspension of payment may still be bound by a restructuring plan in 
certain circumstances. There is also a limited exception where dissenting creditors in an out-of-court 
composition can be bound if there is abuse of power by the creditor(s) in not approving the composition, 
it can become binding on them.169 In suspension of payment, a cram-down is available when at least a 
 
163 CCI, art 61 sets an identical provision in this respect. 
164 Commercial Code, art L636-31.  
165 Freidrich Jergitsch and Carmen Redmann, ‘Restructuring & Insolvency Austria’ (Getting the Deal Through 2018) 
<https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/35/jurisdiction/25/restructuring-insolvency-2019-austria/ > accessed 10 December 2019. 
166 Danish BA, s 14 (2).  
167 Danish BA, s 13 e. 
168 RL, art 119(3). 
169 Supreme Court 12 August 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT7799 (Payroll) at 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.  
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simple majority of the relevant creditors representing not less than half of the accepted claims vote in 
favour.170 A restructuring plan can also be confirmed if: 
i) three quarters of the relevant creditors who appeared, voted in favour of the restructuring 
plan; and  
ii) the rejection of the restructuring plan results from one or more creditors having voted 
against it who could not have arrived at such voting conduct with good reason, taking into 
consideration all circumstances, in particular the amount that they may be expected to 
receive if the debtor were liquidated instead. 
An intra-class cram down provision is available in Spain if certain majorities are met; these range from 
51% to 80% depending on the procedure in question. If the requisite majority is met, then dissenting 
creditors within that class will be bound. In the case of refinancing agreements, the effects can be 
extended to dissenting and non-voting creditors when certain legal requirements are fulfilled, and the 
agreement is approved or confirmed by the Court (“homologación”).171 Among these requirements, the 
agreement has to be subscribed by a certain majority of financial claims. This majority depends on the 
content of the agreement and the type of claims affected by it (non secured/secured claims). In the case 
of non-secured claims, a) the agreement has to be subscribed by at least 60 % of the financial claims, 
when it imposes on these claims either (i) a postponement of less than five years, or (ii) its conversion 
on participating loans for the same period of time172 (b) the agreement has to be subscribed by at least 
75 % of the financial claims, when it imposes on these claims (i) a postponement of five years or more, 
but never beyond ten years; (ii) a write-off or release; (iii) a debt-equity swap; (iv) the conversion on 
participating loans for five years or more, but never beyond ten years, or (v) a payment by transfer of 
assets (Additional Provision 4th (3) (b)).173 In the case of secured claims, to extend the effects of the 
agreement to dissenting and non-voting creditors, it has to be subscribed by at least 65 % of financial 
secured claims, when the agreement contains any of the provisions described under (a), or by at least 80 
% of financial secured claims, when it contains any of the provisions described under (b). Similar rules 
are applicable in the case of extra-judicial payment compositions (articles 238 and 238 bis of the Spanish 
Insolvency Act). However, no confirmation (“homologación”) is required to extend the effects. The 
adoption of the agreement with the abovementioned majorities is sufficient to make it binding for the 
dissenting or non-voting creditors (articles 238 (1) bis and 240 of the Spanish Insolvency Act). 
In England and Wales both the CVA and the Scheme of Arrangement have intra-class cram-down i.e. 
majority rule within classes.174 The CVA becomes binding on the company and all of the unsecured 
creditors – not secured creditors – if it has passed the 75% by value threshold.175 The Scheme of 
Arrangement requires a majority of the creditors and members in each class, provided that the majority 
represents 75% by value of the claims of the relevant creditors.176 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements  
From the responses received to the questionnaire, it can be tentatively concluded that the majority of 
Member States – Ireland, England and Wales, and France– are unlikely to require amendments to their 
existing legislation. As Spain allows for confirmation majorities above 75% in some circumstances it 
may need to consider amendments in line with the PRD majorities. As discussed above, they all appear 
to adopt majority rule within classes of creditors, which allows a plan to be approved. Austria currently 
intends to adopt a 75% majority for its new preventive restructuring proceeding. Denmark and Poland 
appear not to need amendments over those discussed in the previous question. As articulated previously, 
Italy may need to amend the rules relating to single creditors which hold the majority of the value of the 
overall amount of claims entitled to vote, as it can result in a higher percentage than 75% being required 
for approval. Germany might consider mapping their existing rules on creditor and member voting 
processes in insolvency to preventive restructuring, as part of any overall reforms. It looks as though 
the WHOA will amend Dutch law in line with article 9(6) of the Directive, in that it should provide for 
 
170 Dutch BA, art 268. “Relevant creditors” refers to recognised and admitted creditors 
171 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, additional provision 4(1).  
172 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, additional provision 4(3)(a). 
173 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, additional provision 4(3)(b). 
174 English and Welsh Insolvency Act 1986, s 5. 
175 “Unsecured creditors who were entitled to vote” also refers to creditors who would have been entitled to vote if they had notice 
176 English and Welsh Companies Act 2006, s 899.  
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voting in separate classes and outline the required majorities. Finally, it would seem wise for Romania 
to introduce new provisions regulating majority in the value of creditors’ claims or interests to be 
obtained in each voting class.  The UK currently uses the maximum limit of majority, which looks like 
will also be adopted should the Government Consultation and Response yield reform that produces a 
preventive restructuring plan procedure.  
7.4 The Confirmation of Restructuring Plans (Article 10) 
Article 10 regulates the confirmation of restructuring plans by the relevant authorities; it makes court 
or administrative authority confirmation mandatory if certain criteria are present, thereby seeking to 
protect affected parties. While a goal of the PRD was to increase flexibility within preventive 
restructuring procedures, it is key to the EU proposals that a layer of formality and protection exists 
where creditors or employees may be negatively affected by the restructuring plan. As was the case with 
article 9, article 10 forms an important part of the cross-class cram-down provisions in article 11. It also 
regulates the circumstances in which a judicial or administrative authority can confirm a plan - further 
protecting the interests of creditors - and mandates that a plan can be rejected by the relevant authority 
should it not have a reasonable prospect of success.  
 The Purpose of Article 10 in the PRD (Question 5) 
Article 10(1) lays out the conditions, which if present, mandate that the restructuring plan must be 
subject to judicial or administrative authority review and confirmation. All restructuring plans which 
affect dissenting creditors, which feature new finance, or which involve the loss of 25%, or more, of the 
workforce must be confirmed by the relevant authority before becoming binding. Article 10(2) requires 
Member States to clearly articulate the circumstances in which the relevant authority can confirm a plan. 
A plan can only be confirmed if it has been adopted in line with article 9, if there is equal treatment for 
creditors with similar interests in the same class, if there has been compliance with national law in 
relation to the notification of relevant parties and where applicable, if any necessary new finance does 
not unfairly prejudice the interests of creditors. The plan must also satisfy the best-interest-of-creditors 
test for dissenting creditors, if its confirmation is challenged on this ground. The ‘best interest of 
creditors test’ under the PRD means:  
“…that no dissenting creditor is worse off under a restructuring plan than it would be either in the case 
of liquidation, whether piecemeal liquidation or sale of the business as a going concern, or in the event 
of the next-best-alternative scenario if the restructuring plan were not to be confirmed. Member States 
should be able to choose one of those thresholds when implementing the best-interest-of-creditors test 
in national law. That test should be applied in any case where a plan needs to be confirmed in order to 
be binding for dissenting creditors or, as the case may be, dissenting classes of creditors.”177 
Article 10(3) provides that Member States must empower judicial or administrative authorities to reject 
a plan if it would not have a reasonable prospect of success, in other words, prevent the insolvency of 
the debtor or ensure the viability of the business. Finally, article 10(4) seeks to promote efficiency within 
the process by mandating that, where relevant authority confirmation is required, the decision is taken 
in an efficient manner.  
Question 5 of the questionnaire had two parts; first, it investigated what circumstances, if any, trigger 
automatic court or administrative body oversight of a restructuring plan in the various jurisdictions and 
it examined the extent to which, if at all, these domestic provisions comply with the requirements in 
article 10(1). Secondly, it inquired as to what the domestic rules are for the confirmation of a 
restructuring plan and whether courts or administrative bodies are empowered to reject a plan on 
particular grounds.   
The existence of copious options within article 10 may lead to greater court or administrative authority 
oversight in some Member States than others; some jurisdictions require that all restructuring plans are 
 
177 PRD, recital 52 and as defined in art 2(1)(6):  
“a test that is satisfied if no dissenting creditor would be worse off under a restructuring plan than such a creditor would be if the normal 
ranking of liquidation priorities under national law were applied, either in the event of liquidation, whether piecemeal or by sale as a going 
concern, or in the event of the next-best-alternative scenario if the restructuring plan were not confirmed”. 
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confirmed by the relevant authority, whereas others mandate confirmation in the circumstances outlined 
by the PRD.  
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Conditions for Obligatory Court Confirmation of 
Restructuring Plans (Article 10(1))178 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 5.1:  
Article 10(1) provides that: 
“Member States shall ensure that at least the following restructuring plans are binding on the parties 
only if they are confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority:  
(a) restructuring plans which affect the claims or interests of dissenting affected parties; (b) 
restructuring plans which provide for new financing; (c) restructuring plans which involve the loss 
of more than 25% of the workforce, if such loss is permitted under national law.” 
a. Does your jurisdiction provide conditions under which restructuring plans must be approved 
by administrative or judicial authorities? Please specify and describe the relevant legislative 
provisions or rules and how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 10(1) of the Directive? If 
so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the 
enactment of the Article 10(1). 
In Irish examinership, all proposals are subject to court approval, therefore those which affect the claims 
of dissenting affected parties, those which provide for new financing and those which involve the loss 
of more than 25% of the workforce are all automatically subject to court confirmation.179 The Irish 
Scheme of Arrangement framework is similarly regulated in that the compromise must be court 
sanctioned in order to be binding.180 
The Polish RL provides for an arrangement plan to be confirmed by a court and thereby binding 
on participating creditors,181 including dissenting creditors who have voted against the arrangement 
plan. There are, however. no specific criteria as provided in detail by Directive article 10(1). If it turns 
out that any of the situations covered by the above article are part of an arrangement plan and negative 
conditions for a court not approving an arrangement are absent, a court will approve an arrangement 
plan.182  
So too is the legal position in Romania, where restructuring plans are automatically subject to judicial 
approval and must be confirmed by the syndic judge before becoming binding.  
In the Netherlands, court confirmation is required in order to bind the relevant parties in both the 
suspension of payment and the WHOA preventive restructuring framework. In the suspension of 
payment, the court will consider the composition for confirmation – homologatie - once the composition 
has been accepted by the creditors in accordance with article 268 or 268a DBA.183 Accordingly, court 
confirmation is an integral part of the suspension of payment proceeding. Article 386 WHOA requires 
court confirmation of a plan to make it generally binding on all (dissenting) creditors and shareholders. 
Article 383(1) WHOA enables the debtor, or plan expert (where relevant), to submit the composition 
for court confirmation, when at least one class of creditors has adopted it.  
 
178 PRD,  art 10(1):  
“Member States shall ensure that at least the following restructuring plans are binding on the parties only if they are confirmed by a judicial 
or administrative authority:  
(a) restructuring plans which affect the claims or interests of dissenting affected parties;  
(b) restructuring plans which provide for new financing;  
(c) restructuring plans which involve the loss of more than 25 % of the workforce, if such loss is permitted under national law.” 
179 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541. 
180  Irish Companies Act 2014, s 453(1) & (2)(c). 
181 RL, art 166. 
182 RL, art 164.  
183 Dutch BA, arts 269b(1) & 271. 
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The situation in Italy is slightly different; judicial oversight is mandatory in order for any plan to be 
binding on creditors per article 48 CCI.184 The requirement, however, is that the court must validate the 
process that led creditors to approve the plan and verify the legal compliance and economic feasibility 
of the restructuring plan. Where the debtor has filed for confirmation, any interested party may lodge 
an objection within 10 days before the confirmation hearing (concordato preventivo), or within 30 days 
from the publishing date of the debt restructuring agreement in the public register (accordo di 
ristrutturazione dei debiti). The court, after deciding on the objections, must confirm the agreement by 
way of a judgment.185 
Denmark also has comparable regulations in that all restructuring plans, which contain an element of a 
business transfer or compulsory composition, must be confirmed by the court.186 The degree to which 
the court examines the proposal depends on the factual circumstances of each case. Parties affected by 
the plan can object to its confirmation generating a court examination of the basis for the objection.187  
In France, the court will hear from the relevant parties, consider the opinion of the Public Prosecutor 
and rely on the economic, social and environmental assessment drafted by the administrator before 
sanctioning a sauvegarde plan in accordance with article L628-8.188 
In a conciliation procedure, the court can confirm the plan in two ways: 
(i) constater l’accord if the parties to the agreement request it; or  
(ii) homologuer l’accord if the debtor requests it and if certain conditions are met, namely the 
debtor is not insolvent (‘en cessation des paiements’), the provisions of the agreement aim 
to ensure the viability of the going concern of the company and the agreement does not 
affect the interests of creditors who are not parties to it.189 
Austrian insolvency law requires that all plans are subject to court confirmation. This, however, is not 
extended to plans in the preventive restructuring framework.  
Germany is similar in that it has comparable requirements in insolvency proceedings. The court is 
required to examine the plan to determine if any procedural mistakes were made in the submission or 
in context, as well as assessing the viability of the plan. If the court accepts the plan, the plan will then 
be forwarded to the individual in charge of its implementation.  
In Spain, whether there are conditions for approval by administrative or judicial authorities depends on 
the type of plan or procedure in question. Refinancing agreements must be approved by a court. 
However, the extra-judicial payment composition is initiated by the debtor with a request to a registrar 
or an official list of mediators or before a notary public to appoint an insolvency mediator.190 In the case 
of business, the framework is initiated before the Commercial Register (Registro Mercantil). In the case 
of consumers, it is initiated before a notary. The Register has to appoint a mediator. The Notary can 
supervise the framework by himself or appoint a mediator. 
 
184 As CCI, art 56 (accordi in esecuzione di piani attestati di risanamento) does not bind dissenting creditors, it does not provide for any court 
confirmation. The judicial involvement is merely potential, being limited in case of a subsequent insolvent liquidation of the debtor.   
185 The new accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti reflects the prevailing case law, which used to admit judicial assessment on the content of 
the plan, although the “old” law used to entrust this assessment to creditors with the informative support of the independent expert and the 
insolvency practitioner (commissario giudiziale). 
186 Danish BA, s 13 e. As previously noted, restructuring plans refer to insolvency restructuring and not preventive restructuring, however, the 
process appears to be quite similar to preventive restructuring frameworks in other jurisdictions. Arguably, the main difference is that the 
Danish system attempts to support the exit of debtors from insolvency, not the prevention of them entering insolvency in the first place. 
187 Per Betænkning 1512/2009 om rekonstruktion mv. P. 237 and 388, objections must be presented at the last court meeting regarding the 
creditors’ adoption of the plan. The relevant creditor(s) cannot object at a later date. 
188 The assessment specifies the origins, severity and nature of the company’s financial difficulties (Article L623-1 of the Commercial Code). 
For the SA, the sanctioning of the plan takes place in the same manner as for a sauvegarde procedure, after approval has been obtained from 
the relevant creditors and bondholders. The court will have three months to approve the plan, or else it terminates. See art L628-8 of the 
Commercial Code. For the SFA, creditors have only 8 days to discuss and approve the plan, while the court has to approve the plan within 1 
month following approval by the creditors per art L628-10. 
Per Commercial code, art L626-9, the court will hear from the debtor, the administrator, the creditors’ representative, the supervising creditors 
and the employees’ representatives i.e. the relevant parties. 
189 Commercial Code, art L611-8. Per Commercial Code, art L611-9, in order to sanction the plan through homologation, the court will hear 
from the debtor, the creditors which are part of the plan, workers’ representatives, the conciliator, the Public Prosecutor and any other person(s) 
that the court deems necessary. Homologation confers more legal advantages than a constatation – for example priority for new financing – 
but it renders the court’s decision public, which is not the case of a constatation. 
190 Allen and Overy, ‘Restructuring Across Borders – Spain: Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency Procedures’ (2018) 5-9 < 
http://www.allenovery.com/expertise/practices/restructuring/Pages/Spain-corporate-restructuring.aspx> accessed 26th October 2019. 
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In England & Wales, the CVA procedure requires the nominee to report to the court on the prospect of 
success of the arrangement or composition. Court approval is not required for the CVA unless an 
application is made on foot of a disagreement about the contents of the plan.191  
In relation to Schemes of Arrangement under the Companies Act 2006 (Part 26), the court is involved:192  
(i) At the first hearing, it must decide whether to convene meetings of members and/or 
creditors to vote on the scheme.193 The court will base its decision on whether the scheme 
has the general support sufficient to have a prospect of success and whether the class design 
is correct.194  
(ii) At the second hearing, it must decide whether to sanction the scheme if the scheme has been 
approved per section 899(1) of the Companies Act 2006. This will consider if the approval 
of the scheme is reasonable, if each class was fairly represented by those attending the 
meeting and the statutory majority acted bona fide and whether there has been compliance 
with the relevant statutory provisions.195 
At the second hearing, the court will also consider whether the Scheme is fair to all creditors bound by 
it, including those who voted against it.196 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements 
It can be tentatively concluded from the analysis of the responses of contributors to the JCOERE 
questionnaire that the majority of Member States will not require amendments to domestic legislation 
in order to comply with the PRD, namely Ireland, Italy, Romania, Denmark, Poland, Spain, France and 
England and Wales.197 As has been the case with a number of other aspects of the questionnaire, 
Germany and Austria may well need to introduce, or extend existing provisions, to allow for court 
confirmation of restructuring plans in preventative restructuring. 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Conditions for Refusal to Confirm a Plan (Article 10(2))198 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 5.2:  
Article 10(2)(a-e) provides for a number of conditions under which a restructuring plan can be 
confirmed by judicial or administrative authorities (see Appendix A), while 10(3) requires Member 
States to ensure that administrative authorities can refuse to confirm a plan where the plan “would 
 
191 English and Welsh Insolvency Act 1986, s 4A(3-4).  
192 For the Scheme of Arrangement, the procedural requirements for implementation are set out in part 49 and Practice Direction 49A of the 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Chapter 21 of the Chancery Guide and Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) [2002] 1 WLR 
1345.47 
193 English and Welsh Companies Act 2006, s 896(1). 
194 Re Savoy Hotel Ltd [1981] Ch 351 and Re T & N Ltd [2005] 2 BCLC 488 respectively. 
195 Re Anglo-Continentalk Supply Co Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 723; relevant statutory provisions include correct notice of the court convened meetings, 
proper despatch of the explanatory statement and the relevant majority in number and value of the appropriate classes passed a resolution to 
approve the scheme. 
196 The meaning of “fairness” in the context of the Scheme of Arrangement reflects the requirements of the CVA as not being ‘unfairly 
prejudicial’. See Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 195, citing the Practice 
Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) [2002] 1 All ER 96: “The Court will look to ensure that the procedure has been carried out 
correctly and also that the Scheme is fair to all creditors bound by it, including those who voted against it. The meaning of ‘fairness’ in this 
context has a very similar meaning to ‘fairness’ when considering claims that a CVA is ‘unfairly prejudicial’.” 
197 The UK Government’s proposal for a new restructuring procedure largely adopts the same approach as the Scheme, thus the two levels of 
court approval will also apply to it. While the CVA falls outside of much of the PRD, the UK’s plans for introducing a preventive restructuring 
may make considering the CVA in this context a moot point. 
198 PRD art 10(2): 
“Member States shall ensure that the conditions under which a restructuring plan can be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority 
are clearly specified and include at least the following:  
(a) the restructuring plan has been adopted in accordance with art 9;  
(b) creditors with sufficient commonality of interest in the same class are treated equally, and in a manner proportionate to their claim;  
(c) notification of the restructuring plan has been given in accordance with national law to all affected parties;  
(d) where there are dissenting creditors, the restructuring plan satisfies the best-interest-of-creditors test;  
(e) where applicable, any new financing is necessary to implement the restructuring plan and does not unfairly prejudice the interests of 
creditors.  
Compliance with point (d) of the first subparagraph shall be examined by a judicial or administrative authority only if the restructuring 
plan is challenged on that ground.” 
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not have a reasonable prospect of preventing the insolvency of the debtor or ensuring the viability of 
the business.” 
a. Are there conditions specified for judicial or administrative confirmation and are such 
authorities also empowered to refuse to confirm a plan? Please specify and describe the 
relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the Directive? If so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment 
Article 10 of the Directive provisions in this context.  
Following the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire and contributor views on what the 
implementation requirements may be to align jurisdictional frameworks with the PRD, a number of 
tentative conclusions can be drawn based on current knowledge and commentary from these and various 
other fora. In Ireland, the court can only confirm a proposal from the examiner provided it complies 
with the conditions in s.541(4).199 Irish law compels the examiner to supply a copy of the proposal to 
any interested party upon written application (s.534(5)(c)) and Irish law mandates that the appointment 
of an examiner is adequately publicised under (s.531(2)(3)), thereby notifying interested parties that the 
process has commenced. Section 539(1)(d) states that the examiner’s proposals “must provide equal 
treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class unless the holder of a particular claim or interest 
agrees to less favourable treatment”. The courts are free to reject a proposal according to s.541(3). 
Although Irish legislation does not specifically provide for the rejection of a proposal by the court on 
the grounds that it “would not have a reasonable prospect of preventing the insolvency of the debtor” – 
article 10(3)) – the Irish courts have demonstrated that it must be the case that the prospect of the 
company surviving (and consequently the proposal succeeding) is a relevant criterion, given the very 
purpose of the examinership process.200 Under Irish law the examiner will not be appointed in the first 
place unless the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that the company will survive as 
described in s. 509(2) of the Companies Act 2014. This is part of the mandatory threshold test. 
legislation does not require that creditors must be better off in examinership than they would be in a 
liquidation, however it does appear, from case law, to have the “next-best-alternative scenario”, which 
satisfies the best-interests-of creditors test. In Re McInerney Homes the court refused to confirm the 
plan from the Examiner because the dissenting creditors demonstrated that they would do better under 
long-term receivership.201 There are no conditions specified in the legislation which enable the court to 
refuse to sanction the Scheme of Arrangement over and above a lack of approval from the specified 
majority.  
In the Italian concordato preventivo, article 48, par. 3, CCI expressly requires the court to verify  legal 
compliance, including the voting procedure; class formation; and notification – and the economic 
feasibility of the plan (i.e., whether the plan will likely succeed).202 Under article 48, par. 7, CCI, if the 
Court does not confirm the plan and the debtor is insolvent, it will open an insolvency liquidation 
proceeding at the request of one of the parties (including the public prosecutor).203 The Italian 
framework does not spell out the duty of the Court to assess whether the new financing is necessary to 
implement the restructuring plan and does not unfairly prejudice creditors’ interest, although the Court 
is required to refuse confirmation of the plan when there is evidence of fraudulent activities. (It must be 
considered that those new financings that are not necessary to implement the plan and/or unfairly 
prejudice the interest of creditors cannot be deemed per se fraudulent)  
In the Austrian insolvency procedure, the court is empowered to refuse a plan if the benefits granted to 
the debtor in the plan are not appropriate under  the circumstances, or  if the plan conflicts with the 
common interests of insolvency creditors, or if the creditors are going to receive less than 30% of their 
 
199 Section 541(4) provides that the court cannot approve the proposals unless the proposal has been approved by at least one class of affected 
(impaired) creditors, and that the court is satisfied that the proposal or compromise is  fair and equitable to any dissenting class of creditors or 
members and the court is satisfied that the compromise is not unfairly prejudicial to any interested party.  Finally the court must be satisfied 
that the purpose of the proposal or compromise is not the avoidance of payment of tax due. 
200  See Re Tivway Ltd [2009] IEHC 494; [2010] 3 IR 49 and Re Clare Textiles Ltd [1993] 2 IR 213. 
201 McInerney Homes Ltd v Cos Acts 1990 [2011] IESC 31 (22 July 2011). 
202 This provision puts on a legislative footing the requirements established in recent case law, as Art. 180 of the previous Italian insolvency 
law was unclear in this regard.    
203 Where “parties” refs to one or more creditors, the Public Prosecutor or the debtor itself.  
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claims as a result of dishonesty, recklessnes. Finally, the court will not confirm a plan if there is 
excessive burden or delay in filing the application for insolvency proceedings.204  
In implementing the PRD, Germany could draw from their insolvency plan procedure used in the InsO 
restructuring route under the unified procedure205 and case law. In the restructuring aspect of the German 
Insolvency code, an order for debtor in possession management aimed at agreeing a restructuring plan 
can be repealed by the court in three circumstances. Firstly, the court shall repeal the order if the majority 
of the creditors’ assembly requests that this is done. Secondly, if a creditor with a right to separate 
satisfaction requests that the order is repealed and that there are now circumstances which could place 
creditors at a disadvantage as a result of the management of the debtor in possession.206  The debtor can 
also ask for such an order to be repealed or the debtor requests it, but only if the “envisaged restructuring 
no longer has prospects of success.”207 It would, however, need to extend the grounds for refusal known 
in German insolvency law to include further conditions in the PRD, such as a feasibility test.  
Denmark has three mandatory grounds, which if present, must result in the rejection of a restructuring 
plan:208 
(i) First, the court examines if there have been procedural violations or if the debtor and 
insolvency practitioner have given incomplete information. Any errors must have had the 
potential to influence the voting in order for the Court to reject the plan.209 
(ii) Second, the court examines if the restructuring proposal contains provisions that are 
contrary to the rules of law or statutory provisions in the Bankruptcy Act.210  
(iii) Third, the court must reject the plan if a creditor has been granted an advantage outside of 
the restructuring plan to influence the voting of the plan.   
The court may also reject the plan if it is disproportionate to the debtor’s financial position; in other 
words, this is a determination of whether the creditors will be better off in liquidation (best-interests-of-
creditors test).211 The Supreme Court has held that the Bankruptcy Court should also reject the plan if its 
purpose is solely to discharge the debtor from personal debt (debt that continues to exist after bankruptcy 
proceeding have ended) as opposed to the continuation of a business, even if the plan fulfils the best-
of-interest test.212 It is worth noting that the prospect of success is not one of the mandatory factors 
assessed by the court in its decision, though it can form part of the consideration.  
In the Netherlands, the court should have regard to several factors when confirming or rejecting a plan 
in the suspension of payment, namely: 
(i) if the assets of the estate exceed the amount stipulated in the composition; 
(ii) if performance of the composition is insufficiently secured; 
(iii) if the composition was realized by fraudulent acts or undue preference of one or more 
creditors or other unfair means, regardless of whether the debtor or any other party co-
operated therein; and 
(iv) if the remuneration and disbursements of the experts and the insolvency practitioner have 
not been paid to the insolvency practitioner or if no security has been provided for.213  
 
204 Austrian Insolvency Code, s 154.  
205 See Chapter 6, section 6.4.2 (g) for a description of the InsO unified procedure and the insolvency plan. 
206 InsO, s 270(2)(2). 
207 InsO, s 270b(4). 
208 The list of grounds mandating the rejection of a plan is exhaustive in that it must occur is one of the three grounds has been met. This 
limitation on the court is explained by the legislator; it was noted that rejection of a restructuring plan that has been approved by a majority of 
creditors should be the exception because the (majority of the) creditors should have the final say on the adoption of a restructuring plan. 
209 Danish BA, s 13 e (3)(i)  
210 For example, if the plan encompasses claims that cannot be affected by a compulsory composition. 
211 Betænkning 1512/2009, 389 
212 U2019.1859H and U2018.3090H 
213 Dutch BA, art 272(2). Per art 272(3), the court can refuse the confirmation of a composition on any other ground either upon request or ex 
officio. Per the Court of Appeal Amsterdam decision of 8 November 1938, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1938:69, this can be because when the 
composition would be unfair to creditors. 
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Although the suspension of payment does not provide for separation of classes, the court can reject a 
plan if it is unfair to creditors on the basis of Dutch BA Art 272(3).214 The DBA does not provide an 
explicit best-interest-of-creditors test for the suspension of payment. However, putting forward a 
composition that violates this test may be a reason for rejecting the confirmation on the basis of article 
272(3) Dutch BA.215 The test is performed both upon request and ex officio. The regulations pertaining 
to the suspension of payment do not specify what must be included in the plan; where relevant, the plan 
may include new finance to facilitate the restructuring. However, the fact that the interest of (certain) 
creditors are unfairly prejudiced can be a ground for refusal per article 272(3) Dutch BA.216 The 
legislation does not refer to the prospect of preventing insolvency as a condition for confirming the plan, 
however, the court may reject the plan if performance of the composition is insufficiently secured as 
stated in article 272(2)(2) DBA.217  
In Poland, the RL provides for conditions whereby a court has either a duty or right to  refuse 
confirmation of an arrangement plan, while the rule is that it will confirm an arrangement plan if it has 
been accepted by an assembly of creditors.218 The court will reject an arrangement if it violates 
the law;  in particular, if it provides for state aid contrary to regulations or if it is clear that 
the arrangement will not be executed.219 A court may refuse to approve an arrangement if its conditions 
are grossly unfair to creditors who voted against it and submitted reservations to the arrangement.220 A 
court will discontinue restructuring proceedings if it determines that an arrangement has not been 
adopted due to lack of a required majority.221 In arrangement approval proceedings and in  accelerated 
arrangement proceedings the court will refuse approval of an arrangement if the sum of disputed claims 
entitled  to vote on an arrangement exceeds 15% of  total claims entitled to a vote on an arrangement.222 
In view of the implicit obligation imposed by Directive article 10(2) where the condition 
for confirmation must be “clearly specified and include at least”… the RL may well require a rewording 
of its provisions. That would probably also apply in view of Directive article 10(3). 
In Romania, the syndic judge can only refuse to confirm a plan if the amount of claims challenged 
and/or disputed in court exceeds 25% of the total amount of claims and/or the preventive concordat was 
not approved by the required majority of creditors.223 The viability of the plan is not analysed by the 
judicial authority, as there are no provisions which empowers a judge to refuse a plan on the grounds 
that it would not have a reasonable prospect of success.  
In France, the court can only confirm a plan through homologation in the conciliation procedure if 
certain conditions are met, including that the agreement aims to ensure the viability of the company.224 
When sanctioning a plan through constatation, the power of the judge is quite limited leading to the 
contention by some that the judge has quite a “passive” role in such cases.225 Should the court refuse to 
proceed with the homologation, the debtor can appeal the decision.226 Because the conciliation is 
consensual in nature, if the agreement is not sanctioned by the court, it is only binding on those who 
expressed agreement. 
In the sauvegarde procedure, the plan includes an economic, social and environmental assessment, 
which states the recovery prospects of the company.227 Where there is a “serious possibility for the 
 
214 The Dutch BA has specific rules for informing creditors of the suspension of payment and the proposed restructuring plan and failure to 
adhere can be a reason for rejecting the confirmation on the basis of Dutch BA, art 272(3). The rules are laid out in Dutch BA, arts 215, 253, 
256(1-2). 
215 This has been argued, for instance, by RD Vriesendorp and FMJ Verstijlen, ‘Enige opmerkingen over Polak-Wessels, Insolventierecht’ 
(2004) 6603 WPNR 1020. 
216 See for instance Court of Appeal Amsterdam 8 November 1938, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1938:69, in which it is stated that a request for 
confirmation can be rejected when the composition would bring great unfairness to creditors.  
217 It may also be a ground for refusal under Dutch BA, art 272(3). 
218 RL, art 164. 
219 RL, art 165.  
220 ibid. 
221 RL, art 165(5). 
222 RL, art 165(3). 
223 Creditors who represent not less than 75% of the amount of accepted and undisputed claims.  
224  Commercial Code, art L611-8. 
225 Y Muller, ‘Le contrat judiciaire en droit privé’ (Doctoral thesis, Paris I 1995). Amongst the limited powers of the judge is the ability to 
refuse the constatation if the agreement is illegal, particularly if it violates public order; see B Faucher, ‘La conciliation judiciaire’ (Doctoral 
thesis, Paris 2 1980) 388 and B Gorchs, ‘Le contrôle judiciaire des accords de règlement amiable’ (2008) Revue de l’arbitrage 45. 
226 Commercial Code, art R611-42.  
227 Commercial Code, art L626-2. 
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company to be rescued”, the court will confirm the sauvegarde plan.228 It appears that the judge can 
amend a plan, and therefore refuse the original one based on the wording of article L626-14 of the 
Commercial Code. However, French law provides scant detail regarding the reasons why a plan can be 
amended or rejected.229 The law states that if no solution is found, the court can refuse a plan and open 
liquidation proceedings or judicial reorganisation proceedings (redressement judiciaire) after hearing 
the relevant parties.230. The tribunal can also do so if the debtor becomes insolvent while the plan is 
being implemented.231 For a SA/SFA, the Commercial Code states that the court can terminate the 
procedure if it does not approve the plan. However, specific conditions for rejection are not listed.232 In 
contrast to the sauvegarde procedure, however, the court cannot convert the procedure into another 
procedure such as liquidation or judicial reorganisation; failure to adopt a plan brings the process to an 
end. 
In Spain, non-voting and dissenting creditors can contest the refinancing plan before the judge invoking 
that the plan imposes a “disproportionate sacrifice” on them. In the case of extra-judicial payment 
compositions, non-voting and dissenting creditors can invoke before the judge the disproportionate 
nature of the measure 
In England and Wales, the CVA requires the nominee to assess whether the plan has a reasonable 
prospect of success. If the plan is challenged under IA 1986 s 4A(3), the court can decide to order a 
decision of the company meeting to have effect instead of the decision at the creditors’ meeting.233 The 
requirements/conditions for approval of a Scheme of Arrangement have already been outlined above, 
however, technically, a court could refuse to sanction a Scheme  even if the preconditions have been 
met (statutory requirements, meetings and majority approvals, and that sufficient information was 
available to inform the vote), and will do so if it is not satisfied that the Scheme is fair to creditors 
generally,234 and particularly that the majority has not taken advantage of its position.235  
 Summary of Implementation Requirements  
Given the foregoing description of the contributing jurisdictions, it can be tentatively concluded that all 
Member States will need to amend their legislation in some shape or form in order to comply with the 
PRD. Ireland will likely need to codify the best-interests-of-creditors test, in order to ensure compliance 
with article 10(2)(d) and to articulate the relationship between this test and the unfair prejudice 
criterion236 in the Irish legislation and case law. Furthermore, the legislature may wish to make it explicit 
that the prospect of survival of the company is a ground for court refusal of the plan, although the courts 
have always considered it to be a criterion for confirmation. Romania may need to consider the 
introduction of the prospect of success of the plan as a mandatory condition for confirmation. The 
situation seems similar for Denmark, Germany and Austria. Italy will likely need to make two 
modifications to its legislation. First, a provision will need to be introduced to mandate a judicial 
assessment on compliance with the requirements set forth under article 10(2)(e) PRD regarding new 
financing (no unfair prejudice to the interests of creditors). Secondly, Italy may need to refine the 
conditions for confirmation in CCI article 48, para 3, which appear to be more stringent than those set 
forth in the PRD requiring positive verification of economic feasibility, instead of refusal to confirm “a 
restructuring plan where that plan would not have a reasonable prospect of preventing the insolvency of 
the debtor or ensuring the viability of the business”. This is in contrast with the underlying goal of 
reducing the judicial role in the context of preventive restructuring. Spanish law allows for non-voting 
and dissenting creditors to contest the plan, although there does not appear to be a specific ‘best-interest-
of-creditors’ test, which Spain may need to implement. In France, the best-interest-of-creditors test 
criterion may be an area of concern; although under the law, courts currently have to verify that the 
interests of all creditors are sufficiently protected. It has been argued that the best interest-of-creditors 
 
228 Translated from “une possibilité sérieuse pour l’entreprise d’être sauvegardée”; Commercial Code, art L626-1. 
229 This article uses the wording “[i]n the judgment sanctioning or amending the plan…” 
230 Commercial Code, art L622-10; the relevant parties are the debtor, the administrator, the creditors’ representative, the supervising creditors, 
the workers’ representatives and the Public Prosecutor. For the legal provisions regarding the liquidation judiciaire, see Commercial Code, 
arts L640-1 et seq. and for legal provisions regarding the redressement judiciaire, see arts L631-1 et seq. 
231 Commercial Code, art L622-27.  
232 Commercial Code, art L628-8. 
233 Insolvency Act 1986, s 4A(6); the court can also make any other order it sees fit.  
234 Kristin Van Zwieten, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 585. 
235 See Re Industrial Equity (Pacific) Ltd [1991] 2 HKLR 614, per Nazareth K 625B.  
236 As described in PRD, art 11. 
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test criteria may be “more challenging for French courts”. 237 For the Netherlands, confirmation of a 
restructuring plan is possible, but not explicitly in situations where the restructuring plan involves new 
financing or loss of more than 25% of the workforce. As such, an amendment to the WHOA may be 
required. Furthermore, as was contended previously, the suspension of payment framework is only 
partially in line with article 9 of the Directive; the knock-on effect is that it may not be completely in 
line with article 10, as appears to be the case with a number of the jurisdictions.238 It seems clear that 
the current law in England and Wales does not comply with the Directive. However, the planned 
preventive restructuring procedure from the Government appears likely to grant the court absolute 
discretion to confirm or reject a restructuring plan.239 
7.5 Cross-Class Cram-Down (Article 11) 
The cross-class cram-down is a particularly controversial concept in preventive restructuring in the 
European Union, with few jurisdictions having anything that resembles it in their current frameworks. 
This has been, however, a focus of the Commission since the 2014 Recommendation. It has evolved 
through the various iterations of the PRD and is now a complex provision with numerous derogations. 
The cross-class cram-down, by its very nature, reduces the power of creditors in their ability to enforce 
their rights under the contracts agreed with the debtor, although insolvency procedures do this as a 
matter of course due to their collective nature. The cross-class cram-down, however, goes a step further 
by forcing a whole class of creditors to abide by a plan, which they have rejected, once it is approved 
by other classes. That said, without a cross-class cram-down, it may be difficult rescue some businesses, 
leaving liquidation as the only other alternative. It is unsurprising therefore, that this particular provision 
attracted significant debate;240 in particular, the test which should be applied to guarantee the fairness 
of a restructuring plan binding dissenting creditors was a matter of debate. 241 This diversity of opinions 
is evident when one considers the changes made to article 11 by the Council, which appeared to favour 
a “relative priority rule (RPR)”.242  Given the different formulations permitted under the PRD, there is 
a possibility that the potentially diverse treatment of creditors may make it difficult to come to an 
agreement on a plan if one jurisdiction favours more powerful creditors by applying an APR.  
 The Purpose of Article 11 in the PRD (Question 6) 
The purpose of Question 6 is to determine whether jurisdictions have a cross-class cram-down and how 
they operate. In addition, the Directive offers a number of choices for Member States to use as a test of 
fairness for dissenting creditors, which if implemented in different ways among the Member States may 
lead to differential treatment of creditors across borders. Question 6 of the Questionnaire focusses on 
several aspects of the cross-class cram-down; namely if the jurisdiction has cross-class cram-down, how 
the jurisdiction deals with dissenting classes (APR, RPR, hybrid) and  finally, whether the jurisdiction 
applies an “unfair prejudice test” and if not, how it assesses the fairness of a plan.  
Article 11, while referring to parts of articles 9 and 10, primarily provides a mechanism for a cross-class 
cram-down in preventive restructuring frameworks. The wording of article 11(1) is obligatory: 
“Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which has not been approved by affected parties… 
may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority…” if certain criteria are met. In effect, this 
binds an entire class of creditors against their vote. The justifications for this rule, as well as arguments 
against, were discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. In short, this is a controversial provision which was 
changed at the last minute, ostensibly, to bring it in line with the Chapter 11 cross-class cram-down.243 
 
237 Commercial Code, art L626-31 pertains to protection of creditors’ interests. Droege Gagnier and Dorst argue that it may be “more 
challenging for French courts [as they] suppose a concrete simulation and calculation of the business: (1) in an ongoing concern scenario; and 
(2) in an isolated asset disposal, whatever is more favourable while taking into consideration the complex ranking of each dissenting creditor. 
Such an exercise means, in practice, that the debtor should provide the court with a report established by an accounting expert and will add a 
challenge in terms of costs and timing; Gagnier & Dorst (n 139) 26. 
238 In the Netherlands, the debtor can propose a restructuring plan and the voting on the plan will be done before the supervisory judge (or if 
none is appointed, before the court) per the Dutch BA, arts 214(3) and 252. If the plan is adopted, the supervisory judge (or court) will set the 
date for a hearing by the court to decide on the confirmation of the restructuring plan per Dutch BA, arts 269b and 270. In this way, the 
adoption of the restructuring plan is verified, although no ex officio examination takes place of the creditor’s rights or the formation of classes. 
239 Government Response (n 60) 70. There will also be a right to appeal following court confirmation. 
240 See Chapter 5. 
241 The Absolute Priority Rule (“APR”), Relative Priority Rule (“RPR”), and Unfair Prejudice Test. 
242 PRD, art 11(1)(c) provides that dissenting voting classes should be treated at least as favourably as any class of the same rank and more 
favourably than any junior class. 
243 There are certainly arguments that the approach of the PRD is not as close to the American version as it sets out to be.  
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Regardless, given the wide scope of implementation prospects for Member States, this provision may 
make harmonisation difficult and furthermore be an obstacle to cooperation if different jurisdictions 
provide varying levels of protection for those dissenting classes of creditors. Aspects of court 
cooperation will be discussed further in JCOERE Report 2.  
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Existence of a Cross-Class Cram-Down (Article 11(1)(a-
b))244 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 6.1 
Article 11(1)(a-b) provides for the application of a cross-class cram-down in the adoption of 
restructuring plans:  
“Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties as 
provided for in Article 9(4) in every voting class, may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative 
authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with the debtor's agreement, and become binding upon 
dissenting voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils” certain conditions Articles 10(2) and 
(3). 
a. What is the current position regarding a cross-class cram-down for the approval of 
restructuring plans in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or 
rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they compare with the terms of the 
Directive, specifically Art 11(1)(a-b). 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the Directive? If so please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions in light of the enactment of 
Article 11(1)(a-b) of the Directive. 
Irish law provides for a cross-class cram-down in terms that closely align with the PRD in that court 
confirmed proposals will be binding on all classes of creditors.245 As outlined previously, Irish 
legislation broadly complies with articles 10(2) & 10(3) and also mandates that a plan cannot be 
confirmed unless at least one impaired class of creditors has accepted the proposal, which appears to be 
in line with article 11(1)(b).246 There is no cross-class cram-down within the Scheme of Arrangement 
procedure.   
Italy also has a cross-class cram-down mechanism under the judicial composition procedure, where 
such classes are constructed.247 If a majority of the number of classes vote in favour of a plan under the 
judicial composition, then a plan can be confirmed, overcoming the dissent of one or more classes.248 
The Italian provision is considerably more restrictive than the conditions to be satisfied under 11(b) in 
the PRD (and thus in contrast with the PRD),249 in that, besides a majority of the number of classes, the 
majority by value of the claims must be reached. If the debtor opts not to form classes, then “only” a 
majority in value of the total amounts of claims needs to be reached. A dissenting creditor, either within 
a dissenting class or holding 20% of the total amount of voting claims, can object to the cross-class cram 
 
244 PRD, art 11(1):  
“Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties, as provided for in art 9(6), in every voting 
class, may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with the debtor's agreement, and become 
binding upon dissenting voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils at least the following conditions:  
(a) it complies with art 10(2) and (3);  
(b) it has been approved by:  
(i) a majority of the voting classes of affected parties, provided that at least one of those classes is a secured creditors class or is senior to 
the ordinary unsecured creditors class; or, failing that,  
(ii) at least one of the voting classes of affected parties or where so provided under national law, impaired parties, other than an equity-
holders class or any other class which, upon a valuation of the debtor as a going concern, would not receive any payment or keep any 
interest, or, where so provided under national law, which could be reasonably presumed not to receive any payment or keep any interest, 
if the normal ranking of liquidation priorities were applied under national law;” 
245 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(7). As outlined, court confirmation is dependent upon the proposals being adjudged as fair and equitable 
to any affected class of creditors (or members) that has rejected the plan and that the plan is not unfairly prejudicial to any interested party per 
the Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(4)(b). 
246 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(4). 
247 This is currently optional but is customary. 
248 CCI, art 109. 
249 Andrea Zorzi, ‘The Italian Insolvency Law Reform’ (2019) 
 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492422&download=yes> accessed 12 December 2017,  33-34 .  
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down - and consequently the court confirmation - on the grounds that the plan fails to satisfy the ‘best 
interest of creditors test’. Interestingly, the plan can be confirmed without the agreement of the debtor, 
which appears to be contrary to the PRD, with the sone exception of procedures involving non-SMEs.250  
In the Netherlands, neither the out-of-court composition, nor the suspension of payment, has a cross-
class cram-down. However, the WHOA will introduce the relevant provisions and implement the 
criteria of article 11(1)(b).251 The WHOA also provides for the circumstances in which a court should 
reject a plan; these primarily relate to issues of fairness in the treatment of creditors under the plan, with 
a clear connection to the importance of preserving priority of entitlements. Without specifying the APR 
by name, the new Dutch act is enshrining it in their legislation.252  However, there are provisions for 
deviation described below.   
The Polish Restructuring law contains a provision similar, but not as detailed, to the cross-class cram-
down Directive rules already covered above. There is, however, no specific provision addressing the 
need for particular judicial confirmation of a cross-class cram-down other than the principle that a court 
generally approves an arrangement and will not confirm it in defined situations, including a situation 
when it breaches the law.253 A court cannot confirm an arrangement plan that has not been accepted 
in the first place by an assembly of creditors.254  
The German jurisdiction has a cross-class cram-down in its regular insolvency procedures. If a class of 
creditors rejects a plan under the restructuring route, the class may still be bound if a majority of classes 
accepted the plan and the requisite tests are met. Appeals against a court order confirming a plan stay 
its implementation unless the court of appeals orders the plan to become effective.  
As previously articulated, in Romania, creditors are not organised into classes, instead the preventive 
restructuring procedure relies on a majority of 75% by claim value to confirm a plan; accordingly, a 
cross-class cram-down is not possible.255 Similarly, as Denmark does not have creditor classes, the 
foundation for a cross-class cram-down does not yet exist.  
Spain does not currently employ a cross-class cram-down in either its refinancing agreements or its 
extra-judicial payment compositions. These two procedures allow simply for a majority rule based on a 
range of circumstances that affect the percentages of majority by value applied along with judicial or 
administrative approval.  These can bind dissenting creditors within a class, including secured creditors.  
Neither Austria nor the UK currently has an explicit statutory cross-class cram-down mechanism. 
However, the UK the courts have approved Schemes where votes have not been given to “out-of-the-
money” creditors.256 Similarly, France has no cross-class cram down in any of its preventive 
restructuring procedures. It is likely, however, that the Loi Pacte of May 2019, referenced in previous 
sections, will be utilised to introduce the cross-class cram-down (article 196(2)).257   
 Summary of Implementation Requirements 
Based on the responses of our JCOERE contributors and other commentaries, it is believed that the 
following represents the next steps for Member States. Ireland currently provides for a cross-class cram-
down similar to the PRD. Poland will need to introduce judicial confirmation of plans, which do not 
have the approval of all classes after expanding the conditions during which a cross class cram down 
can take place.  At present, dissenting classes can be overruled following a rule covered by law, and 
then court confirmation is required as is in the case of any arrangement plan. The amendments to Dutch 
law contained in the WHOA will satisfy the conditions laid down in article 11, so the Netherlands will 
have no need to further amend its law. It is questionable if Italy will need to amend its position to come 
into line with the PRD. On the one hand, requiring approval of the majority of voting claims, which is 
not provided for in the Directive and which  operates jointly with the other requirements relating to the 
 
250 CCI, art 48; the wording of the PRD is “upon the proposal of a debtor or with the debtor’s agreement” with the derogation that Member 
States may limit the requirement to have the debtor’s agreement to only SMEs.  
251 WHOA, art 383(1)(2). 
252 WHOA, art 384(4)(a).  
253 RL, art 165(1). 
254 See PRD, recital 54. 
255 Law 85/2014 on preventive insolvency proceedings, art 27(5). 
256 See Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch).  
257 The following arts of the Commercial Code would need to be amended include: arts L626-9, L626-18, L626-30-2, and L626-31. 
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number of classes, in addition to requiring the approval of the majority of classes, could be unduly 
restrictive when compared with the Directive. On the other hand, since article 11(1) sets a list of 
minimum conditions for the confirmation via cross-class cram-down, there may be no impediment to 
having a more restrictive structure. As was the case with previous articles, it is likely that Germany will 
adapt the current cram-down provisions in their InsO insolvency plan to meet the needs of the new 
restructuring framework, thereby implementing the requirements of the PRD. Romania and Denmark 
will need to make extensive changes to comply with the Directive, owing to the fact that they do not 
have creditor classification The Spanish and Polish legislature will need to make changes to include 
other classes of creditors and to ensure that the cross-class cram-down is available against specific types 
of classes of dissenting  creditors. France, Austria and the UK will have to introduce provisions to align 
with article 11. In England & Wales, the UK Government proposal on a new restructuring plan refers 
to the introduction of a cross-class cram-down. The proposal currently recommends that dissenting 
classes of creditors in this new procedure, most importantly those who are out-of-the-money, may be 
bound to an arrangement that is in the best interests of all stakeholders.258 This is the most likely 
approach for it, assuming the UK needs to adopt the PRD at all. 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Dissenting Creditors and Conditions for Approval (Article 
11(1)(c)259 and 11(2)260 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 6.2:  
Article 11 offers options for dealing with affected and dissenting classes of creditors in a cross-class 
cram-down. Under Art 11(1)(c), one of the conditions for approval by a judicial or administrative 
authority of a cross-class cram-down is if the plan: 
“…ensures that dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at least as favourably as any 
other class of the same rank and more favourably than any junior class.”  
A derogation from this condition is also offered in 11(2):  
“By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 1, Member States may provide that the claims of 
affected creditors in a dissenting voting class are satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means 
where a more junior class is to receive any payment or keep any interest under the restructuring plan.” 
a. If your jurisdiction provides for a cross-clam down, how does it treat dissenting classes of 
creditors? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of 
these provisions and how they compare with the terms of the Directive, in particular 11(1)(c) 
and 11(2). 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the treatment of classes of 
creditors in the cross-class cram-down? If so, please describe any currently suggested 
changes to your provisions considering the enactment of Article 11(1)(c) and 11(2) of the 
Directive. 
In view of the derogations available to Member States in article 11, it is unlikely that jurisdictions will 
have to make substantial changes based on article 11(1)(c) alone. Instead, it is more likely that 
amendments will be required by virtue of the complete absence of a cross-class cram-down mechanism, 
as above, or because the jurisdiction is neither in line with article 11(1)(c) nor either of the derogations. 
 
258 Government Response (n 60) 69. 
259 PRD, art 11(1)(c) otherwise known as a “relative priority rule”:  
“(1) Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties, as provided for in art 9(6), in every 
voting class, may be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with the debtor's agreement, and 
become binding upon dissenting voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils at least the following conditions:  
(a)… 
(b)… 
(c) it ensures that dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at least as favourably as any other class of the same rank and 
more favourably than any junior class;” 
260 PRD, art 11(2) commonly referred to as an “absolute priority rule”:  
“(2) By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 1, Member States may provide that the claims of affected creditors in a dissenting 
voting class are satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means where a more junior class is to receive any payment or keep any interest 
under the restructuring plan.” 
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Accordingly, the summary of implementation requirements which usually follows each question will 
be combined for questions 6.2 (section 7.5.4) and 6.3 (section 7.5.5). 
In Ireland, the conditions for approval of the cram-down of dissenting creditors does not refer to either 
an absolute or relative priority rule. There is, however, a requirement for the proposal to be “fair and 
equitable” to dissenting classes of creditors.261 Aspects of Irish law do appear to vary from the provisions 
in the Directive. However, there is a derogation available to Member States as described below.  
While Romania does not currently require classes for preventive restructuring and consequently no 
underpinning foundation for a cross-class cram-down, it has adopted conditions for confirmation of a 
plan that could be considered in line with article 11(1)(c) and / or 11(2). There are conditions for 
cramming down creditors in a reorganisation procedure and dissenting creditors can object to the syndic 
judge if these conditions are not satisfied. Similar to the wording in Irish law, though not in application, 
dissenting categories of creditors must be given “fair and equitable treatment” under the plan.262 Fair 
and equitable treatment is present if certain conditions are met simultaneously: (a) no dissenting creditor 
receives less than they would have received in a liquidation; (b) no creditor receives more than the total 
amount of their claim; (c) no creditor with a lower ranking than the dissenting creditor receives more 
than it would receive in liquidation and the plan provides the same treatment for each claim within a 
distinct category, unless the holder of a claim consents to a less favourable treatment for its claim.263  
The Italian jurisdiction has a presumed APR, in that a plan is not permitted to alter the normal ranking 
of priorities. That said, it has often been deemed as admissible to leave some value to the shareholders 
notwithstanding the fact that creditors have not been paid in full, which seems fundamentally contrary 
to the APR.264 It could be said that the Italian jurisdiction has adopted a hybrid RPR and APR system, 
as in order to ensure the success of restructuring plans, shareholders are incentivised. Recent reforms 
have mandated regard for equity holders when devising a restructuring plan that envisages the 
continuation of the business with the same entrepreneur.265 It is still unclear, however, if APR applies 
with respect to restructuring value; if so, it also unclear if it applies solely to creditors or includes equity 
holders. When the plan provides for the direct continuation of the business, the most recent trend in case 
law seems to be to distinguish between the value of the estate and the proceeds generated by the direct 
continuation of the business. While the value of the estate should be distributed amongst creditors 
according to their ranking, the value of the proceeds generated by the activity may be distributed more 
widely. 266 This appears very similar, in its economic results, to the outcome of the joint application of 
the RPR and best-interest-of-creditors test. Undoubtedly, when the CCI enters into force, it will make 
it easier to allow the allocation of part of the restructuring value to equity holders, contrary to a strict 
interpretation of the APR. However, neither the “old” Italian Insolvency Law, nor the “new” CCI spell 
out any criteria to distribute among creditors and shareholders the value of the proceeds generated by 
the direct continuation of the business. In this respect, while the lack of clarity within the Italian 
framework needs to be addressed, the judicial composition seems to be compatible with the derogation 
and discretion within article 11(1)(c). Functionally, however, the rule currently being applied in Italy 
does not adequately reflect the APR as set out in the PRD, as it allows for the allocation of value to 
shareholders before all other senior classes have been fully paid.267  
The Dutch WHOA has wholly adopted the concept of absolute priority in its preventive restructuring 
framework. This has been incorporated – with a caveat for deviations – through one of the grounds 
under which the court can refuse to confirm a plan, if: 
“ At the request of one or more creditors or shareholders eligible to vote, who did not themselves 
approve the restructuring plan and were allocated in a class which did not approve the 
restructuring plan or whose admittance to the vote was wrongfully refused and who should have 
 
261 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(4)(b)(i). 
262 Law 85/2015, art 139(1)(D). 
263 Law 85/2014, art 139(2). The ranking of claims / statutory order of priority is set out in art 138(3) of the Law 85/2014. 
264 Court of Milan, Insolvency Section, 3rd November 2016. 
265 CCI, art 84 para 2. 
266 Most recently, Court of Appeal of Venice, 27 June 2019. 
267 While this allocation of value to equity holders does not adhere strictly to the APR in art 11(2), this treatment of equity holders is not 
necessarily contrary to the PRD as recital 57 states “Member States that exclude equity holders from voting should not be required to apply 
the absolute priority rule in the relationship between creditors and equity holders.” 
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been allocated in a class which did not approve the restructuring plan, the court will refuse a 
request for court confirmation of a restructuring plan which was not approved by all classes, or if  
(a) the distribution of the value realised with the restructuring plan deviates from the ranking in 
the case of recourse against the debtor's assets in accordance with Title 10 of Book 3 of the Civil 
Code; another law; or a set of rules or agreements based thereon, to the detriment of the class that 
did not approve unless there are reasonable grounds for such deviation and the creditors or 
shareholders concerned are not harmed in their interests as a result; (…).”268  
Thus, the proposed WHOA already complies with one of the tests offered for plan confirmation with a 
cross-class cram-down. 
The Polish test focuses on dissenting creditors satisfied by an arrangement on terms not less favourable 
than in bankruptcy proceedings (i.e. liquidation insolvency). There are no sophisticated tests in the 
Polish Restructuring law such as those in the Directive - the RPR in 11(1)(c) or the APR derogation 
in 11(2). Since the above provisions set a certain minimum, it seems that the RL will need to be 
amended. 
As Spain does not currently provide for a cross-class cram-down in its legislation, the fairness of 
impairing the rights of dissenting creditors is not considered, although the current majority rule 
provisions do allow the court to consider whether a plan imposes a disproportionate sacrifice to 
dissenting or non-voting creditors. It is not yet clear what test the Spanish legislator will adopt when it 
comes to implement the PRD.  
In France, the Loi Pacte provides that the ordinance which will be passed to implement the Directive 
must merely take into account subordination agreements, which is vaguer than the rules in the PRD, 
namely APR, RPR and unfair prejudice test. At present it is unclear what approach will be favoured in 
France. On the one hand, given the emphasis on priorities in the insolvency law, APR could be logical. 
With that said, the French approach, by its very nature, requires some degree of flexibility; accordingly, 
avoiding a strict priority rule would also be logical.  
Germany adopted a strict adherence to the APR and the best-interests-of-creditors test to test the veto 
of a class when reforming its insolvency law in 1999. It also requires a majority of classes to support a 
plan. As noted by the German contributor, it does, however, remain unclear which of the rules – APR 
or RPR – Germany will adopt for preventive restructuring.  
As discussed previously, Denmark does not currently have any framework which resembles cross-class 
cram-down, therefore it does not have ARP or RPR. 
The current proposal from the UK aligns with the APR. The suggested approach as described by the 
Government is based on the expressed notion that strong creditor protections are essential to create the 
right conditions for business. As such, the safeguarding of creditor interests through respect for and 
application of the ordinary order of priority in liquidation and administration, is considered desirable. 
Interestingly, however, the court will be empowered to confirm a restructuring plan at odds with the 
APR where the non-compliance is (1) necessary to achieve the restructuring; and (2) just and equitable 
in the circumstances.269  
The Government Response notes that the two-stage test creates a high threshold to permit deviation 
from the APR and that the basic principle remains that absolute priority will be followed in most cases.270 
However, as with jurisdictions with robust restructuring processes, the APR may simply be a starting 
point in some cases. 
 Jurisdictional Contributions: Question 6.3 – Unfair Prejudice Test (Article 11(2) para 
2)271 
 
268 WHOA, art 384(4)(a). 
269 Government Response (n 60) 71-72.  
270 idem 72. 
271 PRD, art 11(2) paragraph 2, often referred to as the “unfair prejudice test”:  
“Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first subparagraph where they are necessary in order to achieve 
the aims of the restructuring plan and where the restructuring plan does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties.” 
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JCOERE Questionnaire Question 6.3:  
Article 11 goes on to provide the following regarding an ‘unfair prejudice’ test.  
“Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first subparagraph where 
they are necessary in order to achieve the aims of the restructuring plan and where the restructuring 
plan does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties.” 
a. If your jurisdiction provides for a cross-clam down, does it apply a similar test in the current 
state of your jurisdiction’s legal framework? If not, is there a different approach adopted by 
your jurisdiction in the context of the cross-class cram-down? Please specify relevant 
legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they 
compare with the terms of the Directive, in particular this derogation at the end of Article 
11. 
b. Is your jurisdiction likely to avail of this ‘unfair prejudice’ test derogation? If so, please 
describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 11 of the Directive. 
The final paragraph of Article 11 offers a further derogation from what has been termed the Relative 
Priority Rule in Article 11(1)(c) and its primary derogation to the Absolute Priority Rule in Article 
11(2). This paragraph introduces criteria in which a dissenting class of creditors must not be unfairly 
prejudiced by the restructuring plan.  
Ireland contains a provision similar to this derogation in that the test for the court when confirming a 
plan is that it is not “unfairly prejudicial to the interests of any interested party”.272 This obligation is 
borne by the examiner, in other words, it is the responsibility of the examiner to defend the scheme and 
prove it is not unfairly prejudicial. In assessing this criterion, the court will consider the effect of the 
proposal and of alternatives on that class. The court balances the outcome of the process for these classes 
against the overall goal of the process and the long-term benefits of the continuation of trade of the 
debtor. As such, there may be circumstances where a dissenting creditor could have done better under 
liquidation, but the proposal will still be considered “fair and equitable”.273 This concept has been well-
developed through the courts in Ireland, which have used this test to prevent large and secured creditors 
from acting solely in their own best interests to the detriment of the collective of creditors and other 
stakeholders.274 As such, the Irish unfair prejudice test appears to be in line with the final derogation in 
article 11 as it automatically forms part of every court confirmation.275 
The Italian framework does not explicitly provide for an “unfair prejudice test”, nor is it likely to in the 
future. It does, however, refer to the insolvency liquidation procedure as a “comparator scenario” for 
the application of the best-interests-of-creditors test.276 This does not appear to reflect the Directive, 
which includes equity holders in the test criteria.277  
The current French sauvegarde procedure provides a mechanism through which fairness is ensured by 
assessing whether the interests of creditors are protected, so French law does have some characteristics 
that could be adapted to comply with the implementation of the Directive with regards to the treatment 
of dissenting classes of creditors.  
German insolvency procedures currently adhere to APR in its insolvency procedures, but it is not yet 
clear if they will adapt an unfair prejudice test when they come to create their restructuring framework.  
A number of Member States do not have, nor are likely to avail of the “unfair prejudice test” derogation. 
As discussed, the Netherlands already has a clear connection to the APR in their new WHOA, so an 
 
272 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 541(4)(b)(ii). 
273 As discussed in section 7.4.4, Ireland appears to have a “best-interests-of-creditors test" in line with recital 49. 
274 See Re McInerney Homes Ltd and Ors [2011] IESC 31 and Re Mount Wolseley Hotel Golf & Country Club & Ors & Companies Acts 
[2014] IEHC 24. 
275 The common law test of fairness, which applies to the Scheme of Arrangement in England & Wales, may also be relevant to the Irish 
situation. See the later paragraph in this section where unfair prejudice in England & Wales is discussed. 
276 CCI, art 112, para 1. 
277 See the ‘next best alternative’ scenario as set out in the PRD, recital 49 and art 2 para 1(6) (although this latter provision only makes 
reference to creditors, there are several elements in the PRD signalling that the best interest of creditors test applies also to equity holders).  
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unfair prejudice test is unnecessary to comply with the PRD. Poland, Austria and Romania do not 
currently envisage the adoption of this test and it is not yet clear what direction Spain will take. 
In England and Wales, while there is currently no statutory cross-class cram-down, both the CVA and 
the Scheme have mechanisms through which fairness is assessed by reference to unfair prejudice as 
derived from statute278 and the common law. Case law in England and Wales has had to deal with 
questions of unfairness, particularly in relation to the CVA given that the voting takes place among the 
whole collective of creditors without separation into classes, which has led certain creditor groups to 
pursue their own interests in a contentious manner.279 The Scheme has built in protections against such 
actions by separating creditors into classes whose interests align and requiring a 75% voting 
threshold.280 However, the Court will still assess the fairness of a Scheme. The meaning of ‘fairness’ in 
the context of the Scheme has a very similar meaning to ‘fairness’ when considering claims that a CVA 
is ‘unfairly prejudicial’, so reference may be made to case law surrounding fairness of a CVA when 
considering the same for a Scheme.281 So, the English framework already contains concepts, largely 
defined in case law, that align with the unfair prejudice test in the PRD. Regarding the potential cross-
class cram-down in the new restructuring plan, given its modelling on the current Scheme of 
Arrangement, it is likely that the new framework will contain the same test. 
 Summary of Implementation Requirements for Questions 6.2 and 6.3  
From discussions with the respondents to the questionnaire, the following appears to be the state of play 
in the various jurisdictions. Ireland appears to have no need to amend its position, as its legislation 
appears to be in line with the second derogation in article 11(2) i.e. the unfair prejudice test. The same 
can be said for the Netherlands, where the WHOA will be in line with first derogation in article 11(2), 
i.e. the APR. The remaining jurisdictions require amendments to align with the PRD. Italy, although 
usually considered to adhere to APR, has certain features which are in line with RPR; as such, this 
vagueness or uncertainty within the law will likely need to be addressed by the legislature in order to be 
assured that it complies with the PRD. The remaining jurisdictions need to choose which approach they 
will take to legislating for the introduction of the cross-class cram-down.282 For example, assuming 
Romanian law maps its conditions for confirmation of a restructuring plan to a cross-class cram-down, 
it should reflect a species of the RPR in line with article 11(1)(c).283 Germany, Austria, Poland, France, 
Denmark, Spain, England & Wales are all in a similar position in that their legislatures will have to 
choose which system to utilise when legislating for the cross-class cram-down. 
7.6 Protection of New and Interim Financing 
 The Purpose of Article 17 in the PRD (Question 8) 
Arguably, the protection of new and interim financing is a particularly contentious issue across Member 
States.  For a restructuring plan to be successful, however, it often requires a new injection of money or 
at least some input of funds while the plan is under negotiation and being implemented. In order for 
lenders to engage in lending at a time of a company’s financial difficulty, some kind of incentive is 
needed. As noted in the PRD: 
“The success of a restructuring plan often depends on whether financial assistance is extended to 
the debtor to support, firstly, the operation of the business during restructuring negotiations and, 
secondly, the implementation of the restructuring plan after its confirmation. Financial assistance 
should be understood in a broad sense, including the provision of money or third-party guarantees 
and the supply of stock, inventory, raw materials and utilities, for example through granting the 
debtor a longer repayment period. Interim financing and new financing should therefore be 
exempt from avoidance actions which seek to declare such financing void, voidable or 
 
278 The CVA can be challenged under Insolvency Act 1986, s 6 “on grounds of unfair prejudice or material irregularity”.  
279 See IRC v Wimbeldon Football Club Limited [2005] 1 BCLC 365; SISU Capital Find Ltd v Tucker [206] BCC 463; Primacom Holding 
GmbH [2013] BCC 201; Re Greenhaven Motors [1999] 1 BCLC 635; HMRC v Portsmouth City FC [2011] BCC 149; and Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Ltd [2007] BCC 500. 
280 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP 2017) 436-437. 
281 Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) [2002] 1 All ER 96. 
282 The jurisdictions, which do not currently have a cross-class cram-down, are discussed in section 7.5.3. 
283 As Romania already has a starting point that will satisfy the RPR, it is unlikely to adopt the APR or the unfair prejudice test.  
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unenforceable as an act detrimental to the general body of creditors in the context of subsequent 
insolvency procedures.”284 
As a result, article 17 has introduced several options whereby new and interim financing can be 
protected to varying degrees, depending on the choices made in implementation. It should be 
remembered that where there is a provision of financing under a plan, the confirmation of a court should 
also be required, which gives at least some oversight that can balance out the benefits given to lenders 
in these circumstances.285  
The minimum protection required is from any declaration that new and interim financing is void, 
voidable, or unenforceable286 and that grantors should not incur civil, administrative or criminal liability 
on the ground that “such financing is detrimental to the general body of creditors.”287 The PRD goes on 
to offer higher levels of protection, which are optional for implementation. First, Member States can 
limit the protection of article 17(1) to new financing associated with a restructuring plan that has been 
confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority and to interim financing that has been under ex ante 
control.288  The PRD offers an additional limitation where by protection can be excluded if  interim 
financing is granted after the debtor has essentially become insolvent, i.e. unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due.289 Thus, Member States are allowed to restrict the protection for interim financing to only those 
circumstances where there is only a “likelihood of insolvency” and the debtor is still well within this 
pre-insolvency area. The PRD finally provides the option to grant a super-priority to financers who 
provide new and interim financing.290 
The questionnaire targeted mainly article 17(1) and whether there was any protection at all for financiers 
in terms of both its integrity and lenders’ protection from liability for lending to debtors in financial 
difficulty. Additionally, it queried whether there was any priority for lenders who provided such 
financing, in similar form to 17(4). It should be noted that while not all jurisdictions currently provide 
explicit priorities for repayment of new and interim financing, a number of jurisdictions place these 
debts within the remit of expenses of the procedure, which generally are paid before other debts are, 
giving them a notional priority.  
 
7.7 Jurisdictional Contributions: Question 8 – Existence of Protection or Priority for Interim 
Financing (Article 17(1)&(4))291 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 8:  
Article 17 provides that “Member States shall ensure that new financing and interim financing are 
adequately protected.” This includes protecting it from claims that it is detrimental to the general 
body of creditors, but also includes an option to provide a “super-priority” in 17(4).  
a. What is the current position regarding new and interim financing for the approval of 
restructuring plans in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or 
rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they compare with the terms of 
Article 17 of the Directive 
 
284 PRD, recital 66. 
285 PRD, art10(1)(b).  
286 PRD, art 11(1)(a). 
287 PRD, art 11(1)(b).  
288 PRD, art 11(2). 
289 PRD, art 11(3).  
290 PRD, art 11(4).  
291 PRD, art 17(1) & (4):  
“(1) Member States shall ensure that new financing and interim financing are adequately protected. As a minimum, in the case of any 
subsequent insolvency of the debtor:  
(a) new financing and interim financing shall not be declared void, voidable or unenforceable; and  
(b) the grantors of such financing shall not incur civil, administrative or criminal liability, on the ground that such financing is detrimental 
to the general body of creditors, unless other additional grounds laid down by national law are present. 
… 
(4) Member States may provide that grantors of new or interim financing are entitled to receive payment with priority in the context of 
subsequent insolvency procedures in relation to other creditors that would otherwise have superior or equal claims.” 
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b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 17 in the context of 
preventive restructuring? If so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your 
provisions considering the enactment of Article 17 of the Directive. 
In Ireland, new and interim financing appears to be protected by the legislation and the courts - through 
a series of decisions – however, the degree to which this protection for new financing has been availed 
of in more recent times, is questionable. Normally new financing is part of the debt-equity swap 
incorporated in the compromise or restructuring arrangement.292 According to s 554(3), costs “which 
have been sanctioned by … the court shall be paid in full and … before any other claim, secured or 
unsecured, under any compromise or scheme of arrangement or in any receivership or winding up of 
the company”. The legislation makes no specific distinction between new and interim finance, instead 
any costs of the examiner - with prior court approval - are have priority ranking in subsequent 
liquidation. This section is considered to have been “specifically designed to encourage loans” to be 
made to a company, giving “a formal statutory assurance to anyone who lends money to a company 
during the protection period that he will be repaid in full”.293 In Re Atlantic Magnetics the Supreme 
Court took the view that the court sanctioned costs of the examiner, in this case the repayment of money 
borrowed "would clearly rank in priority to any claim of any form or secured creditor”.294 The legislation 
was subsequently amended to rank such sanctioned costs of the examiner “after any claim secured by a 
mortgage, charge, lien or other encumbrance of a fixed nature or a pledge, under any compromise or 
scheme of arrangement or in any receivership or winding up of the company” (s 554(4)).295 The Irish 
Scheme of Arrangement mirrors the Scheme in England and Wales and as such, contains no statutory 
provisions granting preferential treatment to new finance.  
Austrian law provides for limited protection for new and interim financing under the “URG” in the form 
of an exemption from avoidance actions for “Überbrückungsmaßnahmen” – legal actions necessary to 
continue the business – and “Reorganisationsmaßnahmen” – legal actions described in the plan and 
executed during the pending proceedings or 30 days thereafter. “Reorganisationsmaßnahmen” are not 
deemed to be subordinated claims.296 
In Germany, interim finance is commonly repaid before proceedings are terminated in insolvency 
proceedings. New financing under a plan is claw-back-safe, or “good faith provided” and may enjoy a 
privilege in later insolvency proceedings, if provided for in the plan.297  
No specific new finance provisions exist in Danish law. With that said, a financier may provide new 
finance, which can, in principle, be secured with a security right. Where new financing or a security 
agreement is entered into during the restructuring proceeding, with the consent of the restructuring 
administrator, the claim will be privileged.298 It is worth noting, however, that a security or 
financing agreement with the consent of the administrator is not automatically protected from avoidance 
actions. 
French law has provided protection for new and interim financiers, in that such providers will have 
priority over claims of creditors (“privilege de conciliation”) that arose before the date of the opening 
of the conciliation proceedings, if the company is subsequently placed into sauvegarde proceedings.299 
The condition is that the court has sanctioned the agreement through homologation.300 New financers 
cannot have any debt write-off, debt-for-equity swap or debt rescheduling via creditor vote imposed 
 
292 Re Goodman International (28 January 1991), HC, Hamilton P, (1963–1993) Irish Company Law Reports 623. For commentary see Irene 
Lynch Fannon, ‘Saving Jobs-At What Cost? Consideration of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1990’ (Irish Law Times 1994) 208. 
293 Blayney J in Re Don Bluth Entertainment [1994] 3 IR 141, [1994] 2 ILRM 436, 440. 
294 [1993] 2 IR 561, 577. This meant that money, which was alleged to be secured by a fixed charge, could be used by an examiner to obtain a 
loan.  
295 See also Re Don Bluth Entertainment Ltd [1994] 3 IR 141 where the Supreme Court, overturning a High Court decision, ruled that a loan 
had to be repaid in full in the currency in which it was given i.e. American Dollars, as distinct from repaying the Irish Punt equivalent when 
examinership ended, the difference between the two figures being approximately £200,000. According to the Court, to repay anything other 
than the full amount in dollars as of the date of payment would not fulfil the requirements of what was then s 29(3) 3 of the Irish Companies 
Act 1990. 
296 URG, art 20. 
297 InsO, s 264-265. 
298  Danish BA, s 94 
299 Financiers are those who make credit available within the terms of the restructuring agreement for the purposes of ensuring the continuation 
of the company’s business during the conciliation period. “Claims of creditors” refers to claims other than super-priority salary claims and 
court fees and expenses 
300 Commercial Code, art L611-11.  
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upon them.301 The latest reforms have extended the protection to new money made available during the 
negotiation phase (conciliation), which was not the case before 2014. Lenders can now extend credit 
while discussions are on-going, and the privilege will vest once the agreement is confirmed by the court 
(homolgation). The reforms have also strengthened the protection of new money when subsequent 
insolvency proceedings are opened.302 In such situations, new debts cannot be rescheduled by a court-
imposed plan.303 Since the 2016 reforms, a rescheduling and write-off of claims can no longer be 
imposed upon those creditors within a plan, which has been approved by a two-third majority of a 
creditors’ committee.304 This also applies to finance granted in favour of a debtor after the opening of 
an accelerated sauvegarde or a financial accelerated sauvegarde (SFA) if the proceedings are not 
successfully completed by a court-sanctioned plan.    
Italian law protects new and interim financing in both restructuring agreements and judicial composition 
with creditors.305 Specifically, new and interim financing enjoys priority over unsecured creditors in the 
context of subsequent insolvency procedures, it cannot be declared void, voidable or unenforceable and 
the financiers cannot be subject to criminal or civil liability (article 324 CCI).306 Priority in the case of 
subsequent insolvency proceedings will not vest where the debtor knowingly provided false information 
and the financier was aware of this fact.  
There is no special protection in Dutch law for interim finance in the suspension of payment framework; 
accordingly, interim finance provided during the suspension may be subject to transaction avoidance 
actions in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.307 The WHOA, if passed, will not grant super priority 
status to new and interim financing. It will, however, increase protection for interim financing by 
ensuring that it is not considered prejudicial to the general body of creditors, assuming certain conditions 
are satisfied.308 The proposed article 42a of the WHOA aims to prevent application of transaction 
avoidance, which is contained in article 42 of the Dutch BA.309 
The Polish RL preferentially treats financing provided to a debtor covered by restructuring proceedings 
subject to compliance with detailed conditions.310 The preference lies that such financing and other acts 
cannot be subject of a claw back action (treated as ineffective - concept based on actio pauliana) if 
subsequent bankruptcy proceedings are opened after restructuring proceedings and financing granted 
 
301 This is one of the differences between the mandate ad hoc and conciliation; if a conciliation agreement is sanctioned by the court, creditors 
benefit from certain protection in subsequent sauvegarde procedure i.e. against certain clawback actions. For example, if the rescue of the 
debtor fails, the court cannot impose any write-off, debt for equity swap or debt rescheduling through the voting mechanism on the providers 
of new finance.  
302 Either sauvegarde proceedings or judicial reorganisation proceedings (redressement judiciaire). 
303 Commercial Code, art L626-20, as strengthened by art 20 of the Ordinance of 2014. 
304 Commercial Code, art L626-30-2, as amended by art 99 of Law n 2016-1547 of 18 November 2016.  
305 CCI, art 99 para 1 and art 101 para 1. 
306 The conditions are as follows; with respect to interim financing, the debtor has filed a petition for such protections on the grounds of the 
need to ensure the continuation of the business and avoid a significant damage to the value of the estate and the judge has authorized such 
petition. With respect to new financing, the court-confirmed plan provides for such financing.   
307 During the suspension of payment, it is the responsibility of the (existing) financers, the debtor and the insolvency practitioner to decide on 
the payment of such debts. 
308 “A legal act performed after the debtor has filed a statement with the court registry as referred to in Article 370(3), or a plan expert has been 
appointed by the court in accordance with Article 371, may not be annulled on the grounds of the previous article, if the court has granted 
authorisation for that legal act at the request of the debtor.” 
309 As new finance provided under a confirmed restructuring plan is exempt from the paulian action (application of transaction avoidance), the 
amendment does not apply to it. 
310 RL, art 129:  
“1. The following actions taken by the debtor or the administrator shall require authorisation from the creditors’ committee and shall 
otherwise be null and void: 
1) encumbering the arrangement and/or remedial estate by mortgage, pledge, registered pledge and/or maritime mortgage to secure 
claims not covered by the arrangement; 
2) transferring ownership of an asset and/or the right to secure claims not covered by the arrangement; 
3) encumbering the arrangement and/or remedial estate by other rights; 
4) taking out commercial and/or cash loans; 
5) concluding the lease contract for the debtor’s undertaking and/or an organised part thereof and/or other similar contract. 
2. The sale by the debtor of real estate property and/or other assets worth more than PLN 500,000 shall require authorisation from the 
creditors’ committee and shall otherwise be null and void. 
3. The creditors’ committee may grant authorisation to conclude a commercial loan agreement and/or cash loan agreement and/or establish 
security interest referred to in section 1 subsections 1-3 when it is necessary to preserve its ability to pay the current restructuring costs 
and fulfil other obligations arising after opening of the restructuring proceedings and/or to conclude and perform the arrangement, and it 
has been guaranteed that the funds will be transferred to the debtor and used in the manner prescribed by the creditors’ committee resolution 
and the established security interest is adequate to the granted commercial and/or cash loan. 
4. The actions referred to in section 1 performed with the consent of the creditors’ committee shall not be regarded as ineffective in relation 
to the bankruptcy estate.” 
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under a facility, loan, security, guarantee, letter of credit or any other type of financing under an 
arrangement is ranked in the first category of satisfaction of claims in case of subsequent bankruptcy 
proceedings.311 The application of such preference is subject to compliance with conditions set by the 
RL (inter alia filing of a simplified motion to open bankruptcy proceedings within three months from 
the date when a ruling on setting aside of the arrangement plan has become final).  
Romanian law provides protection for new financing in the context of pre-insolvency proceedings. In 
the mandate ad-hoc, the arrangement agreed with the creditors in the course of out-of-court negotiations 
will not be voided by the court or declared fraudulent, provided that it was made in good faith i.e. (i) 
was likely to result in the financial recovery of the debtor and (ii) was not intended to prejudice some 
creditors.312 The ad-hoc agent is entitled to propose a wide range of debt restructuring measures to 
creditors and the ad-hoc agreement contains the privileges and guarantees accompanying the debts.313 
In order to safeguard the debtor's business, however, the ad-hoc agent can propose limiting the effect of 
these guarantees and privileges in favour of essential lenders for restructuring.314 In the Preventive 
Concordat, patrimonial - i.e. civil - liability of the directors and other interested parties cannot be 
incurred if good faith conditions are met.315 The draft of the Preventive Concordat must include a 
recovery plan, which specifies the means by which the debtor will successfully restructure.316 If new 
funds are to be granted during the concordat term, the priority of these amounts upon distribution, after 
payment of the procedural expenses, shall be specified. Interim financing is not regulated in pre-
insolvency proceedings, however, is it not forbidden either.  
In Spain, refinancing agreements that include the extension of available credit or the amendment or 
extinction of its obligations, cannot be revoked as long as the terms of the agreement respond to a 
feasibility plan that permits the continuity of employment or of the business in the short or the medium 
term, thus protecting additional financing under such plans.317 In addition,  in those refinancing 
agreements in which it is foreseen to resort to resources generated by the total or partial continuation of 
the business, the proposal shall also be accompanied by a feasibility plan that specifies what those 
necessary resources are, the means and conditions of obtaining them, and any commitments to these 
provided by third parties. The claims granted to the insolvent debtor to finance the feasibility plan shall 
be settled under the terms established under the agreement.318 Thus, the provision of additional finance 
is at least protected from being challenged in the event that it is included in a restructuring plan. The 
Spanish system therefore provides certainty for lenders who may choose to lend under a restructuring 
plan and as the super priority aspect of article 17(4) is optional, this appears to satisfy the provision of 
adequate protection under the PRD. 
Priority is granted under Spanish Insolvency Act for new financing foreseen in refinancing agreements: 
50% of the value of the new financing will be considered as administrative expenses in subsequent 
insolvency proceedings (article 84) and the rest of the value can benefit of a general priority (article 91). 
England and Wales do not have priority for new and interim finance within either the Scheme of 
Arrangement or the CVA. There is, however, a framework which prioritises rescue financing by giving 
it statutory protection and construing it as an expense of administration, however, this is specific to 
administration procedures.  
 
311 RL, art 342. 
312 Law no 85/2014, art 117(3).  
313 These include debt relief, rescheduling or partial reductions, the continuation or termination of ongoing contracts, personnel redundancy or 
an abstention by the creditor from improving its position vis-à-vis other creditors through guarantees or preferential treatment as well as any 
other actions it may deem necessary per art 13(3). 
314 Examples of such limitations could include limiting the right of creditors to pursue, preference, interest and penalties. 
315 The good faith conditions are that in the month before payment were ceased, the payments were made in good faith under an arrangement 
with the creditors, concluded pursuant to out of the court negotiations for debt restructuring, provided that such arrangement was likely to lead 
to financial recovery of the debtor and was not intended to prejudice and/or discriminate some creditors.  
Patrimonial liability is explained in the terminology Chapter 2 section 2.11. 
316 Law no 85/2014, art 24 (2); the plan must specific:  
“…[t]he actions by which the debtor [will] overcome the financial difficulty, such as: increase in the share capital, debt to equity swap, 
taking a bank loan, bond or similar borrowing, including shareholder loans, creation or termination of branches or operating units, sale of 
assets, creating causes of privilege; if new funds are to be granted during the concordat term, the priority of these amounts upon 
distribution, after payment of the procedural expenses shall be specified”.  
317 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 71 bis. 
318 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, art 100(5). 
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 Summary of Implementation Requirements  
Countries including Ireland, Italy, Spain, Romania, Poland and the Netherlands are not likely to have to 
make (further) changes to comply with the PRD. The government response to the Insolvency and 
Corporate Governance Consultation from the United Kingdom recognised the necessity for formally 
giving priority to interim and new financing, however, their plan was dropped following on from 
negative feedback during the consultation process. As such, England and Wales will likely need to 
introduce a provision to comply with the Directive. Germany and Austria may also need to introduce 
frameworks to provide protection for new and interim finance. Denmark may need to introduce 
protection from avoidance actions for new financiers, assuming it implements a similar system to its 
current insolvency restructuring. Because interim financing is not specifically referred to in article 
L611-11 of the Commercial Code, France may decide to include it in the Ordinance, thereby amending 
its legislation. 
7.8 Workers (Article 13)319 
The normal labour and employment law rules will continue to apply to employees affected by preventive 
restructuring procedures as they stand alongside the PRD. These include 5 EU social Directives 
specifically referred to in article 13 of the PRD that relate to employees affected by employer insolvency 
and the actions that might be taken by a company in financial distress that impact on employee rights 
and entitlements. The Acquired Rights Directive320 requires the automatic transfer of employment 
contracts upon the  transfer of a going concern or part of a going concern, even if that business transfer 
to a new owner occurs out of what are deemed liquidation procedure as long as the business of the 
undertaking is continuing as an independent economic entity.321 The Collective Redundancies 
Directive322 sets out participation and consultation obligations if a certain number of employees are at 
put at risk of redundancy. The Employers in Insolvency Directive323 requires each Member State to 
create a guarantee fund that protects a limited amount of employee wages and entitlements in the event 
of their employers’ insolvency. In addition, the EU has passed a number of directives that aim to protect 
 
319 Per art 13 (1):  
“Members States shall ensure that individual and collective workers' rights, under Union and national labour law, such as the following, 
are not affected by the preventive restructuring framework:  
(a) the right to collective bargaining and industrial action; and  
(b) the right to information and consultation in accordance with Directive 2002/14/EC and Directive 2009/38/EC, in particular:  
(i) information to employees' representatives about the recent and probable development of the undertaking's or the 
establishment's activities and economic situation, enabling them to communicate to the debtor concerns about the situation of the 
business and as regards the need to consider restructuring mechanisms;  
(ii) information to employees' representatives about any preventive restructuring procedure which could have an impact on 
employment, such as on the ability of workers to recover their wages and any future payments, including occupational pensions;  
(iii) information to and consultation of employees' representatives about restructuring plans before they are submitted for adoption 
in accordance with art 9, or for confirmation by a judicial or administrative authority in accordance with art 10;  
(c) the rights guaranteed by Directives 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC and 2008/94/EC.” 
320 Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L 82/16 (“Acquired Rights 
Directive”). 
321 See the Case C-126/16 Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging and Others v Smallsteps BV (2017) where it was found that a (partial) going 
concern sale arranged through a Dutch pre-pack connected to a liquidation procedure under the Dutch Insolvency Code would not be protected 
by the insolvency exception to the automatic transfer of employment contracts set out in art 5(1) of the Acquired Rights Directive because the 
pre-pack as conceived was not with a view to liquidation (but with a view to continuing at least a part of the business of the undertaking). For 
a short discussion on the Dutch position, see Rick Aalbers, Jan Adriaanse, Gert-Jan Boon, Jean-Pierre van der Rest, Reinout Vriesendorp, and 
Frank van Wersch, ‘Does Pre-Packed Bankruptcy create Value? An Empirical Study of Post-Bankruptcy Employment Retention’ (2019) 28(3) 
IIR (forthcoming).  
For a catalogue of case law on this question with the evolution of approach from a contrary view in the first case on this topic, Case 135/83 
HBM Abels v The Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Electrotechnische Industrie [1985] ECR 469, 
to cases where the sale of a business of the undertaking may occur in a liquidation procedure, but because a business or part of a business of 
the undertaking continues, the compulsory transfer of employment contractswill still apply, see the following non-exhaustive list of cases: 
Case C-362/89 D’Urso and ors v Ercole Marelli Eletromeccanica Generale SpA and ors [1991] ECR I4105; Case C-472/93 Spano and Others 
v Fiat Geotech and Fiat Hitachi [1995] ECR I-4321; Case X319/94 Jules Dethier Equipement SA v Jules Dassy [1998] ECR I-1061; Case C-
399/96 Europieces SA, in liquidation v Wilfried Sanders and Automotive Industries Holding Company SA [1998] ECR I-6965; Case C-29/91 
Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol [1992] ECR 3189; and Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94 Albert Merckx and Patrick Neuhuys v 
Ford Motors Company Belgium SA [1996] ECR I-1253. For a discussion of this European case law in the context of the insolvency exception 
in the Acquired Rights Directive and the rescue culture, see Jennifer L L Gant, Balancing the Protection of Business and Employment in 
Insolvency: An Anglo-French Perspective (Eleven International Publishing 2017) 139-144. 
322 Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ 
L 225/6. 
323 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the 
insolvency of their employer [2008] OJ L 283/36. 
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employees’ rights to bargain collectively and add certain additional requirements for information and 
consultation obligations by employers.  There are two mentioned in article 13 of the PRD which include 
the Information and Consultation Framework Directive324 and the Works Councils Directive.325 
It is important to remember that regardless of which Member State is running a principal insolvency or 
restructuring proceeding, the employment law of each individual Member State will continue to apply 
to those employees working within its borders, unless otherwise provided for in a legal employment 
contract. The aforementioned social policy directives that attempt to approximate the treatment of 
employees when faced with the financial difficulties of their employers or other changes to the 
organisational environment of their employer  
Article 13 on Workers was a late addition to the Directive. Early during the inter-institutional 
negotiations, European Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament Committees on 
Employment and Social Affairs both expressed concern that the Directive did not explicitly address the 
position of workers, nor did it give them any protection compared with other creditors. article 13 serves 
to remind the Member States that their new or reformed restructuring frameworks should continue to 
adhere to both “Union and national labour law” as implemented in the Member States. The 
interinstitutional discussions did make clear the importance of workers’ rights and the ability for 
workers to both participate and for their entitlements to be protected in an employers’ insolvency, as 
evident in their exclusion from the stay in article 6(5), though this can be derogated from if payment of 
claims is guaranteed at a similar level of protection.  
Contributors were asked to assess what the current position of workers in their jurisdictions currently 
is. As all Member States are bound by the same minimum standards arising from the 5 aforementioned 
Directives, with some exceptions stemming from domestic differences, such as priorities and the level 
of development of collective bargaining, the position in each Member State is largely the same. While 
there are some differences in approach in domestic legislation, it is unlikely that these differences will 
inhibit the development of preventive restructuring frameworks as regardless of what jurisdiction opens 
main proceedings, the domestic law and protections governing workers will continue to apply in each 
Member State. For this reason, this Report will not offer an in-depth discussion of workers’ rights in the 
context of the PRD and its relevance to the JCOERE Project. 
7.9 Conclusion: Benchmarking to the Directive  
As evident in the foregoing sections, the Member States that have contributed to the JCOERE 
Questionnaire as of October 2019 vary significantly in terms of (1) the existence of preventive 
restructuring procedures; (2) the provisions common to preventive restructuring, which may currently 
be associated with insolvency or insolvent restructuring or reorganisation procedures; and (3) the view 
of certain key concepts and principles that are common to preventive restructuring. Chapter 7 has 
explored specific provision arising from the PRD as an incoming European framework Directive as a 
focal point of examining preventive restructuring procedures generally among the EU Member States 
and the JCOERE contributing jurisdictions. The key provisions explored included the stay or 
moratorium, its existence and duration with extensions in the contributing jurisdictions in either 
preventive or insolvent restructuring procedures as well as whether this stay was revocable by a court 
(article 6(1) and (9)).  
With a view to, in particular, investigating the complicated and challenging cross-class cram-down 
provision, the rules pertaining to both the adoption and confirmation of restructuring plans had to be 
examined. With regard to adoption, this necessarily included the ability to vote on a plan as well as what 
conditions were present that could exclude certain creditors from voting (article 9(2-3)). It was also 
important to explore how classes were formed and, in some cases, if at all beyond recognising the 
difference between secured and unsecured creditors (article 9(4)) as well as whether there was provision 
for the judicial or administrative examination of voting rights prior to the approval of a plan (article 
9(5)). Finally, and crucially, this question explored whether with a simple or super majority rule within 
 
324 Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation [2002] OJ L 80/29. 
325 Directive 2009/38/EC of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings 
and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (Recast) [2009] OJ L 122/28. 
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individual classes of creditors the adoption of a plan would be allowed, often called an intra-class cram 
down (article 9(6)).  
Confirmation criteria related to restructuring plans was also interrogated in the questionnaire with 
responses dealing with the conditions under which a plan would have to be confirmed by a judicial 
administrative authority and whether the current provisions in the contributing jurisdictions included at 
least the criteria set out in article 10(1). Additional conditions were set out in 10(2) that can also require 
judicial or administrative approval, which contributors also gave their views on in relation to their 
current and planned or hypothetical implementation of restructuring frameworks, including whether 
they provided or would provide for the ability for an authority to refuse to confirm a plan under 10(3).  
One of the key and most controversial provisions in the PRD is the cross-class cram-down, and few 
jurisdictions have this already in a preventive restructuring procedure and not all even have it in their 
insolvent restructuring procedure. Therefore, this provision may be one of the most challenging ones to 
implement in the time period allotted for putting into place domestic legislation in line with the PRD. 
Article 11(1) provides an obligatory provision for a cross-class cram-down, but provides a myriad of 
options for testing the fairness of this as against dissenting creditors, seeming to prefer a “relative 
priority rule” as set out in article 11(1)(c) with a derogation set out to utilise an “absolute priority rule” 
in 11(2). Finally, another separate test is provided in the second paragraph of 11(2) that describes an 
“unfair prejudice test”. Many EU jurisdictions favour an absolute priority rule already, while Ireland, 
for example, has already been applying a kind of relative priority test that relies as well on whether 
creditors are unfairly prejudiced. There is a lot of debate in the relative value of these rules and whether 
the more flexible of these lead to morally hazardous circumstances that could be abused by powerful 
lenders and unscrupulous debtors.  
There was also a brief exploration of article 13 in relation to workers, which specifies five social 
Directives that all jurisdictions should continue to apply in relation to the development of preventive 
restructuring frameworks. These directives include the Works Councils and Information and 
Consultation Directives, the Collective Redundancies, Acquired Rights, and Employers in Insolvency 
Directives. Given the fact that these Directives have already been implemented within the Member 
States, the additional admonition does little to change the status quo.  
Finally, the provision of interim financing in article 17 has been recognised as an absolutely vital 
element for the success of preventive restructuring plans. When a company finds itself in temporary 
financial distress, it is axiomatic that it will need money from somewhere to be able to continue with 
negotiating a plan and to implement it. As such, the provision of protection from claw-back manoeuvres, 
liability for lending, as well as the potential to apply a super priority to such loans in repayment is a 
vital piece of the restructuring puzzle. The contributing jurisdictions already take a varied approach to 
this concept, with views that it, along with aspects of the cross-class cram-down could lead to abuse of 
process and moral hazard. However, it is also widely accepted that this is an unavoidable aspect of 
preventive restructuring if the Member States are to create or adjust procedures that will be effective at 
rescuing companies in states of likelihood of insolvency in the near future.  
7.10 Chapter 8: Mapping of Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU Directive 
Part II Specific Procedural Aspects of Preventive Restructuring in Domestic Processes and 
in the Directive  
The next Chapter 8 will explore the first half of Part III of the JCOERE questionnaire. The next chapter 
begins with an exploration of the thresholds of insolvency in the contributing jurisdictions as this gives 
a perspective on the accessibility of preventive restructuring along the stream of financial difficulty.  
Secondly, Chapter 8 will explore contributor responses to the implementation of article 5 Debtor in 
Possession. This requires Member States to provide a debtor in possession procedure while making 
provisions for the involvement of an insolvency practitioner either on a case-by-case basis, or in certain 
specified circumstances. The next chapter will also look at the interplay of article 8 of the EIR Recast, 
which provides absolute protection for rights in rem for assets located in a jurisdiction other than the 
jurisdiction of primary proceedings. This has been viewed as potentially conflicting with the cross-
border aspects of preventive restructuring as it could lead to differential treatment of rights in rem 
holders as between the jurisdiction of preliminary proceedings and other jurisdictions recognising and 
deferring to those proceedings. 
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8. Chapter 8: Mapping of Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the 
EU Directive Part III Specific Procedural Aspects of Preventive 
Restructuring in Domestic Processes and in the Directive 
8.1 Introduction to Part III of the Questionnaire Mapping Preventive Restructuring 
Frameworks 
Part III of the JCOERE Questionnaire Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the EU 
Directive examines specific procedural aspects that may arise in relation to preventive restructuring 
frameworks, whether in current domestic processes, new domestic processes, or processes which will 
be introduced as a result of implementing the provisions of the PRD.1 The questions in this part of the 
questionnaire focus on aspects of the PRD that relate to procedural matters. As an example, this includes 
the requirement for the appointment of insolvency practitioners in restructuring processes as set out in 
article 5 Debtor in Possession. It also explores the interface between provisions in the EIR Recast on 
the protection of rights in rem and the provisions in the PRD on both intra- and cross-class cram-down. 
In addition, a question about insolvency and restructuring thresholds was raised with the contributors. 
Differences between Member States on this issue may affect the commencement of preventive 
restructuring processes leading to difficulties with the operation of the EIR Recast.  Part III of the 
questionnaire also queried certain procedural aspects relating directly to challenges to court-to-court co-
operation. However, this Chapter will confine itself to rules deriving directly from the PRD, leaving 
those that deal with the characteristics of the courts and judiciaries throughout the Member States to be 
discussed in the JCOERE Report 2. 
This Chapter seeks to satisfy the second need addressed by the JCOERE Project: viz. identifying 
procedural rules associated with preventive restructuring that could present as obstacles to judicial co-
operation. The topics discussed in this Chapter are informed, in part, by strong concerns expressed in 
some member states regarding what is perceived to be the potentially abusive nature of restructuring or 
rescue processes. Throughout the Chapter these concerns will be balanced against the clear policy 
imperatives expressed by the European Commission for the need to introduce rescue processes 
throughout the EU.  
Further, the flexibility of involving insolvency practitioners as described in article 5 of the PRD may 
also be problematic, both in terms of the perception of oversight of a potentially morally hazardous 
process, as well as the nature of court co-operation extending as it tends to do through communication 
between practitioners and the courts. The flexibility of article 5 appears to make it possible to have an 
entirely debtor-run restructuring procedure without the aid of an insolvency practitioner. In such cases, 
court co-operation may be difficult as there will not be practitioners representing all jurisdictions 
between which co-operation is needed. Finally, where practitioners are officers of the court the 
cooperative relationship will potentially be different from those jurisdictions who have insolvency 
practitioner who are not as there will be differing levels of obligation and trust between courts and 
practice. 
Rights in rem also cause a potentially difficult problem in the way foreign security rights are protected 
by article 8 of the EIR Recast, a protection that does not extend to local creditors of a cross-border 
proceeding. In other words, wherever a preliminary proceeding is opened, the secured creditors in that 
jurisdiction will not have the same protection as secured creditors in foreign jurisdictions under the same 
proceeding by operation of the absolute protection provided by article 8. While these differences and 
inequities may not prevent recognition of a preliminary proceeding that is within Annex A of the EIR 
 
1 European Commission DG Justice Grant Agreement 800807 – JCOERE – JUST-AG-2017/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017, Annex 1 Part B section 
1.2 “The needs Addressed by this Project.”  
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Recast, it could give judges pause when they consider the need to cooperate in relation to local claims 
that are stayed or otherwise impeded by a foreign preliminary proceeding.  
8.2 The Threshold for Insolvency and Restructuring 
EU Member States adopt a range of gatekeeping approaches for companies to access insolvency and 
restructuring procedures. These differences start range from having no threshold test at all to having a 
restrictive approach setting out express debt percentages, sometimes at a very low threshold, that define 
when a company can and at times must file under a relevant procedure. The academic debate in this area 
revolves around the potential for abusing flexible restructuring procedures that could allow a company 
to use them simply to escape some of their debt obligations by holding its creditors hostage to a 
procedural cram-down. On the other side of this moral hazard is the potential for using flexible 
restructuring procedures to try to save hopelessly insolvent companies, wasting court time and causing 
greater hardship for creditors. Currently, there does not seem to be any agreement between the Member 
States on this issue, but where different approaches to insolvency and restructuring thresholds persist, 
it could lead to the unequal treatment of creditors from one jurisdiction to another, with some being 
roped into procedures much earlier or potentially too late, causing delay in payment and expenses for 
creditors.  
There also appears to be a lack of a pan-European acceptance of preventive restructuring, which can, to 
some extent, be attributed to the varying strictness of insolvency thresholds, which are in turn linked to 
the distrust of debtors generally. The PRD introduces a seemingly flexible test of entry, which has 
caused ample debate in academic circles. As discussed at length in Chapter 4 of this Report, there are 
questions as to whether a collective proceeding occurring prior to insolvency can actually be justified 
when one considers the principles that govern the justification of collective insolvency proceedings 
generally. The question, then, is why might the differing threshold tests of insolvency make a difference 
in relation to court-to-court co-operation? How available and accessible should preventive restructuring 
be when balanced against the moral hazard and potential for abuse feared by many academic 
commentators?  
There are certain thresholds determining functional insolvency that a debtor must generally meet in 
order to access insolvency procedures. The same applies to a number of existing preventive restructuring 
procedures. The PRD sets the “likelihood of insolvency” as the threshold at which preventive 
restructuring procedures should be available:  
“This Directive lays down rules on: (a) preventive restructuring frameworks available for debtors 
in financial difficulties where there is a likelihood of insolvency, with a view to preventing the 
insolvency and ensuring the viability of the debtor.”2 
Generally, insolvency is determined by reference to a company’s inability to pay its debts,3 which 
different Member States assess by reference to a variety of criteria. The inability to pay debts is often 
assessed through two common insolvency threshold tests: the balance sheet and cash flow tests. The 
balance sheet test refers to a situation where a companies’ liabilities exceed the value of its assets.4 
Under this test, any number of companies may be definitionally insolvent at many points during their 
lifecycle, however, this does not necessarily mean the company cannot continue as a viable enterprise 
if these situations of imbalance are temporary in nature. The cash flow test is simply the debtor’s 
inability to pay its debts as they fall due. As noted in Chapter 4, the PRD aims to make restructuring 
procedures available to debtors prior to circumstances in which a debtor would be considered insolvent. 
This raises the question of what is meant by “pre-insolvency” in a preventive restructuring context.5 It 
is sufficient to point out here that the definitions for “likelihood of insolvency” have been left entirely 
to the national law of Member States,6  which may result in procedures in different jurisdictions that can 
be used at a diverse number of points along the stream of financial distress. A key determination must 
be where on the stream of financial distress “pre-insolvency” begins and to find this, it must first be 
determined the threshold at which insolvency procedures are available to a debtor company. 
 
2 PRD, art 1(1)(a).  
3 Kristin van Zweiten, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 134-135.  
4 idem 167-176. 
5 The concept of pre-insolvency was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this Report.  
6 PRD, art 2(2)(a&b). 
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 Threshold of Insolvency and Restructuring in the Contributing Jurisdictions 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question (Additional):  
How does your jurisdiction define the “threshold for insolvency”, for example, is it when a company 
is unable to pay its debts, when liabilities exceed assets, or something else? How does this threshold 
then relate to your restructuring framework as described in your response to our questionnaire? 
 
In Ireland, the Scheme of Arrangement can be used in circumstances of solvency or insolvency, so there 
is no relevant threshold to consider.7 The threshold for insolvency for Examinership is that the company 
is, or is likely, to become unable to pay its debts,8 so it can be used notionally in either solvency or 
insolvency, which facilitates its use for preventive restructuring objectives in line with the PRD.    
In Austria, the threshold for insolvency is either illiquidity or over-indebtedness. Illiquidity is assumed 
when a debtor is unable to repay debts that are due within a reasonable time, essentially the “cash-flow 
test”. Further, illiquidity is presumed if a company is unable to immediately liquidate assets in order to 
pay its liabilities, even if there are sufficient assets to cover the debts. Illiquidity was recently given 
definition by the Austrian Supreme Court, which found that if a company defaults on more than 5% of 
its due debts, it will be presumed to be illiquid. Over-indebtedness is essentially defined as the balance 
sheet test mentioned above, tempered by the requirement that there is no positive forecast for the 
continued existence of the company. The value of assets over liabilities is determined by actual or 
potential sales of those assets under normal circumstances, rather than liquidation value. The “positive 
forecast” is predicated on the ability of the company to fulfil all due liabilities within the current and 
following financial year.  
Denmark defines insolvency based on the cash flow test: when the debtor is unable to meet its liabilities 
as and when they fall due, unless such inability must be deemed to be only temporary.9 The Danish 
insolvency threshold does include what is sometimes referred to as “anticipated insolvency”. A debtor 
is considered insolvent when it is inevitable that the debtor in the near future will not be able to pay his 
debts.10 Spain takes a similar approach, deeming a company insolvent if the debtor cannot meet debts 
due, whether or not the inability to pay is only on a temporary basis. Impending insolvency is when a 
debtor has not yet stopped paying, but it is foreseeable that it will eventually be unable to do so.11 
The threshold for insolvency in the Netherlands depends on the insolvency proceeding. In a bankruptcy, 
a liquidity test is applied. When the debtor is unable to pay its debts (in practice there should be two 
outstanding debts, of which at least one is due and payable) in order to be declared bankrupt.12 For the 
suspension of payment, a liquidity test is applied; this is identified as the debtor in circumstances in 
which it foresees that it will not be able to continue to pay its debts as and when they become due and 
payable.13 
In England and Wales, both the CVA and Scheme of Arrangement can be used prior to the debtor 
becoming functionally insolvent by reference to the balance sheet or cash flow tests. The Scheme of 
Arrangement can be used for the reorganisation of a solvent or insolvent company so there is no 
threshold test to be applied, which also explains why it remains a procedure available under the 
Companies Act 2006, rather than under the Insolvency Act 1986. It only needs court approval of an 
arrangement agreed between the company and its creditors or a class of them.14 The CVA may also be 
made whether or not the company is insolvent or likely to become insolvent,15 so there is no threshold 
test here either. However, if the Scheme or the CVA is being used in the context of an Administration 
 
7 Irish Companies Act 2014, chapter 1, part 9. See further Irene Lynch Fannon and Gerard Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (2nd 
edn, Bloomsbury 2012) chapter 8; and L McCann and Thomas B Courtney (eds), Bloomsbury Professional’s Guide to the Companies Act 
2014 (Bloomsbury 2015) chapter 9 on Mergers and Acquisitions. 
8 Irish Companies Act 2014, s 509(1).  
9 Danish BA, s 17(2).  
10 Betænkning II nr 606/1971 om konkurs og tvangsakkord, 72. 
11 Spanish Bankruptcy Code, art 2. 
12 Dutch BA, art 1 and 6(3). 
13 Dutch BA, art 214(1). 
14 England and Wales Companies Act 2006, s895(1).  
15 England and Wales Insolvency Act 1986, part I.  
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procedure, which often happens so that a moratorium is available, then the company will need to meet 
the relevant threshold, which is that the debtor is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts.16   
The threshold for insolvency in France is defined as “cessation de paiements”. Article L631-1 of the 
Commercial Code defines “cessation de paiements” as the inability of a company to meet its payable 
liabilities with the assets available (“l’impossibilité de faire face au passif exigible avec [l’]actif 
disponible”). This concept is important as it is from the moment the business satisfies this criterion that 
some preventive restructuring procedures become closed to the debtor. The ad hoc mandate is only 
available to debtors that are not in cessation de paiements. The conciliation procedure is only available 
to debtors, which have not been in cessation de paiements for more than 45 days.17 The safeguard 
procedure is also unavailable to debtors in cessation de paiements.18 However, what constitutes a 
situation of cessation de paiements is not straightforward and has been the subject of debate in the courts 
and among commentators over the years, in particular the accounting basis of the concept. Following 
the introduction of the Law of 1967,19 French case law referred to the concept of cessation de paiements 
as an essentially accounting-based notion, reliant on a comparison of available assets to meet the due 
liabilities.20 Yet, many courts have departed from this accounting view and have interpreted elements of 
the concept, such as what constitutes an asset21 and a liability22 and whether the debt is in fact due.23 
Overall, some courts have disputed the purely accounting nature of the concept and stated that it is, 
rather, a concept which takes into account the treasury of the business and which includes “dynamic 
elements” of the company’s life that are not reflected in the accounts, such as temporary credits and the 
use of occasional overdrafts. Solely relying on the balance sheet test, therefore, would not be a true 
reflection of the reality of the business.24  
German insolvency law defines insolvency as the inability to pay debt as it falls due.25 Case law further 
explains that the relevant inability must extend to more than 10 per cent of debt over more than 3 weeks. 
Any cessation of payment indicates unequivocally the inability to pay. In addition, German law offers 
two further insolvency tests for specific debtors. First, the debtor can initiate insolvency proceedings 
early (in order to use it for a restructuring).26 Here, any foreseeable inability to pay suffices. Case law 
provides that the forecast may include a timeframe of up to two years in the future, for example, at the 
time a bond is to fall due. Secondly, any limited liability company (corporation) is insolvent under a 
balance sheet test once it has no prospect of continuation (viability test).27 So balance sheet insolvency 
in itself does not suffice anymore (since 2008) in order to prevent a duty to file for insolvency due to a 
crash in market value of relevant assets as experienced in 2008. Only a balance sheet insolvent 
corporation that is also unable to continue trading would be insolvent under sec. 19 InsO and thereby 
be required to file.28 Any future preventive restructuring framework would interfere with the purpose of 
section 18 of the InsO (voluntary petition). It would probably not be available for debtors that are already 
unable to pay their debt. Corporations in the process of promising restructuring negotiations protected 
by the new framework would probably not be seen as being unable to continue trading, so no conflict 
should arise there. Currently, two ideas dominate the discussion in Germany: (1) Access to any 
preventive tool would be based on a foreseeable inability to pay that is combined with a minimum 
requirement for liquidity to finance the restructuring, or (2) access to any preventive tool would not 
include a separate test; instead these tools (stay, plan) would only have non-collective effects, thus 
guiding viable debtors to them while more troubled debtors (requiring collective redress) would need to 
file for insolvency plan proceedings. Which of these ideas will become law or whether both or none of 
them are adopted was, at the time of this questionnaire, impossible to forecast. Indeed, given the current 
 
16 idem schedule B1, para 11(a).  
17 Commercial Code, art L611-4.  
18 Commercial Code, art L621-1. 
19 Law No 67-563 of 13 July 1967. 
20 See C Saint-Alary-Houin, Droit des Entreprises en Difficulté (Montchrestien 2001) para 344. 
21 See e.g. Cassation Commerciale, 22 January 2002, RJDA 2002.5 no 516; Cassation Commerciale, 17 May 1989, Bull Civ IV no 152. 
22 See e.g. Cassation Commerciale, 22 June 1993, D 1993.somm.366; Cassation Commerciale, 8 March 1994, RJDA 1994.7 no 847; CA 
Nancy, 20 May 1987, JCP 88 éd E.II.15114; Cassation Commerciale, 22 February 1994, Bull Civ IV no 75; CA Aix, 16 April 1985, D 
1987.somm.389; CA Paris, 18 February 2000, Cah Dr Aff (actualité jurisprudence) 170. 
23 See the ‘due and demanded’ doctrine, cf Cassation Commerciale, 17 June 1997, RJDA 1997.11 no 1393. 
24 CA Aix, 5 June 1987, D.1988.somm.41. 
25 InsO, s 17. 
26 InsO, s 18. 
27 InsO, s 19. 
28 InsO, s 15(a). 
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obligatory nature of filing for insolvency in Germany, the introduction of a flexible but robust procedure 
such as the PRD has been controversial. 
In Poland, insolvency is defined by article 11 of the BL29 and covers both liquidity and asset to liabilities 
tests. Meeting any one of the two implies that a debtor is insolvent and that its representatives have a 
duty to file for a declaration of bankruptcy. On the other hand, restructuring proceedings can also be 
opened in relation to an already insolvent debtor. A court will not open restructuring proceedings if their 
effect is detrimental to creditors. Moreover, in the case of arrangement and remedial proceedings, the 
court will not open proceedings if a debtor’s ability to pay current costs of proceedings and obligations 
arising after opening has not been rendered credible.”30 There is no specific test for restructuring 
proceedings not to be opened in case of deep insolvency. 
In the new Italian code (CCI), insolvency is defined as the debtor’s inability to meet its obligations as 
they fall due, a situation which usually manifests itself in defaults or other signs31￼ According to well-
established case law, a firm that is being wound up, either piecemeal or as a going concern, may be 
declared insolvent only provided that its debts exceed the value of its assets, a balance sheet test. When 
the proceeds of the assets of a non-insolvent liquidation are assessed as sufficient to pay all creditors in 
full, the company may not be declared insolvent although not able to pay claims as they fall due, relying 
on a cash-flow test. The CCI also distinguishes between insolvency and crisis; the latter is defined as 
the situation of economic and financial difficulty making it probable that the debtor will become 
insolvent from a cash flow standpoint.32 Crisis manifests itself as the inadequacy of prospective cash 
flow to meet planned obligations as they fall due. That said, both the judicial composition with creditors 
(concordato preventivo) and to debt restructuring agreement (accordo di ristrutturazione dei debiti) are 
available to debtors that are either in a crisis or in an insolvency situation, as described above. Therefore, 
it is not necessary for businesses to be insolvent in order to be able to access these procedures, being in 
a “crisis” situation is sufficient. This approach seems to be aligned with the PRD, which requires, under 
art. 4, par. 1, that “Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, debtors 
have access to a preventive restructuring framework that enables them to restructure”. 
In Romania, insolvency is understood as insufficiency of cash available to pay the undisputed, liquid 
and enforceable debts, as follows: (a) The debtor is presumed insolvent when it fails to pay its debt to 
the creditor after sixty (60) days from the due date; this presumption is relative; (b) Insolvency is 
imminent when the debtor is proven unable to pay its debts when due, out of the cash available on the 
due date.33 The threshold value is defined as the minimum amount that the claim must meet in order to 
allow a petition for opening of the insolvency proceeding to be filed.34 Romanian law contains a positive 
definition of insolvency, it introduces the criterion of over-indebtedness as a ground for opening the 
proceeding. It is defined as the so called “imminent illiquidity”; this is established if the debtor will be 
unable to satisfy the claims when they become due. Romanian law also defines a threshold for pre-
insolvency proceedings, which is applicable to debtors in financial difficulty.35 A debtor is undergoing 
financial difficulty if, despite fulfilling or an ability to fulfill its obligations when due, it has a low short 
term liquidity ratio and/or a high long term indebtedness ratio, which may adversely affect its possibility 
to fulfill its contractual obligations by means of the resources generated from operations or the resources 
attracted from the financial activity.36 
The balance sheet test and cash flow tests are common among the contributing jurisdictions in the 
assessment of functional insolvency, which then allow a debtor to access the relevant insolvency 
procedures. However, the current state of affairs at the time of writing does not dispel the questions as 
to how a “likelihood of insolvency” will be determined under the Member States’ national restructuring 
frameworks at implementation time. As noted in Chapter 4, there are certain principles at play when a 
debtor accesses a collective procedure, a term that also applies to the new preventive restructuring 
procedures. It remains to be seen how the insolvency principles that justify collective action will be 
 
29 BL, art 11. 
30 Art. 8 of the RL. 
31 CCI, art 2, para 1(b).  
32 CCI, art 2, para 1(a).  
33 Law no 85/2014, art 5(29). 
34 Law no 85/2014, art 5(72). 
35 Law no 85/2014, art 6.  
36 Law no 85/2015, art 5(27). 
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reconciled with the use of collective preventive restructuring procedures when a debtor is not technically 
or functionally insolvent. However, given the approach of some of the contributing jurisdictions, for 
example Italy, which differentiates insolvency and “financial crisis”, and Austria, which tempers a 
finding of insolvency with a viability forecast, an aligned access to restructuring frameworks is unlikely 
to be created with the implementation of the PRD, which means not all restructuring frameworks will 
be available to the same debtors at the same points in their financial distress.  
8.3 Insolvency Practitioners in Preventive Restructuring (Article 5 – Debtor in Possession) 
 Purpose and Spirit of Article 5: Debtor in Possession (Qn 9) 
Article 5 aims to encourage the development of a debtor in possession (“DiP”) style of restructuring 
procedure along the lines of what the American Chapter 11 provides (and which the Irish Examinership 
has fully adopted). Essentially, DiP should limit the control that an insolvency practitioner, where 
appointed, or other body might exercise over the daily decision-making and activities of a company, to 
merely advising on aspects of the restructuring plan, rather than replacing the company management or 
taking control of the running of the business of the company. As such, the question seeks to determine 
the level of involvement required by insolvency practitioners in a restructuring and circumstances under 
which those requirements arise. Critically, the PRD states the following: 
(1) “Member States shall ensure that debtors accessing preventive restructuring procedures remain 
totally, or at least partially, in control of their assets and the day-to-day operation of their 
business.” 37 
This section clearly emphasises that a debtor should remain in control of the business during the 
restructuring proceeding, meaning that they continue to make decisions about how assets will be 
allocated, as well as any decisions about how the business should run. Essentially, a restructuring 
proceeding could proceed under the PRD framework without the involvement of a practitioner at all, 
depending on the circumstances. Article 5 goes on to state: 
(2) “Where necessary, the appointment by a judicial or administrative authority of a practitioner in 
the field of restructuring shall be decided on a case-by-case basis, except in certain 
circumstances where Member States may require the mandatory appointment of such a 
practitioner in every case.”38 
This second sub-section presents an optional appointment by judicial or administrative authority of an 
insolvency practitioner when it is considered necessary, which gives Member States some flexibility in 
determining what may necessitate that appointment. An appointment then becomes an obligation in 
certain specified minimum circumstances: (a) where a general stay is granted, and the authority decides 
a practitioner is necessary to safeguard party interests; (b) where a cross-class cram-down is required 
for confirmation; or (c) where it is requested by the debtor or by a majority of the creditors.39 
The Directive emphasises the fact that a preventive restructuring procedure is essentially characterised 
by a true “debtor-in-possession” element, reflecting the framework of the American Chapter 11 
procedure. Debtor in possession refers to a situation wherein a corporate debtor has filed under an 
insolvency or, in this case, preventive restructuring procedure, while the pre-petition management 
remain in control of the assets and the business of the company.40 While this element is not particularly 
contentious in itself, article 5 also provides an option to, where necessary, have a judicial or 
administrative authority appoint an insolvency practitioner on a case by case basis. By predicating such 
an appointment on the vague criteria of “where necessary”, article 5(2) gives fairly wide discretion for 
Member States to choose when the appointment of an insolvency practitioner will be necessary. 
However, it has been noted that the spirit of article 5 aims to avoid the practitioner (or indeed courts) 
being involved in all cases involving a restructuring plan.  The following recitals of the PRD support 
this idea. In relation to court involvement, recital 29 states:  
 
37 PRD, art 5(1). 
38 PRD, art 5(2).  
39 PRD, art 5(3) (a-c). 
40 Vanessa Finch and David Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press 2017) 231. 
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“To promote efficiency and reduce delays and costs, national preventive restructuring 
frameworks should include flexible procedures. Where this Directive is implemented by means 
of more than one procedure within a restructuring framework, the debtor should have access to 
all rights and safeguards provided for by this Directive with the aim of achieving an effective 
restructuring. Except in the event of mandatory involvement of judicial or administrative 
authorities as provided for under this Directive, Member States should be able to limit the 
involvement of such authorities to situations in which it is necessary and proportionate, while 
taking into consideration, among other things, the aim of safeguarding the rights and interests of 
debtors and of affected parties, as well as the aim of reducing delays and the cost of the 
procedures.”41 
In relation to practitioner involvement, recital 30 states:   
“To avoid unnecessary costs, to reflect the early nature of preventive restructuring and to 
encourage debtors to apply for preventive restructuring at an early stage of their financial 
difficulties, they should, in principle, be left in control of their assets and the day-to-day operation 
of their business. The appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring, to supervise the 
activity of a debtor or to partially take over control of a debtor's daily operations, should not be 
mandatory in every case, but made on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of 
the case or on the debtor's specific needs. Nevertheless, Member States should be able to 
determine that the appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring is always necessary 
in certain circumstances, such as where: the debtor benefits from a general stay of individual 
enforcement actions; the restructuring plan needs to be confirmed by means of a cross-class cram-
down; the restructuring plan includes measures affecting the rights of workers; or the debtor or 
its management have acted in a criminal, fraudulent, or detrimental manner in business 
relations.”42 
These two recitals seem to indicate a preference towards court and practitioner involvement only when 
strictly necessary, in other words, when their involvement benefits the best interests of creditors and the 
efficiency of the restructuring process. While IP and Court supervision and/or involvement in all cases 
may not be factually contrary to the wording of article 5 of the PRD, it may be that the underlying 
intentions of the provisions surrounding court and practitioner involvement are lost if involvement is 
required in all cases. That said, the nature of some procedures - the Irish Examinership, for example - 
are such that the mandatory involvement of both practitioners and courts is justified due to the robust 
nature of the procedures themselves. If considered on a case-by-case basis, there would always be 
justification for the involvement of IPs and courts, thereby aligning with both the provisions of article 
5 and the recitals set out above.   
There are different views about the latitude that Member States have been given to derogate on the case-
by-case appointments of an insolvency practitioner. The scope of the derogation in the PRD is vague 
and appears to allow for a blanket appointment of an insolvency practitioner, however there are also 
strong grounds to maintain that a mandatory appointment of an insolvency practitioner in all cases may 
not be compliant with the PRD. Thus, the PRD may set a ceiling to the scope of such derogation, which 
might preclude a domestic provision mandating the appointment of an IP in all circumstances. The 
wording of the article, however, does not make this clear. A further relevant consideration is that if the 
EU had wished to allow a general derogation from the “case-by-case appointment rule”, it likely would 
have just added a paragraph along the following lines: “Member States may derogate from paragraph 
2” (as has been done with respect to other optional provisions).43 Without a clear statement in the 
operational provision, however, the ambiguity will allow for a much wider scope of implementation 
than may have been intended. 
Article 5 also provides an obligation to appoint of a “practitioner in the field of restructuring, to assist 
the debtor and creditors in negotiating and drafting the plan” in at least the three specific cases set out 
above. There are some problems with the timing inferred by this provision. At the time that a plan is 
being negotiated and drafted, it may not be evident that a cross-class cram-down will be a necessary 
 
41 PRD, extract from recital 29.  
42 PRD, recital 30.  
43 Thank you to the Italian team at Universite degli Studi di Firenze for their explanation of this argument in relation to the spirit of article 
5(2).  
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part of the process, so the mandatory nature of the appointment may not become apparent until after the 
negotiation has begun. Furthermore, there are a range of circumstances that are not described as 
requiring the appointment of an IP, but which are currently included as criteria for obligatory 
appointment by some of the Member States, as will be discussed below. 
The purpose of question 9 of the JCOERE questionnaire was to determine the level of practitioner 
involvement in current restructuring proceedings in the contributing jurisdictions and the depth of their 
roles in controlling the enterprise. While the appointment of an insolvency professional does not 
necessarily take a debtor out of possession, the power retained by the debtor will depend on the level of 
power transferred to an insolvency practitioner in such cases.  
 Jurisdictional Contributions (Article 5 – Debtor in Possession) 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 
Article 5 includes an option for the involvement of an insolvency practitioner in relation to preventive 
restructuring processes. 
a. What is the current position regarding insolvency practitioners in restructuring processes in 
your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant legislative provisions or rules and describe the 
terms of these provisions and how they compare with the terms of Article 5 of the Directive. 
b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the requirements regarding the 
involvement of insolvency practitioners in relation to preventive restructuring processes?   
While the Irish Scheme of Arrangement could be carried out without the assistance of an insolvency 
practitioner, as is the case Scheme of Arrangement in the England and Wales this is unlikely (see below). 
Critical to the examinership procedure is the appointment of an examiner by the court, if the court 
declined to appoint, then the procedure comes to an end.44  Therefore, a question can be raised regarding 
the requirement that an examiner be appointed in all cases.  Article 5(3) goes on to state, however, ”that 
Member States shall provide for the appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring, to assist 
the debtor and creditors in negotiating and drafting the plan, at least in the following cases” which 
include when a stay is imposed, when cross-class cram-down is used or when the appointment is 
requested. The Irish legislation provides for the appointment of an examiner, pursuant to a court petition 
(which is equivalent to a request). The framework also includes a mandatory stay and the use of cross-
class cram-down. In that context the particular procedure cannot have these features without the 
appointment of an IP. In totality, therefore, there seems to be compliance.  
In Italy, when a debtor files for a concordato preventivo45the court is required to nominate an insolvency 
practitioner who, before the confirmation of the plan, is entrusted with the role of monitoring and 
overseeing the debtor, as well as supporting creditors in their assessment of the proposal through the 
provision of independent information. After the confirmation, the insolvency practitioner may be vested 
with the power to enforce the plan in case of non-spontaneous implementation by the debtor (see below).  
Recent reforms (by means of Art. 118) have also widened the power of the IP in cases of non-
implementation of a (confirmed) restructuring plan. The IP’s powers in this instance will generally 
include all those normally reserved to the shareholders‘ meeting. The concordato has many 
characteristics that align well with the provision of the PRD. In the concordato46 an insolvency 
practitioner is required to inform the court of any misconduct of the debtor or any other circumstance 
that might have a negative impact on the restructuring process. The insolvency practitioner is not given 
a right of administration in this case, leaving the debtor in control of the running of the business. Any 
operations falling outside of ordinary business activity, however, may need a priori authorisation by a 
judge.47 For the debt restructuring agreement, unless an involuntary liquidation petition has been filed, 
the court is not required to nominate an insolvency practitioner. This circumstance is not unusual, as the 
 
44 The examiner is regulated under the Irish Companies Act 2014, s 519 – in short, an examiner must possess the same qualifications as a 
liquidator in order to act as an examiner. 
45 CCI, art 44 para 1b: commissario giudiziale. 
46 Pursuant to CCI, art 118 para 4, after the confirmation of a concordato plan, if the insolvency practitioner detects that the debtor is unduly 
omitting or delaying the implementation of the plan, it must be reported to the court, which can authorise the IP to carry out the acts needed to 
implement the plan.  
47 CCI, art 44, para 4.  
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filing of a confirmation request for a debt restructuring agreement can also aim to block the petition for 
involuntary liquidation but it is not the norm. The insolvency court previously had discretion on the 
appointment of an insolvency practitioner in cases of restructuring agreements, which were binding on 
dissenting creditors, with a view to ensuring that the negotiations were made in good faith and lawful.48 
It is unclear if following the recent reforms that will enter into force in 2020. With regard to the PRD, 
the concordato preventivo does not appear to be fully in line with the requirements to “assist the debtor 
and creditors in negotiating and drafting a plan” as the role in the Italian procedure is largely one of 
oversight only. Also, the mandatory appointment of an insolvency practitioner in all cases is unlikely to 
comply with article 5(2) given the limited scope of the derogation (see above).  
All Romanian restructuring processes require the appointment of an expert or administrator and are 
therefore more restrictive than the provisions of the PRD article 5. The practitioners do not take over 
the business, rather the management stays in control; as such, the Romanian pre-insolvency procedures 
are “debtor in possession” mechanisms. However, the training of these crises’ managers leaves much to 
be desired, as the practitioner generally knows far less about the management of a business than the 
former management of those businesses. As such this is supervision without a sound basis in business 
knowledge. This has often resulted in a loosely managed reorganisation ultimately resulting in an 
insolvency.  
The French conciliation and ad hoc mandate procedures, the insolvency professionals do not interfere 
with the management of the company. The Directors remain in place and in control of the assets and the 
day to day operations of the business. A conciliator may not necessarily be a practitioner in insolvency 
but rather may be appointed by the court provided that they have experience that is likely to facilitate 
the course of the proceedings. This is conditional on them having not received any remuneration from 
either the debtor or its creditors in the 24 months prior to opening proceedings. The role of the conciliator 
is to help the debtor reach an agreement with its main creditors in order to end the financial difficulties 
of the company.49 Similarly, a debtor remains in possession during the safeguard and related procedures, 
but the administrator is appointed to supervise and/or assist the management while preparing the plan.50 
The Loi Pacte will introduce an obligation for the court to justify the choice of administrator and of the 
creditors’ representative, in order to bring the French framework closer in line with the PRD, article 
5(2); this will amend the Commercial Code in respect of the mandate ad hoc, conciliation, and the 
sauvegarde. 
In Germany, insolvency practitioners are always appointed in insolvency proceedings, even if the debtor 
remains in possession, and this is likely to apply to any newly introduced preventive restructuring 
procedure. Such practitioners act as a supervisor and may be authorised to co-sign or approve acts of 
the debtor, which conflicts with the debtor-in-possession concept to some extent. The position appears 
to be similar in Austria.  The provisions of 5(2) allow for an appointment when necessary, therefore 
while the blanket requirement for the appointment of an insolvency practitioner may not be in conflict 
with the PRD, it is contrary to the spirit of the compromise that led to the drafting of article 5(2), which 
aimed at preventing an insolvency practitioner being blindly involved in all cases.  
In the Netherlands, the suspension of payment procedure always requires the appointment of an 
insolvency practitioner, who conducts the administration of the debtor’s affairs together with the 
debtor.51 For any act of disposal related to the estate, the debtor must have the co-operation, 
authorisation, or assistance of the insolvency practitioner.52 Where the debtor fails to appropriately 
include the insolvency practitioner in its decision-making, the insolvency practitioner can do whatever 
is necessary to prevent any loss in the estate,53 which will not be liable for obligations entered into by 
the debtor after the commencement of the suspension of payment without the involvement of the 
insolvency practitioner.54 These provisions appear to make the suspension of payment a procedure that 
 
48 Art 182 septies para 4 of the previous Insolvency Law; the recently enacted provision CCI, art 61 regarding the accordi di ristrutturazione 
ad efficacia estesa (debt agreement binding on dissenting creditors) has extended the scope of this procedure, making it available also to bind 
dissenting creditors, but has not replicated the provision empowering the court to appoint an IP (thereby making the possibility to appoint an 
IP uncertain in the new framework). 
49 Commercial Code, article L611-7. 
50 Commercial Code, L622-1. 
51 Dutch BA, Art 215(2) and 228. 
52 Dutch BA, Art 228. 
53 Dutch BA, art 228(1). 
54 Dutch BA, art 228(2). 
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essentially removes the debtor from full possession of the decision-making of the company, given the 
onerous results should the debtor fail to comply. The WHOA will provide for a proceeding in which, in 
principle, no involvement of an insolvency practitioner is required, except for those situations noted in 
article 5(3) of the PRD. In line with article 5(2), the Netherlands has provided a few exceptions that will 
require the involvement of a practitioner. A creditor, shareholder, works council, or the debtor may 
request the appointment of a so-called ‘plan expert’ (herstructureringsdeskundige’)55 to propose a 
restructuring plan. The expert will negotiate a restructuring plan with the creditors and shareholders for 
the debtor.56 There is also a provision that allows the court upon request or at its own discretion to take 
specific measures necessary for the protection of the interests of the creditors and shareholders.57 This 
could include the appointment of a specific practitioner in the field of restructuring called the 
‘observer’.58  
For the Netherlands, as mentioned above, in the suspension of payment proceeding a joint administrator 
is appointed by the court when the proceeding is commenced.59 This allows the debtor to be in partial 
possession during the full suspension of payment proceeding.60 This proceeding therefore meets the 
requirements of article 5(3). When the debtor is no longer able to meet current and new obligations as 
they fall due, the joint administrator will ask for conversion of the suspension of payment proceedings 
in bankruptcy proceedings, which ends a phase where the debtor is in possession. As proposed in the 
WHOA, appointment of either an observer or a plan expert is possible in the three circumstances 
mentioned in article 5(3), when the proceeding is commenced by the debtor. In those cases where a plan 
expert has not (yet) been appointed, the court will – in line with article 5(3)(i) – consider the appointment 
of an observer. Its appointment is not obligatory, but will be subject to whether or not the court considers 
it necessary to safeguard the interest of creditors. 61 Furthermore, when setting the date for the hearing 
on confirmation of a restructuring plan that involves a cross-class cram-down, the court will appoint an 
observer in case no plan expert or observer has yet been appointed (in line with article 5(3)(ii)).62 The 
court will appoint a plan expert in particular in those cases where the WHOA is commenced at the 
request of a creditor, shareholder or works council. In this case the plan expert will be involved for the 
full proceeding.63 The request to appoint a plan expert may also be made at a later, when the debtor 
commenced the WHOA. This request can also be made by the debtor (in line with article 5(3)(i)).64 
In Poland, the involvement of an insolvency practitioner is governed by the RL; in each restructuring 
proceeding, an individual who has passed a state exam and is entered on a list of restructuring advisers 
can act in any of the four restructuring proceedings and perform different roles in them depending on 
the type of proceeding (such persons also act as receivers during bankruptcy proceedings).65 In approval 
arrangement proceedings, a restructuring advisor acts as an arrangement supervisor and the debtor enters 
into an agreement with the restructuring advisor which defines its duties.66 In accelerated arrangement 
and arrangement proceedings, the court nominates a court supervisor in a decision opening 
proceedings,67 whereas in remedial proceedings the debtor, as a rule, loses possession and the court 
appoints an administrator who takes over administration of a remedial estate and manages it 
independently in favour of the debtor. If the success of remedial proceedings requires involvement of 
the debtor or his representatives, a court may permit a debtor to administer all or part of an undertaking 
if a guarantee of proper performance and no exceeding of ordinary administrative tasks is provided.68 
In accelerated arrangement and simple arrangement proceedings, a court supervisor approves acts 
 
55 The original Dutch text refers to ‘herstructureringsdeskundige’, which could be translated into ‘restructuring expert’ or ‘plan expert’. 
56 WHOA, art 371(1). 
57 WHOA, art 379(1). 
58 WHOA, art 376(9), 380 and 383(4). See also the explanatory memorandum to the WHOA (2019) 40-41 and 66-67 
<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/07/08/tk-nader-rapport-wet-homologatie-onderhands-akkoord> accessed 12 
December 2019. In accordance with WHOA, art 381(1), the observer’s task is to supervise the realization of the restructuring plan and, in so 
doing, to take into account the interests of all creditors. Once the court appoints a so-called ‘plan expert’, the observer will be removed (WHOA, 
art 380(3)). 
59 Dutch BA, art 215(2). 
60 Dutch BA, art 228. 
61 WHOA, arts 376(9), 379 and 380. See also the explanatory memorandum to the WHOA, 2019, p. 24 and 61-62. 
62 WHOA, art 383(4). 
63 WHOA, art 371(1). See also the explanatory memorandum to the WHOA (2019) 43-44. 
64 WHOA, arts 371(1) and 370(5). See also the explanatory memorandum to the WHOA (2019) 21. 
65 Companies with the involvement as representatives of restructuring advisers are also allowed to be appointed as insolvency practitioners. 
66 RL, art 210. 
67 RL, art 233(1&2). 
68 RL, ss 3, 51, 52, 53, and 288.  
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exceeding ordinary administration.69 In arrangement approval proceedings, the conclusion of an 
agreement with an arrangement supervisor does not limit the debtor in management of his property.70 
In addition, debtor sale of real estate or other assets worth more than PLN 500,000 always requires 
authorisation of the creditors’ committee or is otherwise invalid71 It seems that the Polish Restructuring 
law is already compliant with article 5 of the Directive.  
The appointment of a restructuring administrator and a restructuring accountant is mandatory for the 
opening of the restructuring proceedings in Denmark.72 The debtor remains in possession during the 
restructuring proceedings and continues to control the day-to-day operations of the business. The debtor 
is not, however, entitled to enter into any transactions of material significance without the consent of 
the restructuring administrator.73 The restructuring administrator can take over the management of the 
debtor if a majority of the creditors do not vote against such a takeover or if it necessary to protect the 
value of the business. Both of the takeover options are examined and confirmed by the Bankruptcy 
Court.74 While Denmark does have a debtor in possession style of procedure, some changes are 
necessary to align with the directive. The current Danish frameworks requires the appointment of an 
insolvency practitioner, which may not be in the spirit of the case-by-case basis enshrined in the PRD. 
In addition, the forced takeover option in the Danish framework appears to be in conflict with the 
requirement to ensure that the debtor stays in control, at least in part. 
The extra-judicial payment composition in Spain provides for the appointment of an independent 
insolvency mediator in commercial cases; this is a professional who must meet certain personal 
requirements and who receives remuneration as governed in express rules.75 Refinancing agreements 
do not require independent expert professionals as the procedures are developed and directed by the 
judicial authority. In view of article 5 of the PRD, the Spanish legislator will need to introduce 
procedures that leave the debtor in possession with the simple involvement or supervision in an advisory 
capacity of insolvency practitioners. However, in all these cases, the debtor can be considered to be in 
possession, as control of the business is retained. 
For both the Scheme of Arrangement and the CVA in England and Wales, insolvency practitioners play 
an important role, but they do not take over the running of the business as they would in an 
administration, leaving the debtor in possession. The new restructuring plan is likely to reflect the 
framework already provided by the Scheme of Arrangement. However, the provisions in the PRD state 
that an insolvency practitioner shall be assigned where there is a general stay, cross-class cram-down, 
or at the request of the creditor or debtors, so the new restructuring plan may need to account for this 
aspect should Brexit not occur.  
It should be noted that article 5(3) has some obligatory provisions that all Member States will need to 
accommodate. Namely, that a practitioner shall be appointed in a minimum of three circumstances: 
where there is a moratorium; when there is a cross-class cram-down; or at the request of the debtor or 
creditors. While a number of the Member States require the appointment of a practitioner in all 
restructuring circumstances, that does not necessarily deprive the debtor of possession and therefore is 
not contrary to this article. It depends entirely on the role assigned to that practitioner and what freedoms 
the debtor’s management continues to wield during the process. The appointment under article 5(3) may 
not (fully) transfer the right to administer the debtor's affairs to the insolvency practitioner appointed. 
article 5(2)2 only states that the IP tasks include “taking partial control over the assets or affairs of the 
debtor during negotiations”, without providing further details on the actual scope of such powers. So 
indeed, the preconditions mentioned here may only lead to a practitioner with powers similar to where 
the debtor remains in possession but under the supervision and some co-administrative powers of the 
insolvency practitioner. However, in those Member States that allow a full absence of practitioner 
guidance, these three elements will need to be incorporated.   
 
69 RL, s 39. 
70 RL, s 36. 
71 RL, s 129(2). 
72 Danish BA, s 11(a). 
73 Danish BA, s 12. 
74 Danish BA, s12(a) & 12(b).  
75 Law 22/2003 of 9 July, arts 232 et seq.  
 150 
 
The JCOERE Report 2 will explore in more depth the issues surrounding the responsibilities and 
requirements for the involvement of insolvency practitioners in the context of  
8.4 Rights in Rem (Question 10) 
 Introduction to the Concept of a Right in Rem 
Before the question as to whether the EIR Recast and the provisions of the PRD conflict with regards 
to the treatment of rights in rem, it is important first to define what is meant by this phrase. Conceptually, 
it seems to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but if one looks to original fundamental concepts, it 
can be defined thus:  
“Rights in rem may be defined in the following manner – ‘rights residing in persons and availing 
against other persons generally.’ Or they may be defined thus: ‘Rights residing in persons, and 
answering to duties incumbent upon other persons generally. By a crowd of modern civilians, jus 
in rem has been defined as follows: ‘facultas homini competens, sine respect ad certam 
personam,’ a definition I believe invented by Grotius.”76  
More simply stated, a right in rem is a “right against a thing”, meaning that it pertains to the rights held 
over a specific piece of property, such as a house in the case of a mortgage. Following the evolution of 
the concept of the legal person residing in a corporate entity, rights in rem are also now held by lenders 
and banks who engage in secured lending, which establishes a right owned by the person of the lending 
entity over the property against which the funds are secured.  
 Contributor Definitions of a Right in Rem 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 10.1 
How are rights in rem defined in your jurisdiction? Please describe a type of right in rem which 
arises in insolvency proceedings. 
In most jurisdictions, rights are classified as either real (in rem) or personal. Possession and ownership 
of a chattel are considered real rights with the main significance being that they survive the insolvency 
of the entity against which they are asserted so that the asset can be held against or reclaimed from the 
administrator or other insolvency practitioner in charge of the procedure. Goode explains that the 
distinction between real and personal rights may also be expressed as the distinction between property 
and obligation, i.e., between what I own and what I am owed.77 The common law in Ireland and 
elsewhere has always maintained this distinction strictly. A contract to transfer an asset is not the same 
as an actual transfer. Until the actual transfer is made, the transferee has no proprietary interest in the 
asset, merely a contractual right to have it transferred. So, if the transferor becomes insolvent before 
executing the transfer, the transferee’s status is just that of an unsecured creditor. The impact of this 
distinction is lessened by the intervention of equity and the development of equitable real rights under 
the common law, drawing a potential distinction to treatment of rights in rem in civil law countries, 
which do not generally use equity to extend interpretation and definition in law. Thus, in equity, the 
agreement to transfer is treated as if it was an actual transfer and the proprietary interest that is created 
is as effective as a transfer at law except that it will be defeated by a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the interest. Equitable proprietary rights play an important part in the creation of 
security in the provision of finance in commercial transactions.78 
The Italian jurisdiction defines rights in rem in line with what has been set out above: rights purported 
to bind a certain asset to guarantee the reimbursement of a certain claim.79 The French define it similarly 
as a right attached to an object or property, such as a fixed charge or a mortgage. The Dutch add that 
 
76 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (first published in 1885, 4th edn, John Campbell (ed), The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd 2005) a cited in A Kocourek ‘Rights in Rem’ (1919-1920) 68 U Pa L Rev 322. 
77 R M Goode, Commercial Law (Penguin 1995) 31. See also R M Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions’ (1987) 
103 LQR 433. 
78 Caterina Gardiner ‘National Report on the Transfer of Movables in Ireland’ in Wolfgang Faber & Brigitta Lurger (eds) National Reports on 
the Transfer of Movables in Europe: Volume 2 (Sellier Publishers 2009) 165-166. 
79 In Italy, rights in rem include a pegno (pledge), which is a right on a moveable asset granted by the debtor or by a third party, as a collateral 
for credit; an ipoteca (mortgage), a right on an immoveable asset or on some goods included in public registries as a guarantee for credit; and 
some special liens provided for by banking law.  
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such property rights cannot be infringed by a third party. The Polish definition aligns with that quoted 
above by Austin, including that such rights are effective against everyone (erga omnes) and cover 
typical rights in rem such as a hypothec, registered pledge, treasury pledge, pledge under civil law, 
maritime mortgage. The RL and BL also treats claims secured by a transfer of ownership of an asset, 
claim or other right to a creditor as a secured claim.”80 The Romanian and Spanish position largely 
reflects all of these elements. The most obvious right in rem that exists in insolvency is what most 
jurisdictions would consider a retention of title clause, wherein a creditor retains title over the property 
that has been delivered to the debtor but has not yet been paid for. While this may seem a simple means 
of protecting property by keeping it outside of the cumbersome collective recovery procedure, not every 
jurisdiction treats this as a right in rem. For example, in the Netherlands, a retention of title clause does 
not bestow upon the creditor a right in rem,81 whereas in the UK it is accepted that the purpose of a 
retention of title clause is to protect the property by keeping it outside of an insolvency procedure. In 
Romania, however, a hybrid approach is taken in which a creditor benefitting from a retention of title 
clause will be able to make its claim as a creditor holding a mortgage-like preference rather than by 
exercising the prerogatives of the property right on the subject matter of the clause.82 In order to avail 
of this, such a clause must be registered before the commencement of insolvency. In contrast, were such 
a clause treated like this in the UK (viewed as a charge and required to be registered), the clause would 
be rendered inoperable and the goods would be deemed to have been transferred and form a part of the 
insolvency estate. While the scope of this Project does not extend to a detailed analysis of the different 
treatment of retention of title clauses among the Member States, this is an important example of how 
the same legal mechanism can be treated very differently in different national systems.  
 A Right in Rem under the EIR Recast 
The EIR Recast discusses rights in rem in the Recitals, which is instructive in terms of how the concept 
is viewed under the Regulation:  
“There is a particular need for a special reference diverging from the law of the opening State in 
the case of rights in rem, since such rights are of considerable importance for the granting of 
credit. The basis, validity and extent of rights in rem should therefore normally be determined 
according to the lex situs and not be affected by the opening of insolvency proceedings. The 
proprietor of a right in rem should therefore be able to continue to assert its right to segregation 
or separate settlement of the collateral security.”83 
Thus, a right in rem clearly covers those cases in which security is held against collateral, such as fixed 
and floating charges in common law legal systems and other securities in civil law legal systems; 
essentially, this segregates those creditors from the operation of an insolvency procedure and allows 
such security holders to exercise their rights against the relevant collateral. Recital 69 goes on to 
recommend that the holders of a right in rem should also be exempt from the operation of a stay or 
moratorium. 
Rights in rem will often have procedural rights attached to them by virtue of the agreement granting the 
security, such as the right of a floating charge holder to proceed with a receivership or other type of 
insolvency procedure. Such procedures are governed by the law of the Member State in which 
preliminary proceedings are commenced insofar as they pertain to “the rights of creditors who have 
obtained partial satisfaction after the opening of insolvency proceedings by virtue of a right in rem.”84 
This indicates that a rights holder may have exercised their security in another Member State prior to 
the opening of preliminary proceedings, but has been unable to obtain full repayment locally, leaving 
them to rely on the outcome of preliminary insolvency proceedings and the law governing it to recover 
what remains. 
Finally, article 8 of the EIR Recast provides that:  
 
80 RL, art 151. 
81In Dutch law, a right of retention does not qualify as a right in rem. Therefore, it is argued that a Dutch right of retention falls outside the 
scope of Article 8 EIR (2015). See further Dutch Country Report, page 8. 
82 Law no 85/2014, art 123 para 6; See Romanian Country Report, page 5. 
83 EIR Recast, recital 68. 
84 EIR Recast, art 7(2)(i). 
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“The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third 
parties in respect of tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable assets, both specific assets 
and collections of indefinite assets as a whole which change from time to time, belonging to the 
debtor which are situated within the territory of another Member State at the time of the opening 
of proceedings.”85 
The article goes on to specify the particulars of what rights are implicated, including:  
“(a) the right to dispose of assets or have them disposed of and to obtain satisfaction from the 
proceeds of or income from those assets, in particular by virtue of a lien or a mortgage; 
(b) the exclusive right to have a claim met, in particular a right guaranteed by a lien in respect of 
the claim or by assignment of the claim by way of a guarantee;  
(c) the right to demand assets from, and/or to require restitution by, anyone having possession or 
use of them contrary to the wishes of the party so entitled;  
(d) a right in rem to the beneficial use of assets.”86 
Some would interpret this as effectively placing rights in rem outside of the reach of insolvency and 
restructuring procedures when those rights reside in a Member State other than the state of preliminary 
proceedings,87 with the consequence in principle being that the holder of the assets, although a part of 
the estate, will retain his rights in respect of the asset in question. Such a creditor should therefore be 
able to exercise the right to separate the security from the estate and, where necessary, realise the asset 
individually to satisfy his claim.88 That said, an alternative view is that article 8(1) specifies the opening 
of insolvency proceedings as shielding rights in rem from those procedures qualifying under article 1 of 
the EIR Recast. A restructuring plan is not, in effect, an opening of insolvency proceedings.  It is a 
separate measure with a separate mechanism for recognition and enforceability of judgments set out in 
article 32. While article 8 will protect creditors with a right in rem on assets of the debtor situated abroad, 
it would depend on the applicability of the EIR Recast to preventive restructuring plans. It is just a 
matter of whether Member States will or will not implement the PRD using a proceeding already 
included in that Annex or will activate the process to have it included therein. article 1(1) leaves this 
decision effectively to Member States. However, if the new preventive restructuring processes are 
scheme-like, deriving from company law, article 8 will not be able to provide protection as the EIR 
Recast would not cover such procedures.89 This view asserts that an interpretation of article 8 along 
these lines would not shield rights in rem on foreign assets from a restructuring at all.  
On the other hand, where a restructuring is carried out under a new procedure added to Annex A of the 
EIR Recast it would seem that rights in rem held in relation to assets situate in a second jurisdiction will 
be outside the restructuring process. And to be clear, the idea of article 8 shall not be expanded to any 
restructuring in proceedings not listed in Annex A.90 
The EIR does not itself define rights in rem in any detail and individual Member States may have 
different definitions for such a concept. There is a potential conflict between these provisions of the EIR 
Recast and the operation of provisions under the Preventive Restructuring Directive, if they purport to 
interfere with the ability of the holders of rights in rem to exercise their rights fully outside of relevant 
insolvency procedures. As noted in the Italian response, the provision of article 8 of the EIR Recast, 
since it allows to foreclose on a collateral situated in a different Member State, may pose a contrast 
between the restructuring framework under which a plan has been conceived and the other Member 
State’s rules on the enforcement of security rights (rights in rem).91 
 Rights in Rem under the PRD 
The PRD has introduced a number of provisions that may imperil rights in rem subject to restructuring 
procedures. For example, the stay of individual enforcement actions may potentially interfere with the 
 
85 EIR Recast, art 8(1). 
86 EIR Recast, art 8(2). 
87 Automatically recognised under EIR Recast, arts 19-21 
88 See Romanian Country Report, page 5. 
89 See German Country Report, page 4. 
90 Thank you to Professor Stephan Madaus for his synopsis of this viewpoint, which is common among German commentators. 
91 See Italian Country Report, page 6. 
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ability of a right holder to enforce its rights within the time frame stipulated by the contract. While a 
hindrance to enforcement, this does not affect property rights; by contrast, the majority rule provisions 
for the adoption of restructuring plans, and most significantly, the cross-class cram-down against 
dissenting classes of creditors have the potential to deprive rights holders of their full rights to 
repayment. The Directive does not give any particular special treatment to the position of secured 
creditors or rights in rem holders, as they are to be treated in a class and subject to a plan as agreed 
under the relevant procedure. This means that a plan may have the effect of impairing a secured 
creditor’s rights, depending on the priority rules applied. For example, the plan is agreed such that it 
deviates from absolute priority, a secured creditor may not benefit from full repayment whole more 
junior creditors are receiving something, which certainly impairs the rights they would normally have 
in a liquidation procedure. While theoretically restructuring procedures must respect the provision of 
article 8 of the EIR Recast and should not include secured creditors, the Directive appears to allow for 
the impairment of the rights of secured creditors,92 depending on how the frameworks are implemented 
within the Member States. That said, from a pragmatic perspective, excluding an important preferential 
creditor from the negotiations and approval of a preventive restructuring plan may lead to the 
ineffectiveness of the plan as a whole.93  
 Jurisdictions Allowing Potential Impairment of Rights in Rem 
JCOERE Questionnaire Question 10.2:  
Given the interaction of Article 8 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation (see Annex B) on the protection 
of rights in rem and Article 11 of the Preventive Restructuring Directive allowing for a cross-class 
cram-down, there is a potential conflict between the protection of rights in rem and the application 
of a cross-border cross-class cram-down.  
 
Consider Article 8 in Annex B and Article 11 in Annex A and indicate whether or not this conflict is 
present in your jurisdiction. Please provide examples, reference to policy, principles, and legislative 
texts where relevant.  
 
a) Ireland  
In Ireland, the most common exercise of a right in rem is the right of a secured lender to appoint a 
receiver over an asset or assets of a debtor. A receiver can either be court-appointed or appointed by a 
debenture holder, the latter being considerably more common; where it is the latter, the terms of the 
debenture (contract) will dictate the circumstances that give rise to his appointment. It is common to 
have a receiver appointed as a receiver-manager, despite the fact that this right has been severely 
curtailed under English law. A receiver-manager takes control of the business, effectively suspending 
the powers of the directors, and realises the assets in order to repay the creditor. Alternatively, he 
manages the business in order to salvage some or all of it. The debenture holder has a contractual right 
to appoint the receiver. Irish law, however, permits the displacement of the receiver by the appointment 
of an examiner provided that the receiver has not been in situ for more than 3 continuous days. 94￼ In 
this regard, the ability of a secured lender to exercise its rights over a secured asset is compromised by 
a rescue procedure. Whilst this might give rise to a conflict between the examinership procedure, the 
EIR Recast article 8 and the fact that examinership is registered in Annex A, this conflict will only arise 
in relation to assets situate outside the jurisdiction. 
b) Italy  
 
92 See Romanian Country Report, page 5. 
93 ibid. 
94 It is often the case that the company as debtor in possession applies to have an examiner appointed as a defensive mechanism to the 
appointment of a receiver.  Per Irish Companies Act, s 512(4) “The court shall not give a hearing to a petition if a receiver stands appointed 
… for a continuous period of at least 3 days prior to the date of the presentation of the petition.” This short “window of opportunity” has 
occasionally given rise to last minute petitions by companies for the appointment of an examiner; in Re Belohn & Merrow Ltd [2013] IEHC 
157 for example, the Receiver was appointed to Merrow Ltd – the sole registered shareholder of Belohn Ltd – on a Friday and when they 
became aware of this on the following Sunday, the directors of Merrow Ltd petitioned the court ex parte for the appointment of an examiner. 
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Italian law also provides for the automatic creation of certain rights in rem when parties enter into 
particular transactions or relationships. These liens concern, for instance, some tax claims and costs 
incurred to enforce against an asset in the context of a litigation. There are also cases in which creditors 
will automatically enjoy a general priority over all of the assets of a debtor. These are not technically 
considered rights in rem under the Italian framework, as the collateral is not represented by a specific 
asset or a collection of indefinite assets; rather, it is extended over an entire estate. Further, it is 
contended that these should not be considered rights in rem under the EIR Recast either 
The Italian moratorium extends to secured claims if granted upon the filing of a petition for judicial 
composition with creditors or the confirmation of a restructuring agreement.95 Deferral of payment 
under the plan, which provides for the continuation of the business, may last for a maximum of 2 years 
after confirmation. 96 This deferral of payment of secured claims may be imposed overcoming the dissent 
of relevant classes through a cross-class cram-down. 
It is also permitted in general under the Italian restructuring frameworks for the debtor to create a plan 
that pays a secured claim less than its face value, provided that a payment of at least equal value of the 
collateral is granted, essentially a case in which the creditor would be in no worse position if it were 
faced instead with liquidation. The deficiency in the claim can then be treated as an unsecured claim 
(described as a “bifurcation”). Significantly, the consent of the affected secured creditors is not required 
under the Italian framework. This is clearly out of keeping with the protection intended by article 8 of 
the EIR Recast.  
The right to enforce against the secured asset situated within the territory of another Member State, a 
right protected under article 8 of the EIR Recast, may allow the relevant secured creditor to use that 
asset as a hostage, whenever the disposal value (i.e., the value the debtor would bear to replace the asset) 
is significantly higher than the market value (i.e., the value the creditor would obtain foreclosing on the 
asset), and thereby obtain a higher recovery by threating foreclosure. This adds costs to the struggling 
business in terms of the need to replace the asset and potentially loss of revenue during the intervening 
period, which may threaten the success of a restructuring plan. In addition, the protection of article 8 
may put the creditor with the asset outside of the primary jurisdiction in a much stronger position than 
a creditor with property in the jurisdiction of procedure; article 8 does not offer the same protection in 
the latter case. Such a dynamic, especially if applicable on a plurality of assets or if the disposal value 
is much higher than the market value (in case of “tailor-made” assets etc.) will erode the margins 
available to successfully achieve a restructuring. The view of the Italian respondent is that this is clearly 
at odds with the purposes of the preventive restructuring framework. 
German insolvency law continues to respect security rights in terms of a priority in access to the value 
of encumbered assets. The process of liquidating the asset outside of insolvency proceedings and thus 
controlling its timing is only granted to the secured creditor where the asset is immovable, or the creditor 
is currently in possession of a moveable asset. If, however the debtor was in possession of a moveable 
asset, the right to foreclose is assigned to the insolvency practitioner who may sell the asset with 
proceeds going to the secured creditor, less a deduction of legal costs.  Still, even the enforcement of 
security rights outside of insolvency proceedings can be stayed in favour of securing a going concern 
of the debtor’s business in Germany. A German insolvency plan may even permanently modify security 
rights provided that the secured debtor agrees or receives the value achievable in a liquidation.  
According to Romanian insolvency legislation, the secured creditors have a general priority where the 
proceeds obtained from the sale of their duly perfected collateral are concerned. This is provided that 
such proceeds first satisfy taxes, fees, costs, expenses arising from the sale of the assets and claims of 
secured creditors which arise after the opening of the insolvency procedure (including the principal, 
interests and ancillary rights). If the secured creditors are not fully satisfied following the sale of their 
collateral, the outstanding amounts will be deemed to be unsecured claims. 
 
95 CCI, art 54 para 2.  
96 CCI, art 86 – only one year under the Insolvency Code, art 186 bis, although a longer deferral is allowed if secured creditors are given the 
opportunity to vote on the plan and the plan is confirmed by the court (possibly overcoming the dissent of the relevant classes of secured 
creditors, if the proposals complies with the requirements for cross-class cram-down). Under CCI, art 86 due to entry into force on August 
2020, a deferral of payment is allowed for a period of up to 2 years and, in all cases, secured creditors are entitled to vote on the plan (thus, no 
deferral of secured claims beyond 2 years seems to be allowed under the new rules).  
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The Austrian, Polish, Spanish, and Dutch positions are quite similar to the German approach. Rights 
cannot be infringed in an insolvency or restructuring, without express and unanimous consent by the 
secured creditors. Currently in France, there is no conflict in French insolvency law, though this could 
change following the implementation of a law under the Loi Pacte, which does not currently indicate if 
there will be a conflict with the protection of rights in rem under article 8. Similarly, if the UK introduces 
a new restructuring framework following on from the consultation, there may be a conflict with article 
8 and the eventual introduction of the cross-class cram-down, depending on the nature of the rights that 
are permitted to be infringed in a plan. As the UK does not currently espouse a cross-class cram-down 
element, this conflict is not at issue. However, given the willingness of the UK government to introduce 
this provision and its current application of majority rule in the Scheme of agreement, which can affect 
secured creditors, it is not likely that this conflict will be problematic in the UK. Further, given that the 
scheme is not covered by the EIR, the protection of rights in rem would not extend to plans derived 
under this procedure in any event. As the EIR Recast does not apply to Denmark, there is no conflict. 
Effectively, a cross-border restructuring in which a lender has a right in rem in a second jurisdiction, 
will access to the assets covered by the right be limited by the absolute terms of Art 8 of the EIR? Is this 
a significant practical issue?  
8.5 Conclusion and Transition 
Chapter 8 has given a synopsis of the first half of Part III of the JCOERE Questionnaire, focussing on 
thresholds of insolvency, debtor in possession as set out under article 5 of the PRD, and the 
interrelationship between article 8 of the EIR Recast protection rights in rem and the potential to impair 
secured creditors rights under the PRD. The concept of thresholds of insolvency is important as it is at 
this cusp that the availability of a preventive restructuring procedure over an insolvency procedure will 
be possible. Where these differ across Member State lines, other more flexible jurisdictions may be 
more attractive, leading to potential COMI shifting. While the PRD aims to reduce court and practitioner 
involvement, it has made this aspect broad in scope. This means that Member States have discretion to 
choose a higher level of involvement of courts, authorities, and practitioners, perhaps more than the 
spirit of the PRD may have initially intended. Finally, while the protection of rights in rem seem to be 
absolute under the EIR Recast as it relates to foreign property, the wording of the regulation does not 
necessarily cover secured property in the primary insolvency jurisdiction, which will mean potentially 
differential treatment of secured creditors across borders. As the PRD was aiming to approximate and 
harmonise Member State laws in preventive restructuring, the broad scope given to adopt its provisions 
may potentially fail to achieve this aim.  
The next Chapter will offer a simple conclusion of the discussions had in this Report to summarise the 
main ideas and findings. 
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9. Chapter 9: Conclusion of the JCOERE Project Report 1 
9.1  Introduction  
The first Report of the JCOERE Project has presented the context within which the project’s overall 
investigation of court-to-court co-operation in cross-border restructuring cases arises. It has considered 
preventive restructuring frameworks among the Member States along with that provided in the new 
Preventive Restructuring Directive. In order to fully understand the substantive and procedural issues 
associated with preventive restructuring frameworks that may cause obstacles to effective court-to-court 
cooperation, it was necessary to first explore how these are reflected in the contributing jurisdictions, 
within the PRD, and also within the debates and commentary surrounding the more controversial 
provisions common to advanced preventive restructuring frameworks. This first Report from the 
JCOERE project has therefore dealt with core substantive rules and some procedural aspects arising 
directly from preventive restructuring legal frameworks so that the overall JCOERE hypothesis may be 
addressed and considered in the second Report. This hypothesis is that given existing experience with 
restructuring (e.g. the Irish Examinership1 and the English Scheme of Arrangement) obstacles to court 
cooperation will arise from substantive rules which are particular to preventive restructuring and that in 
addition, some of these problems pertain to existing procedural obstacles which will be exacerbated in 
the preventive restructuring context. 
This Report contains 7 substantive chapters ranging from exploring issues arising from the comparative 
methodology adopted in the study, to the consideration of important concepts such as the regulation of 
cross-border insolvency and restructuring and on to academic commentary and debates around 
preventive restructuring. Since the financial crisis of 2006/07 there have been many changes to 
insolvency and restructuring frameworks at national level within the EU. However, these changes had 
remained broadly domestic in nature rather than achieving any substantive convergence of legal 
frameworks within the EU. It is a commonly shared belief that substantive harmonisation in insolvency 
law will always be difficult to achieve due to the range of differences in legal frameworks which are 
impacted by, or linked to, insolvency systems. Exceptionally, the PRD introduced an opportunity to 
harmonise one aspect of insolvency law, namely preventive restructuring.  Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
Report describe the policy discussions surrounding this significant step in the EU.  
Following on from that discussion, the three core chapters of this report, namely Chapters 6-8, present 
a synthesis and comparative discussion of the various jurisdiction-based contributors’ responses to the 
JCOERE Questionnaire which focussed on the state of play regarding restructuring in each jurisdiction. 
Based on the experience of some European jurisdictions with restructuring, in particular in Ireland and 
the UK some key aspects of the PRD were used to formulate the JCOERE Questionnaire. 
Following our research and analysis of the questionnaire responses, we argue that although the PRD 
represents an attempt to harmonise approaches to preventive restructuring and to introduce such 
measures in jurisdictions that do not yet have them, the scope of derogation, and the differences in views 
at domestic policy level regarding the more controversial provisions, mean that it is unlikely to achieve 
close harmonisation upon implementation throughout the Member States. The following Chapter will 
summarise the chief findings in this Report. 
9.2  Summary of Findings 
 Preventive Restructuring Terminology 
Chapter 2 of this Report set out commonly used terms (in English) but also explored some of the 
discrepancies in the meaning of some terms that are used by several jurisdictions, but at times have 
slightly (or in some cases) significantly different meanings. There is no need to summarise this 
 
1 Irish Companies Act 2014, part 10 “Examinerships”. 
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Chapter’s findings here, apart from pointing out that these terms were identified by the contributors who 
responded to the JCOERE Questionnaire. During the analysis of these responses, it became clear that 
sometimes seemingly similar terms are used in different jurisdictions to mean different things, which 
could present challenges to harmonisation and could also cause confusion when communicating across 
borders.  Three aspects of the PRD which we considered seem to have engendered quite a bit of 
confusion in a comparative context. These are the threshold question, namely when the preventive 
restructuring procedure will be available and whether this ought to be available in situations which are 
described in some jurisdictions as pre-insolvency. The consequent characterisation restructuring as 
preventive or pre-insolvency seems to cause both linguistic and conceptual difficulties. A second area 
relates to the involvement of the IP in a debtor in possession model of rescue. Some contributors seem 
to see this as a binary issue, either the IP is in control or the debtor is in control, whereas this was not 
seen in such binary terms by others. Finally, the involvement of a court or administrative authority has 
engendered considerable divergence of opinion. 
 The Regulation of Cross-Border Insolvency and Restructuring in the EU 
The Chapter on the regulation of cross-border insolvency and restructuring in the EU explored the way 
that cross-border insolvencies are currently regulated within the EU along with a description of this 
development over time. By the time the EIR Recast was passed, there had been multiple attempts to 
agree to insolvency conventions that would aid in cross-border insolvencies, beginning in the 1970s. 
These attempted conventions often failed due to a lack of unanimity among the states negotiating them. 
It took the EU Institutions negotiating together to create a regulation that could begin to co-ordinate 
complex insolvency procedures across the Member States.  
While the EIR and its Recast did not harmonise insolvency or restructuring frameworks in any 
substantive sense, they have succeeded in creating a regulatory framework that helps to manage 
complex cross-border cases efficiently by introducing rules of jurisdiction and instituting rules about 
the universal nature of primary proceedings, with the option to file secondary domestic proceedings 
where viewed as necessary to protect domestic interests. Thus, the key features of the EIR Recast 
include rules of procedural uniformity, the application of the COMI test to establish primary jurisdiction, 
and the scope of application of the Regulation by reference to procedures situated in Annex A. These 
provisions aimed in part to prevent forum shopping, though the COMI test can still allow for shifts if 
certain criteria are met.  
Legitimate forum shopping is not likely to be further reduced without real substantive harmonisation 
within the EU.  However, empirically throughout this first stage of our research it did not seem to be 
the case that whatever the level of forum shopping there currently is in the EU was a barrier to co-
operation in insolvency matters. 
The effect of the EIR Recast seemed to be clearly understood in the surveys and discussions which we 
conducted with members of the judiciary and practising professions. All in all, the EIR Recast seemed 
to have achieved its policy aims. The provisions on recognition are clear. As for co-operation, it did not 
seem that the issue of positive co-operation and consequently the obligations imposed by the EIR Recast 
arose frequently in reality. It is not clear how the PRD at the moment how will affect this status quo. 
 The Context of Preventive Restructuring in the EU 
Chapter 4 examined the theoretical and conceptual development of preventive restructuring, pre-
insolvency, and some of the more controversial provisions common to advanced preventive 
restructuring procedures. This Chapter began with a discussion of the theoretical framework within 
which preventive restructuring has developed, beginning as it does from a basis in insolvency law and 
theory. It considered the well-known creditors’ bargain theory introduced by Thomas Jackson and 
Douglas Baird. The traditionalist insolvency theory is then contrasted with the creditors’ bargain as it 
relates to rescue and rehabilitation goals, while the communitarian and insolvency choice theories 
developed by Korobkin set the scene for a more stakeholder oriented approach, which it could be said 
more closely reflects the aims of preventive restructuring with its emphasis on job protection and the 
broader policy issues relating to capital markets as outlined by the EU.  A discussion of the justification 
for corporate rehabilitation is given, focusing on the commonly accepted reasoning that more value can 
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be saved if economic entities are kept intact, rather than sold off piecemeal as would be done in a straight 
liquidation. 
Within the theoretical context, the conceptual evolution of preventive restructuring within the EU was 
discussed in terms of contrasting academic and scholarly commentary on the subject. One of the key 
debates in this area revolves around the conceptual problems associated with the use of a collective 
proceeding for a company in financial distress when that company is not actually formally insolvent. 
As described above in relation to Chapter 2 the threshold question  revolves around the idea that the 
justification for imposing a collective proceeding in an insolvency (or insolvent restructuring) procedure 
arises from the fact that the assets are insufficient and would otherwise be dissipated in an inefficient 
manner to the detriment of all creditors. When a company is not yet formally in a situation of insufficient 
funds, this justification is not obvious to some commentators. However, this problem may be mitigated 
by the fact that some view “pre-insolvency” as essentially an insolvency situation in which the likely 
outcome is a formal insolvency unless a restructuring takes place. It is our view that there is a debate 
being conducted at cross-purposes aggravated by misunderstandings and mistranslations of different 
legal systems, a problem inherent in comparative contexts. The Chapter goes on to discuss the definition 
of preventive restructuring as it is set out in the PRD, which includes pre-insolvency as well as situations 
where there is “a likelihood of insolvency”2 with the distinction being only that the procedure instead 
takes place outside of what would be considered formal insolvency procedures. This question is the 
subject matter of contributor responses which are described in Chapter 8. It will be returned to in the 
second JCOERE Report. 
A brief discussion of the evolution of the PRD was also presented to lend additional context to the 
exposition of the PRD discussed in Chapter 5. This section discusses some of the earlier influences on 
the introduction of preventive restructuring occurring outside of the institutional negotiations, 
particularly a report by INSOL Europe. It also explains some of the background influences leading to 
the introduction of a harmonising directive for preventive restructuring frameworks, namely the 
financial crisis. 
The more controversial provisions were discussed in terms of the debate and commentary surrounding 
them. These include the stay or moratorium; intra-class cram-down; cross-class cram-down; and the 
protection and priority of new and interim financing. The stay or moratorium is considered a central 
aspect of preventive restructuring as it avoids the rush to court by creditors for a period of time while 
negotiation can take place. While true that a stay interferes with creditors’ rights and potentially creates 
a means of abusing the procedure, this is mitigated by the obligation to provide a means to lift a stay. 
The protection of new and interim financing is also considered a somewhat controversial provision as 
it also interferes with creditor priorities. However, this provision has been recognised in established 
processes as being necessary to ensure the success of a restructuring plan. By providing that new 
financing will not be subject to normal insolvency rules such as avoidance actions and existing priority 
rules, new lenders can be encouraged to provide funds. 
Majority rule within classes is also justified as to require unanimity would give stronger creditors a right 
of veto over a restructuring plan. The cross-class cram-down has provided European insolvency 
academics with a rich field of debate around the relative values of absolute as opposed to relative 
priority. While the academic debate continues and is likely to influence lawmakers in some jurisdictions, 
the PRD allows a broad scope to adopt either of these tests in addition to a test of unfair prejudice. 
Absolute priority is supported as it preserves pre-insolvency entitlements and prevents an erosion of 
creditors’ rights by trying to force through a plan. However, absolute priority in its pure form is viewed 
as too rigid in an effective restructuring framework. Thus, the Commission introduced a relative priority 
rule, although it would seem that this differs from what is considered relative priority in the United 
States, according to some. Regardless of the unresolved nature of the debate, the PRD provides for a 
menu of choices to ensure the fairness of cramming down a plan against dissenting creditors, including 
one of relative priority.  
 
2  PRD, art 4(1):  
“Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, debtors have access to a preventive restructuring framework that 
enables them to restructure, with a view to preventing insolvency and ensuring their viability, without prejudice to other solutions for avoiding 
insolvency, thereby protecting jobs and maintaining business activity. “ 
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The consideration of these four controversial provisions provide context for both the discussions in the 
exposition of the directive in Chapter 5 as well as for the focus of the JCOERE Questionnaire, discussed 
in Chapters 6-8. 
 Exposition of the Preventive Restructuring Directive 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the PRD, which came into effect on 20th June 2019 and is due for 
implementation by 17th July 2021, is the culmination of years of communication and negotiation 
between the various EU institutions. Its primary specific goal was to harmonise certain aspects of EU 
insolvency and preventive restructuring law with an overall aim of promoting and encouraging cross-
border investment and company expansion. This aim was somewhat unsurprising given the financial 
upheaval within the EU at this time. To achieve agreement from the various member states, however, 
considerable compromises had to be made, some of which may have arguably weakened the overall 
goal of the Directive. Chapter 5 outlines the historical development of the PRD, with the goal of giving 
a clear context for Chapters 6 – 8 and in particular, to explain some of the perceived resistance to change 
within some member states. 
The Chapter highlights the changes made by the various bodies to the Commission Proposal (2016) by 
the time the Directive was signed in 2019, however, the historical analysis actually begins with a report 
presented to the European Commission by the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs in 
2011. This interaction, in addition to the response from the Commission in 2012 and the Commission 
Recommendation in 2014, presents the background for the subsequent Commission Proposal. Many of 
the key aims and goals of the Directive were stated and repeated throughout the process. The difficulty 
in harmonising law of this nature across the Member States, is explained in the context of the more 
‘controversial’ aspects of the PRD, namely, the stay of individual enforcement actions, the protection 
of new finance, decreased court formality, and the cross-class cram-down. Examining the development 
of the articles relevant to these provisions provides important background for Chapters 6 – 8. 
As implementation of the Directive is not due until 2021 it is difficult to predict how the controversial 
provisions as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 will impact on recognition and co-operation under the EIR 
Recast. With regards to implementation, there is also a prospect that new frameworks may avoid 
inclusion in Annex A of the EIR Recast in order to retain flexibility to attract cross-border restructuring 
cases. As the PRD does not require that all frameworks are included in the Annex, nor does it require 
that the Annex A criteria are satisfied by the frameworks, there is scope for Member States to effectively 
avoid the more restrictive COMI tests should they avoid inclusion. Such procedures could be introduced 
to compete with the UK Scheme of Arrangement, which is not an Annex A procedure, and which post-
Brexit may no longer be a preferred jurisdiction, opening the way for competing procedures, such as 
the Irish Examinership and new Dutch WHOA procedure. (That said, the Irish Examinership procedure 
as with the French sauve garde procedure is listed in Annex A). Despite the potential lack of 
harmonisation of restructuring frameworks and the continued possibilities for forum shopping outside 
of the EIR Recast, the introduction of more efficient restructuring frameworks will still be beneficial to 
the EU as a whole.  
 The JCOERE Questionnaire: Chapters 6-8 
Chapters 6-8 of this Report provide a synthesis of the 11 contributors’ responses to the JCOERE 
Questionnaire, the purpose of which was to explore substantive and procedural rules arising in the 
context of preventive restructuring, which may be challenging in terms of cross-border restructuring 
cases and in terms of harmonisation and implementation of the PRD. The challenges these present to 
court-to-court co-operation will be discussed in Report 2 of the JCOERE Project. The questionnaire 
focused on specific substantive (and procedural) rules arising in a typical restructuring process, 
particularly those that seem controversial in nature. These three chapters focussed on the substantive 
provisions of preventive restructuring in the contributing jurisdictions and how they measure up to the 
new PRD, with some discussion of procedural issues in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 6 began by introducing the methodology surrounding the use of the questionnaire which began 
with the responses to the JCOERE Questionnaire. However, we also followed up a number of times for 
clarifications and additions in light or the original responses, along with a final review and approval. 
This was needed due to the challenging nature of comparative law in the context of multiple jurisdictions 
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as well as engaging with contributors from different professional backgrounds. We hope that the fact 
we engaged with follow up dialogue from our contributors enriches the comparative methodology which 
the report adopted. The responses to part I of the questionnaire were also discussed in Chapter 6, which 
interrogated the existing preventive restructuring frameworks in the contributing Member States as well 
as the aims and functions of their insolvency and restructuring systems. These responses have helped to 
determine how each jurisdiction’s preventive restructuring (or insolvent restructuring) frameworks 
relate to the terms of the PRD.  
Part II of the JCOERE Questionnaire3 queried the substantive aspects of preventive restructuring, asking 
the contributors to examine whether specific PRD-style provisions existed in their preventive 
restructuring frameworks, describe them, and identify what changes, if any, would be needed to bring 
their legal provisions into line with the PRD. While some Member States did not have truly preventive 
procedures, with restructuring instead occurring during an insolvency proceeding, the contributors were 
asked to respond with reference to comparable frameworks. The Member States that have contributed 
to the JCOERE Questionnaire vary significantly in terms of (1) the existence of preventive restructuring 
procedures; (2) the provisions common to preventive restructuring, which may currently be associated 
with insolvency or insolvent restructuring or reorganisation procedures; and (3) the perspective on 
certain key concepts and principles that are common to preventive restructuring.  
The key provisions explored in Part II of the questionnaire as synthesised in Chapter 7 included the stay 
or moratorium, its existence and duration including extensions, as well as whether this stay was 
revocable by a court.  The cross-class cram-down also generated an important discussion, which 
required a discussion of the various criteria required for confirmation and approval under the PRD. 
Rules pertaining to both the adoption and confirmation of restructuring plans had to be examined, 
including the ability to vote on a plan as well as what conditions were present that could exclude certain 
creditors from voting; including principles surrounding class formation and recognition; the 
examination of voting rights; and the application of majority rule within classes. These were necessary 
precursors to consider leading up to the discussion of the cross-class cram-down. Few jurisdictions 
provide for a cross-class cram-down in a preventive restructuring procedure and not all even have it in 
their insolvent restructuring procedure. This provision appears therefore to be one of the greater 
challenges to implementation. A current academic debate revolves around the menu of rules that can be 
applied to confirm a plan against dissenting classes of creditors. There are a variety of opinions on which 
rules are appropriate and most jurisdictions have not yet decided which they will apply when they come 
to implement the PRD.  
The provision of interim and new financing was also queried with the contributors as this is a vital 
element for the success of preventive restructuring plans. The provision of protection from claw-back 
manoeuvres, liability for lending, as well as the potential to apply a super priority to such loans in 
repayment is a vital piece of the restructuring puzzle. The contributing jurisdictions take a varied 
approach to this concept, with views that it, along with aspects of the cross-class cram-down could lead 
to abuse of process and moral hazard. However, it is also accepted by others that this is an unavoidable 
aspect of preventive restructuring if the Member States are to create or adjust procedures that will be 
effective at rescuing companies from insolvency.  
Part III of the JCOERE Questionnaire examined specific procedural aspects that could arise in relation 
to preventive restructuring frameworks. This part of the questionnaire was divided into two parts, the 
second of which will be dealt with in JCOERE Report 2 (the role of judicial or administrative 
authorities). Chapter 8 focussed on the jurisdictional approaches to the threshold of insolvency, which 
is important as it is at this cusp that the availability of, and accessibility to, a preventive restructuring 
procedure over an insolvency procedure will be possible. A right of locus standi in relation to preventive 
restructuring frameworks may therefore differ despite the fact that the PRD aims at harmonisation in 
this area. It also discussed contributor responses in relation to the requirement for insolvency 
practitioners in restructuring processes, for which there is currently a range of approaches, some, such 
as Ireland and Italy, requiring a practitioner to be appointed under all circumstances. Chapter 8 also 
explores whether the perceived legislative conflict between the EIR Recast on the protection of rights 
in rem and the introduction in the PRD of provisions that potentially interfere with these rights in both 
 
3 See Annex 2 of this Report for the full JCOERE Questionnaire.  
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the intra- and cross-class cram-down may produce a conflict in practice that could also interfere with 
the obligation to co-operate. While the protection of rights in rem seem to be absolute under the EIR 
Recast as it relates to foreign property, the wording of the regulation does not necessarily cover secured 
property in the primary insolvency jurisdiction, which will mean potentially differential treatment of 
secured creditors across borders. As the PRD was aiming to approximate and harmonise Member State 
laws in preventive restructuring, the broad scope given to adopt its provisions may potentially fail to 
achieve this aim.  Where these differ across Member State lines, other more flexible jurisdictions may 
be more attractive, leading to potential COMI shifting.  
9.3  Conclusion and Introduction to JCOERE Report 2 
Report 1 has explored preventive restructuring in relation to existing domestic provisions and as 
presented within the PRD through discussion of academic and scholarly commentary and debate, a 
survey of specialists in 11 jurisdictions, and a synthesis of responses to establish where serious 
divergences may exist. Such divergences are not only challenges to implementation but may also 
challenge the recognition provisions under the EIR Recast because of the potential exclusion of 
restructuring frameworks from Annex A. Once outside the EIR Recast the obligations for co-operation 
as specified in the Regulation are not applicable. However, even if domestic preventive restructuring 
provisions are included there will be challenges to court-to-court cooperation arising from the provisions 
we have discussed in this report. These issues will be further considered in the second JCOERE Report. 
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10. Annex 1: Additional Submissions Contributing to the Exposition of the 
Preventive Restructuring Directive 
The following are submissions from various groups and committees which contribute to the rich 
conversation about the PRD; however, when these contributions were included in Chapter 5 itself, it 
was felt that they compromised its flow and clarity. As such, they have been included here in Annex 1 
for readers who wish to delve further into the development of the PRD.  
 The Experts Group on Restructuring and Insolvency Law (2016) 
Following on from the lack of reaction to its Recommendation, the Commission established the Expert 
Group on Restructuring and Insolvency Law – hereafter ‘the Expert Group’ or ‘the Group’– which met 
a number of times throughout 2016. It was comprised of over 20 leading academics and practitioners 
from 12 EU countries and its function was to discuss various aspects of insolvency law and more 
specifically, to focus on how the Commission Recommendation may be amended, thereby making it 
more effective across the EU and leading to more legal certainty.1 
The first meeting of the Expert Group took place on 14th January 2016, at which the members discussed 
the need for a definition of insolvency, the early warning system and directors’ liability and 
disqualification. Much of the material discussed at that meeting was outside the scope of this particular 
report; interestingly, however, on the issue of a common definition of insolvency, the Expert Group did 
not view the matter in the same way as the European Central Bank, as discussed previously, in that there 
was no consensus amongst the members as to the need for a common definition.2  
Amongst other matters, the issues of protection for new financing and the stay of individual enforcement 
actions were considered at the second meeting of the Expert Group. There was no consensus amongst 
the members as to the extent to which new financing should be protected, however concern was 
expressed that secured creditors may be prejudiced by the preferential treatment of new financiers in 
subsequent insolvency proceedings. One interesting point to note was the contention that the protection 
of new financing should have a time limit, after which such finance would not receive preferential 
treatment if new insolvency proceedings were commenced. On the issue of the stay, the Group 
emphasized the importance of the restructuring plan having a “reasonable prospect of the success”, 
stating that this should be the test used by the courts in considering the application. On other aspects, 
such as whether the stay should be automatically ordered or on specific request of the debtor, there was 
a lack of consensus amongst the participants.  
A more comprehensive discussion relating to the stay took place at the third meeting of the Group; the 
experts were of the view that a debtor should be able to request a stay where individual enforcement 
actions would negatively impact on the restructuring process, however it was thought by some members 
that the stay should only be granted in circumstances where the negotiations have a reasonable prospect 
of success and do not unfairly prejudice creditor's interests.3 Interestingly, on the matter of the duration 
of the stay, the Group disagreed with the Recommendation – and consequently, the eventual text of the 
Directive – on the duration of the stay, as members advocated for a duration of two months instead of 
four. In terms of lifting the stay, the Group was of the view that the stay could be lifted at the request of 
 
1 Minutes Expert Group Meeting – 14/01/2016 p.3; “[t]he view shared by the majority of the experts is to focus on how the Insolvency 
Recommendation may be improved as to provide more legal certainty and more binding force in Member States.” 
2 Those who were in favour of a common definition were of the view that it would increase legal predictability and consistency in early 
restructuring across Member States. Those opposed to a common definition viewed it as unnecessary for accessing early restructuring, instead 
many viewed consistency in the elements which trigger restructuring as the best way forward. 
3 The use of the word “only” is added by the author, as it seems to be implied in the meeting minutes but not expressly stated.  
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a majority of the creditors involved in the restructuring process or by a single (class of) creditor(s) if it 
was unfairly prejudicial. The issue of decreased court involvement / greater flexibility within the 
restructuring process was also discussed with a majority of the Group opining that debtors should be 
able to begin restructuring without the need to immediately open court proceedings, but with the 
appointment of a “competent and well-trained” mediator or supervisor.  
At the fourth meeting of the Expert Group, the members discussed a number of key points including 
cram-down and protection of new finance.4 It is worth noting at this point that it was unclear if the 
Group reached a consensus on many of the issues discussed, as the report often refers to “some 
members” as opposed to “the experts”, “the majority of members” or “the Group”. On the issue of cram-
down, the Group were in favour of a provision which would allow Member States to avoid “a hold out 
from 'out-of-the-money' shareholders”; as such, the members discussed 'cross-class cram-down' with 
“appropriate safeguards” as one mechanism of avoiding such a ‘hold out’.5 The Group appeared to have 
quite a comprehensive discussion on the matter of protection for new financing. They discussed granting 
super-priority status to new financing subject to court confirmation and while some members were in 
favour of this approach, there was a divergence of views regarding how this should be reflected in the 
law;  
“some members of the group expressed … that the new instrument should not entail too many 
details on this issue, just providing for a general rule on protection of new finance in case of 
liquidation...others were in favour of providing for more details, in order for the [Member State] 
to be able to implement correctly the legislation.”6 
The experts advocated for a distinction to be made between ‘new financing’ and ‘interim financing’, 
however, they stopped short of agreeing definitions of new and interim finance. Instead, some of the 
members opined that interim finance should be understood as “the money necessary to enable the debtor 
to negotiate a plan with its creditors”. Some members of the group went on to suggest that interim 
financing should receive some protection, just not super-priority status. The Expert Group then 
proceeded to identify some key questions related to new and interim financing: 
• When should protection be granted for interim financing; should it be the date of the hearing 
for granting the stay, or when a mediator has been appointed by a court, or any step which 
indicates clearly that the debtor has entered into a restructuring process? 
• Should protection be granted for 'new equity money'? 
• Should the protection of new financing be granted for a limited period? 
Little of the content of meetings 5 and 6 of the Group is relevant for the purposes of this report, however 
the stay was discussed once again.7 The majority of the Group advocated for a stay of short duration, 
which would not exceed 4 months save in exceptional circumstances, where there would be a possibility 
of extension. It is interesting to note that the Group theorised that longer time periods “would just create 
unwanted incentives for debtors without raising the chances of agreement in practice”. 
 
4 The matters of the stay and judicial involvement were also discussed but former discussion was limited to whether the stay should only apply 
to past unpaid claims or to both unpaid claims and current obligations and the latter to judicial involvement in the context of the confirmation 
of a restructuring plan, where it appeared to be the view of the experts that court confirmation was necessary is all cases where there was 
interference with the rights of dissenting creditors. 
5 The Group also proposed an alternative  solution; a provision “by which the liability of directors and/or shareholders may be sought in 
subsequent insolvency proceedings if there is an attempt to reach an agreement bearing in mind that in preventive restructuring it remains 
difficult to assess whether shareholders would be out-of-the money in case of liquidation(as the debtor should not be insolvent to enter into a 
preventive restructuring process under the scope of the future instrument).” 
6 Expert Group Meeting 4, 4 
7 The conversation regarding whether future EU restructuring matters could come within the scope of the recast insolvency regulation was 
interesting, as the Group noted the requirement within the recast EIR that proceedings be public. The Group expressed concern that this 
requirement that the restructuring procedure be conducted in “public” could undermine one of key factors which determines the success of a 
preventive restructuring process namely the confidentiality of the negotiations. The importance of preventing debtors and certain creditors 
from forum shopping was also highlighted. 
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Meeting 7 saw the Group revisit the issues of the stay, cram-down and protection for new finance, 
amongst a number of other matters. The experts, once again, reaffirmed their position that the stay 
should be short – an initial period of three months8 – and extended in the case of complex restructurings. 
As outlined earlier, it was interesting to note the “strong concerns” of certain experts that the stay would 
be open to abuse and their reference to the “moral hazard problem”.9 There was divergence between the 
experts as to whether the stay should be automatic and general. The same experts who expressed 
concerned regarding abuse also stated that the stay should be neither automatic nor general, whereas 
other members were of the view that the stay should be automatic at first, otherwise it would be 
“cumbersome for a court to determine if there are reasonable prospects of success of the restructuring”. 
The Group also unanimously agreed that nothing should prevent the debtor from paying his creditors 
during the stay period. 
Cram-down was discussed as one possible mechanism of ensuring that the adoption of a restructuring 
plan would not be unreasonably prevented by certain parties in the context of the treatment of out of 
money shareholders in the restructuring process.10 From the perspective of this report, it was interesting 
to see that some of the Group were hesitant to make cramming down in such cases mandatory and noted 
constitutional issues such as “infringement of property rights” as potential conflict. On the issue of 
priority of the financier, the Group agreed that new and interim finance should be encouraged via 
provisions to exempt them from avoidance actions in subsequent insolvency proceedings and from civil 
and criminal liability in subsequent insolvency, unless there was fraud. There was, however, no 
consensus on whether the regulation needed more specifics regarding the ranking of new financiers in 
subsequent insolvency proceedings, e.g. they should be ranked senior to unsecured creditors, they 
should receive priority status, etc.11 
At the 9th and final meeting of the Expert Group,12 the issues of the stay and cram-down were revisited.13 
On the matter of the stay, the position of the Group appeared to be largely the same as it had been in 
previous meetings.14 They reiterated their concerns on the link between the “moral hazard problem” and 
the length of the (extension of the) stay and advocated, once again, for the duration of the stay to be of 
a limited period and that any extension would be “granted under stricter conditions”. On the issue of 
cross-class cram-down, the Group definitively summarised its position as one of being in favour of 
cramming down on dissenting creditors “as long as the best interest of creditors test is respected” and 
in favour of cross-class cram-down “as long as at least one class of creditors votes for the plan and the 
absolute priority rule is respected”. The experts also, once again, raised the issue of the protection of 
property rights in relation to shareholders, however, where the shareholders form a class for the purposes 
of voting, they should be subject to cross-class cram-down rules.  
Lastly, the Group, once again, discussed the matter of confidentiality in the negotiation process. There 
was no consensus amongst the experts as to whether confidentiality should be mandatory in the process. 
Some experts viewed confidentiality in the negotiation of restructuring plans as essential to ensuring 
that the success of the restructuring plan was not compromised. As such, it was their view that 
confidentiality should be guaranteed.15 Interestingly, other members opined that once there is court 
 
8 This duration was most desirable according to the majority. 
9 Broadly speaking, moral hazard occurs when a party takes increased risks because they are aware that another party will bears the cost of 
those risks. 
10 Other mechanisms included shareholders’ liability in cases where they reject the restructuring plan frivolously and preventing the out of 
money shareholders from voting. 
11 Some of the experts viewed better protection for new financing to be necessary to ensure the success of a restructuring plan. Others were 
hesitant to mandate more increased protection for new finance because of “potential repercussion to securities, credit markets and capital 
requirements for banks”. 
12 At meeting 8, the Expert Group discussed rules for group companies, ‘safe harbour’ provisions relating to avoidance actions and new rules 
on second chance, however, none of these issues are directly linked to the specific focus of this report.  
13 Protection for interim financing was also briefly discussed, as well as a number of other issues not directly relevant to this report such as, 
Ipso Facto clauses, third party releases and minimum standards for Insolvency Practitioners. 
14 With that said, comments from individual experts were minuted. One expert was of the view that protection from avoidance actions for 
interim financing should only be given when the negotiations yield a court confirmed plan. This view did not appear to be popular with other 
members. 
15 It is worth noting that the “problematic issue of the relationship of this legislative instrument with EIR” was also highlighted in the context 
of this discussion.   
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involvement, there would be publicity/opening of proceedings for the purposes of Insolvency 
Regulation and as such, confidentiality should not always be applicable. Furthermore, they added that 
a requirement for confidentiality may conflict with other laws, for example where the debtor is subject 
to laws for listed companies.16  
 National Parliament Submissions to the European Parliament 
The first opinion on the Commission proposal to be received by the European Parliament came from 
Dáil Éireann, the Irish Parliament, via article 6 of Protocol (No. 2), which states:  
“Any national Parliament …may …within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft 
legislative act …send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft …does not comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity.”17 
In line with the internal workings of the Dáil, a Joint Committee was created to consider if the proposed 
directive complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.18 It found that the proposed 
directive was in conflict with the aforementioned principles on a number of grounds. At 3.2, the 
Committee opined that the proposal breached the principle of subsidiarity in seeking to harmonise the 
substantive law of Member States and specifically referenced what it described as the “prescriptive 
approach on both substantive and procedural aspects” of insolvency law. The Committee referenced the 
requirement that Member States provide for preventive restructuring frameworks contained in article 4, 
the “detailed conditions for Member States to fix a stay on enforcement actions pending restructuring” 
contained in article 6 and the minimum conditions for cross-class cram-down contained in article 11. 
The Committee acknowledged that although Irish law already had many of the features contained in the 
proposed directive, its approach was quite different on some of the more prescriptive provisions; as 
such, the Committee opined that the proposal may affect the delicately-struck balance between debtors 
and creditors, which individual Member States strike with “reference to specific cultural, social and 
economic factors”.  
At 3.4 the Committee expressed concern about the goal of the proposed directive to limit the 
involvement of the courts in insolvency matters. First, it expressed its unease at the use of the words 
“necessary” and “proportionate”, opining that these words are open to a range of interpretations. 
Arguably, however, this flexibility of interpretation by the individual Member State contradicts the 
concern relating to the “prescriptive approach” taken by the proposal, which the Committee expressed 
earlier in the submission. Consistent with the concerns expressed by the Expert Group, the Committee 
noted the impact that the insolvency process can have on the property rights of creditors which, without 
a high level of judicial oversight, may raise questions as to consistency of the proposal with Bunreacht 
na hEireann (the Irish Constitution).19 
Interestingly, at 3.7, the Committee expressed concern that the independence of the judiciary, provided 
for by the Irish Constitution, may be compromised by the requirements for specialised training of judges 
and for Member States to ensure that proceedings are dealt with in an efficient manner.20 One could 
argue, however, that the qualification contained in article 25, namely “[w]ithout prejudice to judicial 
 
16 It is worth noting that some experts differentiated between the adoption of a restructuring plan and the contents of that plan for the 
purposes of confidentiality.  
17 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - PROTOCOLS - Protocol (No 2) on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
18 The Joint Committee is comprised of members of the Dáil (Parliament) and the Seanad (Senate). 
19 The Irish Constitution explicitly safeguards property rights; see arts 40.3.2 & 43. Citing the distinguishing of business and personal debts in 
relation to sole traders, the Committee also noted the potential for the property rights of lending institutions to be affected if they no longer 
have full recourse against both the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial assets of a sole trader. In view of the concern expressed for the 
rights of lending institutions, it is somewhat ironic that Irish law provides for the displacement of a receiver – generally appointed by a financial 
institution – if examinership proceedings are commenced within a designated timeframe, thereby denying the financial institution full recourse. 
In that way, Irish law already quite substantially affects the rights of financial institutions. Also, it is worth noting that the link made between 
constitutional property rights and financial institutions is quite tenuous, as Irish constitutional rights do not attach to an entity, only to an 
individual.  
20 The Committee contended this on the basis that Irish law does not dictate how the courts operate. 
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independence”, should alleviate any related concerns. The Committee also viewed the requirement to 
collect data on the relevant procedures, contained in article 29, to be unduly arduous, as “a significant 
number of informal arrangements are made …between debtors and creditors, no details of which are 
maintained”.  
In total, national submissions were received from Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy and the Czech 
Republic. Germany, through the Bundesrat, issued a lengthy opinion.21  
 EMPL – Workers’ Rights 
As outlined earlier in Chapter 5, the EMPL Committee proposed multiple amendments with a view to 
strengthening the position of workers. For example, the EMPL Committee advocated for a specific 
reference to “workers representatives” in Recitals 1322 and 1623 and for a specific reference to the right 
of workers in Recital 2.24 The Committee also sought to create new recitals such as:  
“(1) All workers should have the right to protection of their claims in the event of the insolvency 
of their employer, as set out in the European Social Charter.” 
“(3a) The Member States should examine the possibility of devising mechanisms to prevent 
excessive or abusive recourse by employees to experts at the expense of an undertaking, since 
such recourse would ultimately have a negative impact on the financial situation of the 
undertaking.” 
“(3c) Special treatment should be accorded to retired workers whose pensions depend, entirely 
or in part, on company pension plans, and who might be harmed by early restructuring” 
Interestingly, when amending Recital 35 – rights of workers where a restructuring plan entails a transfer 
of part of undertaking or business – the Committee advocated for specific account to be taken of “the 
rulings handed down by the Court of Justice, as Advocate-General Mengozzi recently pointed out in his 
conclusions in Case C126/16” i.e. the Estro case. 
The Committee proposed amending article 3 to include “workers and their representatives” in the parties 
that should have access to early warning tools and argued for the inclusion of two new paragraphs within 
that article, which would guarantee access to information for employees’ representatives and the ability 
of employees to communicate concerns.25 Article 8(1), which governs the content of restructuring plans, 
was amended by the Committee to mandate the inclusion of the impact of the restructuring plan on all 
types of pensions of retired and current workers, on the working conditions and remuneration of workers 
and on subsidiaries and subcontractors. The insertion of a new article, 8(1a) was also proposed, which 
sought to consider employees a preferential class: 
“Workers’ claims or other rights shall not be affected by restructuring plans and the workers 
class shall take priority. Exceptionally, contractual conditions may be renegotiated in early 
 
21 The Bundesrat is the legislative forum comprised of the 16 Federal States. 
22 “Small and medium enterprises, especially when facing financial difficulties, as well as workers representatives, often do not have the 
resources to hire professional advice, therefore early warning tools should be put in place to alert debtors to the urgency to act.”  
23 “The earlier the debtors or the workers’ representatives can communicate concerns about an undertaking’s worrying situation or 
financial difficulties and can take appropriate action, the higher the probability of avoiding an impending insolvency or, in case of a business 
whose viability is permanently impaired, the more orderly and efficient the winding-up process. Clear information on the available 
preventive restructuring procedures as well as early warning tools should therefore be put in place to incentivise debtors who start 
to experience financial problems to take early action and to empower the workers concerned so that they are able to take an active role 
in the restructuring process.”  
24 “In the restructuring process the rights of all parties involved should be protected, including those of workers.” 
25 Art 3(2a); “Member States shall ensure that employees’ representatives have full access to information and are consulted if action needs to 
be taken” and art 3(3a):  
“Member States shall ensure that workers’ representatives are able to communicate concerns to debtors and entrepreneurs about  the 
difficulties the undertaking is in and the urgent nature of those difficulties; Member States shall ensure that workers’ representatives are 
in a position to have recourse to an independent expert of their choice in accordance with national law and practices, giving an access to 
relevant, up-to-date, clear, concise and user-friendly information regarding the financial situation of the business and the different 
restructuring strategies being envisaged, including transfer to worker ownership; Member States shall also ensure that the tax, social 
security, competition and audit authorities are able under national law to be able to flag any worrying financial developments as soon as 
possible.” 
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restructuring processes at company level between the management and the workers’ 
representatives if this serves the normal continuation of business activity and maintenance of 
jobs.”26 
 ECON – Article 7 
Amendments 57 – 61 of the report from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee pertained to 
article 7 of the Commission proposal27; the Committee attempted to rewrite article 7(2)28 to confine “all 
creditors” to those “involved in the negotiation of the restructuring plan” and to add “with the exception 
of workers, in accordance with article 6(3)” to the end of the article. Similar to the proposed amendment 
to article 6(9), ECON attempted to strengthen the position of creditors in article 7(3)29 and 7(4) by 
inserting the condition of not causing “severe financial difficulties to creditors”30 to (i) the stay, or 
suspension of the opening of insolvency proceedings and (ii) the prevention of the modification 
(including withholding performance, termination or acceleration) by creditors of executory contracts.31 
The Committee attempted to soften the requirement on Member States to prevent creditors from 
modifying executory contracts via a contractual clause32 by changing the wording form “shall ensure” 
to “may require”. None of the changes proposed by ECON were adopted in the final text, thus the 
protection afforded to creditors remained largely as it was before.  
The Report proposed only one change to article 17, the replacement of the word “may” with “shall” in 
article 17(3);  
“Member States shall require the transactions referred to in point (e) of paragraph 2 to be 
approved by a practitioner in the field of restructuring or by a judicial or administrative authority 
in order to benefit from the protection referred to in paragraph 1.”33 
Point (e) was removed from the final text, thus the amendment was rendered moot. 
Similar to EMPL, ECON proposed no amendments to article 11, but did propose five to article 9. 
Generally speaking, these amendments attempted to strengthen to position of workers and vulnerable 
creditors.34 The Report proposed specifying “workers” in the types of creditors who should have a right 
to vote on a restructuring plan and added that creditors should have “full knowledge of the 
consequences” of the restructuring plan.35 ECON also amended article 9(2) to provide that Member 
States “shall” provide that workers are treated in a class of their own, as opposed to that they “may” do 
so, as per the original proposal and inserted a reference to “specific rules supporting separate class 
formation for vulnerable creditors, such as small suppliers and micro and small enterprises” at the end.36 
Few of the amendments proposed were accepted in the final text, however, given that article 9(4) 
 
26 The amended art 9(2) also refers to employees as preferential creditors.  
27 Amendment 61 was to the original art 7(6), which was subsequently from the final text, so just Amendments 57 - 60 will be considered 
28 Pertains to the prevention of the opening of insolvency proceedings during the stay by creditors.  
29 The derogation from art 7(1); “Where the obligation of the debtor to file for insolvency under national law arises during the period of the 
stay of individual enforcement actions, that obligation shall be suspended for the duration of the stay” 
30 ECON Report 35: 
“Member States may derogate from paragraph 1 where the debtor becomes illiquid and therefore unable to pay his debts as they fall due 
during the stay period. In that event, a judicial or administrative authority shall have the power to defer the opening of the insolvency 
procedure and to keep in place the benefit of the stay of individual enforcement actions, on condition that it does not cause severe financial 
difficulties to creditors, in order to examine the prospects for achieving an agreement on a successful restructuring plan or an economically 
viable business transfer, within the period of the stay.” 
31 The Committee further amended art 7(4) to include “any supplies where a suspension of deliveries would lead to the company’s activities 
coming to a standstill” as the definition or meaning of an executory contract.  
32 “…that creditors may not withhold performance or terminate, accelerate or in any other way modify executory contracts to the detriment of 
the debtor by virtue of a contractual clause providing for such measures, solely by reason of the debtor's entry into restructuring negotiations, 
a requested for a stay of individual enforcement actions, the ordering of the stay as such or any similar event connected to the stay.” 
33 ECON Report p. 44. For clarity, “point (e)” is one of the “[t]ransactions enjoying the protection referred to in paragraph 1” per art 17(2); 
“transactions such as new credit, financial contributions or partial asset transfers outside the ordinary course of business made in contemplation 
of and closely connected with negotiations for a restructuring plan”. 
34 For example, ECON added the following to att 9(6); “Member States shall guarantee that in the case of lack of collaboration of other 
creditors, the workers’ restructuring plan may be presented to the competent administration or court and adopted without the consent of non-
cooperative creditors.” 
35 ECON Report, 39. 
36 ECON Report, 39. 
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requires now Member States to put appropriate measures in place “to ensure that class formation is done 
with a particular view to protecting vulnerable creditors such as small suppliers”, it appears that the 
Committee may have had success on that particular point.37 
 Committee of the Regions 
In October 2017, the Committee of the Regions expressed its opinion on the proposal and drafted seven 
amendments to the proposed directive. Generally speaking, these amendments pertained to the rights of 
workers or their involvement in the insolvency process. The COR also made a number of policy 
recommendations, many of which were quite general in nature such as “creating new opportunities” i.e. 
facilitating start-ups and “access to finance” for start-ups. The COR did, however, express specific 
concern about what it considered to be the “current inability to harmonise Member States’ legal systems 
relating to insolvency proceedings; it was the view of the Committee that the directive would not “make 
a meaningful contribution to increasing the number of start-ups remaining on the market for longer than 
two to three years”.38
 
37 Art 9(4); Member States shall put in place appropriate measures to ensure that class formation is done with a particular view to protecting 
vulnerable creditors such as small suppliers.  
38 Opinion COR – 12/10/2017 – 342/47 
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11. Annex 2: Mapping the Preventive Restructuring Frameworks and the 
EU Directive for the JCOERE Project  
Jurisdiction Questionnaire 
11.1 Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to contribute to our report mapping the Preventive Restructuring Processes and 
the new EU Directive1  as part of the JCOERE Project.  
The JCOERE Project (Judicial Co-Operation supporting Economic Recovery in Europe), (Project 
Number 800807) funded by the EU Justice Programme (2014-2020), will identify obstacles to judicial 
co-operation presented by both existing domestic restructuring frameworks and the implementation of 
the Directive. JCOERE is focused on the strengthened co-operation and communication obligations 
imposed on the courts in the Recast Insolvency Regulation,2 specifically in the context of preventive 
restructuring processes.  
The Project will explore substantive and procedural rules arising in the context of preventive 
restructuring, which we consider may present obstacles to co-operation. It will focus on specific 
substantive rules arising in a typical restructuring process, such as the commencement of secondary 
proceedings to protect a creditor’s interests in the face of the ‘cram-down’ provisions.  The question of 
whether it is reasonable for a court in the second state to decline jurisdiction becomes more immediate 
in such circumstances. In addition, the project will explore the challenges that procedural rules might 
present to co-operation. In short, our hypothesis is that the obligations imposed on courts to cooperate 
may be challenged in the context of radical restructuring processes.   
A key element of the first JCOERE Project Report is to map existing restructuring processes and the 
Directive, focussing on specific provisions in several EU Member States. Firstly, it will include those 
partnered on the JCOERE Project: Ireland (University College Cork), Italy (Università degli Studi di 
Firenze), and Romania (Universitatea Titu Maiorescu).3 Secondly, contributors from several other 
Member States have agreed to take part: Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, France, and the United 
Kingdom (for comparative purposes). Other jurisdictions may be added if contributors are identified 
and available to participate. 
The purpose of this mapping exercise is to firstly determine what preventive restructuring frameworks 
are already present in the contributing jurisdictions and how they relate to the terms of the Directive. 
Secondly, the mapping exercise will determine existing rules in member states, in addition to those in 
the Directive regarding key areas of interest for the project. These include the stay/moratorium; cram-
down provisions; the protection of rescue financing; and rights in rem. Additional issues which seem to 
have emerged as being important during the discussions on the Directive are rights accorded particularly 
 
1 We refer to the current iteration published on 28 March 2019 of  P8-T-Prov(2019)0321 Increasing the Efficiency of Restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures: European Parliament legislative resolution 28 March 2019 on the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency, and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU (COM(2016)0723 – C8-0475/2016 – 2016.0359(COD)) (Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure – First Reading) (the ‘Directive’).  
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) (the ‘Recast 
Regulation’), Article 42-44 and Articles 57-59 (see Appendix B).  
3 INSOL Europe is also partnered on the JCOERE Project but represents a network of the jurisdictions that will be contributing.  
The Arrow indicates for you to type your answer in the adjacent space.  
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to employees and court or judicial approval processes. In addition, the Questionnaire will focus on a 
number of emerging procedural issues which also may present obstacles to co-operation. 
The following questions are intended to assist you in focusing on the particular areas of interest that are 
key to the JCOERE Project. Please provide references in footnotes to your jurisdiction’s legislation or 
professional rules, where relevant, as well as any other texts or information referred to when providing 
your report. This will assist us in further research during the project.  
If there are questions that are irrelevant to your jurisdiction, please answer with “not applicable”.  
Appendix A contains the full text of each of the relevant Articles drawn from the iteration of the 
Directive published on 28 March 2019. Appendix B includes the relevant Articles from the Recast 
Regulation 848/2015. 
Please complete your report directly in the table of questions below but limit your responses to 500 
words for each question and/or sub-question (excluding footnotes). Please submit your answers to 
Jennifer Gant at jennifer.gant@ucc.ie by 15st June 2019.  
 
  
 171 
 
11.2  The Questionnaire 
 
Part 1: General Context of Preventive Restructuring 
 
The Preventive Restructuring Directive in its current iteration as of 28th March 2019 gives 
EU Member States a suggested framework and options for approaching the development and 
improvement of preventive restructuring procedures aimed at creating a more effective 
European rescue culture and improving the prospects of economic recovery at an earlier 
stage in the life cycle of companies. The Directive states in Article 4(1) that:  
 
“Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, debtors 
have access to a preventive restructuring framework that enables them to restructure, 
with a view to preventing insolvency and ensuring their viability, without prejudice to 
other solutions for avoiding insolvency, thereby protecting jobs and maintaining 
business activity.” 
 
The first part of this questionnaire aims to investigate your jurisdiction’s current preventive 
restructuring frameworks, practices, and underpinning principles in light of the Directive. 
Please consider Article 4(1) set out above as you discuss the current provisions in place in 
your jurisdiction and whether they comply fully with this Article. The complete Article 4 is 
set out in Appendix A.  
 
1 Please specify existing legislative frameworks (if any) in your jurisdiction that 
provide for the preventive restructuring of companies, specifying the relevant 
legislation, legislative provisions, and/or rules that regulate the framework along 
with the date of implementation.  
 
(Please note that there will be specific questions in Part II and Part III in relation to 
specific substantive and procedural rules so there is no need for a high level of detail 
on these specific aspects here in Part I).  
 
  
 
2 What are the stated functions and aims of your jurisdictions’ preventive restructuring 
frameworks? Please refer to legislative policy documents or from your jurisdiction 
where relevant, statements in the legislation or statements by courts in applying the 
legislation (e.g. the Cork Report in the UK).4 
 
  
 
  
 
4 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558. 
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Part II: Specific Substantive Aspects of Preventive Restructuring in Domestic 
Processes and in the Directive 
 
The JCOERE project focuses on a selection of provisions found in restructuring processes 
by type. The following questions are directed at these provisions (Articles 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 
and 17). 
 
 
Introduction to Part II 
 
The provisions typically found in most effective restructuring processes and which are also 
present in the Directive include first that the debtor remains in possession; second, that 
individual enforcement actions are stayed in order to provide the debtor with “breathing 
space; third the adoption of restructuring plans (cram-down) and cross-class cram-down; and 
the protection of new and interim financing.  
 
The full text of each Directive Article is set out in the Appendix A for your ease of reference.   
 
The following questions are based on the assumption that your jurisdiction has preventive 
restructuring frameworks. If this is not the case, please write “not applicable” as your answer. 
 
3 Article 6: Stay of Individual Enforcement Actions 
 
3.1  Article 6 of the Directive states that:  
 
“Member States shall ensure that debtors may benefit from a stay of individual 
enforcement to support the negotiations of a restructuring plan in a preventive 
restructuring framework.”  
 
 
 c) Does your jurisdiction provide for a stay of individual enforcement actions in 
existing preventive restructuring proceedings? Please specify relevant 
legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of your jurisdiction’s 
stay or moratorium and how it compares with the terms of Article 6(1-8) of 
the Directive. 
 
  
 
 d) Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 6 of the 
Directive? If so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your 
provisions considering the enactment of Article 6(1-8) of the Directive. 
 
  
 
3.2 Article 6(9) sets out a mandatory provision allowing for the removal of the stay by a 
judicial or administrative authority under certain conditions. 
 
 c. If your jurisdiction provides for a stay, does it also provide for its removal by 
judicial or administrative authorities and under what conditions are 
authorities empowered to remove it?  
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 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 6(9) and 
if so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment of Article 6(9).  
 
  
 
4 Article 9: Adoption of Restructuring Plans 
 
Article 9(1) provides for the adoption of restructuring plans:  
 
“Member States shall ensure that, irrespective of who applies for a preventive 
restructuring procedure in accordance with Article 4, debtors have the right to 
submit restructuring plans for adoption by the affected parties.” 
 
The full Article sets out conditions under which such plans should be adopted, 
including the creditors’ right to vote on the adoption of restructuring plans, the 
creation of creditor classes for voting purposes, and an intra-class cram-down.  
 
4.1 Article 9(2) requires that Member States to “ensure that affected parties have a right 
to vote on the adoption of a restructuring plan”, allowing for certain exclusions from 
this rule in 9(3).  
 
 c. Does your jurisdiction provide voting rights to affected parties of a 
restructuring plan and what, if any, exclusions are permitted? Please specify 
and describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they 
compare with the terms of the Directive. 
 
 
 
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(2-3) 
and if so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment of Article 9(2-3).   
 
 
 
 
4.2 Article 9(4) requires that Member States treat affected parties in separate classes, 
“which reflect sufficient commonality of interest based on verifiable criteria, in 
accordance with national law.” 
 
 d. Does your jurisdiction provide for the separation into classes of those parties 
affected by a restructuring plan?  
e. What classes does your jurisdiction recognise?  
Please specify and describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules and 
how they compare with the terms of the Directive. 
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 f. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(4) and 
if so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment of Article 9(4).   
 
  
 
4.3 Article 9(5) allows for judicial or administrative examination of voting rights and the 
creation of classes when a request for confirmation of a plan is submitted and, further, 
allows Member States to “require a judicial or administrative authority to examine 
and confirm the voting rights and formation of classes at an earlier stage…” 
 
 c. Does your jurisdiction provide for the examination, confirmation, approval 
or otherwise of the voting rights and separation into classes of affected parties 
for the purpose of approving a restructuring plan? Please specify and describe 
the relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they compare with the 
terms of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9(5) and 
if so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment of Article 9(5).   
 
  
 
4.4 Article 9(6) includes a compulsory intra-class cram-down element:  
 
“A restructuring plan shall be adopted by affected parties, provided that a 
majority in the amount of their claims or interests is obtained in each class. 
Member States may, in addition, require that a majority in the number of 
affected parties is obtained in each class.” 
 
The optional provisions are that member states may provide that a majority in number 
in each class must also agree. In addition, the majority can be set down by member 
states but cannot be higher than 75%. Article 9(7) provides that formal votes can be 
replaced by an agreement with the requisite majority. 
 
 c. Does your jurisdiction have intra class cram down provisions in existing 
preventive restructuring proceedings? Please specify relevant legislative 
provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they 
compare with the terms of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 9 of the 
Directive? If so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your 
provisions considering the enactment of the Article 9(4). 
 
  
 
5 Article 10: Confirmation of Restructuring Plans 
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5.1 a. Article 10(1) provides that: 
b.  
c. “Member States shall ensure that at least the following restructuring plans 
are binding on the parties only if they are confirmed by a judicial or 
administrative authority:  
d.  
(a) restructuring plans which affect the claims or interests of dissenting 
affected parties; (b) restructuring plans which provide for new financing; (c) 
restructuring plans which involve the loss of more than 25% of the workforce, 
if such loss is permitted under national law.” 
 
 c. Does your jurisdiction provide conditions under which restructuring plans 
must be approved by administrative or judicial authorities? Please specify and 
describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they compare 
with the terms of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 10(1) of 
the Directive? If so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your 
provisions considering the enactment of the Article 10(1). 
 
  
 
5.2 Article 10(2)(a-e) provides for a number of conditions under which a restructuring 
plan can be confirmed by judicial or administrative authorities (see Appendix A), 
while 10(3) requires Member States to ensure that administrative authorities can 
refuse to confirm a plan where the plan “would not have a reasonable prospect of 
preventing the insolvency of the debtor or ensuring the viability of the business.” 
 
 c. Are there conditions specified for judicial or administrative confirmation and 
are such authorities also empowered to refuse to confirm a plan? Please 
specify and describe the relevant legislative provisions or rules and how they 
compare with the terms of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the Directive? If 
so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment Article 10 of the Directive provisions in this 
context.  
 
  
 
6 Article 11: Cross-class Cram-down 
 
6.1 Article 11(1)(a-b) provides for the application of a cross-class cram-down in the 
adoption of restructuring plans:  
 
 176 
 
“Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by 
affected parties as provided for in Article 9(4) in every voting class, may be 
confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority upon the proposal of a 
debtor or with the debtor's agreement, and become binding upon dissenting 
voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils” certain conditions Articles 
10(2) and (3). 
 
 c. What is the current position regarding a cross-class cram-down for the 
approval of restructuring plans in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant 
legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and 
how they compare with the terms of the Directive, specifically Art 11(1)(a-
b). 
 
 
 
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the Directive? If 
so please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions in light 
of the enactment of Article 11(1)(a-b) of the Directive. 
 
  
 
6.2 Article 11 offers options for dealing with affected and dissenting classes of creditors 
in a cross-class cram-down. Under Art 11(1)(c), one of the conditions for approval 
by a judicial or administrative authority of a cross-class cram-down is if the plan: 
 
“…ensures that dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at 
least as favourably as any other class of the same rank and more favourably 
than any junior class.”  
 
A derogation from this condition is also offered in 11(2):  
 
“By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 1, Member States may 
provide that the claims of affected creditors in a dissenting voting class are 
satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means where a more junior class is to 
receive any payment or keep any interest under the restructuring plan.” 
 
 c. If your jurisdiction provides for a cross-clam down, how does it treat 
dissenting classes of creditors? Please specify relevant legislative provisions 
or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they compare 
with the terms of the Directive, in particular 11(1)(c) and 11(2). 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the treatment of 
classes of creditors in the cross-class cram-down? If so, please describe any 
currently suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of 
Article 11(1)(c) and 11(2) of the Directive. 
 
  
 
6.3 Article 11 goes on to provide the following regarding an ‘unfair prejudice’ test.  
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“Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first 
subparagraph where they are necessary in order to achieve the aims of the 
restructuring plan and where the restructuring plan does not unfairly prejudice 
the rights or interests of any affected parties.” 
 
  
 
 
 
 c. Is your jurisdiction likely to avail of this ‘unfair prejudice’ test derogation? If 
so, please describe any currently suggested changes to your provisions 
considering the enactment of Article 11 of the Directive. 
 
  
 
7 Article 13: Workers 
 
Article 13 provides for the protection of workers in the context of preventive 
restructuring, stating that “Members States shall ensure that individual and collective 
workers’ rights, under Union and national labour law…are not affected by the 
preventive restructuring framework.” 
 
 a. What is the current position regarding workers in the context of preventive 
restructuring in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant legislative 
provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and how they 
compare with the terms of Article 13 of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 b. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the treatment of 
workers in the context of preventive restructuring? If so, please describe any 
currently suggested changes to your provisions in light of the enactment of 
Article 13 of the Directive. 
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8 Article 17: Protection for New Financing and Interim Financing  
 
Article 17 provides that “Member States shall ensure that new financing and interim 
financing are adequately protected.” This includes protecting it from claims that it is 
detrimental to the general body of creditors, but also includes an option to provide a 
“super-priority” in 17(4).  
 
 c. What is the current position regarding new and interim financing for the 
approval of restructuring plans in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant 
legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and 
how they compare with the terms of Article 17 of the Directive 
 
  
 
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with Article 17 in the 
context of preventive restructuring? If so, please describe any currently 
suggested changes to your provisions considering the enactment of Article 17 
of the Directive. 
 
  
 
 Part III: Specific Procedural Aspects of Preventive Restructuring in Domestic 
Processes and in the Directive 
 
9 Article 5: Debtor in Possession 
 
 Article 5 includes an option for the involvement of an insolvency practitioner in 
relation to preventive restructuring processes. 
 
 c. What is the current position regarding insolvency practitioners in 
restructuring processes in your jurisdiction? Please specify relevant 
legislative provisions or rules and describe the terms of these provisions and 
how they compare with the terms of Article 5 of the Directive. 
  
  
 d. Will your jurisdiction have to make changes to comply with the requirements 
regarding the involvement of insolvency practitioners in relation to 
preventive restructuring processes?   
 
  
10 Rights in Rem  
 
10.1 How are rights in rem defined in your jurisdiction? Please describe a type of right in 
rem which arises in insolvency proceedings. 
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10.2 Given the interaction of Article 8 of the Recast Insolvency Regulation (see Annex B) 
on the protection of rights in rem and Article 11 of the Preventive Restructuring 
Directive allowing for a cross-class cram-down, there is a potential conflict between 
the protection of rights in rem and the application of a cross-border cross-class cram-
down.  
 
Consider Article 8 in Annex B and Article 11 in Annex A and indicate whether or 
not this conflict is present in your jurisdiction. Please provide examples, reference to 
policy, principles, and legislative texts where relevant.  
 
  
 
11 The Role of Judicial or Administrative Authorities. 
 
 Many of the Articles in the Directive refer to judicial or administrative authorities 
exercising power or authority in various ways. However, there can be a significant 
difference in the characteristics of judicial and administrative authorities, whether 
within a single jurisdiction or in a cross-border situation.  
 
What authority is empowered to confirm, approve, or examine plans and other 
aspects of preventive restructuring frameworks, such as those referred to in the 
questions in Part II above? From whence is their authoritative competence derived?  
 
If an administrative authority is involved are these subject to procedural rules which 
are similar to procedural rules to which courts are subject? 
  
  
 
12 In your jurisdiction, are there specific constitutional parameters present that delimit 
the freedom of judicial communication generally? For example, a constitutional 
provision that requires that justice is administered in public? 
 
  
13 In your jurisdiction, are there examples of judicial cooperation in case law, focusing 
on the issues set out in Part II of this questionnaire. 
 
  
14 In your jurisdiction, what are the training and competency requirements for 
insolvency judges? 
 
  
  
 180 
 
15 If you have any further comments to provide in relation to the research being 
conducted on this project, including any other potential contributors from 
jurisdictions not listed in the introduction above, please do so below.  
 
 
  
 
 
Please accept the JCOERE Team’s sincere thanks for the time and effort you have put into this 
questionnaire. We will keep you updated as to our progress. If you encounter any issues of 
clarity or require more time to complete your report, please contact Dr Jennifer L. L. Gant at 
jennifer.gant@ucc.ie.  
JCOERE Team 
Additional Questions following Initial Responses 
AQ1 Given that our project focuses on the judiciary and that we have noted in our ongoing 
research that Member States place different relative value on national court 
judgements, we would like to know what weight or value is placed on the decisions 
made by courts in terms of their persuasiveness in subsequent cases and any influence 
on how the law develops in relation to judicial influence, if at all. It would be helpful 
if you could give examples of your national courts’ treatment of previous judgements 
in practice if possible. 
 
 As a common law system, Ireland relies on the principle of stare decisis, which 
required lower courts to follow the decisions made by higher courts. Judges also have 
a broader interpretative role than their civil law counterparts, which gives them a 
pseudo-legislative function at times when their decisions fill in ambiguities and gaps 
left by the legislator.  
 
AQ2 How does your jurisdiction define the “threshold for insolvency”, for example, is it 
when a company is unable to pay its debts, when liabilities exceed assets, or 
something else? How does this threshold then relate to your restructuring framework 
as described in your response to our questionnaire? 
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Appendix A: Preventive Restructuring Framework Directive 
Articles Relevant to the Questionnaire 
Article 4:  
Availability of preventive restructuring frameworks  
1. Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, debtors have access to a 
preventive restructuring framework that enables them to restructure, with a view to preventing 
insolvency and ensuring their viability, without prejudice to other solutions for avoiding insolvency, 
thereby protecting jobs and maintaining business activity. 
2. Member States may provide that debtors that have been sentenced for serious breaches of accounting 
or bookkeeping obligations under national law are allowed to access a preventive restructuring 
framework only after those debtors have taken adequate measures to remedy the issues that gave rise to 
the sentence, with a view to providing creditors with the necessary information to enable them to take a 
decision during restructuring negotiations. 
3. Member States may maintain or introduce a viability test under national law, provided that such a test 
has the purpose of excluding debtors that do not have a prospect of viability, and that it can be carried 
out without detriment to the debtors' assets. 
4. Member States may limit the number of times within a certain period a debtor can access a preventive 
restructuring framework as provided for under this Directive. 
5. The preventive restructuring framework provided for under this Directive may consist of one or more 
procedures, measures or provisions, some of which may take place out of court, without prejudice to 
any other restructuring frameworks under national law. 
Member States shall ensure that such restructuring framework affords debtors and affected parties the 
rights and safeguards provided for in this Title in a coherent manner. 
6. Member States may put in place provisions limiting the involvement of a judicial or administrative 
authority in a preventive restructuring framework to where it is necessary and proportionate while 
ensuring that rights of any affected parties and relevant stakeholders are safeguarded. 
7. Preventive restructuring frameworks provided for under this Directive shall be available on 
application by debtors. 
8. Member States may also provide that preventive restructuring frameworks provided for under this 
Directive are available at the request of creditors and employees’ representatives, subject to the 
agreement of the debtor. Member States may limit that requirement to obtain the debtor's agreement to 
cases where debtors are SMEs. 
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Article 5  
Debtor in possession 
1. Member States shall ensure that debtors accessing preventive restructuring procedures remain totally, 
or at least partially, in control of their assets and the day-to-day operation of their business. 
2. Where necessary, the appointment by a judicial or administrative authority of a practitioner in the 
field of restructuring shall be decided on a case-by-case basis, except in certain circumstances where 
Member States may require the mandatory appointment of such a practitioner in every case. 
3. Member States shall provide for the appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring, to assist 
the debtor and creditors in negotiating and drafting the plan, at least in the following cases: 
(a) where a general stay of individual enforcement actions, in accordance with Article 6(3), is 
granted by a judicial or administrative authority, and the judicial or administrative authority 
decides that such a practitioner is necessary to safeguard the interest of the parties; 
(b) where the restructuring plan needs to be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority 
by means of a cross-class cram-down, in accordance with Article 11; or 
(c) where it is requested by the debtor or by a majority of the creditors, provided that, in the latter 
case, the cost of the practitioner is borne by the creditors.  
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Article 6  
Stay of individual enforcement actions  
1. Member States shall ensure that debtors can benefit from a stay of individual enforcement actions to 
support the negotiations of a restructuring plan in a preventive restructuring framework. 
Member States may provide that judicial or administrative authorities can refuse to grant a stay of 
individual enforcement actions where such a stay is not necessary or where it would not achieve the 
objective set out in the first subparagraph. 
2. Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5, Member States shall ensure that a stay of individual 
enforcement actions can cover all types of claims, including secured claims and preferential claims. 
3. Member States may provide that a stay of individual enforcement actions can be general, 
covering all creditors, or can be limited, covering one or more individual creditors or categories of 
creditors. 
Where a stay is limited, the stay shall only apply to creditors that have been informed, in accordance 
with national law, of negotiations as referred to in paragraph 1 on the restructuring plan or of the 
stay. 
4. Member States may exclude certain claims or categories of claims from the scope of the stay of 
individual enforcement actions, in well-defined circumstances, where such an exclusion is duly 
justified and where: 
(a) enforcement is not likely to jeopardise the restructuring of the business; or 
(b) the stay would unfairly prejudice the creditors of those claims. 
5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to workers' claims. 
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may apply paragraph 2 to 
workers’ claims if, and to the extent that, Member States ensure that the payment of such claims is 
guaranteed in preventive restructuring frameworks at a similar level of protection. 
6. The initial duration of a stay of individual enforcement actions shall be limited to a maximum 
period of no more than four months. 
7. Notwithstanding paragraph 6, Member States may enable judicial or administrative authorities 
to extend the duration of a stay of individual enforcement actions or to grant a new stay of individual 
enforcement actions, at the request of the debtor, a creditor or, where applicable, a practitioner in 
the field of restructuring. Such extension or new stay of individual enforcement actions shall be 
granted only if well-defined circumstances show that such extension or new stay is duly justified, 
such as: 
(a) relevant progress has been made in the negotiations on the restructuring plan; 
(b) the continuation of the stay of individual enforcement actions does not unfairly prejudice 
the rights or interests of any affected parties; or 
(c) insolvency proceedings which could end in the liquidation of the debtor under national 
law have not yet been opened in respect of the debtor. 
8. The total duration of the stay of individual enforcement actions, including extensions and 
renewals, shall not exceed twelve months. 
Where Member States choose to implement this Directive by means of one or more procedures or 
measures which do not fulfil the conditions for notification under Annex A to Regulation (EU) 
2015/848, the total duration of the stay under such procedures shall be limited to no more than four 
months if the centre of main interests of the debtor has been transferred from another Member State 
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within a three-month period prior to the filing of a request for the opening of preventive 
restructuring proceedings. 
9. Member States shall ensure that judicial or administrative authorities can lift a stay of individual 
enforcement actions in the following cases: 
(a) the stay no longer fulfils the objective of supporting the negotiations on the restructuring 
plan, for example if it becomes apparent that a proportion of creditors which, under national 
law, could prevent the adoption of the restructuring plan do not support the continuation of 
the negotiations;  
(b) at the request of the debtor or the practitioner in the field of restructuring; 
(c) where so provided for in national law, if one or more creditors or one or more classes of 
creditors are, or would be, unfairly prejudiced by a stay of individual enforcement actions; 
or 
(d) where so provided for in national law, if the stay gives rise to the insolvency of a creditor. 
Member States may limit the power, under the first subparagraph, to lift the stay of individual 
enforcement actions to situations where creditors had not had the opportunity to be heard before 
the stay came into force or before an extension of the period was granted by a judicial or 
administrative authority. 
Member States may provide for a minimum period, that does not exceed the period referred to in 
paragraph 6, during which a stay of individual enforcement actions cannot be lifted. 
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Article 9  
Adoption of restructuring plans  
1. Member States shall ensure that, irrespective of who applies for a preventive restructuring 
procedure in accordance with Article 4, debtors have the right to submit restructuring plans for 
adoption by the affected parties. 
Member States may also provide that creditors and practitioners in the field of restructuring have 
the right to submit restructuring plans and provide for conditions under which they may do so. 
2. Member States shall ensure that affected parties have a right to vote on the adoption of a 
restructuring plan. 
Parties that are not affected by a restructuring plan shall not have voting rights in the adoption of 
that plan. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, Member States may exclude from the right to vote the following: 
(a) equity holders; 
(b) creditors whose claims rank below the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors in the 
normal ranking of liquidation priorities; or 
(c) any related party of the debtor or the debtor's business, with a conflict of interest under 
national law. 
4. Member States shall ensure that affected parties are treated in separate classes, which reflect 
sufficient commonality of interest based on verifiable criteria, in accordance with national law. As 
a minimum, creditors of secured and unsecured claims shall be treated in separate classes for the 
purposes of adopting a restructuring plan. 
Member States may also provide that workers' claims are treated in a separate class of their own. 
Member States may provide that debtors that are SMEs can opt not to treat affected parties in 
separate classes. 
Member States shall put in place appropriate measures to ensure that class formation is done with 
a particular view to protecting vulnerable creditors such as small suppliers. 
5. Voting rights and the formation of classes shall be examined by a judicial or administrative 
authority when a request for confirmation of the restructuring plan is submitted. 
Member States may require a judicial or administrative authority to examine and confirm the voting 
rights and formation of classes at an earlier stage than that referred to in the first subparagraph. 
6. A restructuring plan shall be adopted by affected parties, provided that a majority in the amount 
of their claims or interests is obtained in each class. Member States may, in addition, require that a 
majority in the number of affected parties is obtained in each class. 
Member States shall lay down the majorities required for the adoption of a restructuring plan. Those 
majorities shall not be higher than 75% of the amount of claims or interests in each class or, where 
applicable, of the number of affected parties in each class. 
7. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 to 6, Member States may provide that a formal vote on the 
adoption of a restructuring plan can be replaced by an agreement with the requisite majority. 
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Article 10  
Confirmation of restructuring plans  
1. Member States shall ensure that at least the following restructuring plans are binding on the parties 
only if they are confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority: 
(a) restructuring plans which affect the claims or interests of dissenting affected parties; 
(b) restructuring plans which provide for new financing; 
(c) restructuring plans which involve the loss of more than 25% of the workforce, if such loss is 
permitted under national law. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the conditions under which a restructuring plan can be confirmed by 
a judicial or administrative authority are clearly specified and include at least the following: 
(a) the restructuring plan has been adopted in accordance with Article 9; 
(b) creditors with sufficient commonality of interest in the same class are treated equally, and in 
a manner proportionate to their claim; 
(c) notification of the restructuring plan has been given in accordance with national law to all 
affected parties; 
(d) where there are dissenting creditors, the restructuring plan satisfies the best-interest-of-
creditors test; 
(e) where applicable, any new financing is necessary to implement the restructuring plan and does 
not unfairly prejudice the interests of creditors. 
Compliance with point (d) of the first subparagraph shall be examined by a judicial or administrative 
authority only if the restructuring plan is challenged on that ground. 
3. Member States shall ensure that judicial or administrative authorities are able to refuse to confirm a 
restructuring plan where that plan would not have a reasonable prospect of preventing the insolvency of 
the debtor or ensuring the viability of the business. 
4. Member States shall ensure that where a judicial or administrative authority is required to confirm a 
restructuring plan in order for it to become binding, the decision is taken in an efficient manner with a 
view to expeditious treatment of the matter. 
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Article 11  
Cross-class cram-down  
1. Member States shall ensure that a restructuring plan which is not approved by affected parties, 
as provided for in Article 9(6), in every voting class, may be confirmed by a judicial or 
administrative authority upon the proposal of a debtor or with the debtor's agreement, and become 
binding upon dissenting voting classes where the restructuring plan fulfils at least the following 
conditions: 
(a) it complies with Article 10(2) and (3); 
(b) it has been approved by: 
(i) a majority of the voting classes of affected parties, provided that at least one of those 
classes is a secured creditors class or is senior to the ordinary unsecured creditors class; 
or, failing that, 
(ii) at least one of the voting classes of affected parties or where so provided under 
national law, impaired parties, other than an equity-holders class or any other class 
which, upon a valuation of the debtor as a going-concern, would not receive any 
payment or keep any interest, or, where so provided under national law, which could 
be reasonably presumed not to receive any payment or keep any interest, if the normal 
ranking of liquidation priorities were applied under national law; 
(c) it ensures that dissenting voting classes of affected creditors are treated at least as 
favourably as any other class of the same rank and more favourably than any junior class; 
and 
(d) no class of affected parties can, under the restructuring plan, receive or keep more than 
the full amount of its claims or interests. 
By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, Member States may limit the requirement to 
obtain the debtor's agreement to cases where debtors are SMEs. 
Member States may increase the minimum number of classes of affected parties or, where so 
provided under national law, impaired parties, required to approve the plan as laid down in point 
(b)(ii) of the first subparagraph. 
2. By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 1, Member States may provide that the claims 
of affected creditors in a dissenting voting class are satisfied in full by the same or equivalent means 
where a more junior class is to receive any payment or keep any interest under the restructuring 
plan. 
Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first subparagraph where 
they are necessary in order to achieve the aims of the restructuring plan and where the restructuring 
plan does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties. 
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Article 13 
Workers 
1. Members States shall ensure that individual and collective workers’ rights, under Union and 
national labour law, such as the following, are not affected by the preventive restructuring 
framework: 
(a) the right to collective bargaining and industrial action; and 
(b) the right to information and consultation in accordance with Directive 2002/14/EC and 
Directive 2009/38/EC, in particular: 
(i) information to employees' representatives about the recent and probable 
development of the undertaking's or the establishment's activities and economic 
situation, enabling them to communicate to the debtor concerns about the situation of 
the business and as regards the need to consider restructuring mechanisms; 
(ii) information to employees' representatives about any preventive restructuring 
procedure which could have an impact on employment, such as on the ability of 
workers to recover their wages and any future payments, including occupational 
pensions; 
(iii) information to and consultation of employees' representatives about restructuring 
plans before they are submitted for adoption in accordance with Article 9, or for 
confirmation by a judicial or administrative authority in accordance with Article 10; 
(c) the rights guaranteed by Directives 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC and 2008/94/EC. 
2. Where the restructuring plan includes measures leading to changes in the work organisation or 
in contractual relations with workers, those measures shall be approved by those workers, if 
national law or collective agreements provide for such approval in such cases. 
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Article 17 
Protection for new financing and interim financing  
1. Member States shall ensure that new financing and interim financing are adequately protected. 
As a minimum, in the case of any subsequent insolvency of the debtor: 
(a) new financing and interim financing shall not be declared void, voidable or 
unenforceable; and 
(b) the grantors of such financing shall not incur civil, administrative or criminal liability, 
on the ground that such financing is detrimental to the general body of creditors, unless 
other additional grounds laid down by national law are present. 
2. Member States may provide that paragraph 1 shall only apply to new financing if the 
restructuring plan has been confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority, and to interim 
financing which has been subject to ex ante control. 
3. Member States may exclude from the application of paragraph 1 interim financing which is 
granted after the debtor has become unable to pay its debts as they fall due. 
4. Member States may provide that grantors of new or interim financing are entitled to receive 
payment with priority in the context of subsequent insolvency procedures in relation to other 
creditors that would otherwise have superior or equal claims. 
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Appendix B 
Excerpt from the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast) 
Article 8  
Third parties' rights in rem  
1.The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third parties 
in respect of tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable assets, both specific assets and collections 
of indefinite assets as a whole which change from time to time, belonging to the debtor which are 
situated within the territory of another Member State at the time of the opening of proceedings.  
2.The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in particular, mean:  
(a) the right to dispose of assets or have them disposed of and to obtain satisfaction from the 
proceeds of or income from those assets, in particular by virtue of a lien or a mortgage;  
(b) the exclusive right to have a claim met, in particular a right guaranteed by a lien in respect 
of the claim or by assignment of the claim by way of a guarantee;  
(c) the right to demand assets from, and/or to require restitution by, anyone having possession 
or use of them contrary to the wishes of the party so entitled;  
(d) a right in rem to the beneficial use of assets.  
3.The right, recorded in a public register and enforceable against third parties, based on which a right in 
rem within the meaning of paragraph 1 may be obtained shall be considered to be a right in rem.  
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Article 42  
Cooperation and communication between courts  
1.In order to facilitate the coordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings 
concerning the same debtor, a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is pending, 
or which has opened such proceedings, shall cooperate with any other court before which a request to 
open insolvency proceedings is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, to the extent that such 
cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings. For that purpose, 
the courts may, where appropriate, appoint an independent person or body acting on its instructions, 
provided that it is not incompatible with the rules applicable to them.  
2.In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, the courts, or any appointed person or body 
acting on their behalf, as referred to in paragraph 1, may communicate directly with, or request 
information or assistance directly from, each other provided that such communication respects the 
procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.  
3.The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers 
appropriate. It may, in particular, concern:  
(a) coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners;  
(b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court;  
(c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs;  
(d) coordination of the conduct of hearings;  
(e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary. 
Article 43  
Cooperation and communication between insolvency practitioners and courts  
1.In order to facilitate the coordination of main, territorial and secondary insolvency proceedings opened 
in respect of the same debtor:  
(a) an insolvency practitioner in main insolvency proceedings shall cooperate and 
communicate with any court before which a request to open secondary insolvency proceedings 
is pending or which has opened such proceedings;  
(b) an insolvency practitioner in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings shall 
cooperate and communicate with the court before which a request to open main insolvency 
proceedings is pending or which has opened such proceedings; and  
(c) an insolvency practitioner in territorial or secondary insolvency proceedings shall 
cooperate and communicate with the court before which a request to open other territorial or 
secondary insolvency proceedings is pending or which has opened such proceedings; to the 
extent that such cooperation and communication are not incompatible with the rules applicable 
to each of the proceedings and do not entail any conflict of interest.  
2.The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any appropriate means, such as 
those set out in Article 42(3). 
Article 44  
Costs of cooperation and communication  
The requirements laid down in Articles 42 and 43 shall not result in courts charging costs to each other 
for cooperation and communication. 
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Article 57  
Cooperation and communication between courts  
1.Where insolvency proceedings relate to two or more members of a group of companies, a court which 
has opened such proceedings shall cooperate with any other court before which a request to open 
proceedings concerning another member of the same group is pending or which has opened such 
proceedings to the extent that such cooperation is appropriate to facilitate the effective administration 
of the proceedings, is not incompatible with the rules applicable to them and does not entail any conflict 
of interest. For that purpose, the courts may, where appropriate, appoint an independent person or body 
to act on its instructions, provided that this is not incompatible with the rules applicable to them.  
2.In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, courts, or any appointed person or body acting 
on their behalf, as referred to in paragraph 1, may communicate directly with each other, or request 
information or assistance directly from each other, provided that such communication respects the 
procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.  
3.The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers 
appropriate. It may, in particular, concern:  
(a) coordination in the appointment of insolvency practitioners;  
(b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court;  
(c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the assets and affairs of the members 
of the group;  
(d) coordination of the conduct of hearings;  
(e) coordination in the approval of protocols where necessary. 
 
Article 58  
Cooperation and communication between insolvency practitioners and courts  
An insolvency practitioner appointed in insolvency proceedings concerning a member of a group of 
companies:  
(a) shall cooperate and communicate with any court before which a request for the opening of 
proceedings in respect of another member of the same group of companies is pending or which has 
opened such proceedings; and  
(b) may request information from that court concerning the proceedings regarding the other 
member of the group or request assistance concerning the proceedings in which he has been 
appointed; to the extent that such cooperation and communication are appropriate to facilitate the 
effective administration of the proceedings, do not entail any conflict of interest and are not 
incompatible with the rules applicable to them.  
 
Article 59  
Costs of cooperation and communication in proceedings concerning members of a group of 
companies  
The costs of the cooperation and communication provided for in Articles 56 to 60 incurred by an 
insolvency practitioner or a court shall be regarded as costs and expenses incurred in the respective 
proceedings.
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